MUSLIM POPULATION

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Perceived Muslim Population Growth Triggers Divergent Perceptions and Reactions from
Republicans and Democrats

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MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Abstract

The Muslim population is rapidly growing worldwide. Five experiments show that Republicans and Democrats respond to this demographic change with divergent reactions in three domains: perception of threats, celebratory reactions, and emotional responses. In terms of threat perceptions, Republicans tend to perceive Muslim population growth as a threat to Christians and the U.S. society in terms of American culture, legal norms, and peace. Furthermore, Republicans are less likely to have celebratory reactions to Muslim population growth (a theoretically novel reaction). They experience less hope and pride, along with more anxiety and anger. The divergent responses from partisans are partially explained by citizens' ideological orientation and media exposure, but they are not explained by any racial mechanisms or the partisans' religious identity. Together, these studies reveal that political leaning can be an antecedent to reactions to the demographic change in many complex ways beyond the dominant group's concern for their status.

Keywords: Muslim, Party Identity, Intergroup, Demographic Shifts, Emotions

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

With 1.8 billion followers, Islam accounts for 24.1% of the world population. As the fastest-growing religious group, there will be more Muslims than any other religious followers within the next several decades worldwide (Hackett & McClendon, 2017). Yet, Muslims in western industrialized societies are often feared and unwelcomed (e.g., Ghumman & Ryan, 2013). After the 9/11 attack in 2001, Muslims have been particularly vulnerable to discrimination and hate crimes (Venkatraman, 2021), and not too long ago, Donald Trump's call for a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States" was a hallmark of his campaign for the presidency (Greenwood, 2017). Therefore, as the Muslim population growth is gradually yet unwaveringly redefining the world demographic landscape, it is important to understand how we react to the growing presence of this population.

Recent studies reveal that people tend to have a defensive and negative reaction to the population growth of a minority out-group (i.e., more prejudice toward minorities and greater preferences for policies that undermine minorities; e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014a, b). Will the growth of the Muslim population inevitably lead to a psychological backlash among non-Muslims? As American partisans often have very different ideals of the society and take different approaches to social issues (e.g., Mason, 2015), Democrats and Republicans may react to the Muslim population growth differently. As such, the current research investigates the psychological consequences of the Muslim population growth and the moderating role of partisanship.

Perceptions of Muslims

In many western industrialized societies, Muslims are seen as a threatening social group (e.g., Kalkan et al., 2009; Lajevardi, 2020; González et al., 2008). Their values are often considered to be incompatible with those of Christians (Moss et al., 2017) and western societies (Telhami, 2016), so they are generally perceived as disloyal and resistant to assimilation (Huntington, 2004). As a result,

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

they are perceived to undermine the host countries' culture (Smeeke & Verkuyten, 2014). When compared to Christians, Muslims are perceived to be more aggressive and supportive of terrorism (Fischer et al., 2007).

In the U.S., Republicans' attitudes toward Muslims are particularly unfavorable compared to Democrats' (Pew Research Center, 2017a). Republicans are more likely than Democrats to claim that Muslims are anti-American and to believe that Islam is fundamentally incompatible with democracy. Republicans are also more likely than Democrats to believe that Islam encourages violence and that a great deal of Muslims are extremists. So Muslims are perceived as threatening by westerners in general, and Americans' perceptions of Muslims are often divided by partisan lines.

The Population Growth of Muslim and Threat Perceptions

According to the Pew Research Center (2015), the Muslim population could grow by 73% between 2010 and 2050, becoming the biggest religion in the world by outnumbering the Christian population. Though countries with the largest population of Muslims are mostly in Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa (Pew Research Center, 2015), the Muslim population has a substantial growing presence in several western countries, such as France (8.8%), Sweden (8.1%), Germany (6.1%) and the U.K. (6.3%) as of 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2017b). In the U.S., the Muslim population is merely 0.9% of the total population as of 2010—yet, its population growth is the fastest among that of all major religions, and is projected to reach 2.1% by 2050 (Pew Research Center, 2015).

According to the intergroup threat theory, perceptions of threats from out-group members can lead to prejudice toward the out-groups (Bobo, 1988; Sherif, 1966; Scheepers et al., 2002; Stephan et al., 2009). This may occur in part due to cognitive biases. For example, negative behaviors from a threatening group can be interpreted as a reflection of nature instead of the situation. and negative stereotypes about the group can be easily formed but difficult to undo (see

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Stephan et al., 2016 for a review). Furthermore, different social groups can hold incompatible values and beliefs, so individuals may perceive the out-group members to challenge the in-group's belief systems, thereby violating the in-group's moral convictions, posing a symbolic threat (Stephan et al., 2016; also see Brandt et al., 2014). For these reasons, perceptions of threat from an out-group can eventually lead to an overall negative evaluation of the threatening group and more prejudice toward them.

Recent studies suggest that people can be threatened by an out-group's population growth and the in-group's population decline (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014a, 2014b; Bai & Federico, 2020). As a group's size can signal its status advantage and dominance (Blumer, 1958; Stephan, et al, 2009), non-Hispanic Americans can perceive Hispanic Americans' population growth as a challenge to their status (Craig & Richeson, 2014a, 2014b), and White Americans can perceive their own population's decline as a threat to their existence (Bai & Federico 2020). These perceptions of threat can ultimately lead to prejudice toward the out-groups and the adoption of more exclusionary political attitudes (Craig & Richeson, 2014a, 2014b).

Party Identity and Muslim Population Growth

As Americans adopt stronger partisan identities, their sociopolitical attitudes are increasingly divided along the partisan line (e.g., Mason, 2015). Past studies revealed that party identity can determine citizen's adoption of issue position (Druckman, 2013), evaluation of politicians' performances (e.g., Bartels, 2002), political attitudes, and even their preferences in where to live (Hui, 2013) and whom they want their children to marry to (Iyengar, et al., 2012).

In the context of the demographic shift, Republicans may find the population growth of Muslims more threatening than Democrats and react to it aversively because of three reasons. First, Republicans may adopt the elite cues from Republican leaders in the media. Partisans can be more willing to adopt the positions from their partisan in-group members (Druckman et al., 2013), even if

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

the purported elite cues are known to be inaccurate (Bai, 2021). Since Republican-oriented media and Republican political leaders often portray Muslims as threatening (e.g., Krieg, 2017), Republicans may consider Muslims' population growth as threatening as well.

Second, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to be conservative, and therefore have a psychological profile characterized by resistance to social changes and sensitivity to threats to existing social orders (see Jost et al., 2009 for a review). Consequently, they may have particularly negative reactions to the rapid growth of the Muslim population, a type of social change that may undermine the existing social order and hierarchies in the U.S. It should be noted that this concern about changes in social order and hierarchy is underpinned by a need for certainty and security (van Hiel et al., 2004), not necessarily by the concerns for the dominant status of the in-group members. Consistent with this, the results will show that negative reactions toward the growth of the Muslim population are observed among low-status minority groups as well.

Finally, as discussed above, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to believe that Muslims do not endorse values that are treasured by Americans (Pew Research Center, 2017a; Telhami, 2016). As such, Republicans may evaluate Muslims and their population growth negatively due to their perceived value conflicts (e.g., Brandt, 2014). The current research will test the first and the second explanations as potential mechanisms empirically.

Though recent studies reveal that the perceived growth of a racial minority group can trigger defensive reactions from the dominant/majority group (i.e., White Americans; Outten et al., 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2014a, 2014b, Danbold & Huo, 2015), the current project is distinct in two main ways. First, most studies on the psychological consequences of a demographic shift (see above) focus on the population change in terms of race, a construct that has a significant biological

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

undertone and is relatively immutable¹. The current research focuses on the population change of a symbolic group defined by values and beliefs, and it demonstrates that the effects of the Muslim population change are not a racialized effect (as will be described later, the experiments do not manipulate the perceived population change of Whites or minorities, and the experimental effects are not unique to Whites or Christians).

Second, past studies on demographic shifts fail to investigate the moderating role of political orientation. Past studies identified the moderating roles of White's racial identity (Major et al., 2018) and a zero-sum view of the economy (Perkins et al., 2020), but it is still unclear if an identity undergirded by values and beliefs plays a moderating role too. Political identity may be a particularly important moderator to consider because it can help explain partisan-based political polarization, a prominent phenomenon in the current American political landscape (see more in General Discussion).

For these considerations, this research contributes to the literature on intergroup attitudes as well as party polarization. It does so by investigating the psychological effects of the rapid growth of the Muslim population, an often-overlooked domain of demographic shift, and it identifies party identity as a moderator for the effect.

Four Domains of Consequences

The current research investigates the psychological consequences of Muslim population growth on four domains: 1. Threat perceptions, 2. Celebratory reactions, 3. Emotional responses, and 4. Political intolerance.

Threat perceptions. This domain includes threats that are classified based on the perceived victims of the threat, such as believing Muslim population growth is bad for Christians (the most

¹ Many people continue to categorize themselves and others based on phenotypic traits and rarely change their racial identity throughout their lives.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

dominant religious group in the U.S.) and the U.S. society, as well as specific types of threats that are classified by their content, such as perceived threats to cultural values, legal norms/the legal system, and peace in the U.S. (e.g., concerns about terrorism). These domains of threat were derived from the literature on stereotypes of Muslims and qualitative/open-ended responses from Study 3. For example, the idea that Muslims are perceived to hold incompatible values to that of Western culture was mentioned both in the past studies (Pew Research Center, 2017a; Telhami, 2016) and the participants' open-ended responses to questions about why they think the Muslim population growth is bad for the U.S. society in Study 3. Similarly, Muslims are perceived to be violent in quantitative studies (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2017a), and open-ended responses from Study 3 also reveal that participants' concern of Muslim population growth is in part attributable to their concerns of growing terrorism.

Celebratory reactions. Celebratory reactions refer to a positive and celebratory reaction to the Muslim population growth, highlighting its contribution to diversity. It is a domain of reaction that was derived from qualitative data in Study 3 and observed in recent data on related topics (i.e., some participants react positively to a growing out-group population; see Perkins, 2020). As a response to the increasing influence of a stigmatized social group, it is an empirically and theoretically novel domain of reaction to investigate.

Emotions. According to the intergroup emotions theory, individuals can experience emotions on the collective level about their group, and these experiences can be responsible for many intergroup attitudes and behaviors (Mackie et al., 2008). This research focuses on anger, anxiety, pride, and hope. People may experience negative emotions such as anger and anxiety when their group's wellbeing is threatened, or when one senses dangers in their environment (e.g., Spielberger, 2013; Stephan et al., 2009; Smith, 1993, Leach et al., 2002). Consistent with this, Americans experienced emotions related to anger and anxiety after the September 11th attacks, and these

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

emotions further explained their political intolerance of Muslims (Skitka et al., 2004). As Republicans regard Muslims as particularly threatening (e.g., Fischer et al., 2007), they may appraise Muslim population growth as a looming threat to peace and physical safety, and consequently, experience more anger and anxiety. In contrast, positive emotions such as pride and hope are experienced when positive stimuli are present, and occur for someone whose group has reached an accomplishment (e.g., Harth et al., 2008), but suppressed when one anticipates a negative outcome (e.g., Staats & Stassen, 1985). If a growing Muslim population is inherently threatening for Republicans, they would be less likely than Democrats to find the trend worthy of celebration, and less likely to experience pride and hope.

Political intolerance. Finally, individuals can react to the threat of a growing out-group defensively by supporting political actions that limit the growing out-group's influence (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). As Muslim population growth is perceived as threatening to Americans (and American Republicans in particular), they may adopt more intolerant political positions toward Muslims.

Current studies

Therefore, five studies were conducted to investigate partisans' divergent responses to Muslim population growth on four different domains: 1. Perception of threats, 2. Celebratory reactions, 3. Emotional responses, and 4. Political intolerance. The core hypotheses are the following:

Hypothesis 1: non-Muslim Americans on average have aversive reactions to the population growth of Muslims.

Hypothesis 2: this effect is moderated by participants' party identification, such that Republicans are more likely to have aversive reactions than Democrats.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Hypothesis 3a: The party affiliation moderation described above is explained by the partisan cues from their media environment. Unlike all other hypotheses that will be tested with data from all studies, Hypothesis 3a will be tested only using data from Study 5, which is the only study that has measures for partisan cues (see below).

Hypothesis 3b: The party affiliation moderation described above is explained by the participants' political ideology. Unlike all other hypotheses, this hypothesis was not pre-registered.

Technicalities and open science practices. Before analysis, all variables were linearly transformed to run from 0 to 1 such that 1 represents the highest level of that construct. All manipulations, conditions, dependent variables, and sample exclusions in the studies are reported. All materials are described in detail in Appendix A. All data, code, Qualtrics survey files, and online appendices are available at https://osf.io/dyxpk/?view_only=c895b26b92bb45d8899dd676dfb3a537. All studies other than Study 1 were pre-registered:

https://osf.io/y59t3/?view_only=a03b1521fc4d48458f5f10156c021ad7 (Study 2),

https://osf.io/t8sf6/?view_only=2943b6be041146e9b619db07acb6902c

(Study 3), https://osf.io/xuj5t/?view_only=4d97ab1456bd414992fcf0e2395e2afb (Study 4), and

https://osf.io/kf3ea/?view_only=23eb39f3b46845dd8af96fbfa7d7ea2b (Study 5).

The analyses reported in this research have some deviations from the pre-registrations because the focus of this research was updated based on the results of earlier studies. The pre-registrations of Studies 2 and 3 only include participants who were White Christians, but results show that the effects generalized beyond them. Therefore, this delimitation was not specified in Studies 4 and 5 pre-registrations, and all non-Muslim participants were included in the final analyses unless specified otherwise. Furthermore, as opposed to conducting the pre-registered t-tests, the main effects of manipulation were tested using the point-biserial correlations to reduce redundancy,

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

as they are statistical equivalents. Sensitivity analyses² show that the least sensitive analyses across studies can detect an effect the size of $f^2 = .034$, a small effect, according to Cohen (1988).

Therefore, assuming that the effect size is small, the sample sizes of all studies are sufficient for the analyses.

Table 1 summarizes the sample characteristics of each study. Table 2 summarizes which domains were included in which study, as well as the significance of the moderating effect of party identity in the corresponding studies.

Table 1. Overview of Sample Characteristics

Studies	Sample characteristics					
	N	mean age	%Christian	%White	%female	Sample source
Study 1	316	32.58	0.21	0.73	0.47	Prolific
Study 2	641	47.56	0.27	0.82	0.51	Lucid
Study 3	240	38.30	1.00	1.00	0.61	Prolific
Study 4	479	30.82	0.46	0.70	0.44	Prolific
Study 5	761	27.57	0.50	0.73	0.78	Prolific
Combined	2437	35.17	0.44	0.77	0.58	

Note. For the studies collected via Prolific, though participants in earlier studies were not allowed to participate in latter studies, two participants still participated in more than one study (both did two studies) due to technical errors.

² Since the models are similar across studies, and Study 3 has the smallest sample size, analyses from this study would be the least sensitive one, and the parameters from this study are used for the sensitivity analyses. The analysis assumes a power of .80 and a total number of 3 predictors.

MUSLIM POPULATION

Table 2. Overview of Study Features and Results

Studies	Predictors		Domain 1					Domain 2	Domain 3				Domain 4	Additional measures
	Party identity measures	Manipulation	Bad for Christians	Bad for the U.S.	Cultural threat	Legal norms threat	Threat to peace	Celebratory reaction	Pride	Hope	Anxiety	Anger	Intolerance	
Study 1	7 point scale	A graph	†	***										-
Study 2	7 point scale	A graph							***	***	***	***	ns	-
Study 3	7 point scale	A graph	*	*					ns	ns	**	**	ns	Open-ended responses
Study 4	3 point scale	A graph and texts			***	***	**	**	*	*	**	*	†	Checks
Study 5	7 point scale	A graph and texts			***	**	***	***	**	ns	***	**	ns	Checks; partisan cue measures
Combined			†	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	ns	

Note. † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Method

Due to similarities in designs and results, all five studies are described together.

Pre-treatment measures. In all studies, participants were asked their levels of party identity. It was measured on a seven-point scale of 1=Strong Democrat to 7=Strong Republican in Studies 1-3 and 5, using wordings and coding similar to what is commonly asked in political psychology research, such as in the American National Election Studies. Study 4 uses a three-point scale of 1=Democrat, 2=Independents/Others/None, and 3=Republican, asked by Prolific independently before participants entered the survey³. This measure was linearly transformed to run from 0 to 1 so that 1 is the highest level of the scale, indicating a (strong) Republican identity. Participants' political ideology was similarly measured on a seven-point scale from 1=Very liberal to 7=Very conservative, other than Study 4, which uses a three-point scale of 1=Liberal, 2=Moderate/Other/NA, 3=Conservative also asked by Prolific earlier. It was also rescaled to run from 0 to 1 like all measures in all studies. Data for participants' race (1=White; 0=Otherwise) and religious background (1=Christian; 0=Otherwise) were also collected. In Study 5, participants were also asked four questions about how much they were exposed to cues from political elites in media or media they consume in general to test Hypothesis 3a.

Experimental manipulation. In all experiments, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the Muslim growth condition, they learned that the Muslim population was rapidly growing. In Studies 1-3, they learned it by reading a graph that depicts various religious groups' population growth, where the Muslim population's growth rate is the highest, and in Studies 4-5, the graph they read was paired with additional text that elaborates upon the graph in more

³ Since these variables were collected independently by Prolific before this experiment in Study 4, and the interaction between party identity and manipulation remain observable for Study 4 (see below and Appendix D), it is unlikely that the observed interaction is entirely the result of priming political identity before manipulation.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

detail. In the control condition, participants were given similar stimuli that do not mention Muslim's population.

After the treatment, participants responded to the dependent variables in four domains mentioned earlier. As summarized in Table 2, each study measures a subset of these variables. In Studies 4 and 5, participants were also asked some comprehension or attention check questions. In Study 4, 28 participants failed and 479 passed the checks, and in Study 5, 44 failed and 761 passed. Only participants who passed them were included in the analyses according to the pre-registration plans. The wording of these questions and exclusion criteria are described in the pre-registration forms.

Perceived threats to Christians and the U.S. Participants were asked two questions: “Do you think this projected population growth described in the graph is overall a good thing or bad thing for Christians?” In the second item, the word “Christians” was replaced with “the US society” (1=*A very good thing*, 7=*A very bad thing*). These questions were asked in Studies 1 and 3 (see Domain 1 in Table 2), and the responses were linearly transformed to run from 0 to 1.

Open-ended responses about threats. Study 3 asked participants to provide two open-ended responses to explain their answers to the two threat items mentioned above. The first item is “You indicated that this projected population growth is overall ‘[participant choice]’ for Christians. Would you please explain a little bit more how it is the case?” and the word “Christians” was replaced with “U.S. society” in the second item. These open-ended responses were reviewed to gain additional understanding about the nature of threats from the perception of Muslim population growth. These responses were sorted by the author himself in categories based on their themes and summarized in Tables 3 and 4. Instead of conducting a formal qualitative analysis, these tabulations were used as the references for the development of the measures used in the “Perceived threat in three domains”

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

and “Celebratory reactions” below. More detailed discussions of these open-ended responses are relegated to Appendix B due to word count.

Perceived threat in three domains. Participants were asked to what extent they feel that the content they reviewed can threaten American society in three domains. They first read the question stem “Based on your beliefs, to what extend [sic.] do you think the population change described in the article can potentially [...]”⁴ Then they were provided with six individual items that reflect the three domains of threats: threat to American culture and values (i.e., “undermine American culture” and “threaten the American values”; $\alpha_{study\ 4}=.94$, $\alpha_{study\ 5}=.92$), threat to American legal system (i.e., “undermine American's legal system” and “threaten American constitution”; $\alpha_{study\ 4}=.93$, $\alpha_{study\ 5}=.87$), and threat to peace and safety (i.e., “lead to more terrorism” and “lead to more violence”; $\alpha_{study\ 4}=.92$, $\alpha_{study\ 5}=.86$). The questions anchor from 0=Not at all to 7=To a great extent, but the responses were linearly transformed to run from 0 to 1, again, like all other measures. These questions were asked in Studies 4 and 5 (see Domain 1 in Table 2).

Celebratory reactions. Participants’ celebratory reactions to the demographic change was measured with two items also placed after the above question stem and anchored and transformed in the same way (i.e., “allow the US to thrive on its diversity” and “help the US to thrive on the differences between different groups of people”; $\alpha_{study\ 4}=.90$, $\alpha_{study\ 5}=.89$). These questions were asked in Studies 4 and 5 (see Domain 2 in Table 2).

Emotions. Participants were asked how they experienced the emotions of pride, hope, anxiety, and anger when they were reviewing the materials (1=None at all to 5=A great deal; again,

⁴ Additional analyses reported in Appendix C reveal that constructs measured under question stem, i.e., the three types of threat and celebratory reactions, are indeed distinct, albeit related, constructs.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

transformed to run from 0 to 1). These questions were asked in all studies other than Study 1 (see Domain 3 in Table 2).

Political intolerance of Muslims. Finally, participants were asked their level of agreement with statements as measures of their political tolerance of Muslims. This outcome variable was investigated in all studies other than Study 1 (see Domain 4 in Table 2). The measure varies across the studies, including items such as “I would be willing to pay a tax that would increase security screening procedures for Muslim immigrants entering the U.S.” (used in Study 2; adapted from Hunt, 2011) and “The right to establish Islamic schools should always exist in the United States” (reversed coded; used in Studies 4 and 5; adapted from Verkuyen, 2007). The items all anchor from (1=Strongly disagree; 7=Strongly agree), and the responses were linearly transformed to run from 0 to 1, like all other variables ($\alpha_{study\ 2}=.06^5$, $\alpha_{study\ 3}=.78$, $\alpha_{study\ 4}=.81$, $\alpha_{study\ 5}=.83$).

⁵ Due to its low reliability, additional analyses were conducted for the intolerance items separately for this study’s intolerance measure, and they reveal similar results where the interaction between party identity and condition is not significant (see Appendix D).

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table 3. Open ended-response to the "Christian" question in Study 3

Category	Description	Example	Count (percentage) of response
1	Irrelevant, no threat is mentioned	<p>"these statistics do not affect christian at all. "</p> <p>"There is nothing negative or good with Christians being a lower % of world population."</p> <p>"No matter what chart says cat take away my christian beliefs"</p> <p>"The spread of other religions does not really impact Christians in any way. They will still be completely free to practice their religion no matter which faiths others choose to pursue. "</p>	41 (47.7%)
2	Concern of symbolic (culture, value) incompatibility	<p>"muslim ideology seems to be very opposite of our western, american culture. i don't see how more of that influence could be a good thing."</p> <p>"Muslims and Christians have completely different views"</p> <p>"their religions conflict with one another, different beliefs"</p>	6 (7.0%)
3	Concern of (relative) decline of Christian influence/dominance	<p>"It means as Christians we're not doing a good job of being the salt and light to all people."</p> <p>"It means that we are not evangelizing like we should be."</p> <p>"it means there are less Christians and that isnt good for churches"</p> <p>"There is significant conflict between Christians and Muslims currently. The significant increase in Muslim population could put more pressure/stress on the Christian population."</p>	14 (16.3%)
4	Concern of safety threat (terrorism, persecution)	<p>"Muslims are trying to wipe out Christians, in parts of the world"</p> <p>"Muslims are killing Christians every day in the middle east and the Muslim religion states that anybody who is not Muslim is an infidel and must convert or die. Muslims are very violent and tend to be over aggressive. "</p> <p>"Muslims don't like Christians. They slaughter them. This might not be the case for all Muslims, but it's something to be concerned about."</p> <p>"Muslims hate Christians and promote violence"</p> <p>"Muslims want to kill Christians, and behead them in their own countries. They want to wipe us out."</p>	15 (17.4%)
5	Other types of concern and comments	<p>"There isn't much Christian growth noted"</p> <p>"I am a Christian and I believe that Jesus died for our sins so that we might be saved. I think it is a very bad thing if people are not saved from their sins and the judgement to come."</p>	10 (11.6%)

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table 4. Open ended-response to the "U.S. society" question in Study 3

Category	Description	Example	Count (percentage) of response
1	Irrelevant, no threat is mentioned	<p>"I don't think it can negatively impact the state of US society. "</p> <p>"I don't think it matters what religion someone is. It matters more what type of person they are. "</p> <p>"I don't think Muslims want to accept the us society as it currently is and would</p>	28 (33.7%)
2	Concern of symbolic (culture, value, legal practice in particular) incompatibility	<p>"counter ideologies changing american culture."</p> <p>"I don't think Muslims want to accept the us society as it currently is and would rather change it towards their mind set"</p> <p>"I'm afraid eventually this will lead to Sharia Law."</p> <p>"I do not believe the core values of Islam, which is different than Christianity in that it does not separate the practice of the religion from the government and the law, are compatible with the core values and the laws & Constitution of the United States. "</p>	16 (19.3%)
3	Concern of (relative) decline of Christian influence/dominance	<p>"I think it's good that people are coming here but bad because the people that founded the country are becoming minorities"</p> <p>"U.S. society will become more unbalanced. I don't like some minorities, especially religious minorities, taking over the country."</p>	5 (6.0%)
4	Concern of safety threat (terrorism, persecution)	<p>"More violence and terror"</p> <p>"TERRORISM"</p> <p>"The population growth of Muslims is bad for all people, not just U.S. Society. It is not a peaceful religion."</p> <p>"The more population the more these religious segments will influence the government, local and national. Islam is a violent religion."</p>	8 (9.6%)
5	Other types of concern/comm ents (e.g, it is sad that Muslims will go to hell)	<p>"Well there are more of other religions who don't know the truth and who are living a life without Christ, and a life without Christ is indeed a hopeless life."</p> <p>"There is no telling how things can turn out with radicals out there. Radicals on both sides that is."</p> <p>"It wouldn't do anything to society itself, but the society would impact Muslim growth due to their hate for them. "</p>	8 (9.6%)
6	Diversity is a good thing	<p>"It is good to have a diverse group of people in the country."</p> <p>"The U.S. thrives on diversity and encourages religious freedom. "</p> <p>"The US needs diversity and every year it's getting less and less that way"</p>	18 (21.7%)

MUSLIM POPULATION

Table 5. Descriptive statistics and correlations of the aggregated data (results for Hypothesis 1).

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Condition	Party	Cue	Bad for Christians	Bad for the U.S.	Pride	Hope	Anxiety	Anger	Threat to culture	the legal norm	Threat to peace	Celebratory reactions
Party	2434	0.48	0.34	0												
Cue	761	0.36	0.22	0	0.50***											
Bad for Christians	553	0.49	0.26	0.35***	0.27***	-										
Bad for the U.S.	555	0.55	0.24	0.14***	0.15***	-	0.52***									
Pride	2116	0.20	0.29	-0.12***	0.02	-0.09*	-0.28***	-0.29***								
Hope	2113	0.26	0.30	-0.12***	0.01	-0.03	-0.32***	-0.38***	0.82***							
Anxiety	2115	0.21	0.28	0.07**	0.15***	0.18***	0.47***	0.55***	0.21***	0.18***						
Anger	2115	0.13	0.25	0.08***	0.15***	0.20***	0.40***	0.47***	0.16***	0.12***	0.69***					
Threat to culture	1240	0.22	0.27	0.16***	0.41***	0.48***	-	-	-0.04	-0.05	0.40***	0.44***				
Threat to the legal norm	1240	0.19	0.26	0.11***	0.39***	0.45***	-	-	0.03	0.01	0.42***	0.47***	0.89***			
Threat to peace	1240	0.24	0.27	0.17***	0.36***	0.43***	-	-	-0.01	-0.02	0.38***	0.41***	0.81***	0.82***		
Celebratory reactions	1240	0.54	0.28	0.02	-0.20***	-0.25***	-	-	0.28***	0.30***	-0.12***	-0.11***	-0.23***	-0.19***	-0.16***	
Intolerance	2103	0.48	0.24	0.03	0.46***	0.48***	0.46***	0.59***	-0.08***	-0.10***	0.26***	0.24***	0.51***	0.49***	0.47***	-0.33***

Note. * $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$.

Results

Data from all five studies were analyzed separately as well as combined. The patterns are very similar, and therefore, to streamline the reporting and the discussions of the results and to capture the overall patterns, only results from the aggregated data are reported here, and that of the individual studies are relegated to Appendix D. Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlations using data aggregated across all studies.

Testing Hypothesis 1: Main effects. Given that point-biserial correlations between the conditions and dependent variables are statistically equivalent to t-tests, no additional t-tests for main effects are reported, as doing so would be redundant. Thus, the main effects of the experimental manipulation are assessed using the correlations reported in the fourth column of Table 5. Across all studies and all participants, participants who were in the Muslim population growth condition perceived that Muslim's population growth is a threat to Christians and U.S. society in general, and American culture, legal norms, and peace in the United States in particular ($ps < .001$ for all). They also experience lower levels of positive emotions (i.e., pride and hope; $ps < .001$) and higher levels of negative emotions (i.e., anxiety and anger; $ps < .001$ and $.01$ respectively). However, the manipulation has no significant main effect on celebratory reactions and political intolerance for Muslims' threat to the U.S.

Other correlations. Most of the other correlations between the variables are consistent with the expectation that participants who reported more negative reactions in one domain (e.g., feeling more negative emotions or less positive emotions) also report more negative reactions in other domains (e.g., threat perceptions). However, there is one exception to this general trend. Pride and hope are not negatively correlated with the threat measures, and they are positively correlated with the two negative emotions (i.e., anxiety and anger). One possibility is participants' acquiescence bias, or the

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

tendency to respond with a high level of rating in general. This can attenuate or reverse the theoretical negative correlations between variables that are worded in the same direction, which is characteristic of the current case.

Testing Hypothesis 2: interaction between party identity and condition. To test the hypothesis that partisans have divergent responses to the Muslim population's growth, linear regression models were estimated using the variables for experimental condition, party identity, and their interaction to predict each dependent variable listed above. Indicator-coded study number was added to indicate which study a particular row of data is from as a theoretical random effect.

The results are summarized in Table 6 and all interactions are visualized in Figure 1. The analyses conducted by each study are available in Appendix D, and the key findings about the interactions' significance in each of the *individual studies* are summarized in Table 2. Across all regressions in Table 6, the interaction between party identity and condition is significant in the expected direction in all models ($p < .001$) other than the model for predicting political intolerance ($p = .102$) and possibly in the model for predicting threat for Christians ($p = .089$).

In particular, the interaction term is positive in the models that predict negative reactions (i.e., threat perceptions and negative emotions), but negative in the models that predict positive reactions (i.e., celebratory reactions and positive emotions). This suggests that Republicans react to Muslim population growth with higher levels of negative reactions and lower levels of positive reactions. Figure 1 plots the associations between party identity and the dependent variables by conditions. Corresponding with the patterns described above, Figure 1 reveals that a higher level of identification with the Republican party is associated with more negative reactions and less positive reactions in the Muslim growth condition, when compared with the control condition.

When the same models were estimated using participants whose party identity was not independent, moderates, or others (i.e., removing participants whose party identity is at the level

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

of .5, which results in a remaining sample size of 1899), the results were highly similar, which justifies the coding of these participants' party identity at the level of .5. In particular, the estimate for the interaction in the model "Bad for the U.S." changed from $b=.42$ to $b=.41$, that of anger changed from $b=.21$ to $b=.19$, and that of threat to the legal norms changed from $b=.19$ to $b=.20$ ($p < .001$ for all). The estimates for "Bad for Christians" and political intolerance did not change, though the p value for the former changed from $p=.089$ to $p>.100$, while the latter changed from $p=.102$ to $p=.099$. In all other cases, neither the estimate nor the significance level changed.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table 6. Aggregated regression (results for Hypothesis 2).

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Models		b	S.E.	p	95% CI	Partial η^2 (in %)
Bad for Christians	(Intercept)	0.47 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.42 0.53]	
	Condition (1=grow)	0.13 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.07 0.20]	15.48
	Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.09 †	0.05	0.061	[0.00 0.18]	3.33
	Study 1	-0.21 ***	0.02	0.000	[-0.25 -0.17]	17.93
	Condition $\times$ Party identity	0.11 †	0.07	0.089	[-0.02 0.24]	0.53
	F(4,548)=70.09, R2=0.34, adjusted R2=0.33					
Bad for the U.S.	(Intercept)	0.57 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.51 0.63]	
	Condition	-0.12 **	0.04	0.002	[-0.19 -0.04]	2.06
	Party identity	-0.10 †	0.05	0.051	[-0.20 0.00]	1.78
	Study 1	-0.04 †	0.02	0.075	[-0.08 0.00]	0.58
	Condition $\times$ Party identity	0.42 ***	0.07	0.000	[0.28 0.56]	6.05
	F(4,550)=15.66, R2=0.1, adjusted R2=0.1					
Pride	(Intercept)	0.29 ***	0.02	0.000	[0.25 0.32]	
	Condition	0.03 ns	0.02	0.168	[-0.01 0.07]	1.57
	Party identity	0.10 ***	0.02	0.000	[0.06 0.15]	0.00
	Study 3	-0.19 ***	0.02	0.000	[-0.23 -0.15]	3.68
	Study 4	-0.15 ***	0.02	0.000	[-0.18 -0.11]	3.53
	Study 5	-0.14 ***	0.01	0.000	[-0.17 -0.11]	4.04
	Condition $\times$ Party identity	-0.20 ***	0.03	0.000	[-0.27 -0.13]	1.54
F(6,2106)=34.07, R2=0.09, adjusted R2=0.09						
Hope	(Intercept)	0.32 ***	0.02	0.000	[0.28 0.35]	
	Condition	0.03 ns	0.02	0.222	[-0.02 0.07]	1.46
	Party identity	0.10 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.05 0.15]	0.00
	Study 3	-0.14 ***	0.02	0.000	[-0.18 -0.10]	1.91
	Study 4	-0.10 ***	0.02	0.000	[-0.13 -0.06]	1.47
	Study 5	-0.10 ***	0.02	0.000	[-0.13 -0.07]	1.85
	Condition $\times$ Party identity	-0.20 ***	0.04	0.000	[-0.27 -0.12]	1.36
F(6,2103)=20.54, R2=0.06, adjusted R2=0.05						
Anxiety	(Intercept)	0.27 ***	0.02	0.000	[0.23 0.30]	
	Condition	-0.06 **	0.02	0.002	[-0.10 -0.02]	0.53
	Party identity	0.01 ns	0.02	0.620	[-0.04 0.06]	2.08
	Study 3	-0.07 ***	0.02	0.001	[-0.11 -0.03]	0.54
	Study 4	-0.14 ***	0.02	0.000	[-0.17 -0.11]	3.20
	Study 5	-0.12 ***	0.01	0.000	[-0.15 -0.09]	3.19
	Condition $\times$ Party identity	0.21 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.14 0.27]	1.73
F(6,2105)=32.73, R2=0.09, adjusted R2=0.08						
Anger	(Intercept)	0.20 ***	0.02	0.000	[0.17 0.23]	
	Condition	-0.05 **	0.02	0.003	[-0.09 -0.02]	0.78
	Party identity	0.00 ns	0.02	0.947	[-0.04 0.04]	1.85
	Study 3	-0.14 ***	0.02	0.000	[-0.17 -0.10]	2.69
	Study 4	-0.14 ***	0.01	0.000	[-0.17 -0.12]	4.62
	Study 5	-0.13 ***	0.01	0.000	[-0.15 -0.10]	4.58
	Condition $\times$ Party identity	0.19 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.13 0.25]	1.96
F(6,2105)=42.41, R2=0.11, adjusted R2=0.11						

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Threat to culture	(Intercept)	0.09 ***	0.02	0.000 [	0.05	0.13]	
	Condition	-0.03 ns	0.02	0.172 [	-0.08	0.01]	3.02
	Party identity	0.21 ***	0.03	0.000 [	0.15	0.26]	17.84
	Study 5	-0.02 ns	0.01	0.196 [	-0.05	0.01]	0.14
	Condition × Party identity	0.25 ***	0.04	0.000 [	0.17	0.32]	2.95
	F(4,1235)=87.11, R2=0.22, adjusted R2=0.22						
Threat to the legal norm	(Intercept)	0.08 ***	0.02	0.000 [	0.04	0.11]	
	Condition	-0.03 ns	0.02	0.126 [	-0.08	0.01]	1.48
	Party identity	0.20 ***	0.03	0.000 [	0.15	0.25]	15.90
	Study 5	-0.01 ns	0.01	0.289 [	-0.04	0.01]	0.09
	Condition × Party identity	0.19 ***	0.04	0.000 [	0.12	0.27]	1.96
	F(4,1235)=69.97, R2=0.18, adjusted R2=0.18						
Threat to peace	(Intercept)	0.13 ***	0.02	0.000 [	0.09	0.16]	
	Condition	0.00 ns	0.02	0.863 [	-0.05	0.04]	3.29
	Party identity	0.18 ***	0.03	0.000 [	0.13	0.24]	13.74
	Study5	-0.03 *	0.01	0.020 [	-0.06	-0.01]	0.44
	Condition × Party identity	0.20 ***	0.04	0.000 [	0.12	0.27]	1.87
	F(4,1235)=67.91, R2=0.18, adjusted R2=0.18						
Celebratory reactions	(Intercept)	0.53 ***	0.02	0.000 [	0.49	0.57]	
	Condition	0.12 ***	0.03	0.000 [	0.06	0.17]	0.07
	Party identity	-0.06 †	0.03	0.072 [	-0.12	0.01]	4.10
	Study 5	0.06 ***	0.02	0.000 [	0.03	0.09]	1.11
	Condition × Party identity	-0.21 ***	0.05	0.000 [	-0.30	-0.13]	1.78
	F(4,1235)=23.26, R2=0.07, adjusted R2=0.07						
Political intolerance	(Intercept)	0.40 ***	0.01	0.000 [	0.37	0.42]	
	Condition	0.00 ns	0.02	0.817 [	-0.03	0.03]	0.18
	Party identity	0.28 ***	0.02	0.000 [	0.25	0.32]	20.70
	Study 3	0.00 ns	0.02	0.778 [	-0.04	0.03]	0.00
	Study 4	-0.07 ***	0.01	0.000 [	-0.09	-0.04]	1.38
	Study 5	-0.14 ***	0.01	0.000 [	-0.17	-0.12]	7.31
	Condition × Party identity	0.04 ns	0.03	0.102 [	-0.01	0.09]	0.13
	F(6,2094)=133.49, R2=0.28, adjusted R2=0.27						

Note. †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p < .001.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Figure 1. Associations Between Party Identity and Dependent Variables by Conditions at 95% confidence intervals.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Testing Hypotheses 3a and 3b: mechanisms. In the introduction, three reasons why Republicans may react more aversively to Muslim population growth were discussed: Republicans are more likely than Democrats to receive elite cues from other Republicans in Republican-oriented media that Muslims are threatening, Republicans are conservative, and Republicans believe that Muslims do not endorse values that are treasured by Americans. The current studies probe into the first two mechanisms. As Republicans are more likely than Democrats to be White and Christian, the studies also test two other alternative explanations for the mechanism—the interactional effects are mainly driven by White and Christian participants.

To test the first explanation (Hypothesis 3a), a variable for the Muslim threatening cue variable and its interaction with the condition variable were added to the specification described in Table 6 (this analysis used data from Study 5 data because only Study 5 included the cue measure). As discussed in the pre-registration, this hypothesis would be supported if this interaction term is significant, and the addition of this term reduces the effect of the Condition $\times$ Party identity interaction. Though this approach has its shortcomings, among existing statistical procedures the author is aware of, this comes closest to what can be used to answer the research question (see Appendix E for more discussion).

The results are reported in Table 7. The Muslim threatening cue variable is significant in three cases ($p=.035$ for anger, $p=.033$ for threat to culture, and $p=.007$ for threat to legal norms), and marginally significant in one case ($p=.061$ for threat to peace), all in the expected direction. In the cases where the cue interaction is either significant or marginally significant, the Condition $\times$ Party identity term is reduced: $b=.22^{***}$ is reduced to $b=.16^*$ for anxiety, $b=.13^{**}$ is reduced to $b=.07_{ns}$ for anger, $b=.24^{***}$ is reduced to $b=.18^{**}$ for threat to culture, $b=.15^{**}$ is reduced to $b=.08_{ns}$ for threat to the legal norms, and $b=.20^{***}$ is reduced to $b=.15^*$ for threat to peace (note that the Condition $\times$ Party identity interaction term from Table 7 was compared against the Condition $\times$

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Party identity from results reported for Study 5 in Table D10 in Appendix D, not results reported for all studies reported in Table 6, as these are alternative specifications from the same data of Study 5).

As described in the pre-registration, this hypothesized pattern suggests the mediation effect of the Muslim threatening cue, supporting Hypothesis 3a. In two of these cases, the party identity interactions are no longer significant ($p=.199$ for anger, and $p=.175$ for threat to the legal norms), suggesting full mediation. Therefore, although the cue interaction term is not significant in most other cases, the results where it is significant suggest that Republicans' reception and following of cues from the media that Muslims are threatening at least partially explain the observed patterns.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table 7. Muslim threatening cue interactions (Study 5 data only)

Models		b	S.E.	p	95% CI	Partial η^2 (in %)
Pride	(Intercept)	0.19 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.14 0.24]	
	Condition (1=grow)	0.07 †	0.04	0.055	[0.00 0.14]	0.07
	Party identity (1=Rep.)	-0.02 ns	0.05	0.748	[-0.11 0.08]	1.21
	Cue	-0.06 ns	0.06	0.310	[-0.19 0.06]	0.05
	Condition × Party identity	-0.18 **	0.07	0.008	[-0.32 -0.05]	0.93
	Condition × Cue	0.07 ns	0.09	0.421	[-0.11 0.25]	0.09
	F(5,755)=4.64, R2=0.03, adjusted R2=0.02					
Hope	(Intercept)	0.24 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.18 0.30]	
	Condition	0.06 ns	0.04	0.162	[-0.02 0.14]	0.07
	Party identity	-0.06 ns	0.05	0.280	[-0.17 0.05]	0.86
	Cue	0.04 ns	0.07	0.593	[-0.10 0.18]	0.05
	Condition × Party identity	-0.08 ns	0.08	0.283	[-0.24 0.07]	0.15
	Condition × Cue	-0.01 ns	0.10	0.894	[-0.22 0.19]	0.00
	F(5,755)=1.89, R2=0.01, adjusted R2=0.01					
Anxiety	(Intercept)	0.15 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.10 0.20]	
	Condition	-0.14 ***	0.04	0.000	[-0.22 -0.07]	0.04
	Party identity	-0.03 ns	0.05	0.522	[-0.13 0.07]	0.24
	Cue	0.09 ns	0.07	0.152	[-0.03 0.22]	1.75
	Condition × Party identity	0.16 *	0.07	0.022	[0.02 0.30]	0.70
	Condition × Cue	0.16 †	0.09	0.085	[-0.02 0.35]	0.39
	F(5,755)=8.56, R2=0.05, adjusted R2=0.05					
Anger	(Intercept)	0.07 **	0.02	0.001	[0.03 0.11]	
	Condition	-0.09 **	0.03	0.003	[-0.15 -0.03]	0.00
	Party identity	-0.04 ns	0.04	0.269	[-0.12 0.03]	0.01
	Cue	0.12 *	0.05	0.026	[0.01 0.22]	3.38
	Condition × Party identity	0.07 ns	0.06	0.199	[-0.04 0.19]	0.22
	Condition × Cue	0.16 *	0.08	0.036	[0.01 0.31]	0.58
	F(5,755)=8.88, R2=0.06, adjusted R2=0.05					
Threat to culture	(Intercept)	-0.02 ns	0.02	0.318	[-0.07 0.02]	
	Condition	-0.08 *	0.03	0.013	[-0.15 -0.02]	2.31
	Party identity	0.18 ***	0.04	0.000	[0.10 0.26]	9.34
	Cue	0.31 ***	0.06	0.000	[0.20 0.42]	11.26
	Condition × Party identity	0.18 **	0.06	0.003	[0.06 0.30]	1.15
	Condition × Cue	0.17 *	0.08	0.033	[0.01 0.33]	0.60
	F(5,755)=77.03, R2=0.34, adjusted R2=0.33					
Threat to the legal norm	(Intercept)	-0.01 ns	0.02	0.499	[-0.06 0.03]	
	Condition	-0.08 **	0.03	0.009	[-0.15 -0.02]	0.54
	Party identity	0.21 ***	0.04	0.000	[0.13 0.29]	8.54
	Cue	0.24 ***	0.05	0.000	[0.13 0.35]	9.15
	Condition × Party identity	0.08 ns	0.06	0.175	[-0.04 0.20]	0.24
	Condition × Cue	0.21 **	0.08	0.007	[0.06 0.37]	0.95
	F(5,755)=62.07, R2=0.29, adjusted R2=0.29					
Threat to peace	(Intercept)	0.03 ns	0.02	0.259	[-0.02 0.07]	
	Condition	-0.07 *	0.03	0.041	[-0.13 0.00]	1.92
	Party identity	0.16 ***	0.04	0.000	[0.08 0.25]	7.46
	Cue	0.26 ***	0.06	0.000	[0.15 0.37]	8.29
	Condition × Party identity	0.15 *	0.06	0.013	[0.03 0.27]	0.82
	Condition × Cue	0.15 †	0.08	0.061	[-0.01 0.31]	0.46
	F(5,755)=57.6, R2=0.28, adjusted R2=0.27					
Celebratory reactions	(Intercept)	0.63 ***	0.03	0.000	[0.58 0.68]	
	Condition	0.18 ***	0.04	0.000	[0.10 0.26]	0.48
	Party identity	-0.06 ns	0.05	0.254	[-0.16 0.04]	2.21
	Cue	-0.14 *	0.07	0.035	[-0.28 -0.01]	2.53
	Condition × Party identity	-0.19 **	0.07	0.009	[-0.34 -0.05]	0.89
	Condition × Cue	-0.15 ns	0.10	0.124	[-0.35 0.04]	0.31
	F(5,755)=18.67, R2=0.11, adjusted R2=0.1					

Note. †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p < .001.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

To test the second explanation (Hypothesis 3b) and rule out the alternative race and religion explanation, an additional set of analyses using *all five studies' data* was conducted. In this set of analyses, participants' race (1=White), religion (1=Christian), ideology (1=conservatism), and their interactions with conditions were added to the specification described in the main models in Table 6. The results are reported in Table 8. Their interpretations are similar to that of the above—if the interaction terms are significant and reduce the effect of the Condition $\times$ Party identity interaction, then there is evidence of mediation effects.

For the ideology explanation, this term is significant in three cases ($p=.029$ for threat to the U.S., $p=.003$ for hope, and $p=.033$ for anxiety), marginally significant in two cases ($p=.051$ for threat to Christians, and $p=.085$ for pride), although in one case it is marginally significant in the opposite direction of expectation ($p=.056$ for intolerance). In the cases where the ideology's interaction with the condition is significant or marginally significant, the term for party identity's interaction with the condition is reduced: $b=.11^\dagger$ is reduced to $b=-.02_{ns}$ for threat to Christians, $b=.42^{***}$ is reduced to $b=.17_{ns}$ for threat to U.S. society, $b=-.20^{***}$ is reduced to $b=-.16^{**}$ for pride, $b=-.20^{***}$ is reduced to $b=-.10^\dagger$ for hope, $b=.21^{***}$ is reduced to $b=.12^{**}$ for anxiety, $b=-.20^{***}$ is reduced to $b=-.16^{**}$ for pride (note that the Condition $\times$ Party identity interaction terms from Table 6 were compared against the Condition $\times$ Party identity from results reported in Table 8, as these are alternative specifications from the same set of data from all studies). Therefore, there is some evidence that ideology is a mechanism, though, like the analyses related to Hypothesis 3a, there are still substantial amounts of residual variances accounted for by the Condition $\times$ Party identity interaction.

In terms of race and religion as the alternative explanations, the race interaction is only marginally significant in one case ($p=.053$ for anxiety). The religion interaction is significant in one case ($p=.011$ for threat to culture) and marginally significant in one case ($p=.050$ for threat to peace), but it is also significant in the opposite direction to expectation in two cases ($p=.016$ for threat to

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Christians, and $p=.008$ for pride). Together, these analyses suggest that race and religion are unlikely to provide a meaningful explanation for the mechanism of the observed pattern, and the observed reduction in the effect of the Condition $\times$ Party identity interaction is mostly attributable to the effect of the Condition $\times$ Ideology interaction.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table 8. Mechanisms and alternative explanations: ideology, race, and religion.

	b	S.E.	p	95% CI	Partial η^2 (in %)	β
Bad for Christians	(Intercept)	0.51 ***	0.05	0.000 [0.41 0.61]		0.00
	Condition (1=grow)	0.14 **	0.05	0.007 [0.04 0.24]	16.29	0.27
	Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.01 ns	0.08	0.873 [-0.14 0.17]	0.00	0.01
	White	-0.02 ns	0.04	0.674 [-0.09 0.06]	0.02	-0.02
	Christian	0.00 ns	0.04	0.997 [-0.07 0.07]	0.54	0.00
	Ideology	0.07 ns	0.08	0.384 [-0.08 0.22]	1.69	0.07
	Study 1	-0.24 ***	0.03	0.000 [-0.30 -0.18]	10.68	-0.46
	Condition × Party identity	-0.02 ns	0.11	0.834 [-0.25 0.20]	0.01	-0.03
	Condition × White	0.02 ns	0.05	0.756 [-0.09 0.12]	0.02	0.03
	Condition × Christian	-0.10 *	0.04	0.016 [-0.18 -0.02]	1.06	-0.17
	Condition × Ideology	0.22 †	0.11	0.051 [0.00 0.43]	0.70	0.25
	F(10,542)=30.74, R2=0.36, adjusted R2=0.35					
Bad for the U.S.	(Intercept)	0.62 ***	0.05	0.000 [0.51 0.72]		0.00
	Condition	-0.15 **	0.06	0.007 [-0.26 -0.04]	2.39	-0.31
	Party identity	-0.08 ns	0.08	0.336 [-0.25 0.08]	0.00	-0.09
	White	0.07 †	0.04	0.059 [0.00 0.15]	1.25	0.11
	Christian	-0.16 ***	0.04	0.000 [-0.24 -0.08]	2.63	-0.33
	Ideology	0.03 ns	0.08	0.743 [-0.13 0.19]	1.16	0.03
	Study 1	-0.11 ***	0.03	0.001 [-0.17 -0.05]	2.05	-0.22
	Condition × Party identity	0.17 ns	0.12	0.176 [-0.07 0.41]	0.34	0.20
	Condition × White	0.00 ns	0.06	0.975 [-0.11 0.11]	0.00	0.00
	Condition × Christian	0.07 ns	0.04	0.138 [-0.02 0.15]	0.40	0.12
	Condition × Ideology	0.26 *	0.12	0.029 [0.03 0.49]	0.87	0.32
	F(10,544)=9.78, R2=0.15, adjusted R2=0.14					
Pride	(Intercept)	0.34 ***	0.02	0.000 [0.29 0.39]		0.00
	Condition	0.03 ns	0.03	0.319 [-0.03 0.09]	1.61	0.05
	Party identity	0.14 ***	0.03	0.000 [0.07 0.20]	0.28	0.17
	White	-0.05 *	0.02	0.029 [-0.09 0.00]	0.58	-0.07
	Christian	0.01 ns	0.02	0.764 [-0.03 0.04]	0.39	0.01
	Ideology	-0.04 ns	0.04	0.237 [-0.12 0.03]	0.54	-0.05
	Study 3	-0.21 ***	0.02	0.000 [-0.25 -0.16]	3.59	-0.23
	Study 4	-0.17 ***	0.02	0.000 [-0.20 -0.13]	4.32	-0.24
	Study 5	-0.16 ***	0.02	0.000 [-0.19 -0.13]	4.79	-0.26
	Condition × Party identity	-0.16 **	0.05	0.001 [-0.25 -0.06]	0.50	-0.19
	Condition × White	-0.01 ns	0.03	0.626 [-0.07 0.04]	0.01	-0.02
	Condition × Christian	0.07 **	0.03	0.008 [0.02 0.12]	0.34	0.10
	Condition × Ideology	-0.09 †	0.05	0.085 [-0.20 0.01]	0.14	-0.10
	F(12,2098)=20.24, R2=0.1, adjusted R2=0.1					
Hope	(Intercept)	0.36 ***	0.02	0.000 [0.31 0.41]		0.00
	Condition	0.04 ns	0.03	0.170 [-0.02 0.10]	1.50	0.07
	Party identity	0.11 **	0.04	0.002 [0.04 0.18]	0.30	0.13
	White	-0.04 *	0.02	0.042 [-0.09 0.00]	0.45	-0.06
	Christian	0.05 **	0.02	0.007 [0.01 0.09]	1.10	0.09
	Ideology	-0.04 ns	0.04	0.273 [-0.12 0.03]	0.94	-0.05
	Study 3	-0.18 ***	0.02	0.000 [-0.23 -0.14]	2.63	-0.20
	Study 4	-0.13 ***	0.02	0.000 [-0.17 -0.10]	2.44	-0.18
	Study 5	-0.13 ***	0.02	0.000 [-0.16 -0.10]	2.90	-0.21
	Condition × Party identity	-0.10 †	0.05	0.061 [-0.20 0.00]	0.17	-0.11
	Condition × White	-0.01 ns	0.03	0.804 [-0.07 0.05]	0.00	-0.01
	Condition × Christian	0.03 ns	0.03	0.199 [-0.02 0.09]	0.08	0.05
	Condition × Ideology	-0.17 **	0.06	0.003 [-0.28 -0.06]	0.42	-0.18
	F(12,2095)=14.95, R2=0.08, adjusted R2=0.07					

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Anxiety	(Intercept)	0.28 ***	0.02	0.000 [0.24 0.33]	0.00
	Condition	-0.11 ***	0.03	0.000 [-0.17 -0.06]	0.56 -0.20
	Party identity	0.02 ns	0.03	0.594 [-0.05 0.09]	0.51 0.02
	White	-0.03 ns	0.02	0.136 [-0.07 0.01]	0.00 -0.05
	Christian	0.02 ns	0.02	0.409 [-0.02 0.05]	0.04 0.03
	Ideology	-0.01 ns	0.04	0.791 [-0.08 0.06]	0.14 -0.01
	Study 3	-0.08 ***	0.02	0.001 [-0.12 -0.03]	0.56 -0.09
	Study 4	-0.14 ***	0.02	0.000 [-0.17 -0.10]	2.98 -0.20
	Study 5	-0.12 ***	0.02	0.000 [-0.15 -0.09]	2.99 -0.21
	Condition × Party identity	0.12 **	0.05	0.010 [0.03 0.22]	0.32 0.15
	Condition × White	0.06 †	0.03	0.053 [0.00 0.11]	0.18 0.10
	Condition × Christian	-0.01 ns	0.03	0.823 [-0.06 0.04]	0.00 -0.01
	Condition × Ideology	0.11 *	0.05	0.033 [0.01 0.22]	0.22 0.13
	F(12,2097)=17.58, R2=0.09, adjusted R2=0.09				
Anger	(Intercept)	0.20 ***	0.02	0.000 [0.16 0.24]	0.00
	Condition	-0.08 **	0.03	0.003 [-0.13 -0.03]	0.78 -0.15
	Party identity	-0.03 ns	0.03	0.364 [-0.09 0.03]	0.46 -0.04
	White	-0.01 ns	0.02	0.577 [-0.05 0.03]	0.02 -0.02
	Christian	0.00 ns	0.02	0.791 [-0.03 0.04]	0.01 0.01
	Ideology	0.04 ns	0.03	0.221 [-0.02 0.10]	0.18 0.05
	Study 3	-0.13 ***	0.02	0.000 [-0.17 -0.10]	2.11 -0.17
	Study 4	-0.14 ***	0.01	0.000 [-0.17 -0.11]	4.02 -0.23
	Study 5	-0.12 ***	0.01	0.000 [-0.15 -0.10]	3.95 -0.24
	Condition × Party identity	0.19 ***	0.04	0.000 [0.11 0.27]	0.95 0.26
	Condition × White	0.04 ns	0.03	0.156 [-0.01 0.09]	0.10 0.07
	Condition × Christian	-0.02 ns	0.02	0.375 [-0.06 0.02]	0.04 -0.03
	Condition × Ideology	0.01 ns	0.05	0.832 [-0.08 0.10]	0.00 0.01
	F(12,2097)=21.91, R2=0.11, adjusted R2=0.11				
Threat to culture	(Intercept)	0.05 *	0.02	0.028 [0.01 0.09]	0.00
	Condition	-0.05 †	0.03	0.098 [-0.11 0.01]	3.77 -0.09
	Party identity	0.02 ns	0.04	0.600 [-0.06 0.11]	1.09 0.03
	White	0.00 ns	0.02	0.973 [-0.04 0.04]	0.00 0.00
	Christian	0.02 ns	0.02	0.291 [-0.02 0.06]	1.36 0.04
	Ideology	0.22 ***	0.04	0.000 [0.14 0.31]	4.93 0.28
	Study 4	0.03 *	0.01	0.026 [0.00 0.06]	0.40 0.05
	Condition × Party identity	0.18 **	0.06	0.003 [0.06 0.30]	0.70 0.22
	Condition × White	0.01 ns	0.03	0.828 [-0.05 0.07]	0.00 0.01
	Condition × Christian	0.07 *	0.03	0.011 [0.02 0.13]	0.52 0.12
	Condition × Ideology	0.04 ns	0.06	0.541 [-0.08 0.16]	0.03 0.04
	F(10,1229)=47.62, R2=0.28, adjusted R2=0.27				
Threat to the legal norm	(Intercept)	0.05 *	0.02	0.028 [0.00 0.09]	0.00
	Condition	-0.06 *	0.03	0.039 [-0.12 0.00]	1.92 -0.12
	Party identity	0.02 ns	0.04	0.596 [-0.06 0.10]	1.00 0.03
	White	-0.01 ns	0.02	0.558 [-0.05 0.03]	0.00 -0.02
	Christian	0.04 †	0.02	0.052 [0.00 0.08]	1.54 0.08
	Ideology	0.20 ***	0.04	0.000 [0.12 0.29]	3.81 0.27
	Study 4	0.02 †	0.01	0.065 [0.00 0.05]	0.28 0.05
	Condition × Party identity	0.16 **	0.06	0.006 [0.05 0.28]	0.63 0.21
	Condition × White	0.03 ns	0.03	0.279 [-0.03 0.09]	0.10 0.06
	Condition × Christian	0.04 ns	0.03	0.120 [-0.01 0.10]	0.20 0.07
	Condition × Ideology	0.00 ns	0.06	0.987 [-0.11 0.12]	0.00 0.00
	F(10,1229)=38.25, R2=0.24, adjusted R2=0.23				

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Threat to peace	(Intercept)	0.07 **	0.02	0.001 [	0.03	0.11]		0.00
	Condition	-0.03 ns	0.03	0.331 [	-0.09	0.03]	3.81	-0.05
	Party identity	0.02 ns	0.04	0.690 [	-0.07	0.10]	0.91	0.02
	White	0.01 ns	0.02	0.705 [	-0.03	0.05]	0.16	0.01
	Christian	0.02 ns	0.02	0.435 [	-0.03	0.06]	0.79	0.03
	Ideology	0.20 ***	0.04	0.000 [	0.12	0.29]	3.14	0.26
	Study 4	0.04 **	0.01	0.002 [	0.02	0.07]	0.77	0.08
	Condition × Party identity	0.17 **	0.06	0.005 [	0.05	0.29]	0.63	0.22
	Condition × White	0.03 ns	0.03	0.355 [	-0.03	0.09]	0.07	0.05
	Condition × Christian	0.06 †	0.03	0.050 [	0.00	0.12]	0.31	0.09
	Condition × Ideology	-0.02 ns	0.06	0.772 [	-0.14	0.10]	0.01	-0.02
F(10,1229)=34.98, R2=0.22, adjusted R2=0.22								
Celebratory reactions	(Intercept)	0.58 ***	0.02	0.000 [	0.54	0.63]		0.00
	Condition	0.12 ***	0.03	0.000 [	0.06	0.19]	0.07	0.22
	Party identity	-0.07 ns	0.05	0.180 [	-0.17	0.03]	1.23	-0.08
	White	-0.01 ns	0.02	0.712 [	-0.06	0.04]	0.02	-0.01
	Christian	0.05 *	0.02	0.047 [	0.00	0.10]	0.32	0.09
	Ideology	-0.03 ns	0.05	0.618 [	-0.12	0.07]	0.25	-0.03
	Study 4	-0.06 ***	0.02	0.000 [	-0.09	-0.03]	1.15	-0.10
	Condition × Party identity	-0.14 *	0.07	0.044 [	-0.28	0.00]	0.33	-0.17
	Condition × White	0.00 ns	0.04	0.954 [	-0.07	0.07]	0.00	0.00
	Condition × Christian	-0.03 ns	0.03	0.399 [	-0.10	0.04]	0.06	-0.04
	Condition × Ideology	-0.07 ns	0.07	0.311 [	-0.21	0.07]	0.08	-0.08
F(10,1229)=10.14, R2=0.08, adjusted R2=0.07								
Political intolerance	(Intercept)	0.33 ***	0.02	0.000 [	0.29	0.36]		0.00
	Condition	0.03 ns	0.02	0.247 [	-0.02	0.07]	0.24	0.05
	Party identity	0.11 ***	0.03	0.000 [	0.06	0.16]	3.38	0.15
	White	0.04 *	0.02	0.023 [	0.00	0.07]	0.18	0.06
	Christian	0.02 ns	0.01	0.114 [	-0.01	0.05]	0.28	0.05
	Ideology	0.25 ***	0.03	0.000 [	0.19	0.30]	4.99	0.33
	Study 3	-0.03 †	0.02	0.059 [	-0.07	0.00]	0.17	-0.04
	Study 4	-0.05 ***	0.01	0.000 [	-0.08	-0.03]	0.84	-0.09
	Study 5	-0.14 ***	0.01	0.000 [	-0.16	-0.12]	6.63	-0.27
	Condition × Party identity	0.10 **	0.04	0.008 [	0.03	0.17]	0.34	0.14
	Condition × White	-0.03 ns	0.02	0.208 [	-0.07	0.02]	0.08	-0.05
	Condition × Christian	0.01 ns	0.02	0.751 [	-0.03	0.04]	0.00	0.01
	Condition × Ideology	-0.07 †	0.04	0.056 [	-0.15	0.00]	0.17	-0.10
F(12,2086)=82.72, R2=0.32, adjusted R2=0.32								

Note. † $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

General Discussion

Overall, there is a good amount of evidence for Hypothesis 1 (i.e., Americans on average have negative reactions to the population growth of Muslims) and Hypothesis 2 (i.e., partisans' reactions diverge such that Republicans tend to react more negatively than Democrats). There is also some evidence for Hypothesis 3a and 3b that the party affiliation moderation described above is explained by the partisan cues from the media environment (Hypothesis 3b) and the participants' political ideology (Hypothesis 3b). The domains of reactions encompass the areas of threat perceptions, emotional reactions, and celebratory responses, but there are very limited effects (practically none) in the domain of political intolerance.

Addressing alternative explanations about race and dominant status

The effect of perceived Muslim population growth is unlikely to be “racial” in nature⁶ (that is, the effects are not motivated by participants' race or presumed race of Muslims; see below). It is also unlikely that partisans' divergent reactions are about a dominant group's defensive reactions to the growth of a minority (despite the author's prior expectations). First, the type of threat identified by the current studies is theoretically different from perceived threats associated with racial demographic shifts. The threats identified from the current studies include concerns over the American legal norms (e.g., concern that Muslims might implement Sharia law) and terrorism. These threats are theoretically similar to threats specific to Muslims. However, perceived threats associated with *racial* demographic shifts are predominantly about status threat (Craig & Richeson, 2014a) and prototypicality threat (Danbold & Huo, 2014). While it is unlikely that the perceived Muslim population growth triggers status threat and prototypicality threat because some of the effects are still observed among participants who are *neither White nor Christian* (i.e., among people to whom

⁶ Consistent with this idea, Lajevardi (2020) also showed that a hypothetical candidate's religion, not race, determines how they are evaluated.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

these threats are not applicable; see more below), it is possible it still implicitly triggers collective existential threat (Bai & Federico, 2019). Future research should address this possibility empirically.

Second, methodologically speaking, the effects are unlikely “racial” because the experiments do not manipulate perceived population change of different racial groups. In Studies 4 and 5, participants were asked their perceived population growth of Muslims, White people, and racial minorities, and only the perceived Muslim population significantly varies by condition⁷. Therefore, the experimental effects were not driven by participants’ presumption that the population of Whites or minorities is changing.

Third, statistically speaking, additional alternative models were estimated, including an interaction between conditions and participants’ race and an interaction between condition and participants’ religious background. These models reveal that race and religion at best play a very limited role in explaining the observed patterns (see Table 8). This suggests that, from the perspective of participants’ own racial and religious backgrounds, the effects are unlikely “racial.”

Finally, analytically speaking, additional analyses using the aggregated data were conducted. These analyses parallel the models described in the main model in Table 8, but only include the 395 participants who are *neither White nor Christian*. They show that the interaction between condition and party identity still persists in six out of eleven cases ($b=1.04$, $p<.001$ for threat to Christian, $b=-.24$, $p=.030$ for hope, $b=.32$, $p<.001$ for anxiety, $b=.22$, $p=.007$ for anger, $b=.28$, $p=.010$ for threat to culture, $b=.35$, $p=.018$ for celebratory reaction), and was marginally significant in one case ($b=-.20$, $p=.069$ for pride). Thus, Republicans and Democrats who are neither White nor Christian can have

⁷ Participants were asked “Based on your beliefs, how would you describe the current population growth and decline of the following social groups?” (with the target listing of Muslims, White people, and racial minorities) on a nine-point scale from 1=Declining very fast to 9=Growing very fast, which then was linearly transformed to run from 0 to 1. Three regressions using condition and a Study number indicator were used to predict perceived population growth of the three groups separately. The condition variable is significant for the Muslim model ($b=.17$, $p<.001$), but not significant for the White people model ($b=-.01$, $p=.490$) and marginally significant in the opposite direction for the racial minorities model ($b=-.02$, $p=.054$).

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

divergent reactions to Muslim population growth, similar to White and Christian participants. This further reveals that the observed effects are unlikely racial; that is, the experimental effects were not motivated by participants' racial identity. Furthermore, since the partisans' divergent reactions still occur among minority participants, the observed effects are unlikely about a dominant group's defensive reactions to the growth of minorities. Therefore, out of these four considerations, it is unlikely that the effect of perceptions of Muslim population growth is "racial" or about status domination.

Republicans vs Democrats, Republicans vs Everyone else, or Democrats vs Everyone else? Are partisans' diverging responses to Muslim population growth driven by the differences between Republicans and Democrats, or partisans and everyone else? In short, it is a little of both. To address this, another two sets of interaction models parallel to what is in Table 6 were estimated using Study 4 data. These models use the categorical measure of participants' party identity (though in the main analyses, it was coded as a continuous variable), and the party identity was treated as a factor variable. These models are summarized and discussed in greater detail in Appendix F due to space limitation. Overall, these results reveal two main patterns. First, the effect of manipulation on Independents is close to the average of the effects on Republicans and Democrats⁸. Second, the moderating effects of party identity on manipulation in the cases of threat to culture, legal norms, and peace are driven more by the differences between Republicans and everyone else (i.e., Independents and Democrats). In contrast, the moderating effects in the cases of pride and hope are driven by the differences between Democrats and everyone else (i.e., Independents and Republicans). In the remaining cases, the moderating effects are driven by the differences between Republicans and Democrats.

⁸ This pattern, once again, justifies the coding of participants who do not identify with either party as party identity=.5.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Theoretical contributions

This research makes several theoretical contributions to the literature.

First, this research demonstrates that political leaning can be an antecedent (as a moderator), not just a consequence of demographic shift (see Craig & Richeson, 2014b). Past studies reveal that citizens can adopt more conservative attitudes and Republican identity after facing demographic threat. The current studies suggest that Republicans are particularly sensitive to the threat of demographic shift. As a result, Republican citizens may adopt an increasingly strong Republican identity over time as they are repeatedly exposed to information about the demographic shift, as the shift occurs. Therefore, the dynamic interface between perceived demographic shift and party identity may trigger a mutually-reinforcing effect that is more profound than previously thought⁹. Furthermore, as the population growth of Muslim becomes more and more salient in the future, political elites will likely frame it with different narratives, and partisans will likely react to it with divergent responses. These may eventually become yet another source for political polarization in the United States (e.g., Layman & Carsey, 2002).

Second, most studies on the psychological consequences of a demographic shift (see introduction) focus on the population change in terms of race. It is unclear if demographic shifts in terms of a symbolic group that is defined by values and beliefs can trigger similar psychological consequences. As partisan identity is becoming an increasingly salient identity for Americans (e.g., Mason, 2015), examining its interface with the on-going demographic change is critical in revealing the complex psychological backlash of this social change. As mentioned above, this in turn

⁹ However, it should be noted that this possibility was not directly tested in the current studies, and it relies on the assumption that demographic shift in the Muslim population can induce participants' adoption of Republican identity in a similar way that demographic shift in racial population does. Future research should empirically test this implication.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

contributes to the literature of polarization by identifying yet another domain of disagreement between partisans on an increasingly palpable social phenomenon.

Third, most psychological studies on the effect of demographic shift focus on the status threat mechanism (Outten et al., 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2014a, Craig & Richeson, 2014b, Major et al., 2018; contra: Danbold & Huo, 2015; Bai & Federico, 2020), rendering the status threat mechanism the dominant explanation for psychological reactions to demographic shift. The current research suggests a more nuanced approach to understand the psychology of demographic shift. As discussed above, neither dominant status of participants nor perceived status challenged from a target group seem to play a prominent role in partisans' diverging reaction, suggesting that the effects of demographic shift do not always trigger the status threat mechanism from the dominant social group. As shown in the current studies, the types of threat are more descriptive of stereotypes related to Muslims in the American political context. As such, the findings contribute to the literature by suggesting that the type of threat mechanism triggered by a particular type of demographic shift is contingent upon the public image of the social group whose demography is shifting, highlighting the complexities of the psychological backlash of the ongoing demographic shift.

Fourth, past studies on the psychological consequences of demographic shift usually focus on the dominant/majority group's negative and defensive reaction to demographic shift (e.g., Outten et al., 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2014a; Danbold & Huo, 2015; Bai & Federico, 2020). The current studies reveal that a dominant group can have positive and celebratory reactions to the growth of out-groups, which have been overlooked in the past studies. The qualitative data from Study 3 and corresponding quantitative data from Studies 4 and 5 provide evidence that it is possible for the declining dominant/majority group to have a welcoming attitude toward a demographic change. Though the current studies identified a moderator that explains people's variances in this

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

response, it would be worthwhile for future researchers to investigate what factors may motivate people to *change* their attitude toward the demographic shift.

Fifth, the current studies suggest that ideology and media exposure are two potential mechanisms for the partisans' divergent reaction to the population growth of Muslims. Though citizens' ideology is unlikely to change as a dispositional variable, the media environment and political elites' public discourse may eventually help partisans to think about minorities differently, and as a result interpret the implications of demographic shifts differently. This suggests that interventions targeting media's framing and political elites' discourses (in particular, Republican-facing media and Republican elites) may be a potential avenue for reducing prejudice and conflicts that may arise as a result of a demographic shift. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that participants' exposure to derogation of Muslims in media and by elites were measured, as opposed to manipulated. Though doing so is beyond the scope of the current research, future research may consider experimentally manipulating partisans' narratives and framing in addition to demographic shifts.

Finally, as discussed earlier, existing studies on demographic shift often focus on the population change of racial groups (e.g., Outten et al., 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2014a; Danbold & Huo, 2015; Bai & Federico, 2020), and the effects of demographic shift in terms of symbolic groups remains underexplored. Hence, the current research fills in this gap by demonstrating that the psychological effect of a demographic shift occurs in the context of symbolic groups as well.

Limitations, qualifications, and future directions

The current studies have some limitations. Specifically, one may consider that the divergent reaction of partisans is alternatively explained by Republicans' assumption that Muslims are more likely to vote for Democrats and the growing Muslim population implies a growing political power of Democrats. Though the current design of the studies cannot directly address this possibility, the

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

open-ended responses from Study 3 are helpful to rule out this explanation--based on these results, participants' aversive reactions to Muslim population growth is primarily driven by concerns that are distinctively related to stereotypes about Muslims (e.g., terrorism and implementation of Sharia law), as opposed to concerns about "winning status" or challenges to Republicans' political power. The absence of mentioning the challenges to political power is also unlikely a result of social desirability concern, given that participants were willing to mention concerns of terrorism, something presumably defy social desirability even more. Nonetheless, future studies should consider addressing this limitation more thoroughly.

Furthermore, many studies suggest that people tend to adopt more intolerant and exclusionary political attitudes toward a social group after they perceive an intergroup threat from it (Stephan et al., 2009) or experience negative intergroup emotions towards it (Mackie et al., 2008). Though threat perceptions and emotions are correlated with the political intolerance variable (see Table 5), the manipulation does not have the expected main effect or interaction effect. The reason for these null findings in this domain of reaction remains unclear. One possibility is that the manipulation has the expected effect on political intolerance via threat perceptions and emotions while an unobserved competing mediator is activated. Future research may consider addressing this more thoroughly.

Conclusion

The Muslim population is rapidly growing worldwide, and it is slowly, yet unwaveringly, redefining the world demography. The current experiments show that Republicans and Democrats respond to this change with divergent reactions in several domains, possibly due to elite cue-taking and ideology. Together, the complex and dynamic patterns identified in the current studies provide a more nuanced understanding of the psychological consequence of demographic shift, pointing out another potential source of political polarization.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

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MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Online Appendix A

Below are the materials used for manipulation in Study 1 and Study 2

Please carefully review the following graph based on the latest demographic data and answer the following question.

(Graph used in the control condition)

(Graph used in the Muslim growth condition)

According to the graph, what is the religious group that is growing the fastest? (Please type your answer here)

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Below are the materials used for manipulation in Study 3

(Graph used in the control condition)

(Graph used in the Muslim growth condition)

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Below are the materials used for manipulation in Studies 4 and 5

[Muslim grow condition]

Key findings about the Population Change of Muslim

Muslims are the fastest-growing religious group in the world. There were 1.8 billion Muslims in the world as of 2015 – roughly 24% of the global population – according to a Pew Research Center estimate. Although many countries in the Middle East-North Africa region, where the religion originated in the seventh century, are heavily Muslim, the region is home to only about 20% of the world's Muslims. A majority of Muslims globally (62%) live in the Asia-Pacific region, including large populations in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Turkey. The Muslim population is growing fast worldwide. According to the Pew Research Center (2015), the Muslim population could grow by 73% between 2010 and 2050 (see graph to the right that depicts population growth of non-Christian religions in the

world). Though countries with the largest population of Muslims are mostly in Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa (Pew Research Center, 2015), the Muslim population also has a substantial growing presence in several Western countries such as France (8.8%), Sweden (8.1%), Germany (6.1%) and the UK (6.3%) as of 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2017). In the U.S., the Muslim population is merely 0.9% of the total population as of 2010, more of whom are White than any other race. Yet, the growth of its share of the population is the fastest among that of all major religions, and is projected to reach 2.1% by 2050 (Pew Research Center, 2015).

The main reason for the growth of Islam's ultimately involves simple demographics. To begin with, Muslims have more children than members of the seven other major religious groups analyzed in the study. Muslim women have an average of 2.9 children, significantly higher than the next-highest group (Christians at 2.6) and the average of all non-Muslims (2.2). In all major regions where there is a sizable Muslim population, Muslim fertility exceeds non-Muslim fertility.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

[Control condition]

U. S. Census Bureau Reports Residents Now Move at a Higher Rate

New U. S. Census Bureau data suggest that the rate of geographical mobility, or the number of individuals who have moved within the past year, is increasing. The national mover rate increased from 11.9 percent in 2008 (which was the lowest rate recorded since the U. S. Census Bureau began tracking the data) to 12.5 percent in 2009.

According to the new data, 37.1 million people changed residences in the United States within the past year. Eighty-four percent of all movers stayed within the same state. Renters were more than five times more likely to move than homeowners.

The new estimates also reveal that many of the nation's fastest-growing communities are suburbs. Specifically, principal cities within metropolitan areas experienced a net loss of 2.1 million movers, while the suburban areas had a net gain of 2.4 million movers. For those who moved to a different county or state, the reasons for moving varied considerably depending on the length of their move. Overall, four out of 10 (43.7 percent) moved due to housing-related reasons, such as the desire to live in a new or better home or apartment.

These geographic mobility data are used to determine the extent of mobility of the U. S. population and the resulting redistribution. Migration data are collected as a part of the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS). How populations change has implications for federal, state, and local governments, as well as for private industry. The latest figures are predicated on current and historical trends, which can be thrown awry by several variables, including prospective overhauls to public and economic policy.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Below is the full scale for political tolerance of Muslims used in Study 3

The first one is “Park51 (originally named Cordoba House) is a development that was originally envisioned as a 13-story Islamic community center and mosque in Lower Manhattan. Its proposed location is two blocks from the World Trade Center site, and often referred to as the ‘Ground Zero mosque.’ As of 2016, an Islamic cultural museum was planned as part of the building. Are you in favor of letting the developers to build Park51? [sic]” (1=I am IN FAVOR of building Park 51, 7=I am OPPOSED to building Park 51).

The second one is “Tarek ibn Ziyad Academy (TIZA) is a charter school funded by tax payers in Minnesota whose mission is to ‘recognizes and appreciates the traditions, histories, civilizations and accomplishments of the eastern world.’ Although TIZA claims to be non-sectarian, as Minnesota law requires it to be, most students are from low-income Muslim immigrant families. Much ‘after-school Islamic learning’ takes place on weekdays in the same building. Are you in favor of funding TIZA with tax payers’ money? [sic]” (1=I am IN FAVOR of funding TIZA with tax payers’ money, 7=I am OPPOSED TO funding TIZA with tax payers’ money).

Below is the full scale for political tolerance of Muslims used in Studies 4 and 5

We are interested in your opinion about the following statements. Please respond with your honest opinion by indicating the degree of your agreement with them. Keep in mind there is no right or wrong answer.

The right to establish Islamic schools should always exist in the United States.

Some Islamic holy days should become official U.S. holidays.

U.S. TV should broadcast more programs by and for Muslims.

In the U.S., the wearing of a headscarf should NOT be forbidden.

Muslims should establish an Islamic political party in the U.S.

Online Appendix B

What type of threats/reactions are triggered by Muslim population growth? Qualitative analyses from Study 3

Using qualitative data, Study 3 also attempts to gain an additional understanding about the nature of assessment about the perceived Muslim population growth. In particular, in what ways do people see Muslim population growth as something bad (i.e., as a threat) to Christians and U.S. society? Though past studies suggest that Muslims are perceived to be threatening in symbolic as well as realistic ways (González et al., 2008), operationalization of these threats focuses on perceived cultural and value conflicts with in-group (for symbolic threat), economic and employment challenge to the in-group (for realistic threat), and in some cases perceived encouragement of violence (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2017a). It is unclear if Muslims are perceived to be threatening beyond these conventional domains of threat. In order to answer this question, a qualitative analysis for the category of responses was conducted on respondents' open-ended responses from participants assigned to the growth condition. After reading all the responses, the author organized them into five categories for the response about whether the population growth is good or bad for Christian, and six categories for the response about whether the population growth is good or bad for U.S. society. Table 3 and Table 4 summarize the percentages, and number of responses in each category, as well as several example responses from each category. The de-identified open-ended responses can be found via https://osf.io/dyxpk/?view_only=c895b26b92bb45d8899dd676dfb3a537

The first category of responses consists of comments that do not characterize any type of threat or concern. The second category of response is characterized by mentioning symbolic conflicts, or concerns that the culture and values of Muslims are incompatible with that of Christians or (the legal norms of) the United States. The third category includes comments that address concerns that the influence and dominance of Christianity is in relative decline. The responses that comment on the threats to safety and security are in the fourth category. The remaining responses are in the last category, and this category encompasses comments or concerns of very diverse content. The categories for the item about U.S. society include all five categories mentioned above. Additionally, it includes a category where participants' responses are characterized by having a celebratory tone about the growing trend of diversity (which is relatively absent from the responses for the "Christians" item). Occasionally, a response reflects the theme of more than one category, and in such a case, the response is sorted in the category that reflects the responses' content the most based on the author's interpretation, and these responses are commented on in the data file.

Reviewing the qualitative analysis on participants' open-ended responses in its entirety, there are several interesting patterns. Most notably, participants' responses are very diverse in terms of their attitude evaluation—whereas many reflect an unfazed reaction (i.e., the first category) or even a more welcoming/celebratory attitude (i.e., category 6) toward demographic change, others reveal more deeply troubled concerns of different natures. Consistent with prior literature (e.g., González et al., 2008), these concerns reflect their perceived symbolic threats (i.e., category 2) as well as realistic threats (i.e., status threat in category 3 and the "safety threat" in category 4).

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Online Appendix C

The supplemental Table C1 describes the parameter estimate for the latent variable analysis using data from Study 4. In the latent variable analysis, four latent variables corresponding to the four variables were recreated and allowed to be correlated with each other, and each latent variable was manifested by the corresponding two items described above. The model has a good fit, RMSEA = 0.038, CFI=.998, which suggests that the three types of threat and celebratory reactions are indeed distinct, albeit related, constructs. An alternative model was estimated where the factors for threat to culture and threat to legal norms were combined (i.e., a latent variable manifested by the corresponding four items). This model, however, has a worse fit (AIC=11452, BIC=11532) than the model that considers the items separately (AIC=11426, BIC=11518).

Table C1. Parameter estimates

	Predicted variable	Predictor	b		S.E.
Regressions	Tculture	T1	1.00	-	-
	Tculture	T2	1.00	***	0.03
	Tlegal	T3	1.00	-	-
	Tlegal	T4	1.01	***	0.03
	Tpeace	T5	1.00	-	-
	Tpeace	T6	0.95	***	0.03
	Celebratory	T7	1.00	-	-
	Celebratory	T8	0.82	***	0.10
(Co)variances	Tculture	Tlegal	2.62	***	0.19
	Tculture	Tpeace	2.59	***	0.19
	Tculture	Celebratory	-0.74	***	0.15
	Tlegal	Tpeace	2.50	***	0.18
	Tlegal	Celebratory	-0.58	***	0.14
	Tpeace	Celebratory	-0.42	**	0.15
	T1	T1	0.43	***	0.04
	T2	T2	0.35	***	0.04
	T3	T3	0.43	***	0.04
	T4	T4	0.33	***	0.04
	T5	T5	0.31	***	0.05
	T6	T6	0.69	***	0.06
	T7	T7	0.10	<i>ns</i>	0.40
	T8	T8	1.06	***	0.28
	Tculture	Tculture	2.85	***	0.21
	Tlegal	Tlegal	2.59	***	0.20
	Tpeace	Tpeace	2.99	***	0.22
	Celebratory	Celebratory	3.37	***	0.46

Note. * $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$. Tculture, Tlegal, Tpeace, Tpeace, and Celebratory denote "threat to culture," "threat to legal norms," "threat to peace" and "celebratory reaction" respectively. T1 through T8 denote the items that the preceding variables consist of in the order described in the main text.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Online Appendix D

This appendix describes the descriptive statistics, correlations, and regression models based on data from each individual study separately.

Table D1. Study 1 means, standard deviations, and correlations

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5
1. Condition	-	-					
2. Party	0.37	0.26	0.10†				
3. Muslim population	0.74	0.21	.68***	0.09†			
4. Christian population	0.69	0.21	-.40***	-0.03	-.16***		
5. Threat to Christians	0.39	0.25	.48***	0.08	.37***	-.30***	
6. Threat to the U.S.	0.53	0.24	0.07	-0.09	0.06	0.02	.39***

Note. † $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table D2. Study 2 means, standard deviations, and correlations

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Condition	-	-							
2. Party	0.54	0.38	-0.01						
3. Pride	0.31	0.35	-.32***	.14***					
4. Hope	0.33	0.34	-.32***	.15***	.89***				
5. Anxiety	0.29	0.33	.11**	.09*	.23***	.18***			
6. Anger	0.23	0.32	.15***	.16***	.10*	0.06	.70***		
7. Increase screening	0.46	0.33	0.02	.38***	.19***	.18***	.33***	.32***	
8. less background check	0.35	0.31	-0.06	-.19***	.25***	.24***	.08*	0.01	-0.03

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .10$, *** $p < .001$.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table D3. Study 3 means, standard deviations, and correlations

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Condition	-	-								
2. Party	0.52	0.28	-0.06							
3. Threat to Christians	0.62	0.22	.26***	.31***						
4. Threat to the U.S.	0.57	0.25	.23***	.39***	.76***					
5. Pride	0.12	0.21	-.17**	-.21***	-.28***	-.29***				
6. Hope	0.19	0.26	-0.11†	-.25***	-.32***	-.38***	.76***			
7. Anxiety	0.22	0.28	.22***	.33***	.47***	.55***	-0.13†	-.17*		
8. Anger	0.09	0.19	.14*	.23***	.40***	.47***	-0.06	-.15*	.60***	
9. Political tolerance	0.55	0.33	0.03	.51***	.46***	.59***	-.32***	-.38***	.42***	.36***

Note. † $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .10$, *** $p < .001$.

Table D4. Study 4 means, standard deviations, and correlations

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Condition	-	-										
2. Party	0.50	0.41	0.01									
3. Threat to Culture	0.24	0.29	.20***	.37***								
4. Threat to Legal Norms	0.21	0.28	.18***	.34***	.90***							
5. Threat to Peace	0.27	0.29	.24***	.31***	.83***	.84***						
6. Celebratory Reaction	0.50	0.29	-0.03	-.15***	-.23***	-.18***	-.13**					
7. Pride	0.16	0.26	0.02	0.01	0.04	.11*	0.08†	.23***				
8. Hope	0.23	0.28	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.00	.29***	.76***			
9. Anxiety	0.15	0.24	0.05	.17***	.46***	.46***	.43***	-.14**	.22***	.18***		
10. Anger	0.08	0.20	0.08†	.11*	.50***	.51***	.47***	-.09*	.18***	.11*	.70***	
11. Intolerance	0.48	0.22	0.01	.42***	.47***	.44***	.42***	-.30***	-.10*	-.13**	.25***	.23***

Note. † $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .10$, *** $p < .001$.

Table D5. Study 5 means, standard deviations, and correlations

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Condition	-	-										
2. Party	0.46	0.29	-0.01									
3. Pride	0.17	0.24	0.03	-0.14***								
4. Hope	0.23	0.27	0.03	-0.09**	0.76***							
5. Anxiety	0.16	0.25	-0.02	0.13***	0.15***	0.20***						
6. Anger	0.09	0.20	0	0.09*	0.11**	0.15***	0.66***					
7. Threat to culture	0.21	0.26	0.12***	0.46***	-0.10**	-0.05	0.36***	0.41***				
8. Threat to the legal norm	0.18	0.24	0.06	0.45***	-0.02	0.01	0.40***	0.45***	0.88***			
9. Threat to peace	0.22	0.25	0.12**	0.42***	-0.08*	-0.04	0.35***	0.38***	0.79***	0.81***		
10. Celebratory reactions	0.57	0.27	0.07	-0.25***	0.32***	0.32***	-0.11**	-0.13***	-0.23***	-0.19***	-0.16***	
11. Intolerance	0.39	0.21	0.03	0.58***	-0.21***	-0.16***	0.16***	0.12***	0.54***	0.53***	0.50***	-0.34***

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table D6. Study 1 regression results

	Bad for Christians			Bad for the U.S.		
	b	S.E.	95% CI	b	S.E.	95% CI
(Intercept)	0.29 ***	0.03 [	0.23 0.35]	0.65 ***	0.03 [	0.58 0.71]
Condition (1=grow)	0.17 ***	0.04 [	0.09 0.26]	-0.18 ***	0.04 [	-0.27 -0.09]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	-0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.07 [	-0.2 0.08]	-0.40 ***	0.07 [	-0.54 -0.26]
Condition ×Party identity	0.18 †	0.1 [	-0.01 0.37]	0.59 ***	0.10 [	0.39 0.79]

Note. † $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table D7. Study 2 regression results

	b	S.E.	95% CI	b	S.E.	95% CI
	Pride			Hope		
(Intercept)	0.28 ***	0.03 [	0.22 0.35]	0.31 ***	0.03 [	0.25 0.37]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.08 †	0.04 [	-0.17 0.01]	-0.09 *	0.04 [	-0.17 0.00]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.25 ***	0.05 [	0.16 0.34]	0.25 ***	0.05 [	0.16 0.34]
Condition ×Party identity	-0.27 ***	0.07 [	-0.40 -0.13]	-0.25 ***	0.07 [	-0.38 -0.12]
	Anxiety			Anger		
	b	S.E.	95% CI	b	S.E.	95% CI
(Intercept)	0.26 ***	0.03 [	0.20 0.32]	0.18 ***	0.03 [	0.12 0.24]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.04 [	-0.11 0.06]	-0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.04 [	-0.14 0.02]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	-0.01 <i>ns</i>	0.05 [	-0.10 0.08]	0.00 <i>ns</i>	0.04 [	-0.09 0.08]
Condition ×Party identity	0.19 **	0.07 [	0.06 0.32]	0.29 ***	0.06 [	0.16 0.42]
	Intolerant 1			Intolerant 2		
	b	S.E.	95% CI	b	S.E.	95% CI
(Intercept)	0.28 ***	0.03 [	0.22 0.34]	0.44 ***	0.03 [	0.38 0.49]
Condition (1=grow)	0.00 <i>ns</i>	0.04 [	-0.09 0.08]	-0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.04 [	-0.10 0.06]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.31 ***	0.04 [	0.23 0.40]	-0.14 **	0.04 [	-0.22 -0.05]
Condition ×Party identity	0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.06 [	-0.09 0.16]	-0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.06 [	-0.16 0.09]

Note. † $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table D8. Study 3 regression results

	b	S.E.	95% CI		b	S.E.	95% CI	
	Bad for Christians				Bad for the U.S.			
(Intercept)	0.48 ***	0.04	[0.40	0.56]	0.38 ***	0.04	[0.29	0.47]
Condition (1=grow)	0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.08	0.13]	0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.10	0.13]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.16 *	0.07	[0.03	0.28]	0.25 ***	0.07	[0.10	0.39]
Condition ×Party identity	0.18 *	0.09	[0.01	0.36]	0.21 *	0.10	[0.01	0.41]
	Pride				Hope			
(Intercept)	0.25 ***	0.04	[0.17	0.33]	0.31 ***	0.05	[0.21	0.41]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.08 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.19	0.03]	0.00 <i>ns</i>	0.07	[-0.13	0.14]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	-0.17 *	0.07	[-0.31	-0.04]	-0.17 *	0.08	[-0.33	0.00]
Condition ×Party identity	0.00 <i>ns</i>	0.10	[-0.18	0.19]	-0.13 <i>ns</i>	0.11	[-0.35	0.10]
	Anxiety				Anger			
(Intercept)	0.07 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.04	0.17]	0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.04	0.11]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.07	[-0.17	0.10]	-0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.16	0.04]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.17 *	0.09	[0.00	0.34]	0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.08	0.16]
Condition ×Party identity	0.33 **	0.12	[0.10	0.57]	0.23 **	0.09	[0.07	0.40]
	Political intolerance							
(Intercept)	0.25 ***	0.06	[0.06	0.32]				
Condition (1=grow)	-0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.08	[-0.16	0.20]				
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.54 ***	0.10	[0.39	0.83]				
Condition ×Party identity	0.11 <i>ns</i>	0.13	[-0.23	0.37]				

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .10$, *** $p < .001$.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table D9. Study 4 regression results

	b	S.E.	95% CI		b	S.E.	95% CI	
	Threat to Culture				Threat to Legal Norms			
(Intercept)	0.11 ***	0.03	[0.06	0.17]	0.10 ***	0.03	[0.05	0.15]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.01 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.08	0.06]	-0.01 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.08	0.06]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.13 **	0.04	[0.05	0.21]	0.12 **	0.04	[0.04	0.20]
Condition ×Party identity	0.25 ***	0.06	[0.14	0.37]	0.22 ***	0.06	[0.11	0.34]
	Threat to Peace				Celebratory Reaction			
(Intercept)	0.14 ***	0.03	[0.08	0.19]	0.52 ***	0.52	[0.46	0.58]
Condition (1=grow)	0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.03	0.12]	0.07 †	0.07	[-0.01	0.16]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.12 **	0.04	[0.04	0.21]	-0.01 <i>ns</i>	-0.01	[-0.10	0.08]
Condition ×Party identity	0.19 **	0.06	[0.07	0.31]	-0.19 **	-0.19	[-0.32	-0.06]
	Pride				Hope			
(Intercept)	0.12 ***	0.03	[0.07	0.17]	0.21 ***	0.03	[0.15	0.27]
Condition (1=grow)	0.07 †	0.04	[-0.01	0.14]	0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.02	0.14]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.02	0.15]	0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.03	0.15]
Condition ×Party identity	-0.12 *	0.06	[-0.23	0.00]	-0.15 *	0.06	[-0.28	-0.03]
	Anxiety				Anger			
(Intercept)	0.13 ***	0.02	[0.08	0.18]	0.06 **	0.02	[0.02	0.10]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.05 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.11	0.02]	-0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.07	0.04]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.05	0.10]	0.00 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.06	0.07]
Condition ×Party identity	0.15 **	0.05	[0.05	0.25]	0.09 *	0.04	[0.01	0.18]
	Intolerance							
(Intercept)	0.38 ***	0.02	[0.35	0.42]				
Condition (1=grow)	-0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.09	0.02]				
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.18 ***	0.03	[0.12	0.25]				
Condition ×Party identity	0.08 †	0.04	[-0.01	0.16]				

Note. † $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .10$, *** $p < .001$.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table D10. Study 5 regression results

	b	S.E.	95% CI		b	S.E.	95% CI	
	Threat to Culture				Threat to Legal Norms			
(Intercept)	0.03 ns	0.02	[-0.01	0.08]	0.03 ns	0.02	[-0.01	0.07]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.05 ns	0.03	[-0.11	0.02]	-0.04 ns	0.03	[-0.10	0.02]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.30 ***	0.04	[0.22	0.38]	0.30 ***	0.04	[0.23	0.37]
Condition ×Party identity	0.24 ***	0.06	[0.13	0.35]	0.15 **	0.05	[0.05	0.26]
	Threat to Peace				Celebratory Reaction			
(Intercept)	0.07 ***	0.02	[0.03	0.11]	0.60 ***	0.02	[0.55	0.65]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.03 ns	0.03	[-0.09	0.02]	0.15 ***	0.04	[0.08	0.22]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.26 ***	0.04	[0.19	0.34]	-0.11 *	0.05	[-0.20	-0.03]
Condition ×Party identity	0.20 ***	0.05	[0.10	0.31]	-0.25 ***	0.07	[-0.38	-0.12]
	Pride				Hope			
(Intercept)	0.18 ***	0.02	[0.13	0.22]	0.25 ***	0.03	[0.19	0.30]
Condition (1=grow)	0.08 **	0.03	[0.02	0.15]	0.06 ns	0.04	[-0.02	0.13]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	-0.04 ns	0.04	[-0.12	0.04]	-0.04 ns	0.05	[-0.14	0.05]
Condition ×Party identity	-0.15 **	0.06	[-0.27	-0.04]	-0.09 ns	0.07	[-0.22	0.04]
	Anxiety				Anger			
(Intercept)	0.17 ***	0.02	[0.12	0.21]	0.09 ***	0.02	[0.05	0.13]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.11 **	0.03	[-0.18	-0.04]	-0.06 *	0.03	[-0.11	0.00]
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.00 ns	0.04	[-0.08	0.09]	0.00 ns	0.04	[-0.07	0.07]
Condition ×Party identity	0.22 ***	0.06	[0.10	0.35]	0.13 **	0.05	[0.03	0.23]
	Intolerance							
(Intercept)	0.19 ***	0.02	[0.15	0.22]				
Condition (1=grow)	0.02 ns	0.02	[-0.02	0.07]				
Party identity (1=Rep.)	0.42 ***	0.03	[0.37	0.48]				
Condition ×Party identity	-0.01 ns	0.04	[-0.09	0.07]				

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .10$, *** $p < .001$.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Online Appendix E

One key shortcoming of the current approach is that there is no significance testing, so it is unclear if the Condition $\times$ Party identity interaction effect is significantly reduced by the inclusion of the Condition $\times$ cue interaction. Readers who are familiar with moderated mediation may be considering the use of the PROCESS templates from Hayes (2013). However, these procedures remain unable to provide a significant test that can address the research question.

In theory, the corresponding mediation would be a model where party identity, cue, and their interactions with condition all predict the dependent variables, and party identity predicts cue. However, the PROCESS model in this case would only yield estimates for indirect effect from party identity to the dependent variables through cue at each level of the experimental conditions. This specification would not, unfortunately, provide estimates revealing whether the indirect effects at each level of the conditions are significantly different from each other. Consequently, this procedure will still not answer the question about whether the Condition $\times$ Party identity interaction effect is explained by the Condition $\times$ cue interaction with a significance test. The author chose the current approach, considering that the above-mentioned model is significantly more complex and harder to interpret than the regressions provided in the main text.

References

Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach. Guilford publications.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Online Appendix F

Two sets of models were estimated, parallel to that of the interaction models reported for Study 4. The first set of models uses Democrats as the contrast group, so two indicators were used in place of the variable for “Party identity,” one contrasting Democrats against Independents and one contrasting Democrats against Republicans. Their interactions with the condition variables were also used as independent variables. These are reported in Table F1. The second set of models are similar to the first set except that the Republicans are used as the contrast group, so two indicators were used, one contrasting Republicans against Independents and one contrasting Republicans against Democrats. These are reported in Table F2.

On the first point, the effect of manipulation on Independents are in between its effects on Republicans and Democrats. This is because the term for Condition $\times$ Independents are in the same direction as that of Condition $\times$ Republican in the first set of models, and Condition $\times$ Democrats in the second set of models, but they are smaller in size.

On the second point, terms for Condition $\times$ Republican and Condition $\times$ Democrats are significant (or marginally significant) in all cases, so the manipulation’s effect is different on Republicans and Democrats. Whether the effects on Independents are more similar to Republicans or Democrats, therefore, reveal whether the moderating effects of party identity are driven by the differences between Democrats and everyone else or the differences between Republicans and everyone else, in that order. As the results show, the moderating effects of party identity on manipulation in the cases of threat to culture, legal norms and peace are driven more by the differences between Republicans and everyone else. This is because Condition $\times$ Independents is not significant in the first set of models, but they are significant in the second set of models. In contrast, the moderating effects in the cases of pride and hope are driven by the difference between Democrats and everyone else. This is because Condition $\times$ Independents is not significant in the second set of models, but they are (marginally) significant in the first set of models. In the remaining cases, the moderating effects are driven by the differences between Republicans and Democrats because Condition $\times$ Independents is not significant in either set of models while terms for Condition $\times$ Republican and Condition $\times$ Democrats are significant.

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table F1. Alternative analysis for Study 4 (Democrats as the contrast group)

	b	S.E.	95% CI			b	S.E.	95% CI	
	Threat to Culture					Threat to Legal Norms			
(Intercept)	0.10 ***	0.03	[0.05	0.16]		0.08 **	0.03	[0.03	0.14]
Condition (1=grow)	0.01 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.07	0.10]		0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.06	0.09]
Independent	0.09 *	0.04	[0.01	0.18]		0.11 **	0.04	[0.03	0.19]
Republican	0.13 **	0.04	[0.05	0.21]		0.12 **	0.04	[0.04	0.20]
Condition × Independents	0.05 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.06	0.17]		0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.09	0.14]
Condition × Republican	0.25 ***	0.06	[0.14	0.37]		0.22 ***	0.06	[0.11	0.34]
	Threat to Peace					Celebratory Reaction			
(Intercept)	0.13 ***	0.03	[0.07	0.19]		0.53 ***	0.03	[0.47	0.59]
Condition (1=grow)	0.07 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.02	0.15]		0.07 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.02	0.16]
Independent	0.09 *	0.04	[0.00	0.17]		-0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.13	0.05]
Republican	0.12 **	0.04	[0.04	0.21]		-0.01 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.10	0.08]
Condition × Independents	0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.10	0.14]		-0.09 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.21	0.04]
Condition × Republican	0.19 **	0.06	[0.07	0.31]		-0.19 **	0.06	[-0.32	-0.06]
	Pride					Hope			
(Intercept)	0.12 ***	0.03	[0.07	0.18]		0.22 ***	0.03	[0.16	0.28]
Condition (1=grow)	0.08 †	0.04	[0.00	0.16]		0.07 †	0.04	[-0.01	0.16]
Independent	0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.06	0.10]		0.00 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.09	0.09]
Republican	0.07 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.02	0.15]		0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.03	0.15]
Condition × Independents	-0.10 †	0.06	[-0.21	0.02]		-0.12 †	0.06	[-0.24	0.01]
Condition × Republican	-0.12 *	0.06	[-0.23	0.00]		-0.15 *	0.06	[-0.28	-0.03]
	Anxiety					Anger			
(Intercept)	0.13 ***	0.03	[0.07	0.18]		0.06 **	0.02	[0.01	0.10]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.05 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.12	0.02]		-0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.08	0.04]
Independent	0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.05	0.09]		0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.04	0.08]
Republican	0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.05	0.10]		0.00 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.06	0.07]
Condition × Independents	0.08 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.03	0.18]		0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.02	0.15]
Condition × Republican	0.15 **	0.05	[0.05	0.25]		0.09 *	0.04	[0.01	0.18]
	Intolerance								
(Intercept)	0.39 ***	0.02	[0.34	0.43]					
Condition (1=grow)	-0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.10	0.02]					
Independent	0.08 **	0.03	[0.02	0.14]					
Republican	0.18 ***	0.03	[0.12	0.25]					
Condition × Independents	0.05 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.03	0.14]					
Condition × Republican	0.08 †	0.04	[-0.01	0.16]					

MUSLIM POPULATION AND PARTY IDENTITY

Table F2. Alternative analysis for Study 4 (Republicans as the contrast group)

	b	S.E.	95% CI			b	S.E.	95% CI	
	Threat to Culture					Threat to Legal Norms			
(Intercept)	0.23 ***	0.03	[0.17	0.29]		0.20 ***	0.03	[0.14	0.26]
Condition (1=grow)	0.27 ***	0.04	[0.19	0.35]		0.24 ***	0.04	[0.16	0.32]
Independent	-0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.12	0.05]		-0.01 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.09	0.07]
Democrat	-0.13 **	0.04	[-0.21	-0.05]		-0.12 **	0.04	[-0.20	-0.04]
Condition × Independents	-0.20 ***	0.06	[-0.32	-0.09]		-0.20 ***	0.06	[-0.31	-0.09]
Condition × Democrat	-0.25 ***	0.06	[-0.37	-0.14]		-0.22 ***	0.06	[-0.34	-0.11]
	Threat to Peace					Celebratory Reaction			
(Intercept)	0.25 ***	0.03	[0.19	0.31]		0.52 ***	0.03	[0.45	0.58]
Condition (1=grow)	0.26 ***	0.04	[0.17	0.34]		-0.12 *	0.05	[-0.21	-0.03]
Independent	-0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.12	0.05]		-0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.12	0.06]
Democrat	-0.12 **	0.04	[-0.21	-0.04]		0.01 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.08	0.10]
Condition × Independents	-0.17 **	0.06	[-0.29	-0.05]		0.10 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.02	0.23]
Condition × Democrat	-0.19 **	0.06	[-0.31	-0.07]		0.19 **	0.06	[0.06	0.32]
	Pride					Hope			
(Intercept)	0.19 ***	0.03	[0.13	0.25]		0.28 ***	0.03	[0.22	0.34]
Condition (1=grow)	-0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.12	0.04]		-0.08 †	0.05	[-0.17	0.01]
Independent	-0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.12	0.04]		-0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.15	0.03]
Democrat	-0.07 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.15	0.02]		-0.06 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.15	0.03]
Condition × Independents	0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.09	0.13]		0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.06	[-0.09	0.16]
Condition × Democrat	0.12 *	0.06	[0.00	0.23]		0.15 *	0.06	[0.03	0.28]
	Anxiety					Anger			
(Intercept)	0.15 ***	0.03	[0.10	0.20]		0.06 **	0.02	[0.02	0.10]
Condition (1=grow)	0.10 **	0.04	[0.03	0.17]		0.07 *	0.03	[0.01	0.13]
Independent	0.00 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.08	0.07]		0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.05	0.08]
Democrat	-0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.10	0.05]		0.00 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.07	0.06]
Condition × Independents	-0.07 <i>ns</i>	0.05	[-0.18	0.03]		-0.03 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.11	0.06]
Condition × Democrat	-0.15 **	0.05	[-0.25	-0.05]		-0.09 *	0.04	[-0.18	-0.01]
	Intolerance								
(Intercept)	0.57 ***	0.02	[0.53	0.62]					
Condition (1=grow)	0.04 <i>ns</i>	0.03	[-0.03	0.10]					
Independent	-0.10 **	0.03	[-0.16	-0.04]					
Democrat	-0.18 ***	0.03	[-0.25	-0.12]					
Condition × Independents	-0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.04	[-0.11	0.07]					
Condition × Democrat	-0.08 †	0.04	[-0.16	0.01]					