Social inferences from physical evidence via Bayesian event reconstruction

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Abstract

Human Theory of Mind is typically associated with the ability to infer mental states from observed behavior. In many cases, however, people can also infer the mental states of agents whose behavior they cannot see, based on the physical evidence left behind. We hypothesized that this capacity is supported by a form of mental event reconstruction. Under this account, observers derive social inferences by reconstructing the agents’ behavior, based on the physical evidence that revealed their presence. We present a computational model of this idea, embedded in a Bayesian framework for action understanding, and show that its predictions match human inferences with high quantitative accuracy. Our results shed light on how people infer others’ mental states from indirect physical evidence and on people’s ability to extract social information from the physical world.

Key words: Computational modeling, Event reconstruction, Social cognition, Theory of Mind

1. Introduction

As social animals, humans possess a specialized cognitive system to process, understand, and predict each other’s behavior, known as a *Theory of Mind* (Gopnik et al., 1997; Wellman, 2014). Theoretical and empirical work suggests that human Theory of Mind is instantiated as a mental model that specifies the causal relation between other people’s unobservable mental states and their observable actions. That is, Theory of Mind captures how we expect other people’s thoughts, preferences, and feelings to guide what they do. Equipped with this intuitive theory, people can infer the mental states that causally give rise to other people’s observed behavior.

A rapidly growing body of work suggests that the causal model within Theory of Mind is structured around an assumption that agents act to maximize their utilities—the difference between the subjective costs they incur and the

14 subjective rewards they obtain—capturing the idea that we intuitively expect
15 others to act rationally and efficiently (see Jara-Ettinger 2019 for review). Con-
16 sistent with this view, computational models of mental-state inference via util-
17 ity maximization reach human-level performance on simple social tasks (Baker
18 et al., 2017; Jern et al., 2017; Jern & Kemp, 2015; Jern et al., 2011; Jara-Ettinger
19 et al., 2020), they capture richer forms of social behavior including pedagogy
20 (Bridgers et al., 2020; Ho et al., 2019) and moral reasoning (Ullman et al., 2009),
21 they explain social reasoning in early childhood and infancy (Gergely & Csibra,
22 2003; Jara-Ettinger et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017; Lucas et al., 2014), and they
23 have identifiable neural correlates (Collette et al., 2017).

24 Despite its success, this approach implicitly posits that mental-state infer-
25 ence requires access to someone’s observable behavior, as it is these observed
26 actions that enable us to evaluate the plausibility of different mental states. In
27 some cases, however, people can even infer the mental states of agents whose
28 behavior we did not get the opportunity to see (Gosling et al., 2002, 2008). For
29 example, imagine walking into an office building and finding a vacant reception-
30 ist desk with a chewed-up pencil, a half-filled crossword puzzle, and a cellphone.
31 From this arrangement of objects, we can immediately infer that the recep-
32 tionist might have been experiencing anxiety or restlessness (as the pencil was
33 chewed-up), that they were likely procrastinating or had few tasks to complete
34 at the moment (as they were working on a crossword), and that they expected
35 to be gone only momentarily (as they chose to leave their valuable belongings
36 unattended).

37 As the example above shows, human mental-state inference is not limited to
38 an ability to extract mental states from observable actions—we can also infer
39 mental states from physical scenes with no direct social or temporal information.
40 How do we achieve this and how fine-grained are these inferences? Here we
41 propose that social inferences about unobservable agents are supported by a
42 basic form of *event reconstruction*, where, upon seeing indirect evidence of an
43 agent’s presence, we reconstruct what actions they likely took, enabling us to
44 reason about the mental states that best explain the reconstructed behavior.

45 While it has long been known that the ability to infer mental states from
46 observed actions emerges early in infancy (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Onishi &
47 Baillargeon, 2005; Woodward, 1998), recent studies suggest that social reasoning
48 from physical events also emerges early in childhood. By preschool, children can
49 estimate the difficulty associated with building different physical arrangements
50 of objects (Gweon et al., 2017); they understand which kinds of actions leave

51 physical traces in the environment and which kinds of actions do not (Jacobs
 52 et al., 2021); they can infer what someone knew based on physical evidence
 53 for how they searched an area (Pelz et al., 2020); and they can even detect
 54 the transmission of ideas by comparing artifacts created by different agents
 55 (Pesowski et al., 2020).

56 This past research suggests that the capacities needed to perform mental-
 57 state inference via event reconstruction might be in place from childhood. How-
 58 ever, to our knowledge, no work has formally explored the event reconstruction
 59 hypothesis or quantitatively evaluated people’s capacity to derive social infer-
 60 ences from indirect physical evidence. Here we present a computational model
 61 of social reasoning from agent-less physical scenes. Given indirect evidence that
 62 someone was present, our model infers what the agent was doing (i.e., recon-
 63 structs their actions) and why (i.e., infers their goals) through a generative
 64 model of how mental states produce actions, and how actions leave observable
 65 evidence.

66 In Experiment 1, we first tested whether our model matched human infer-
 67 ences in a task where participants had to infer an agent’s entry point into a
 68 room and their goal, all from a single pile of cookie crumbs that revealed their
 69 presence (see Figure 1). In Experiment 2, we then explicitly tested people’s
 70 ability to reconstruct the actions they believe different agents took based on
 71 indirect physical evidence of their presence, lending further support to the idea
 72 that the inferences in Experiment 1 were supported by an ability to reconstruct
 73 events. Finally, if social reasoning from physical scenes is supported by event
 74 reconstruction, people should be able to also infer how many agents might have
 75 been present in a room, based on how many paths they need to reconstruct to
 76 explain the scene. We tested this prediction in Experiment 3. Combined, our
 77 results suggest that people have a nuanced capacity to infer mental states from
 78 indirect evidence, and that these inferences are based on a basic capacity to
 79 “enhance” physical scenes by inferring agents’ spatiotemporal behavior based
 80 on the indirect evidence that they leave behind. All studies were approved by
 81 the Yale University Institutional Review Board (protocol: “Online reasoning”
 82 #2000020357).

83 2. Computational Framework

84 Our model builds on a growing body of work showing that mental-state at-
 85 tribution is instantiated as Bayesian inference over a generative model of utility-

maximizing action plans (Baker et al., 2009, 2017; Jara-Ettinger et al., 2020; Jern et al., 2017; Jern & Kemp, 2015; Jern et al., 2011; Lucas et al., 2014). In our model, however, rather than evaluating unobservable mental states against observable actions, we model how people might use physical evidence to reconstruct the actions that an agent took, and use these reconstructed actions to attribute mental states.

To make our focus concrete, consider a situation like the ones shown in Figure 1a. Each of these displays represents a room with three possible goals (A in blue, B in orange, and C in green), two different doors (1 at the top in both rooms and 2 on the bottom and left, respectively), a set of walls (shown in dark gray), and a small pile of cookie crumbs that reveals that someone was previously in this room. Although we cannot see where this agent came from, what actions they took, or what goal they were pursuing, the cookie crumbs nonetheless contain information that we might be able to extract. In Figure 1a (left), the cookie crumbs intuitively reveal that the agent entered through door 1 and that they were likely pursuing goal A or C, but not goal B. In Figure 1a (right), the cookie crumbs intuitively reveal that the agent was pursuing goal C, but it is unclear whether they entered through door 1 or door 2. Our computational model aims to explain how we performed these inferences.

Figure 1: (a) Example stimuli from Experiment 1. Potential goals are positioned in the corners, labeled alphabetically, and color-coded. Doors are shown in yellow and coded numerically. Walls are shown in dark gray. Each trial included a pile of cookie crumbs positioned in a part of the room. (b) Visualizations of the underlying event reconstruction performed by our computational model for the examples above. Each line represents an inferred possible path, color-coded to indicate time, moving from light green to dark blue.

Formally, we model the environment as a gridworld, where the possible states

of the world are given by the different positions in space that agents can occupy. At each time step, we assume that agents can move in any of the four cardinal directions and that these actions successfully move them in their intended direction (except when attempting to cross a wall, in which case the agent remains in the same position as they were before).

Given an observed static scene s (a gridworld with a set of goals, doors, walls, and a pile of cookie crumbs), the objective is to infer where the agent entered the room from (a door d) and which goal they pursued (a goal g), formally expressed as

$$p(d, g|s) \propto \ell(s|d, g)p(d, g), \quad (1)$$

where $\ell(s|d, g)$ is the likelihood of encountering scene s if an agent had indeed pursued goal g after entering through door d , and $p(d, g)$ is the prior over doors and goals.

According to our proposal, the ability to compute the likelihood function is mediated by a capacity to reconstruct the agent’s actions. Under this view, if we can reconstruct the actions that the agent took, then judgments about the agent’s entry point and goal are immediately revealed, as these are part of the reconstructed behavior (i.e., if we have access to the full reconstructed behavior, we can “see” where the agent entered from and where they were going). Formally, this idea can be implemented by expressing the likelihood function as

$$\ell(s|d, g) = \sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} \underbrace{p(s|t)}_{\substack{\text{how do actions} \\ \text{leave traces?}}} \times \underbrace{p(t|d, g)}_{\substack{\text{how do agents} \\ \text{pursue goals?}}}. \quad (2)$$

Here $t = (\vec{s}, \vec{a})$ is a trajectory (from the set of all possible trajectories $\mathbb{T}$), which consists of an ordered sequence of pairs of states and actions that the agent took. $p(s|t)$ is the probability that an agent who took trajectory t would produce the observed scene s , and $p(t|g, d)$ is the probability that the agent would take trajectory t if they entered from door d with the intention to pursue goal g . This equation reveals the two components critical to our theory: an expectation of how agents navigate to complete their goals ($p(t|d, g)$), and an expectation of how agents’ actions leave observable traces in the environment ($p(s|t)$).

To compute the expectations for how agents complete their goals, we used the standard framework previously developed in computational models of goal

inference (Baker et al., 2009, 2017; Jara-Ettinger et al., 2020) through Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)—a planning framework that makes it possible to compute the action plan or *policy* that maximizes an agent’s utility function (Bellman, 1957). Classical MDPs are designed to produce a single trajectory that fulfills the agent’s goal as efficiently as possible. In the cases that we consider, however, there are often multiple trajectories that can be equally efficient. As such, using a simple MDP can erroneously treat an efficient trajectory as unlikely if it is not an exact match to the solution that the MDP produced. To solve this problem, we built a probabilistic MDP that creates a probability distribution over all possible action plans, assigning higher probability to trajectories that are more efficient. Formally, we achieved this by softmaxing the MDP’s value function when building the probabilistic policy. We used a low temperature parameter to identify all possible action plans that are equally (or approximately equally) efficient, enabling us to implement the expectation that agents navigate efficiently towards their goals. Using a probabilistic MDP, the probability that an agent would take trajectory t , starting from door d with the intention to fulfill goal g is given by

$$p(t|g, d) = \prod_{i=1}^{|t|} p(a_i|s_i, g), \quad (3)$$

where $p(a_i|s_i, g)$ is the probability of taking action a_i in state s_i , and the state sequence is given by trajectory t .

Finally, in our paradigm, we assume that the agent has a uniform probability of dropping the pile of cookie crumbs at any point in their path. The probability of observing scene s if the agent took trajectory t is therefore given by $p(s|t) = 1/|t|$ if the pile of cookie crumbs lies within the trajectory and 0 otherwise.

2.1. Implementation Details

To generate testable predictions, we set a number of parameters in our model prior to data collection. We began by setting a uniform prior distribution over doors and goals, such that agents were equally likely to enter through any of the doors and equally likely to pursue any of the goals. Next, to model the forces that shape agents’ actions, we assumed that agents incur a constant cost of 1 for any action that they take, and that goals produced numerical rewards over the range 0 – 100. Finally, to make our MDP probabilistic, we applied a temperature parameter $\tau = 0.15$ to the value function. This parameter was set

167 *a priori* to ensure that the model would give equal probability to all paths that
168 were equally efficient, while only placing a negligible probability on erroneous
169 and inefficient trajectories.

170 Model inferences were obtained via Monte Carlo methods, sampling 1000
171 combinations of doors and goals and 1000 trajectories conditioned on the se-
172 lected door and goal. Figure 1b visualizes our model’s inferred trajectories for
173 the examples shown in Figure 1a, with each line corresponding to a sample from
174 the posterior distribution, color-coded to indicate time, moving from light green
175 to dark blue. These visualizations show how our model reconstructs the agents’
176 probable spatiotemporal behavior, which in turn reveal the agent’s entry point
177 and goal, matching the intuitive inferences associated with these examples in
178 the introduction.

179 3. Experiment 1

180 In Experiment 1, we tested our model in a task where people had to infer
181 which goal an agent was pursuing and where they came from, all from a sin-
182 gle piece of indirect evidence about their presence. If people’s ability to infer
183 goals from physical evidence is mediated by event reconstruction, then their
184 judgments should show a quantitative fit to our model predictions, including
185 fine-grained patterns of uncertainty.

186 3.1. Participants

187 40 U.S. participants (as determined by their IP address) were recruited using
188 Amazon Mechanical Turk ($M = 37.02$ years, $SD = 11.20$ years).

189 3.2. Stimuli

190 Stimuli consisted of 23 gridworld images, like those in Figure 1a. Each
191 gridworld was 7-by-7 squares in size and represented a room that contains three
192 goal squares (A in blue, B in orange, and C in green), up to three doors (labeled
193 1, 2, and 3), and a pile of cookie crumbs. The goals were always in the same
194 corners, but the position of the doors and the pile of cookie crumbs varied
195 between trials. In addition to these three features, a subset of trials included
196 walls (shown by the dark gray squares in Figure 1a) that agents could not walk
197 through.

198 Our stimuli set was designed to capture different types of inferences while
199 also controlling for features that simple heuristics could exploit (e.g., ensuring

200 that the target goal was not always the one closest to the cookie crumbs, and
 201 that it could not be determined by projecting a straight line that intersected the
 202 entrance and the location of the cookie crumbs). We began by considering four
 203 different possible inference patterns: full certainty (assigning probability close to
 204 1 to a hypothesis; D trials), full negative certainty (assigning probability close
 205 to 0 to a hypothesis, while also not having full certainty over two remaining
 206 hypotheses; N trials), partial certainty (assigning a higher probability to one of
 207 the hypotheses; P trials), and no certainty (assigning a uniform distribution to
 208 the hypothesis space; U trials).

209 We first designed seven single-door trials that captured each of these in-
 210 ference patterns in goal inference (two D , N , and P trials, and one U trial;
 211 schematic versions shown in Figure 3a). We then designed 16 additional tri-
 212 als with multiple doors by combining every possible inference pattern for the
 213 goal the agent was pursuing and the entrance that they took (schematic versions
 214 shown in Figure 3b).

215 3.3. Procedure

216 Participants read a brief tutorial that explained the logic of the task. After
 217 learning how to interpret the images, participants were told that agents were
 218 equally likely to enter the room from any of the doors with the intention of
 219 going directly to one of the three goals (to remove the possibility that agents
 220 pursue multiple goals, or wander aimlessly before selecting one). After the
 221 introduction, participants completed a questionnaire that ensured they had read
 222 and understood the instructions. Participants that failed at least one question
 223 were redirected to the beginning of the instructions and given a second chance
 224 to participate in the study. Participants that failed the questionnaire twice were
 225 not permitted to participate in the study.

226 Participants completed all 23 trials in a random order. On each trial, par-
 227 ticipants answered a multiple-choice attention-check question (“Which corner is
 228 farthest from Door 1 (there may be more than one)?”) and were asked to infer
 229 the agent’s goal (“Which corner is the person going for?”) using three contin-
 230 uous sliders, one for each goal (each ranging from 0, labeled as “definitely no,”
 231 to 1, labelled as “definitely”). Trials with at least two doors included a third
 232 question that asked participants to infer the agent’s entry point (“Which door
 233 did they come from?”) using one slider per door. Participants were allowed
 234 to submit their responses for each trial only when they correctly answered the

Figure 2: Results from Experiment 1. Each point corresponds to a judgment, with model predictions on the x -axis and mean participant judgments on the y -axis. Color indicates inference type and the dotted line shows the best linear fit with 95% confidence bands (in light gray).

attention-check question. Otherwise, participants were prompted to “please pay
attention and try again.”

3.4. Results

Participant judgments were first normalized within-trial (such that every
distribution over goals or doors added up to 1) and then averaged across par-
ticipants. Figure 2 shows the results from Experiment 1. Overall, our model
showed a correlation of $r = 0.94$ (95% CI: 0.91 - 0.96) with participant judg-
ments, and the strength of the model fit was similar when looking only at goal
inferences ($r = 0.95$; 95% CI: 0.92 - 0.97) or door inferences ($r = 0.92$; 95% CI:
0.86 - 0.95).

Figure 3 shows our model’s results as a function of trial. In each subplot,
the image at the top shows an abstract schematic of the trial, with the pile of
cookie crumbs marked as a brown square. This figure reveals how our model not
only predicted participant judgments in situations where the agent’s entry point
and goal were clear, it also matched participant judgments in its expression of
uncertainty. Critically, our model’s uncertainty reflects how well it was able

Figure 3: Detailed results from Experiment 1. From top to bottom, each row of subplots corresponds to the D , N , P , and U trials for goal inferences, respectively. (a) Results for trials that only had one door. (b) Results for trials that had more than one door. From left to right, each column of subplots corresponds to the D , N , P , and U trials for door inferences, respectively. The goals A, B, and C are indicated by the blue, orange, and green squares, respectively. The doors are sequentially numbered in a clockwise fashion, with door 1 starting from the top (or from the right if there is no top door). Walls are marked as dark gray squares and the pile of cookie crumbs are indicated by the brown squares. Red lines represent mean participant judgments and blue lines represent our model’s predictions. Error bars on participant judgments represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.

to reconstruct the event, becoming less confident as a function of how much conflict there is in entry points and goals across different hypothetical event reconstructions. The fact that this event-based uncertainty matched participant judgments with quantitative accuracy suggests that participants may have also been performing these inferences via some form of event reconstruction.

One alternative possibility is that participant judgments were driven by superficial features of the stimuli, rather than by event reconstruction. We tested this possibility through a multinomial logistic regression trained to predict participant goal inferences as a function of the distance between the pile of cookie crumbs and each goal, the average distance between the pile of cookie crumbs and each door, the number of doors, and all of their interactions. To train this regression, we transformed participant judgments into a one-hot vector,

263 marking 1 for the goal with the highest probability and 0 for the rest, and im-
264 plemented LASSO regularization (Tibshirani, 1996) to avoid overfitting. We
265 generated the alternative model’s predictions in a leave-one-out fashion—that
266 is, the predictions for each trial consisted of the output of a regression trained
267 on all remaining trials.

268 Even though this alternative model was trained on the qualitative structure
269 of participant judgments, it nonetheless only produced a correlation of $r = 0.49$
270 (95% CI: 0.30 – 0.63) with participant judgments, which was substantially lower
271 than the one produced by our model ($\Delta r = 0.46$; 95% CI: 0.33 – 0.65). These
272 results show that, while superficial features can capture the broad structure of
273 participant judgments, they fail to do so at our model’s level of granularity,
274 further suggesting that people’s inferences were centered on a form of Bayesian
275 event reconstruction.

276 4. Experiment 2

277 In Experiment 1 we found that people can infer where an agent was going
278 and where they came from, all from a single piece of indirect evidence about
279 their presence. Participant judgments were quantitatively predicted by a model
280 centered on an ability to reconstruct what happened. If our account is correct,
281 then people should also be able to explicitly reconstruct the actions that an agent
282 took in a way similar to our model. We test this prediction in Experiment 2.

283 4.1. Participants

284 40 U.S. participants (as determined by their IP address) were recruited using
285 Amazon Mechanical Turk ($M = 38.25$ years, $SD = 11.02$ years).

286 4.2. Stimuli

287 The stimuli were the same as those from Experiment 1 (see Figure 1a for
288 examples and Figure 3 for schematic versions).

289 4.3. Procedure

290 Participants read a brief tutorial that explained the logic of the task. Partic-
291 ipants were then instructed on how to draw their paths. After the introduction,
292 participants completed a questionnaire that ensured they had read and un-
293 derstood the instructions. Participants that failed at least one question were
294 redirected to the beginning of the instructions and given a second chance to

295 participate in the study. Participants that failed the questionnaire twice were
 296 not permitted to participate in the study.

297 Participants completed all 23 trials in a random order. On each trial, partic-
 298 ipants were asked to infer the path they thought the agent took, given the pile
 299 of cookie crumbs. Participants generated their paths by sequentially clicking
 300 on the squares they believed the agent walked through. Participants were only
 301 allowed to proceed when they had successfully generated a valid path, which
 302 consisted of paths that started at a door, ended at a goal, and passed through
 303 the pile of cookie crumbs. Participants were allowed to reset the drawn path as
 304 many times as they wished.

305 4.4. Model Predictions

306 To evaluate the participant-generated path reconstructions, we used our
 307 framework to calculate

$$p(t|s) \propto p(s|t)p(t), \quad (4)$$

308 where $p(s|t)$ is the likelihood of a trajectory t generating scene s and $p(t)$ is the
 309 prior over possible trajectories. Here, $p(s|t) = 1/|t|$ (like in Equation 2) and $p(t)$
 310 is obtained by marginalizing over the agents’ potential entry points and goals,
 311 as follows:

$$p(t) = \sum_{d,g} p(t|d,g)p(d,g). \quad (5)$$

312 4.5. Results

313 Our computational framework enables us to calculate the probability as-
 314 signed to each path generated by participants. However, directly interpret-
 315 ing these probabilities is difficult, as they are sensitive to the length of the
 316 path and to the number of competing paths that fulfill a goal efficiently. To
 317 make our results easier to interpret, we compared our model’s evaluations of
 318 the participant-generated path reconstructions with that of a baseline model.
 319 This baseline model used a uniform transition function over all actions, exclud-
 320 ing the one that would generate a transition to the previous state (to prevent
 321 infinite back-and-forth loops). We then computed the Bayes factor for each
 322 reconstructed path by dividing the probability of that path, as predicted by
 323 our model (i.e., $p(t|s)$), by the probability predicted by the baseline model. A

Figure 4: Comparison of reconstructed paths generated by our model and participants in Experiment 2. From left to right, each column of subplots corresponds to the D , N , P , and U trials for goal inferences, respectively. (a) Results for trials that only had one door. (b) Results for trials that had more than one door. From top to bottom, each row of subplots corresponds to the D , N , P , and U trials for door inferences, respectively. The goals A , B , and C are indicated by the blue, orange, and green squares, respectively. The doors are sequentially numbered in a clockwise order, with door 1 starting from the top (or from the right if there is no top door). Walls are marked as dark gray squares and the pile of cookie crumbs are indicated by the brown squares. Each line represents a reconstructed path, color-coded to indicate time, moving from light orange to dark red (for participants) or light green to dark blue (for the model).

Bayes factor greater than one would indicate that our model explains participant judgments better than the baseline model; a Bayes factor less than one would indicate that the baseline model explains participant judgments better than our model.

Our model outperformed the baseline model on all trials. The average Bayes factor in our experiment was 16935.33 (lowest factor = 7933.79; highest factor = 84383.12), meaning that our model was 16,000 times more likely to produce the participant-generated path reconstructions relative to the baseline model ($t(39) = 9.10$, $p < 0.001$ using a Bayes factor of 1 as the reference level).

Figure 4 shows trial-by-trial results from Experiment 2. Each trial is presented twice, with our model’s path reconstructions on the left and participant-generated path reconstructions on the right. All paths are color-coded to indicate time (with darker colors occurring later in time). For both our model and participants, the higher path density indicates where the majority inferred the agent to have traveled. As this figure shows, the distribution of participant-generated path reconstructions largely matched those generated by our model (although participants were more likely to generate suboptimal paths).

5. Do explicit event reconstructions in Experiment 2 predict inferences from Experiment 1?

The previous results showed that that people can not only reconstruct agents’ probable actions, but do so in a way similar to our model. According to our proposal, this event reconstruction underlies people’s capacity to infer mental states from indirect physical evidence. If this is the case, then the information implicitly encoded in the path reconstructions from Experiment 2 should have predictive power over the inferences that participants made in Experiment 1. To test this possibility, we extracted the goals and doors from the participant-generated path reconstructions. To achieve this, we calculated the proportion of paths that originated from each possible entrance, and the proportion of paths that reached each possible goal, and compared these values to the corresponding goal and door inferences from Experiment 1. Figure 5 shows the results from this analysis. Overall, the goals and doors extracted from the participant-generated path reconstructions showed a correlation of $r = 0.89$ (95% CI: 0.83 – 0.92) with the inferences participants made in Experiment 1, and the strength of this fit was similar when looking only at goals ($r = 0.88$; 95% CI: 0.80 – 0.93) or doors ($r = 0.90$; 95% CI: 0.82 – 0.95). Furthermore, when we compared these

359 extracted goals and doors against our model’s predictions in Experiment 1, we
 360 found a correlation of $r = 0.86$ (95% CI: $0.79 - 0.91$), and a similar fit when
 361 looking only at goals ($r = 0.85$; 95% CI: $0.76 - 0.91$) or doors ($r = 0.88$; 95%
 362 CI: $0.78 - 0.93$).

363 Critically, participants in Experiment 2 could only generate a single path per
 364 trial. By combining the paths of multiple participants, we were able to reveal
 365 distributions over goals and doors that quantitatively resembled the inferences
 366 participants made in Experiment 1. The fact that these distributions predicted
 367 inferences from Experiment 1 suggests that generated paths were samples from
 368 the posterior distribution (rather than maximum likelihood or maximum *a pos-*
 369 *teriori* estimates, which would not contain enough information to reconstruct
 370 the full probability distribution over inferences). This analysis suggests that
 371 people had access to and sampled their paths in accordance to these goal and
 372 door distributions.

Figure 5: Comparison between the extracted goals and doors from Experiment 2 and the participant inferences from Experiment 1. Color indicates inference type and the dotted line shows the best linear fit with 95% confidence bands (in light gray).

373 6. Experiment 3

374 Experiment 1 showed that people can infer an agent’s goals and origins, and
 375 that these inferences exhibit the quantitative structure predicted by a model of

376 event reconstruction. Experiment 2 further showed that people could explicitly
377 reconstruct the paths in a way similar to our model. In Experiment 3, we test a
378 further prediction of our account: If our model of event reconstruction is correct,
379 then people should not only be able to infer a *single* agent’s probable actions
380 and goals, but also be able to estimate how many agents might have been in a
381 room, based on how many path reconstructions are needed to explain a given
382 scene.

383 6.1. Participants

384 40 U.S. participants (as determined by their IP address) were recruited using
385 Amazon Mechanical Turk ($M = 37.62$ years, $SD = 11.94$ years).

386 6.2. Stimuli

387 Our stimuli consisted of 15 gridworld images that were similar to those in
388 Experiment 1 with the difference that each trial now has two piles of cookie
389 crumbs instead of one (see Figure 6 for examples). Our stimuli set was designed
390 to capture different types of inferences that our model supports. Specifically,
391 we designed three different trials for each of the following possible inference
392 patterns: high certainty that one agent was in the room (definitely one, or $D1$,
393 trials), partial certainty that one agent was in the room (probably one, or $P1$,
394 trials), uncertainty whether it was one or two agents in the room (uncertain, or
395 UN , trials), partial certainty that two agents were in the room (probably two,
396 or $P2$, trials), and high certainty that two agents were in the room (definitely
397 two, or $D2$, trials).

398 6.3. Procedure

399 The procedure was nearly identical to Experiment 1, except that partici-
400 pants were shown two piles of cookie crumbs and were told that their task was
401 to infer if one or two agents had been in the room. After the introduction, par-
402 ticipants completed a questionnaire that ensured they had read and understood
403 the instructions. Participants that failed at least one question were redirected
404 to the beginning of the instructions and given a second chance to participate in
405 the study. Participants that failed the questionnaire twice were not permitted
406 to participate in the study.

407 Participants completed all 15 trials in a random order. On each trial, partici-
408 pants answered a multiple-choice attention-check question (“Which corner
409 is the farthest walk from Door 1? If there is more than one correct answer,

Figure 6: (a-d) Example stimuli from Experiment 3 for $D1$, $P1$, $P2$, and $D2$ trials, respectively (see Experiment 3 Stimuli for details). Potential goals are positioned in the corners, labeled alphabetically, and color-coded. Doors are shown in yellow and coded numerically. Walls are shown in dark gray. Each trial included two piles of cookie crumbs positioned in various parts of the room.

just choose one of them.”) and were asked to infer how many agents were in the room (“How many people were in the room?”) using a continuous slider (ranging from 0, labelled as “definitely one,” to 1, labelled as “definitely two”). Participants were allowed to submit their responses for each trial only when they correctly answered the attention-check question. Otherwise, participants were told to “please pay attention and try again.”

6.4. Model Predictions

To predict how many agents might have been in a scene we computed the probability that a agents were in scene s , through

$$p(a|s) \propto p(s|a)p(a), \quad (6)$$

where $p(a)$ is a prior over the number of agents that could have been present. In natural contexts, this prior should reflect the statistics of how often different agents might interact in different environments. To model our experiment, however, we used a simple uniform prior over the possibility of having one or two agents. This prior was then weighted by the likelihood of a particular number of agents a generating scene s , given by

$$p(a|s) \propto \begin{cases} \sum_{t \in \mathbb{T}} p(s|t)p(t) & a = 1 \\ \sum_{t_1, t_2 \in \mathbb{T}} p(s|t_1, t_2)p(t_1)p(t_2) & a = 2 \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

Figure 7: Results from Experiment 3. Each point corresponds to a judgment, with model predictions on the x -axis and mean participant judgments on the y -axis. The dotted line shows the best linear fit with 95% confidence bands (in light gray).

425 To compute the likelihood that two trajectories explain the scene (i.e., $p(s|t_1, t_2)$),
 426 we modified our generative model to sample two sets of entry points, goals,
 427 and trajectories at a time instead of one, where the likelihood is defined as
 428 $1/(|t_1| + |t_2|)$ if there was a scene match (i.e., both piles of cookie crumbs lie
 429 within both trajectories, and each trajectory was responsible for one of the
 430 cookie crumbs) and 0 otherwise.

431 6.5. Results

432 Participant judgments were averaged across trials and compared against our
 433 model’s predictions. Figure 7 shows the results from Experiment 3. Partici-
 434 pant’s relative confidence about the number of agents in the scene was quan-
 435 titatively similar to our model’s predictions, yielding a correlation of $r = 0.76$
 436 (95% CI: 0.43 - 0.91).

437 Figure 8 shows our model’s results as a function of each trial. In each subplot,
 438 the image at the top shows an abstract schematic of the trial, with both piles
 439 of cookie crumbs marked as brown squares. From left to right, each column
 440 corresponds to the $D1$, $P1$, UN , $P2$, and $D2$ trials, respectively. This figure
 441 reveals how our model quantitatively predicts participant judgments across the

various trials and levels of uncertainty.

Interestingly, the model fit in Experiment 3 was lower relative to Experiment 1. Under our account, this difference arises because Experiment 3 requires reconstructing paths for a single agent, reconstructing paths from multiple agents, and weighting their relative probability of generating the observed scene. Consistent with this, we found higher mismatches between our model and participants in the P trials ($MSE = 0.053$) over the D ($MSE = 0.021$) and U trials ($MSE = 0.019$). That is, participants struggled more in trials that relied on a capacity to make precise comparisons between the number of single-agent reconstructions and two-agent reconstructions.

Figure 8: Detailed results from Experiment 3. From left to right, each column corresponds to $D1$, $P1$, UN , $P2$, and $D2$ trials, respectively. Red bars represent mean participant judgments and blue bars represent our model’s predictions. Error bars on participant judgments represent 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Like in Experiment 1, we also evaluated whether participant judgments could be explained by superficial features of the stimuli rather than via event reconstruction. We tested this possibility through a logistic regression trained to predict participants’ distribution over the number of agents they thought were in the room as a function of the distance between each goal and each pile of cookie crumbs, the average distance between each pile of cookie crumbs and the doors, the number of doors, and all of their interactions. We trained and tested

459 this alternative model in the same way as the one described in Experiment 1.

460 Even though this alternative model had access to the qualitative structure of
461 participant judgments, it nonetheless produced a correlation of $r = 0.19$ (95%
462 CI: $-0.30 - 0.66$) with participant judgments, which was substantially lower
463 than the one produced by our model ($\Delta r = 0.58$; 95% CI: $0.12 - 1.17$). These
464 results extend our findings from Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting that people
465 can not only infer an agent’s goals and origins based on indirect evidence of
466 their presence, but also whether multiple agents may have been present in a
467 given scene.

468 7. Discussion

469 Research on human action understanding has historically focused on how
470 we infer the goals and mental states of agents whose behavior we are observing.
471 Our results show that our capacity to reason about others goes beyond face-
472 to-face interactions and includes nuanced social inferences from simple physical
473 scenes. In Experiment 1, we showed that people can infer an agent’s desires (i.e.,
474 where an agent was going) and past actions (i.e., where an agent came from)
475 from just a single piece of indirect evidence about their presence. The tight
476 correspondence between our model’s predictions and the fine-grained structure
477 of participant judgments suggested that these inferences were structured around
478 a form of mental event reconstruction, where people infer the actions that an
479 agent took and use this reconstructed behavior to make richer social inferences.
480 Experiment 2 showed further support for our proposal, revealing that people
481 can explicitly reconstruct the actions that someone took in a way similar to
482 our model. Furthermore, these explicit reconstructions predicted the inferences
483 participants made in Experiment 1, showing a direct link between people’s social
484 inferences from physical evidence, and people’s ability to reconstruct behavior.
485 Finally, in Experiment 3, we showed that people can use this capacity to infer
486 the number of agents that were in a given scene, based on the number of paths
487 they needed to reconstruct to explain the scene.

488 Our computational model formalized these inferences as the process of re-
489 constructing behaviors that can explain the indirect observable evidence. Our
490 model’s quantitative fit with participant judgments, as well the failure of our
491 alternative models (despite being trained on participant judgments), suggests
492 that people were performing similar computations. In particular, the similarity
493 between the paths generated by our model and those drawn by participants (see

Figure 4) further show that people can indeed reconstruct an agent’s behavior through an expectation that agents act rationally and efficiently.

The heart of our proposal—expressed in Equation 2 (see Section 2)—posits event reconstruction as the key representation that connects two different cognitive capacities. The first is a model of how agents act as a function of their goals and environmental constraints (i.e., a Theory of Mind). The second is a model of how agents’ actions may or may not leave observable traces in the environment. In this paper we focused on testing the general framework that we proposed, using a simple model of how agents leave traces in the environment. However, our computational framework only requires an ability to calculate the likelihood of scenes given behaviors ($p(s|t)$ in Equation 2), and the computations within this component can be arbitrarily complex. Here we consider two richer models that might be employed in future work.

A first way in which our framework could tackle richer inferences is by using a full-fledged model of intuitive physics to evaluate how actions leave traces in the environment. A recent body of work in cognitive science has found that human intuitive physics is instantiated as a *physics engine* that supports rich probabilistic simulations of how objects and forces interact in the environment (Fischer et al., 2016; Battaglia et al., 2013), and that physical simulations might underlie how we reason about the interaction between agents and objects (Yildirim et al., 2019). Thus, using a physics engine to simulate how the forces that agents apply to the world leave observable changes might enable our computational framework to handle more complex physical events that contain social information.

A second possible extension lies in changing what we consider to be an observable scene. Our focus here was on inference from physical information, but recent studies have found that people can also infer other people’s actions from social evaluations, such as inferring what someone might have done by learning that they were blamed by others about a failure (Davis et al., 2021). These inferences might be understood as an extended form of this framework, where the second term is replaced with an expectation of how people’s behavior causes social outcomes, rather than physical ones.

Similarly, our computational framework also allows for more complex models of agents’ behavior, as long as they can express the likelihood of different actions under different goals and environmental constraints. In our work, we used a model structured on an assumption that agents act rationally and efficiently under perfect knowledge. In future work, we hope to extend this work to use

531 models where agents can have partial or incomplete knowledge of their environ-
532 ment (e.g., Baker et al., 2017). This would enable our framework to consider
533 situations where indirect evidence reveals an agent’s intention to explore and
534 understand their surroundings rather than to complete a known goal.

535 While our work focused on adults, some recent research suggests these ca-
536 pacities might emerge in early childhood. In particular, preschoolers can judge
537 what types of physical constructions (such as different types of block towers)
538 require more physical effort (Gweon et al., 2017), suggesting an early under-
539 standing between actions and physical outcomes. At the same age, children
540 can also determine what actions are more likely to leave physical traces. For
541 example, lifting an upside-down cup filled with rice will likely leave visible rice
542 grains after the cup has been repositioned. But it is possible to lift and repo-
543 sition an upside-down cup filled with a few large rocks without leaving any
544 evidence behind (Jacobs et al., 2021). Moreover, children can also associate
545 physical outcomes with the corresponding mental states of the agent who gen-
546 erated them (Pelz et al., 2020). Finally, and most strikingly, young children
547 can infer the transfer of ideas by seeing how different agents create artifacts
548 (Pesowski et al., 2020), a capacity known as “intuitive archaeology” (Hurwitz
549 et al., 2019; Schachner et al., 2018). While these results point towards an early
550 understanding of the relation between the social and physical world, to our
551 knowledge, it is an open question whether these inferences are also linked to
552 some form of explicit or implicit event reconstruction.

553 At first sight, our computational framework appears to suggest that any
554 creature with some form of naïve psychology and naïve physics ought to be
555 able to perform social inferences from physical evidence (i.e., access to the two
556 key components of Equation 2). This may not be the case, however, because
557 our model also requires an ability to transfer information across these intuitive
558 theories (reconstructing behavior via naïve psychology and evaluating how they
559 compare to the environment via naïve physics). While this is an open empirical
560 question, research suggest that intuitive physics and intuitive psychology rely
561 on separate neural circuitry (Fischer et al., 2016; Saxe & Powell, 2006), leaving
562 open the question of how these two intuitive theories might work in tandem to
563 reconstruct other people’s behavior from physical evidence.

564 One interesting case that suggests such a feat might not be simple comes from
565 research with vervet monkeys. Vervet monkeys have an astonishing degree of
566 social intelligence, including a nuanced repertoire of vocal calls to signal different
567 types of predators, each associated with different escape responses (Seyfarth

et al., 1980a,b). Yet, vervet monkeys routinely fail to identify predators from indirect physical evidence. For instance, vervet monkeys fail to infer that a python is hiding in a nearby bush when they encounter the distinct tracks that they leave behind. Similarly, vervet monkeys also fail to infer the presence of a leopard upon encountering a gazelle carcass on a tree (where leopards usually drag their prey so they can feed in solitude; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1985). Critically, this failure appears to persist even after vervet monkeys have, in past events, seen the direct association between the physical evidence and the predator (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1985, 2008). These results might point to the possibility that the form of event reconstruction that we present here might require capacities that go beyond simple physical and social reasoning, as they involve an ability to combine the two capacities to derive richer inferences than would be otherwise possible.

Our work also leaves a critical question open. In our experiments, we focused on situations where people already knew that an agent was previously present. Our work therefore does not speak to how people recognize that a scene contains traces of someone’s behavior in the first place. One possibility is that people engage in a pervasive and constant social analysis of all physical scenes. Doing so, however, might be prohibitively costly and unnecessary. As such, it is likely that people are attuned to the physical signatures that reveal the presence of an agent, which then trigger social reasoning from physical evidence. Consistent with this second view, research suggests that people can infer the presence of an agent based on apparent order (Newman et al., 2010; Keil & Newman, 2015) and on a sensitivity to human-like errors that people leave behind when interacting with the world (Lopez-Brau et al., 2021). An open question is how the ability to detect the presence of an agent interacts with the ability to reconstruct their behavior and infer their mental states.

Overall, our results illustrate the sophistication of human social intelligence. Beyond being able to read the mental states of agents that we are personally interacting with, we can also infer the mental states of agents we have never encountered, just from minimal indirect evidence that reveals their presence. Researchers have long argued that humans are unique in their ability to reason about and navigate the social world (Herrmann et al., 2007). Our work shows that this ability is not confined to social interactions, but can fundamentally affect how we reason about the physical world, allowing us to see social meaning embedded in physical structures, like a pile of rocks, where other animals may see merely just that: a pile of rocks.

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