Trade-offs hurt, compromises as well: How value-driven conflicts impact negotiation behaviors, outcomes, and subjective evaluations

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Author's note

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Abstract

Value conflicts have been shown to impair negotiation behavior and outcomes (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). Positions on values may be perceived as more incompatible than positions interests in utility-driven conflicts because incompatible values typically induce identity threat and a trade-off aversion. In two preregistered experiments ($N=176/310$), we test whether value-driven versus utility-driven conflicts impact behaviors, outcomes, and subjective evaluations even in a setting in which the motives behind the positions (values or utility) are structurally similarly compatible. We further tested whether the provision of information (compared to no provision) about the counterpart's motives would have opposite effects in value-driven and utility-driven conflicts. Our findings corroborate that a value motive leads to an increased aversion against trade-offs, to more compromise offers (Study 1 and 2), and to lower individual and joint outcomes (Study 2). Across multiple dimensions (i.e., instrumental outcome, process, relationship, and in Study 1, self), subjective evaluations were more negative in value-driven conflicts than in utility-driven conflicts. Contrary to our predictions, providing information about the counterpart's motives did not affect behaviors, outcomes, or subjective evaluations, possibly because it neither improved objective understanding of the other nor increased perceived discrepancy between counterparts. The results are discussed regarding theoretical implications for value-driven conflicts, and practical implications for information exchange as a facilitator in integrative negotiations.

Keywords: value conflict, integrative negotiation, subjective value, information exchange

Some of the most pressing societal conflicts involve core values: for example, humanitarian aid versus border security in disputes about refugees, personal freedom versus collective security in conflicts about state surveillance; or care for the environment versus economic success in conflicts about reducing CO₂ emissions. Such value-driven positions may seem incompatible which makes trading off concessions on those values feel like a moral failure. Previous research shows accordingly that people are less cooperative, less willing to make concessions, and more personally involved in negotiations that relate to their values than in standard negotiation settings that relate only to instrumental interests (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck, De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000; Harinck & Druckman, 2015; Harinck & Van Kleef, 2012; Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harinck, & Scheepers, 2012; Kouzakova, Harinck, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2013). Researchers have argued that basic values are deeply tied to who people feel they really are and that this identity is threatened whenever the counterpart pursues interests in conflict with their own values (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). Consequently, parties in value conflicts prefer suboptimal compromise solutions over integrative solutions because they do not require hurtful trade-offs (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014; Stöckli & Tanner, 2014). This implies that parties might evaluate a compromise subjectively as less hurtful than the integrative solution, even though the compromise is economically less efficient. Surprisingly, the current literature has not investigated subjective evaluations in value conflicts yet. However, we believe that these subjective evaluations are crucial for understanding parties' behaviors and outcomes in value conflicts (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006).

Despite the severe challenges that parties experience during value-driven negotiations, little is known about factors that facilitate integrative agreements in them (cf. Harinck & Druckman, 2015). The standard recommendation for conflicts of interests is to exchange

information about underlying interests and priorities in order to detect trade-off opportunities (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson, 1991; Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, & Gollwitzer, 2011). However, if the information conveys that different priorities are based on incompatible values, negotiators may interpret trade-offs as “selling out” their values, and even considering this poses a threat to their identity (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). Therefore, we seek to examine the differential effects of information exchange in value-driven compared to utility-driven conflicts and to show that the standard advice in conflicts of interest may backfire in value conflicts.

The present research contributes to a richer understanding of value conflicts in several ways. First, we expand the empirical fundament by conceptually replicating that people negotiate less effectively in conflicts about values in two preregistered experiments. Second, by developing a novel paradigm with values and interests of similar theoretical compatibility, we provide a more conservative test for the proposed effects than previous research. Third, our research provides unique insights into the subjective evaluations of value-driven negotiations with different objective outcomes. Fifth, we test whether the hands-on, standard advice to exchange information about underlying motives can backfire in value-driven conflicts.

Differences Between Value-driven and Utility-driven Conflicts

Harinck and Ellemers (2014) distinguish two types of conflicts: value conflicts and interest (or resource) conflicts. They argue that the issue of the former is identity whereas the issue of the latter is a scarce resource. As values are at the core of a person’s identity, value conflicts tend to be perceived as an identity threat. If the issue is identity, people feel threatened, have false consensus cognitions, strive for compromise, and reach suboptimal agreements or even impasses. If the issue is a resource, they feel challenged, have fixed pie cognitions, make trade-offs in the

negotiation, then reach win-win, win-lose, or compromise agreements (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). Indeed, there is evidence that parties in value conflicts show physiological markers of threat, avoid trade-offs and end up with lower objective outcomes, compared to interest conflicts (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000; Harinck & Druckman, 2015; Kouzakova et al., 2013). When evaluating hypothetical outcomes, people in value conflicts even *prefer* economically worse compromises over integrative options (Stöckli & Tanner, 2014). However, that they are willing to bear this cost of the compromise does not mean necessarily that they will be satisfied with it at the end; It might rather mean that they try to avoid the subjective cost of trading off on values for their self-view. Although this implies that subjective evaluations of different dimensions (e.g., the outcome, the self) are essential for the understanding of the detrimental effects in value conflicts, researchers have missed to examine them as an outcome in value conflicts. To address this gap is one aim of the present research.

Another aim is to expand evidence on negotiation behaviors and outcomes in value conflicts. In general, the existing evidence on this is well in line with Harinck and Ellermers' theoretical model and the proposition of identity threat as a central difference is very appealing. However, the concept of value and interest conflicts as two structurally distinct conflict types with different issues (identity or resources) may be misleading because both types usually are about conflicting interests regarding resources (and were operationalized this way in previous studies). The major difference between the two types instead seems to be the subjective perception whether the motives behind conflicting interests are values or utility. We will refer to the types as value-driven conflicts and utility-driven conflicts to emphasize this focus on the subjective perception of the conflict.

Incompatible and Compatible Values

From this perspective, the values driving the conflict of interest can even be compatible; their mere association with the issues will make the negotiation seem like a question of integrity. Previous research explicitly considered the compatibility and integrative potential of the parties' interests but has not ensured that the underlying motives (i.e. utility vs. values) are similarly compatible. In fact, the motives of the parties in the value conflict conditions seemed relatively incompatible despite the integrative potential of their interests: an opposite understanding of justice (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000), (reactance to) obligatory charity (Harinck & Druckman, 2015), or communal imperatives such as fairness or environmental concerns in contrast to self-concerns (Harinck & Van Kleef, 2012; Kouzakova et al., 2012, 2013; Stöckli & Tanner, 2014). In such scenarios, even if parties reach an agreement that has an acceptable payoff for each party, the underlying values may remain ideologically incompatible. In contrast, in the utility-driven interest conflicts, the parties, in fact, share the motive to maximize their individual outcome; Hence, the conflict is only on the level of resources, but not on the underlying motives (values or interests, respectively). Extensive research (e.g., Bilsky, Janik, & Schwartz, 2010; S. H. Schwartz, 1992) has mapped the relationships between core values in a circumplex fashion: Some values correlate positively and lie next to each other on the circle (e.g., valuing nature and valuing caring for other people). That is, people usually endorse both values. Other values are uncorrelated and lie on orthogonal sides of the circle (e.g., valuing nature and valuing traditional lifestyles), which means it is still possible to endorse both values. However, values on opposite sides of the circumplex correlate negatively (e.g., valuing nature and valuing personal achievement); Hence, endorsing one value contradicts endorsing the other value and behaviors associated with it to some extent (Shalom H. Schwartz et al., 2017). Consequently, a counterpart's underlying motive of

monetary achievement is more incompatible with the motive of environmental concerns (i.e., an opposed value), compared to an own motive of monetary achievement (i.e., an opposed interest Kouzakova et al., 2013). With respect to previous findings, one may argue that value conflicts elicited identity threat and led to lower joint outcomes just because they were, in fact, less integrative than the interest conflicts, especially on the level of the underlying motives.

Importantly, from a theoretical perspective, the mere salience of values as motives in a conflict could be enough to elicit identity threat as it puts negotiators under pressure to live up to their identity relevant values. If this were true, the detrimental effects of value-driven negotiation would apply not only to contexts where parties have incompatible values but to any negotiation where interests are subjectively linked to personal values. To address this, we examine negotiations specifically in the context of salient, but not incompatible values. If the findings of previous research can be conceptually replicated in such a conservative scenario, the barriers of value conflicts would apply to a much wider range of negotiations than we know so far.

Differential Effects of Information in Value-Driven and Utility-Driven Conflicts

The apparent inability of parties in value-driven conflicts to negotiate integrative agreements suggests that they require better strategies to find integrative potential. Building on evidence from interest conflicts (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson, 1991; Trötschel et al., 2011), the standard recommended strategy is to exchange information about underlying motives. Information exchange may decrease fixed-pie assumptions, help to uncover trade-off opportunities, and thus foster integrative agreements. However, we argue that while information exchange may be effective in utility-driven conflicts, it may be counterproductive in value-driven conflicts.

In theory, people in value-driven conflicts tend to have a false consensus bias about the other party's values, rather than a fixed-pie assumption. Previous research has—albeit inconsistently—shown that false consensus bias and the realization of unexpected value differences play a part in eliciting threat in value conflicts (Harinck et al., 2000). In general, realizing other people's discrepant perspective on identity-relevant dimensions can elicit identity threat in addition to the negative interdependence of a conflict (Sassenrath, Hodges, & Pfattheicher, 2016). This implies that increasing awareness of value differences, for example by explicitly exchanging information about it, may exacerbate the threat experience. Therefore, we believe that investigating the differential effects of negotiation strategies in value-driven and utility-driven conflicts can help to solve value-driven societal conflicts (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). Since information exchange appears to be the standard advice in utility-driven conflicts, we seek to examine its effects in value-driven conflicts as well.

The Present Research

In the present research, we aim to test the effects of motives (i.e., a basic value compared to utility) on negotiation behaviors (i.e., compromising, resisting to concede, making trade-offs), joint outcomes, and subjective evaluation of the negotiation. We hypothesize that value motives will detrimentally affect behaviors (i.e., decreases concession making, reduces systematic trade-offs, and triggers compromising), and outcomes in an integrative negotiation setting. We also predicted that value motives will decrease parties' subjective evaluation of the negotiation outcome, the self, the process, and relationship (Curhan et al., 2006). We further postulated differential effects elicited by the provision of information about the counterpart's motives: Whereas the provision of information is predicted to have a facilitating effect in utility-driven conflicts, we expect it to have a detrimental effect in value-driven conflicts.

Across two pilot studies ($N = 171/94$), we developed and tested a negotiation paradigm in which motives could be manipulated effectively. In this paradigm, participants negotiated the location of future hotels. The interests of the parties were constant across conditions: one party preferred central and the other remote locations. However, in the utility-driven condition, the respective interest was based on different customer preferences (nightlife/seclusion). In the value-driven condition, the interests were based on a value codex (environmental sustainability/protection of local tradition). The specific values were chosen based on their independence (e.g., S. H. Schwartz, 1992) in order to rule out the possibility that previously found effects are limited to conflicts with incompatible values. We tested our hypotheses in an online scenario study (Study 1) with a simulated counterpart and a dyadic, interactive negotiation study in the laboratory (Study 2).

Study 1: Value Motives Affect Offers and Subjective Evaluations

In Study 1, we investigate the effects of motive and provision of information on participants' offers over three rounds of negotiation with a simulated counterpart. The counterpart's offers were programmed in a way that facilitated integrative agreements. This constellation makes the test of the value motive effect even more conservative as the predicted aversion to making trade-offs is in contrast to the programmed behavior of the counterpart. We predict that even under these circumstances, participants' willingness to make concessions and trade-offs will be reduced. To simulate the recommendation to exchange information (e.g., Thompson, 1991), the participant's counterpart provided information about their respective motives in a message accompanying their first offer. Such information should facilitate integrative negotiation behaviors; However, we predict this to be limited to utility-driven conflicts.

Hypothesis 1: Resistance to concede

a) is increased if the motive is values rather than utility.

b) is reduced by provided information in the utility condition, but not reduced by provided information in the value condition.

Hypothesis 2: Trade-offs

a) are reduced if the motive is values rather than utility.

b) are increased if information is provided.

c) to be increased by provided information more or only in the utility condition, but not in the value condition.

In addition, participants' subjective evaluations of the agreements are examined. If integrative agreements are less desirable for value-driven compared to utility-driven negotiators (Stöckli & Tanner, 2014), then they should also be less satisfied when they actually reach integrative agreements, despite the high payoff of such agreements. In addition, if making trade-offs in value-driven conflicts poses a threat to identity, integrative agreements should lead to more negative feelings about the self (i.e., a reflection of identity threat) as they require trade-offs.

Hypothesis 3: Satisfaction with the outcome is reduced if the motive is a value.

Hypothesis 4: Negative feelings about the self are increased if the motive is a value.

Previous research has also indicated that people falsely assume more similar positions with regard to values (i.e., false consensus bias) than instrumental interests and that realizing the difference is characteristic of value-driven negotiations (Harinck et al., 2000). We aim to test whether this replicates in our paradigm with theoretically compatible values. We further test

whether explicit information moderates this predicted effect. Such explicit information might make the differences in values more salient and thus increase disillusionment.

Hypothesis 5: Perceived discrepancy in positions is increased by provided information in the value condition, but reduced by provided information in utility condition, over the course of negotiation.

Besides these pre-registered hypotheses and additional pre-registered manipulation checks further dependent variables (compromises, satisfaction with the process and satisfaction with the relationship) were examined exploratively.¹ The original pre-registration, the complete study materials, and a detailed overview of the results are available on the open science framework.

Method

Participants and design

Participants were recruited via the platform Prolific.ac. Based on sample size estimates with G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) we aimed to collect a sample of 202 participants. Of the 386 participants who started the study, 218 passed the treatment check, after which the data collection was ended. However, 38 more had to be excluded from analyses due to unreasonable first offers, which indicated that they did not understand the task. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 180 participants ($M_{\text{age}} = 33.40$, $SD = 9.56$), 72 of them male, 106 female, and 2 of other or undisclosed gender. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in

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¹The order and numbering of hypotheses from the pre-registration form and the variable originally named logrolling (now trade-offs) have been changed to increase readability. Besides, one of the original hypotheses about the process effect of information, as well as assumptions about manipulation checks, are not listed here but fully reported under "Preliminary analyses of manipulation effects".

a 2 (motive: *value / utility*) by 2 (information: *provided / not provided*) between-subjects design. The negotiation role was kept constant, all participants were assigned to the same role as the Blue Travel Company and preferred central sites.

Procedure and Negotiation Task

After consenting to participate via Prolific, participants were redirected to the survey platform Unipark and read their role instructions including the manipulation of motive, a treatment check, and the pre-negotiation measure of perceived discrepancy. Specifically, participants took the role of a “strategic manager” of Blue Travel company, in which they were told to negotiate with the manager of another company, Orange Travel, about the location of future hotels in a fictional country. The task was to agree on four out of 12 possible locations with different characteristics. Participants started the negotiation by making their first offer (i.e., the four locations with the highest payoff) based on a table displaying payoff information about the locations by criterion (i.e., sustainability/nightlife, events, landscape) and with regard to the total individual payoff of each location. After the first offer, participants were asked to answer questions on their driving motives for the first offer, a first manipulation check. Then, they received their simulated counterparts independent first offer consisting of the four remote locations with the lowest payoff for the participant. The structure of the conflict was that each party preferred four (central vs. remote) locations with a very high payoff for themselves but low for the other, and there were four locations with a medium payoff for both parties (the compromise locations). The integrative pareto-optimal solution consisted of the two locations each party preferred most (joint payoff = 120), with much higher payoff than the four compromise locations (joint payoff = 78). The counterpart’s first offer was accompanied by the provision of information manipulation and was followed by a manipulation check of information, the second measure of perceived

discrepancy of positions, and further explorative items on integrative potential and surprise. Then two more rounds of negotiation followed. The negotiation ended either when the participants made the integrative offer (in the second or third round), or when they accepted the second (consisting of two remote and two compromise locations) or the third (integrative) offer of the counterparty, or with an impasse after the third round. After the negotiation, participants completed a final questionnaire including the subjective evaluations, the second motive manipulation check, a measure of accuracy of the estimation of the counterpart's payoffs, a few explorative items, and demographic questions (age, gender, educational degree, and nationality).

Experimental Manipulations

Motive. The motive was manipulated within the role description. In the value-driven condition, participants were told that their company followed a value codex for sustainable and eco-friendly travel, which meant they strive to use the existing infrastructure (i.e. preferred central locations). Secondly, they tried to offer cultural events, and thirdly, they wanted to show the beauty of the landscapes. In the utility-driven condition, participants were told that their target customer group was young and looking for entertainment in the nightlife of cities (i.e., preferred central locations); secondly, liked cultural events; and thirdly, wanted a beautiful landscape. To strengthen the identification with the roles and the motives, participants were further asked to indicate their agreement with five suggestive statements from their personal point of view, and from their role's point of view (e.g., "The irreparable exploitation of natural resources is a problem."/"It makes economic sense for companies to consider their customers' interests." in value/utility condition, respectively). For each perspective, they were also asked to count the number of agreements. At the end of the page, participants were asked how much they identified with the Blue Travel Company.

Provision of information. The manipulation of this factor was administered alongside the counterpart's first offer. In the *provided* condition, this offer was accompanied by a message by the counterpart sharing their respective motives and priorities (i.e., 1. protection of tradition/secluded places for customers; 2. beautiful landscape; 3. cultural events), whereas in the *not provided* condition no such message was provided.

Dependent variables

Manipulation checks of motive. The first manipulation check consisted of six items with 5-point Likert scales about the extent to which participant's first offer was driven by utility (three items, e.g. *My proposal is driven mainly by economic interests*, Cronbach's $\alpha = .74$) and values (three items, e.g., *My proposal is driven by what I believe is the "right thing to do"*, $\alpha = .59$). The second manipulation check of motive consisted of eight items about the extent participants experienced the negotiation as a value conflict (four items, e.g., *It is about core beliefs of what is important*, $\alpha = .77$) and/or a conflict of economic interests (four items, e.g., *It is about distributing economic advantages*, $\alpha = .68$), rated on 5-point Likert scales.

Manipulation check of information. The self-report manipulation check of the information manipulation consisted of four 5-point Likert-type items that participants answered after the counterparts first offer and the information manipulation (e.g., *I have a clear understanding of my counterpart's preferences*, $\alpha = .78$). In addition, we included a measure of objective accuracy of estimating other's payoff in the final questionnaire to test the prediction that information improves this accuracy. For this, participants were asked to estimate the payoff of each location for their counterpart on slider scales ranging from 0-30. Accuracy was computed by summing the absolute differences between estimations and actual payoff. Note that participants in neither condition were ever given this information directly. They only had the criterion fit of each

location and, in the info condition, the priorities of each criterion for the other party. Therefore, accuracy requires a high level of elaboration and good recall of the given information.

Negotiation behavior. The behavioral dependent measures were derived from the sequence of participants' offers. The measures of resistance to concede and compromise were based on the number of locations that changed between subsequent offers. Resistance to concede was operationalized as the 0-8 instances of persisting to suggest sites already in the first offer (with 0 meaning that none of the locations suggested in the first offer was suggested in later rounds and 8 meaning that the person stuck to their initial suggestion). Compromise refers to the 0-8 possible instances of suggesting compromise sites (8 would mean a person suggested all four compromise locations in the second as well as third offer). The other focal measure of negotiation behavior, trade-offs, was based on the payoff value of the sites: It consists of the ratio between gains of payoff for the other and losses of payoff for the self, across rounds of negotiation. By changing offers to the counterpart's benefit with as little cost in payoff as possible, the integrative potential can be realized. Thus, the higher this ratio, the more participants logrolled to make use of the integrative potential. If either gain for other or losses for the self were 0, trade-offs were coded 0.

Subjective evaluations. Subjective evaluations of the negotiation were measured an adapted version of the 16-item Subjective Value Inventory (Curhan et al., 2006). It consists of four dimensions addressing the instrumental outcome, negative feelings about the self, process, and relationship ($\alpha = .80/.83/.88/.94$). In addition, to measure perceived discrepancy of position, participants were asked before the negotiation and after the first offers were exchanged "...how far apart do you think your and your counterparty's positions, interests, or values are in this negotiation, all in all?" on a 9-point scale ranging from "very close/similar" to "very far apart". As a measure of the change in perceived discrepancy, the first measurement was subtracted from the

second. In addition to the dependent measures, we included some explorative items in the final questionnaire, which are reported in the supplemental material on osf.io.

Results

If not described differently, results refer to univariate 2(VR) x 2(info) ANOVAs. All p -values refer to two-tailed testing. Only effects significant at the 5% α -level or non-significant pre-registered effects will be reported here. Full analyses and descriptive statistics are reported in the file *Detailed Overview of Results* within the supplemental material.

Manipulation checks. As expected, participants in the value-driven condition experienced the conflict to be more about values, $F(1,175) = 25.957$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .129$, and less about instrumental interests, $F(1,175) = 10.776$, $p = .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .058$ than participants in the utility condition. We also found the expected main effect of provision of information on the manipulation check, $F(1,176) = 53.655$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .234$, indicating participants' subjectively better understanding of the other if information was provided, compared to not provided. There was also an unexpected main effect of motive, $F(1,176) = 8.659$, $p = .004$, $\eta_p^2 = .047$, indicating better subjective understanding in the utility-driven than the value-driven condition. However, there was no significant effect of provision of information on the objective accuracy of estimates of other's payoffs, $F(1,153) = 1.546$, $p = .216$, disconfirming the hypothesis that information improves the processing of the payoff structure.

Negotiation behavior. In contrast to hypotheses, there were no main effects of motive, $F(1,176) = 0.014$, $p = .905$, or info, $F(1,176) = 2.505$, $p = .115$, nor an interaction effect, $F(1,176) = 0.315$, $p = 0.575$, on resistance to concede. Participants in the value-driven condition were thus not more resistant to concede nor was this moderated by the provision of information. However, they made less trade-offs, as the predicted main effect of motive shows, $F(1,176) = 4.382$; $p =$

.038, $\eta_p^2 = .024$. The expected main effect of provision of information, $F(1,176) = 3.279, p = .072$, and the two-way interaction effect, $F(1,176) = 1.521, p = .219$, were not confirmed. Although Fig. 1 shows that the avoidance of trade-offs in the value-driven condition was more pronounced in the information condition, this trend is not strong enough to confirm the hypothesis that information exacerbates the value-relevance effect.

Exploratively, the effects of the manipulations on the number of suggested compromise locations were calculated. There was a main effect of motive, $F(1,176) = 5.076, p = .025, \eta_p^2 = .028$, showing higher compromise in the value-driven condition; but no effect of provision of information, $F(1,176) = 0.452, p = .502$, nor an interaction effect, $F(1,176) = 0.014, p = .906$. This indicates that the lower trade-offs in the value-driven condition may have been rooted in participants' concessions to compromises rather than their resistance to concede.

Figure 1. Mean trade-offs and standard deviations by experimental condition in Study 1

Subjective evaluations. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, the value motive significantly decreased the satisfaction with the instrumental outcome, in the complete sample, $F(1,175) = 11.513, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .062$, as well as among the 81 % of the sample who reached the pareto-optimal agreement, $F(1,141) = 18.195, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .097$, with no other main or interaction

effects, all F s < 1.380 , all p s $> .249$. In addition, the predicted higher negative feelings about the self in the value-driven condition, was also confirmed by the main effect of motive in the complete sample, $F(1,175) = 4.875$, $p = .029$, $\eta_p^2 = .027$, as well as among those with pareto-optimal agreement, $F(1,141) = 6.231$, $p = .014$, $\eta_p^2 = .042$, with no other main or interaction effects, all F s < 1.996 , all p s $> .160$. Similar main effects of motive, showing lower satisfaction with the negotiation in the value-driven condition, were found exploratively with regard to the process, $F(1,141) = 9.794$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .065$, and relationship, $F(1,141) = 13.530$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .088$ (in sample with pareto-optimal agreement, but significant in both).

Finally, the hypothesis that providing information would increase perceived discrepancy in the value-driven condition and reduce it in the utility-driven condition was not confirmed by an analysis of the post-pre-discrepancy difference: the two-way interaction effect was not significant, $F(1,153) = 1.948$, $p = .165$, nor were the main effects, $F(1,153) = 0.578/1.546$, $p = .448/.216$ for motive/provision of information, respectively.

Discussion

The results of Study 1 are in line with previous findings on the detrimental effects of value motives. As predicted, participants in negotiations about value-related issues made lower trade-offs. Their ineffective negotiation behavior was not characterized by more resistance to concede, but by proposing compromise locations of low joint value. Both forms of trade-off aversion have been previously reported (Harinck et al., 2000; Stöckli & Tanner, 2014). As expected, participants in value-driven conflicts were also less satisfied with the result– even if it was the pareto-optimal result – than those in the value irrelevant condition, and they reported more negative feelings about the self (an indicator of identity threat). Negotiators in the value-driven condition were also less satisfied with the process and relationship with their counterpart than those in the utility-driven

condition. The lower satisfaction with the (integrative) negotiation in value-driven conflicts is in line with the suggestion from the literature that in these conflicts, integrative outcomes are less desirable than compromises because they elicit identity threat (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014; Stöckli & Tanner, 2014).

However, none of the hypotheses about the provision of information was supported by the results: Information about the other's priorities did not differentially affect changes in perceived discrepancy, resistance to concede, or trade-offs in the value-driven and utility-driven conflict. Providing information also did not facilitate trade-offs in general. Despite increasing self-reported understanding of the other (i.e., the manipulation check), information did not lead to more accurate estimations of the other's payoff.

One limitation of Study 1 may have been the manipulation of the provision of information, which was presented as a message from the counterpart. As an act of communication, this message may have been interpreted in various ways by the participants (e.g. as manipulative, trustworthy, sympathetic). The form may thus have introduced variance beyond the actual process in focus, which should be eliminated in future studies. In addition, the payoff accuracy measure may have been too difficult to differentiate processes elicited by the provision of information, as it requires good recall of the priorities and the location information and an arithmetic operation of the information. Such processing is unlikely in an ad-hoc negotiation, especially in an online study. The potential benefit of information in utility-driven conflicts does not even require such sophisticated mental representation of the other's payoff; Just recognizing the other party's priorities could help make more suitable offers. Another limitation is that participants probably were aware that they were not really negotiating with another person, even though we did not tell them explicitly. In a face-to-face interaction, the effect of value differences may be more

pronounced than in a computer simulation because it may seem more relevant to defend values dyadic interactions. Therefore, our hypotheses need to be tested in an interactive negotiation to understand how they reflect dyadic behavior.

Study 2: Behavior and Perceptions in Interactive Dyadic Negotiation

Study 2 aimed at replicating the findings from Study 1 in a face-to-face dyadic negotiation setting. Here, the dyad-wise manipulations can potentially affect both parties' behaviors and hence will create more variance in outcomes than in Study 1 (where the simulated counterpart was highly integrative). This constellation allows us to examine the effect of motive and information on objective negotiation outcomes. In Study 2, we pre-registered most of the original hypotheses from Study 1 and additional ones:

Hypothesis 1: Resistance to concede a) is increased by value motives, which is b) moderated by information.

Hypothesis 2 (new): Compromises are increased by value motives.

Hypothesis 3: Trade-offs a) are decreased by value motives, which is b) moderated by information.

Hypothesis 4 (new): The frequency of partial impasses is increased by value motives.

Hypothesis 5 (new): Joint outcomes a) are decreased by value motives, which may be b) moderated by information.

The worse subjective evaluations in the value-driven negotiation conditions in Study 1 could stem from being pushed towards making trade-offs that participants were trying to avoid. In Study 2, this is not the case, given the counterpart's expected likewise aversion of trade-offs. The

aim of this study was, hence, to provide insights into the subjective evaluations in the context of the agreements that participants reached based on their behavior in value-driven conflicts. Previous research suggests that people in value-driven conflicts prefer compromise agreements, which might explain that they behaviorally tend to make compromises (Stöckli & Tanner, 2014). If this were true, then they should be satisfied with the negotiation outcome that they achieve with their behavioral choice. However, this is unlikely given the low payoff of compromise outcomes. Alternatively, value-driven negotiators' preference for compromise may stem from their perception that making trade-offs threatens their self-view as a person of value integrity. Thus, they may avoid them but still be dissatisfied with the material consequences. Based on this reasoning and the previous effects of motive on all four dimensions of subjective evaluations, we predict:

Hypothesis 6: subjective evaluations to be negatively affected by value motives, specifically

- a) satisfaction with the process (new)
- b) satisfaction with the relationship (new)
- c) satisfaction with the outcome
- d) and negative feelings about the self, for which e) the effect of motive is moderated by information

As for Study 1, complete materials, data, and results can be found on the open science framework.

Method

Participants and design

Participants were recruited via the university's research participation system. We planned to collect data of 202 dyads, based on the same sample size estimates as in Study 1. However, during the data collection process, we decided to run mixed-model ANOVAs rather than univariate ANOVAs with dyadic data as a more powerful and economical way to test our hypotheses. Consequently, and without preliminary analyses, we ended the data collection after 162 dyads. Eight dyads were excluded because one party did not make the correct first offer, resulting in a final sample of 155 dyads, which is a sample sensitive to medium effects (see *Detailed Overview of Results* in the supplemental material). In total, 227 of the 310 participants were women, 82 men, and one reported another gender. The mean age was 21.65 years ($SD = 3.45$) and all were students of various majors. The experiment had a 2 (motive: value/utility) by 2 (provision of information: provided/not provided) design on the dyad level. The role in the dyad (Blue Travel/Orange Travel, in the following referred to as *central/remote* role for easier interpretation) was the third factor in the mixed-model design.

Procedure and negotiation task

After arrival to the laboratory, participants were assigned a dyadic partner (if possible, strangers of the same gender) by the experimenter. Each of a maximum of three dyads per session took place at a separate table with the blindly distributed study materials lying top-down at their place. The dyads were separated from each other with pinboards to minimize distractions. By taking a seat, participants were assigned to the role who negotiated for central sites (because of their sustainability/customers' preferences for nightlife), or who negotiated for remote sites (because of their lower interference with traditional culture/customers' preferences for seclusion).

A “game board” with 12 location names and matching photos (e.g. historic market, waterfall park) and four orange and four blue cubes were placed on the tables. After instruction from the experimenter and giving informed consent, each participant completed the first section with role and scenario instructions by themselves. This section contained the motive manipulation and a treatment check. The next section of the material started with an explanation of the game board, which served to visualize offers and agreements during the negotiation by placing the cubes on the suggested locations. Participants were also given cards with the payoff information of each location (instead of a table as in Study 1). We expected this procedure to increase participants’ engagement in the negotiation task. In addition, we made the comparisons of the locations more demanding to avoid ceiling effects on negotiation outcomes. On the second page of the negotiation instruction participants indicated their initial position for the negotiation by noting down location numbers (i.e., what we will refer to as first offer). They also estimated the discrepancy of positions and answered the scales on the motives driving their first offer. Then participants read that they would start by placing their cubes to represent the initial offer and negotiate for 10 min. with their partner. Upon signals after 5 min. (i.e. second offer) and at the end (i.e. final offer) they would be asked to indicate their current position in a protocol form and on the board. The locations which both parties included in their final offer were noted as agreement, leaving blanks (i.e. partial impasses) if they could not agree on four locations. After the negotiation, participants completed the final questionnaire, on their own and were paid 6 € or received participant credit.

Experimental manipulations

Motive. In the central role, the motive was manipulated with the same instructions as in Study 1 and enforced by the same suggestive questions about their personal view on sustainability practices or customer orientation, respectively. In the remote role, participants in the value-driven

condition were told that their company's value codex was to keep local culture and tradition alive and thus bring tourist to remote places less frequented by locals. The second and third priorities were the beauty of landscapes and cultural events. The five suggestive items addressed respecting and protecting traditional culture (e.g., The native traditional way of life should not be displaced by tourism.). In the utility-driven condition, participants were told that their company's customers like to travel to quiet, remote places outside of cities and in nature, they secondly preferred beautiful landscapes, and thirdly enjoyed cultural events. The suggestive items about customer interests were identical for the central and remote roles.

Provision of information. This factor was manipulated at the end of the role instructions directly before the start of the negotiation. In the information provided condition, participants read that their assistant had researched the other party and found out what their priorities were, listed by weighting. In the not provided condition, this part of the instruction was missing.

Dependent variables

Negotiation behaviors were calculated from the sequence of each party's individual offers the same way as in Study 1. In addition, objective outcomes were calculated as the payoff value of the final agreement for each party. The motive manipulation checks, the self-report information manipulation check, the subjective evaluation scales, the discrepancy items, and the integrative potential items were the same as in Study 1.

As an objective manipulation check of the provision of information, participants were asked to estimate their counterpart's priorities directly on a scale from *not at all important* (1) to *very important* (7). The items were landscape, protecting traditional culture, sustainability, seclusion, nightlife, and cultural events.

To examine potential role effects of the motive manipulation, two items from the German Version Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schmidt, Bamberg, Davidov, Herrmann, & Schwartz, 2007; based on S. H. Schwartz, 2005) were included: These require participants to rate similarity to a person characterized as having a value (here: the nature value and the tradition value) on a scale from 1 (not at all similar) to 7 (very similar).

Results

If not described differently, all analyses refer three-way mixed-model ANOVAs with the factors motive, provision of information, and role (as within-dyad factor). The results are reported in summarized form. Full reports of all manipulation checks and dependent variables are reported in the supplemental file *Detailed Overview of Results*.

Manipulation checks. Significant and very strong main effects of motive on the manipulation check showed that participants perceived the conflict more about values, $F(1,151) = 206.431$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .572$, and less about instrumental interests, $F(1,151) = 62.719$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .293$, in the value-driven compared to the utility-driven condition. Furthermore, there was an unexpected three-way interaction effect on perception of interest conflict, $F(1,151) = 4.786$, $p = .030$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. This effect indicates that in the remote (but not the central) role, participants with information perceived more similar levels of interest conflict in value-driven and utility-driven conflicts.

Self-reported understanding of other was not affected by the provision of information, $F(1,151) = 1.491$, $p = .224$, $\eta_p^2 = .010$; but by motive, $F(1,151) = 5.26$, $p = .023$, $\eta_p^2 = .034$; showing that better understanding of the other was reported in value-driven than in utility-driven conflicts. Analyses of the objective manipulation check indicated that participants mostly rated

their counterpart's priorities accurately according to condition and role, whether or not they received information.

Negotiation behavior and outcomes. Disconfirming the hypothesis that value-driven negotiators are more resistant to concede, there was no significant main effect of motive on resistance to concede, $F(1,151) = 0.64, p = .425, \eta_p^2 = .004$; nor were there a main effect of the provision of information, $F(1,151) = 0.099, p = .753, \eta_p^2 = .001$, or a two-way interaction effect, $F(1,151) = 0.014, p = .906, \eta_p^2 < .001$. An unexpected main effect of role, $F(1,151) = 4.797, p = .030, \eta_p^2 = .031$, showed higher resistance to concede of the remote-preference compared to the central-preference role. The expected main effect of motive on compromise suggestions was confirmed, $F(1,151) = 12.816, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .078$, with no other main or interaction effects. Supporting the hypothesized trade-off aversion in value-driven conflicts, the respective main effect of motive on trade-offs was large and significant, $F(1,145) = 22.639, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .135$. As in Study 1, the expected motive by provision of information interaction effect was not significant, $F(1,145) = 0, p = .984, \eta_p^2 < .001$, thus disconfirming the hypothesis that information would exacerbate the value motive effect.

A chi-square test was used to compare the number of impasses in the value-driven and utility-driven condition. Confirming Hypothesis 4, there was a significantly higher frequency of 26 of 80 (partial) impasses in the value-driven, compared to 8 of 75 in the utility-driven condition, $\chi^2(1) = 10.776, p = .001$. In addition, in the value-driven condition, the achieved payoffs on the dyad (between-dyad effect) and individual level were lower than in the utility-driven condition: The predicted main effect of motive was significant and large, $F(1,150) = 21.62, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .126$. Consistent with the other results on information, the predicted interaction effect of motive and provision of information was not confirmed, $F(1,150) = 0.115, p = .735, \eta_p^2 = .001$.

Figure 2. Dyads mean joint outcomes and standard deviations by experimental condition in Study 2

Subjective evaluations. Hypotheses were supported by main effects of motive with regard to satisfaction with instrumental outcome, $F(1,151) = 8.973, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .056$, satisfaction with the negotiation process, $F(1,151) = 7.588, p = .007, \eta_p^2 = .048$, and in trend satisfaction with the relationship, $F(1,151) = 3.345, p = .069, \eta_p^2 = .022$ (i.e., significant with one-tailed testing given directed hypothesis). With regard to the evaluation of the process and the relationship, main effects of role resulted; process: $F(1,151) = 4.379, p = .038, \eta_p^2 = .028$, relationship: $F(1,151) = 8.998, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .056$; showing that participants in the central-preference role were less satisfied than in the remote-preference role. In addition, the main effects of motive and role on satisfaction with relationship were qualified by a role*motive interaction, $F(1,151) = 5.576, p = .019, \eta_p^2 = .036$. This means that participants in the central-preference role were less satisfied when their motive was sustainability, compared to nightlife, whereas those in the remote-preference role were not satisfied less when their motive was tradition, compared to seclusion. Only feelings about the self

were not affected by motive, $F(1,151) = 0.671, p = .414, \eta_p^2 = .004$, nor a motive by provision of information interaction, $F(1,151) = 0.135, p = .714, \eta_p^2 = .001$, in contrast to predictions. When controlling for individual payoff by analyzing the residuals of the SVI dimensions regressed on payoffs, all the effects on subjective evaluations became non-significant. This indicates that participants only evaluated value-driven negotiations worse to the extent that their objective outcomes differed.

Further explorative analyses. In order to better understand the structure of value-driven conflicts, we examined the manipulations' effects on perceived integrative potential. There was only a main effect for motive, $F(1,158) = 8.773, p = .004, \eta_p^2 = .053$. This shows that even with theoretically compatible values in the present paradigm, a lower integrative potential was perceived in the value-driven compared to the utility-driven condition.

In addition, we tested the endorsement of the values of the value-driven roles (i.e., tradition/nature), given that role (and thus possibly person-role fit) affected some of the dependent measures. Therefore, we added type of value (nature vs. tradition) as within-dyad factor to the other factors, info and role, in a mixed-model ANOVA of value endorsement, calculated separately for each motive condition. The utility-driven condition, which reflects the endorsement of values in a population sample without any specific value salience, participants described themselves as far more similar to a person that cares about nature than one that cares for tradition (i.e., value type main effect), $F(1,73) = 154.68, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .679$. In the value-driven condition, there was still a very large main effect of value type, $F(1,78) = 117.611, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .601$, but also a main effect of role, $F(1,78) = 7.489, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .088$, a value type * role interaction, $F(1,78) = 15.517, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .166$, and a non-significant trend of a three-way interaction effect, $F(1,78) = 3.916, p = .051, \eta_p^2 = .048$. The large value type*role interaction shows that in the tradition-preference role

the difference between the endorsement of the two value types was smaller than in the sustainability-preference role. In trend, this was pronounced in the info condition.

Discussion

The results of Study 2 confirmed that negotiators in value-driven conflicts make less interest-consistent trade-offs, but propose bad compromise options over the course of the negotiation, they achieve lower individual and joint outcomes and reach more partial impasses. With respect to subjective evaluations, they are also less satisfied with the instrumental outcomes they achieved, with the negotiation process, and – specifically in the sustainability-preference role – with the relationship. Despite the identical payoff structure of the conflict and similar compatibility of values as in utility-driven conflicts, they perceived less integrative potential. The explorative finding that participants in the central role (and specifically the value-driven sustainability preference role) were less satisfied with process and relationship may be explained by the fact that participants endorsed the nature value (related to the central role) much more than the tradition value (related to the remote role). The finding that participants who negotiated for tradition with a counterpart promoting sustainability ended up reporting higher tradition values than all other groups, but not lower sustainability values, further implies that these values are per se compatible. It also implies that the motive manipulation may have actually affected this group's values, possibly by a cognitive dissonance effect (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011).

The results of Study 2 –consistent with Study 1– further lead to the rejection of the hypothesis that information about the counterpart's priorities has differential effects in value-driven and utility-driven conflicts: It had no significant effects on any of the dependent variables. In Study 2, where the information came from a personal assistant rather than the counterpart, it did not even affect the self-reported understanding of the other's preferences. Regarding objective

criteria, providing information did not help either, probably because participants were rather accurate in their understanding of the counterpart even without this information. This understanding may have been conveyed by the exchange of offers and arguments during the negotiation. If most participants, irrespective of condition, already were aware of their counterpart's preference, it makes sense that their negotiation behavior did not improve any further based on the information. Yet if priority information is conveyed easily in a 10-minute negotiation, then the recommendation to exchange this information may be redundant in many other contexts as well. In addition, even in the utility-driven conditions participants attributed interest-consistent value priorities to their counterpart. Thus, information that these actually drive counterpart's offers may not exacerbate the identity threat much. It seems that the value of the other person, in fact, matters less for the detrimental effect of value-driven conflicts. Rather, the threat may result from the own value that cannot be fully actualized in the negotiation.

General Discussion

In two preregistered experiments participants negotiated about identical issues –locations for hotels to be built in the future –, while their underlying motives were either values or utility. Results supported our hypotheses about value motives: Parties driven by values offered fewer trade-offs than those driven by utility, and reached more partial impasses and lower joint and individual outcomes (Study 2). Whereas value-driven participants were not generally more resistant to concede (i.e., kept making the same offers again), they suggested compromise locations that had a low payoff for both sides. These findings conceptually replicate previous findings (Harinck & Ellemers, 2014). They also expand the theoretical understanding of value conflicts by showing that these effects appear even when the utility- and value-driven interests are identical and the values themselves are not even incompatible.

Value-driven negotiations also led to more negative subjective evaluations, a finding that may have practical implications for later economic success (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Eisenkraft, 2010) and negotiators' job satisfaction (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009). Specifically, we found consistent negative effects of value-relevance on satisfaction with the negotiation process and the relationship to the counterpart in both studies. Especially interesting is a look at subjective evaluations of outcome and self in the context of the objective outcomes: In Study 1, the simulated counterparty steered participants towards the integrative solution, thus almost all participants ended with the pareto-optimal outcome. Still, negotiators in the value-driven, compared to the utility-driven condition were less satisfied with this outcome, and also had more threat-related feelings about the self. In Study 2, the outcomes in value-driven conflicts were objectively worse as participants avoided trade-offs and agreed on more compromises. Here, they were also less satisfied with their outcomes but did not feel worse about themselves. After controlling for the objective outcome, the difference in satisfaction disappeared. Previous research has implied (Illes, Ellemers, & Harinck, 2014; Stöckli & Tanner, 2014) that in value conflicts, compromises may be more desirable than integrative outcomes. This was supported by participants' behavior in our studies, but only partially by their satisfaction with the result. Participants seemed to be less satisfied with the integrative solution and feel threatened about it (Study 1), but they are also less satisfied with the low payoff when avoiding trade-offs and choosing more compromise options (Study 2). These findings imply that people in value-driven conflicts may opt for compromise options because if they make trade-offs, it is costly for their self-view; However, this does not mean that they are content with the resulting (worse) agreements or the process leading to it.

The second part of our hypotheses was not supported by the results at all: Information about the counterparty's underlying interest priorities did not significantly affect any negotiation

behaviors or outcomes, nor any satisfaction dimensions. Our prediction was that in the value-driven condition, explicit knowledge about the other's different values would exacerbate the negative effects in value-driven conflicts; In the utility-driven conflict, information about the other's different instrumentalities of interests would help to find integrative solutions. This has to be rejected.

Limitations

The main limitation of the present research is that it remains unclear whether the hypotheses about information in value-driven and irrelevant conflicts have to be rejected in general, or only for the specific type of conflict, the level of information elaboration (Study 1) and communication of the parties (Study 2) in the present studies. According to previous research (Thompson, 1991; Trötschel et al., 2011), knowing what the other party cares about should at least be helpful in utility-driven conflicts. However, this may not mean that providing this knowledge explicitly always is what is missing on the way to an integrative agreement. It could be argued that at least in the interactive study, the information exchanged verbally throughout the negotiation phase may have conveyed much of the necessary knowledge even without the manipulated information at the beginning. This is in line with the very high means of subjective and objective understanding of the other across conditions in this sample. On the other hand, when negotiating rather quickly and without in-depth elaboration, as it is likely to happen in an online simulation study like Study 1, such information may not be elaborated enough to predict specific payoffs, even though it may increase the subjective understanding of the other. This is in line with the relatively lower means in this study, and with the strong positive effect of information on it. In conclusion, the results seem to imply to not expect too much from providing information alone, rather than question the way it was provided in this study. Similarly, the prediction that such

information makes value-driven conflicts worse may have been overreaching, giving that it would be quite hard to miss the fact that the other party does not care about the same values to the same extent. In addition, as the values were not incompatible per se, realizing the different values of the other (i.e., the intended effect of information) may not be more threatening than realizing that the other's demands require trade-offs on one's own values.

A second limitation of this study, as well as of previous studies, is that the value-driven positions were roles randomly manipulated in participants. They may not reflect actual values, as the explorative analyses in Study 2 have confirmed for the role that represented tradition values. It seems noteworthy that even though these participants personally valued nature –the counterparty's value– more than tradition, which they had to represent, they strongly identified with their role in the conflict. The situation for the tradition-relevance role may consequently have been slightly different from that of the sustainability-relevance role: the former negotiated for a value disregarded by another that only focused on a shared value, the latter negotiated with someone whose values they might not consider important at all. This difference may explain why mostly the sustainability-preference role, but not the tradition-preference role evaluated the relationship to the other party worse in a value-driven conflict. On the other hand, the effects on the tradition-relevance role may imply that just making a conflict value-driven with any random, plausibly argued-for value will cause many of the negative consequences of value conflicts.

Implications for Future Research

The findings of the present research have important implications for the understanding of value-driven conflicts and the potential roots of threat within them. Harinck and Ellemers (2014) have argued that people strongly identify with their personal values, which makes the outcome of the conflict more self-worth contingent. The present findings on subjective evaluations imply that

in value conflicts, all outcomes come with a subjective cost. According to general models of threat and challenge (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997), threat is rooted in subjective appraisals of the situation as highly important and of oneself as unable to fulfill one's goals. In a value-driven conflict, all available options to solve it may seem like a loss of something important (objective outcome, identity, relationship). In addition, some values (including nature and tradition) are typically seen as moral imperatives for others as well as the self (S. H. Schwartz, 2007). Concessions on issues linked to moral values may thus be implicitly linked to dooming social sanctions as a consequence of norm violations and sometimes even thinking about such trade-offs could result in serious backlash (Tetlock, 2003). This could limit the subjectively available options in a value-driven conflict, increasing the threat experience. Second, being confronted with a counterparty that justifies their positions with values may curb the expectation of being able to find a good agreement. As people's values are very resistant to change (Schuster, Pinkowski, & Fischer, 2019) and people, as argued above, feel obliged to follow their values, concessions of the counterparty on value-driven issues are less likely. In fact, presenting one's interests in a conflict as sacred values is an unethical tactic to pressure others to concede by appearing relentless (Tenbrunsel et al., 2009). These aspects may be captured by our finding that people in value-driven conflicts were less satisfied with the negotiation process and the relationship; They felt they were less able to make progress towards the important goal and that the other was a less trustworthy partner. For developing process theories on value-driven conflicts further, we hence argue that resource appraisals should be taken in to account further. They may be especially important to foster self-regulation that prevents threat experiences in value-driven conflicts. The threat state is in many ways opposed to the integrative mindset presumably needed to apply collaborative, creative, and curious problem-solving in integrative

negotiations (Ade, Schuster, Harinck, & Trötschel, 2018). However, there may be ways to empower negotiators in value-driven conflicts, such that even though important things are at stake, they feel capable to cope and see the conflict as a challenge, rather than a threat. Future research is needed to identify those ways, in order to help solve the various value-driven issues modern societies are arguing about and to promote better outcomes than bad compromises.

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