China's Propaganda Strategy: Evidence from State-Owned News Networks' English-Language Twitter Posts

Peter Wu¹

Abstract

This paper seeks to analyze one element of China's propaganda strategy. It seeks to find out whether one aspect of this strategy can be described as one of focusing on "positives about China" rather than "negatives about others". This paper builds upon the research conducted by King et al. (2017), which found that the Chinese government employs a "cyber troop" of online influencers who post positive valence issues about the government in order to distract readers from negative valence topics surrounding the state. This study repeats King et. al's study with Chinese government-owned English-language news outlets. Due to the different nature of the units of analysis (anonymous cyber troopers vs. official news agencies), a derivation of King et al.'s categorization scheme needed to be constructed which captures similar sentiments. Using this scheme, the paper analyzes the sentiment of the Twitter posts of these news outlets to determine whether the aforementioned strategy of "positives about China" rather than "negatives about others" is a genuine strategy of Chinese propaganda. Overall, there is evidence that the answer is affirmative. This could be driven by the Chinese government's attempt to anchor public opinion favourably on issues of low public knowledgeability.

Keywords: *Propaganda, China, Social Media, Twitter, State-Owned Media, CCP*

¹ Department of Political Science, McGill University. Address all correspondence to peter.wu@mail.mcgill.ca.

Introduction

Propaganda in China has a long and storied history. Indeed, it was the ancient general Sun Tzu who counselled that “All warfare is based on deception”^[1]. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has engaged in propaganda ever since its founding in 1921, when it used propaganda to mobilize labour unions and military units to its early cause^[2]. In 1942, at the height of China’s war with Japan and the CCP’s revolutionary movement, Mao gave a speech at the Yan’an Forum where he emphasized that “In our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people there are various fronts, among which there are the fronts of the pen and of the gun, the cultural and the military fronts”^[3]. In this paper, I analyze one aspect of contemporary Chinese propaganda, namely, whether Chinese government propaganda strategically chooses to portray the state in a positive light rather than to target perceived opponents of the government. This study is motivated by King et al. (2017), who found that the Chinese government’s cyber troop of online public opinion influencers (government employees pretending to be real people posting on

social media; these people are commonly referred to as the 50c party, which comes from the widespread but untrue belief that they are paid 50 cents for each post) mostly tended to post about positive valence issues (topics which portrayed the state in a favourable manner) about the government rather than negative posts attacking government critics. I attempt to analyze whether this finding can be extrapolated as a general strategy of contemporary Chinese state propaganda. In other words, is the strategy of portraying the Chinese government positively rather than targeting negative criticisms at others reflected across varying sources of Chinese propaganda, thus indicating that this is an intentional policy choice? I argue that the answer is yes.

In attempting to answer this question and find potential evidence for the argument, I will first contextualize the study by presenting a review of the existing literature on the topic of Chinese propaganda. Then, I give an overview of a mixed methods study, involving both qualitative and quantitative research techniques. Here, I review and categorize the valences of 200 twitter posts made by

Chinese state-owned English-language news networks, analyzing the proportions of each category. I will also present the data, methodology, and my findings, followed by a general discussion of implications. Overall, I find evidence that the focus on “positives about China” rather than “negatives about others” is a general strategy of Chinese propaganda. This finding is consistent with the theory that the Chinese government attempts to anchor people’s opinions in a manner favourable to the state using positive valence propaganda.

Literature Review

A review of existing literature indicates that China’s propaganda apparatus is complex, and its aims are variable and vast. At the national level, the Chinese government’s information management bureaus are split between 3 agencies (that we know of): the Propaganda/Publicity Department (中宣部) with 13 subdepartments, the Ministry of Information Industry (信息产业部) with 12 sub-departments, and the General Administration of Press and Publications (国家新闻出版署) with 8 sub-departments [4].

The goals of Chinese propaganda vary. Carter & Carter (in press) argue that authoritarian governments use propaganda to demonstrate their power *vis a vis* their citizens and to deter anti-regime mobilization. This claim seems to be verified by Huang (2015), who found that Chinese university students who were more familiar with government propaganda are more likely to believe that the government has a strong capacity to maintain political order. Likewise, Jaros & Pan (2018) find that China’s provincial-level state media act as signallers that reflect the balance of power between actors in the Chinese political system. Varyingly, Stockmann & Gallagher (2011) find that the Chinese government uses propaganda to portray state institutions in a positive light, thus bolstering the legitimacy of the state. Furthermore, Stockmann (2013, 17) finds that Chinese propaganda is used in attempts to shift public opinion on certain issues in order to increase the policy space of the government on that issue, showing that the Chinese government is still accountable to public opinion in some sense.

Much of the literature on Chinese propaganda deals with new platforms of propaganda dissemination. For example, Stockmann (2010) finds that new commercialized media, which are less regulated than state media and partially private, can increase the legitimacy of the state's propaganda messages. Citizens find commercial media to be more credible. Therefore, when used sparingly, government propaganda can be distributed through commercial channels to greater effect. The Chinese government has also been attempting to use the online sphere to advance new forms of propaganda. Repnikova & Fang (2019) find that local officials and entrepreneurs were able to work together in Shanghai to create a digital-only news outlet, *PengPai* (澎湃), that was allowed to conduct a broader scope of investigative journalism than traditional media, which proved immensely popular among the Chinese audience. This allowed the government to disseminate propaganda by mixing investigative articles with propaganda pieces on the platform. The Chinese government has also used online social media to advance propaganda. The government is known to employ people

to post political commentary on social media in the guise of regular citizens. According to Ai's (2012) interview of a 50c party member, the government directs them to post positive comments about the regime during periods of potential social unrest so as to divert citizens' anger away from the state and towards the commentator. Likewise, King et al. come to the same finding, but the authors argue that the policy is intended to distract citizens towards positive valence issues rather than to redirect their anger at commentators. The goal of this paper, then, is to find out whether this policy is replicated by official Chinese state-owned English-language news outlets.

Study

In this study, I attempt to analyze King et al.'s and Ai's finding about the Chinese government's direction for 50c posters to focus on positive valence propaganda to see if this is a general strategy of Chinese propaganda. To do so, I analyze Twitter posts made by Chinese state-owned English-language news organizations, specifically, CGTN, Global Times, The People's Daily, Xinhua, and CCTV.^[2] The reasoning behind this

decision is as follows. Firstly, Chinese propaganda in the form of 50c party posts are unofficial and intended for consumption within China. Secondly, the state's propaganda in the form of English-language news outlets is official and intended for consumption outside of China. Therefore, these two forms of propaganda differ on two levels. If they nevertheless output social media posts with similar proportions in terms of the valence of posts, then this is evidence that the focus on positive valence posting is a general strategy.

King et al. find that the proportion of positive valence posts about the Chinese government is significantly greater than the proportion of other types of posts, including posts containing negative criticisms of government critics. Therefore, I would expect that the proportion of positive valence posts about the Chinese government made by its English-language news outlets to be higher than the proportion of other types of posts. Therefore, regarding these outlets, we have:

H_a : The proportion of positive valence posts about the Chinese government is significantly higher than the proportion of posts with other valence categories and about other governments.^[3]

H_0 : The proportion of positive valence posts about the Chinese government is less than or equal to the proportion of posts with other valence categories and about other governments.

Figure 1: Figure 3 of King et al. (2017), showing the proportion of posts in valence categories made by 50c party members. “Cheerleading” refers to positive valence posts about the government.

Data and Methodology

The population of interest is all the tweets that have been posted by the aforementioned five Chinese news outlets, excluding comments and retweets, as of March 25, 2021 at 1:21a.m. EDT. This population was collected using the Python tool *snsrape*.^[4] In total, 665,839 tweets were collected. I then used the statistical software SPSS to collect a random sample of 200 tweets from the population, which became the sample of interest. Within the sample, there were 47 tweets from CGTN, 62 from the Global Times, 29 from The People's Daily, 54 from Xinhua, and 8 from CCTV.

In order to assess the valence of each tweet, I created a categorization scheme, adapted from the one employed by King et al. Their scheme, while suitable for an analysis of the valence of posts by government employees pretending to be real people, proved to be unsuitable for a similar analysis for posts created by official state news agencies. This is because most of these posts are summaries of news articles and

opinion articles which have been posted on the website of the agency in question or that of other agencies. Therefore, a sentiment analysis of these news outlets' Twitter posts is in some sense a sentiment analysis of their news and opinion articles. In order to account for this reality, I updated King et al.'s categorization scheme to reflect two dimensions: valence and governmental subject.

"Governmental subject" refers to whether the post mentions the Chinese government or foreign governments. The Chinese government category refers to any agency or actor which is linked with any level of government in China (including Hong Kong and Macau). For example, these might include posts which mention government officials, public schools, and/or the military. Likewise, the foreign government category refers to any agency or actor which is linked with any level of a government outside China. International bureaucracies, such as the UN, are included in this category. Posts which do not mention any government or government-linked agency/person are put into the "Other" category. Some posts mentioned both Chinese and foreign governments, so these posts were divided

into two clause-level observations. There were 18 instances of this, so the total number of observations comes to $n = 218$.

Valence refers to the “positivity” or “negativity” of the posts. This was determined by a qualitative review of every tweet in the sample. Since I am interested in posts about Chinese/foreign governments, a positive valence post would be a post that either praises some aspect of the government (e.g., “China’s centrally administrated state-owned enterprises rake in rising revenues in Q3 amid brisker rebound of economy”)^[5] or shows the government carrying out its legal functions (e.g., “Main structure of main bridge of Baisha Bridge finished in Liuzhou, south China”).^[6] The inclusion of the latter definition follows from Stockmann’s finding that demonstrations of the government doing its job increases the legitimacy of state institutions. Therefore, these posts would be positive valence. A negative valence post is either a post which criticizes a government, portrays a government in a negative light, or offers constructive criticism for a government. For posts that did not obviously fall into any category on an analysis of the text, I conducted a further

review of any attached media (e.g., news articles, videos, images) to determine its category.

The combination of the governmental subject and valence dimensions is meant to mirror the categories employed by King et al. Positive valence coverage of China’s government mirrors King et al.’s category of “cheerleading”, while negative coverage of China’s government mirrors their category of “nonargumentative suggestions”. While positive valence coverage of a foreign government does not have a direct mirror in King et al.’s categorization, negative valence coverage would mirror their category of “taunting of foreign countries”.

Code	Name	Definition	Example
CP	China Positive	Positive report/opinion on the Chinese government and/or affiliated actors	China-built roads boost local economy in #Kyrgyzstan – CGTN ²
CN	China Negative	Negative report/opinion on the Chinese government and/or affiliated actors	Accountability can help Chinese dairies regain trust. http://bit.ly/2FVHhjX – Global Times ³
FP	Foreign Positive	Positive report/opinion on a non-Chinese government and/or affiliated actors	Russia's Soyuz-2.1v lightclass carrier rocket has successfully put a military satellite into orbit: Russian Defense Ministry http://bit.ly/2XPVqrw – Global Times ⁴
FN	Foreign Negative	Negative report/opinion on a non-Chinese government and/or affiliated actors	The White House's plan to hold a series of holiday parties has drawn ire as the COVID-19 cases are surging across the United States. Public health officials warn of the dangers of indoor gatherings in winter. #COVID19 – Xinhua ⁵
O	Other	No mention of national government, international bureaucracy, or affiliated actors	Swimmers participate in the 3,300-meter-long competition of the annual Sun Moon lake ("Riyue Tan") Swimming... http://fb.me/1D2HBljyv – People's Daily ⁶

Table 1: Categorization scheme

² <https://twitter.com/CGTNOOfficial/status/1138725122351611904>

³ <https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/970380958431137793>

⁴ <https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1199518211387088901>

⁵ <https://twitter.com/XHNews/status/1335143397254819842>

Results

Category Code	Count	Sample Proportion	95% Confidence Interval
CP	83	0.381	[0.316, 0.445]
CN	2	0.009	[0.001, 0.036]
FP	32	0.170	[0.120, 0.220]
FN	37	0.147	[0.100, 0.194]
O	64	0.294	[0.233, 0.354]

Table 2: Results of the analysis of proportions (sample proportions and confidence intervals are rounded to 3 significant figures).

Figure 2: Proportion of tweets in each valence category with 95% confidence intervals (intervals are accurate to 9 decimal places)

After the sample was collected and valence categories assigned, I analyzed the proportion of tweets in each valence category. The results are shown in Table 2 and Figure 2. The first thing that we see is that the proportion of tweets in each category are not identical. This is verified by a chi-square goodness of fit test with expected probabilities of $\frac{1}{4}$ across all the categories ($\chi^2 = 88.927, p < 2.2 \times 10^{-16}$). The confidence interval of all the proportions was calculated using the standard method for large samples, with the exception of the interval for posts in the CN category. For this category, because the number of posts was so small ($n_{CN} = 2$), I used the adjusted confidence interval calculation method based on the Wilson point estimator of proportions (Agresti & Coull, 1998; Wilson, 1927). Research has shown that this confidence interval calculation works for even small values of the proportion (McClave et al., 2018, 330). Given the confidence intervals, we can see that the proportion of positive tweets about China's government is significantly greater than the proportion of all other categories of tweets except for the proportion of tweets in the "Other" category. This may simply be due to the

small sample size (perhaps a larger sample would have shortened the confidence intervals of the values of the proportions), or it may be reflective of some intent.^[12] Importantly, the proportion of tweets in the CP category is significantly higher than the proportion of tweets in the FN category.

Discussion

Even though the findings do not allow for a strict rejection of the null hypothesis, the evidence presented seems to support the argument that the focus on "positives about China" rather than "negatives about others" is a general strategy of Chinese propaganda. Just as King et al. found that the highest proportion of 50c party posts consisted of cheerleading, I find that the highest proportion of Twitter posts from 5 major Chinese state-owned English-language outlets consists of positive valence coverage of the Chinese government, with the exception of non-political tweets. This is an interesting find inasmuch as it diverges from the propaganda strategy of other authoritarian states. For example, Russian foreign-language propaganda often seeks to attack foreign institutions in

order to undermine their legitimacy and stoke fears of crisis among foreign populations (Weisburd et al., 2016; Erlich & Garner, in press).

Given that there is evidence for a general strategy of positive valence reporting on the Chinese government, why might the Chinese authorities employ such a tactic? One possible explanation involves the psychological effect known as anchoring. Anchoring describes the effect whereby giving someone a numerical or descriptive piece of information (an anchor) can bias that person's assessment of future information towards the initial information. For example, by asking participants in an experimental study to guess whether the height of the Brandenburg Gate is around a higher or lower value, participants usually gave higher or lower answers in correspondence with their given anchor (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). In another study, participants who were presented with anti-defendant information then pro-defendant information in a criminal case were more likely to view the defendant as guilty than participants who were presented with pro-defendant information then anti-defendant

information if they did not have to justify their beliefs (Tetlock, 1983).

Propaganda is viewed by the CCP as a tool of social transformation, with the aim of creating a "socialist spiritual civilization" (社会主义精神文明), the ideal society in the eyes of the Party (Shambaugh, 2007, 29). In this context, anchoring could partially explain the pattern of Chinese propaganda observed in King et al. and in this paper. Chinese authorities could use positive valence messaging to anchor public opinion on certain issues, assuming the public does not already have views on the matter. Given the dearth of information diversity in the Chinese media landscape, this could have the powerful effect of cementing public opinion in a manner that is favourable to the state. Do we see evidence of this in practice? Two studies from China provide circumstantial evidence. Stockman compared the effect of Chinese media messaging on citizens' views on two subjects: labour law and the United States. On labour law, which was a relatively novel topic at the time, Stockmann & Gallagher found that people who consumed Chinese media reports depicting individuals who

resolved their labour-related cases successfully through the court system were more likely to view the legal system positively. On the other hand, Stockmann found that when the Chinese government attempted to use positive valence coverage of the United States (at the time, Chinese authorities wanted to “cool off” anti-foreign nationalistic feelings), a well-known topic, the effect on people’s views was less than the effect that the media had had regarding labour law. Therefore, it seems that when there was no anchor, media portrayals had a large effect. However, when the public already had pre-existing notions about a topic, the effect of media portrayals was smaller, thus lending credence to the notion that the Chinese government can use the media to anchor people’s opinions. Nevertheless, this evidence is circumstantial, and more research is clearly needed in this area.

Limitations

There are several limitations to this study. Firstly, the inclusion of showing the government carrying out its functions into the definition of positive valence could be controversial. Given the

limitations of my personal qualitative judgement, when a news outlet reports on a government action, it was an open question as to whether this was simply neutral reporting of a political event or whether there was an intention to increase the legitimacy of the state. Because of Stockmann’s findings on the effect of media coverage and the legitimacy of state institutions, I elected to include all such reports in the positive valence category. However, this likely meant that reports which were intended to be neutral were added into this group as well. Perhaps an advanced machine sentiment analysis could have captured sufficient nuance in the valence of words in a post to distinguish between neutral reporting and intent to legitimate, but such a method is beyond my current capabilities.

Secondly, several of the tweets included linked media to images, news/opinion articles, and videos. Although I examined the attached media if the valence of the tweet itself was unclear, I did not examine all of the attached media in detail. Therefore, it is plausible that some of the media may have different valences than the tweet

itself, which would have altered and/or qualified the valence of the tweet overall. For example, a tweet may be a headline to an article, where the headline represents the major but not the only theme in the article. Someone who views the tweet and the article may come away with the valence found in the headline but also other valences in the article which deviated from that of the headline.

Thirdly, the international salience of news events may have acted as a spurious factor which contributed to the types of posts that state news outlets put out. As Repnikova & Fang note, even state-owned news outlets need to report news to attract and maintain their audience. Therefore, the salience of an international news event may contribute to the types of news articles that are then posted by the outlets on their social media. This may be especially prescient for English-language outlets, who need to attract English-speaking audiences and therefore may face more pressure to align their coverage with salient international issues.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to determine whether the propaganda strategy that King et al. discovered among China's 50c party is a general strategy of the Chinese propaganda apparatus. I reasoned that if an arm of Chinese propaganda that differed from the 50c party on two levels demonstrated a similar strategy, then this means that the strategy is a general one and not isolated to the 50c party. After comparing the proportion of Twitter posts put out by 5 Chinese state-owned English-language news outlets that fall into 5 valence categories, I find that the resulting proportions are similar to those discovered by King et al. I therefore conclude that evidence has been found that a strategy of focusing on "positives about China" rather than "negatives about others" is a general one.

However, I do not claim that this strategy is *the* strategy of Chinese propaganda. As stated in the literature review, the political apparatus of Chinese propaganda is vast, and many different strategies likely exist. More research on this subject is certainly needed, especially on the mechanism by which positive

valence propaganda can benefit the Party-state. There is some evidence in the literature that the anchoring effect is a mechanism by which this can take place, but it is circumstantial. Perhaps an experimental study like the ones conducted by Tetlock and Strack & Mussweiler can be undertaken with viewership of Chinese propaganda as the anchor. Moreover, as of writing this paper, there is some evidence that China's propaganda strategy is about to assume a more combative tone in response to international pressure regarding some of the government's domestic policies (Wong, 2021). Repeating this study in the future may very well yield a different result.

Links

Dataset:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/19pEuI7yOQ140D19fopTijX62tb9MHoev/view>

SPSS output:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MLjAjm92VYEH4VW6i4vwTIHH26xwHN7R/view>

R code: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tYL7uv4a2SPyQvCcs0yMdIlbvILjFj13/view>

References

- Agresti, Alan, and Brent A. Coull. "Approximate Is Better than 'Exact' for Interval Estimation of Binomial Proportions." *The American Statistician* 52, no. 2 (May 1998): 119–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.1998.10480550>.
- Ai, Weiwei. "China's Paid Trolls: Meet the 50-Cent Party." *New Statesman*, October 17, 2012. <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/politics/2012/10/china%E2%80%99s-paid-trolls-meet-50cent-party>.
- Carter, Erin Baggot, and Brett L. Carter. "Autocratic Propaganda in Global Perspective," in press.
- Erlich, Aaron, and Calvin Garner. "Is pro-Kremlin Disinformation Effective? Evidence from Ukraine," in press.
- Huang, Haifeng. "Propaganda as Signaling." *Comparative Politics* 47, no. 4 (July 2015): 419–44. <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041515816103220>.
- Jaros, Kyle, and Jennifer Pan. "China's Newsmakers: Official Media Coverage and Political Shifts in the Xi Jinping Era." *The China Quarterly* 233 (March 2018): 111–36. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017001679>.
- King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. "How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument." *American Political Science Review* 111, no. 3 (August 2017): 484–501. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000144>.
- Mao, Zedong. "在延安文艺座谈会上的讲话." Marxists.org. Accessed March 29, 2021. <https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-194205.htm>.
- McClave, James T., P. George Benson, and Terry Sincich. *Statistics for Business and Economics*. 13th ed. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, 2018.
- Repnikova, Maria, and Kecheng Fang. "Digital Media Experiments in China: 'Revolutionizing' Persuasion under Xi Jinping." *The China Quarterly* 239 (September 2019): 679–701. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741019000316>.

- Saich, Tony. *Finding Allies and Making Revolution: The Early Years of the Chinese Communist Party*. Leiden, NL: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2020.
- Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes, and Efficacy." *The China Journal* 57 (January 2007): 25–58. <https://doi.org/10.2307/20066240>.
- Stern, Rachel E., and Jonathan Hassid. "Amplifying Silence: Uncertainty and Control Parables in Contemporary China." *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 10 (February 23, 2012): 1230–54. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011434295>.
- Stockmann, Daniela. "Who Believes Propaganda? Media Effects during the Anti-Japanese Protests in Beijing." *The China Quarterly* 202 (June 2010): 269–89. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741010000238>.
- Stockmann, Daniela, and Mary E. Gallagher. "Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China." *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 4 (February 14, 2011): 436–67. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010394773>.
- Stockmann, Daniela. *Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China*. Communication, Society and Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Strack, Fritz, and Thomas Mussweiler. "Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 73, no. 3 (1997): 437–46. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.73.3.437>.
- Sun, Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Lionel Giles. North Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 2008.
- Tetlock, Philip E. "Accountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 46, no. 4 (December 1983): 285–92. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3033716>.
- Weisburd, Andrew, Clint Watts, and J. M. Berger. "Trolling for Trump: How Russia Is Trying to Destroy Our Democracy." *War on the Rocks*, November 6, 2016. <https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/trolling-for-trump-how-russia-is-trying-to-destroy-ourdemocracy/>.
- Wilson, Edwin B. "Probable Inference, the Law of Succession, and Statistical Inference." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 22, no. 158 (1927): 209–12. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1927.10502953>.
- Wong, Catherine. "US-China Ties: Washington Funded Terrorists in Xinjiang, Beijing Says." April 14, 2021. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3129545/us-china-ties-washingtonfunded-terrorists-xinjian>

“在我们为中国人民解放的斗争中，有各种的战线，就中也可以说有文武两个战线，这就是文化战线和军事战线。”

[2] While CGTN and the Global Times are English-only media outlets, The People's Daily, Xinhua, and CCTV are predominantly Chinese-language outlets with an English section.

[3] "Significantly higher" refers to statistical significance.

[4] <https://github.com/JustAnotherArchivist/snsrape>

[5] <https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1318587797926760451>

[6] <https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1001976636022099968>

[7] <https://twitter.com/CGTNOOfficial/status/1138725122351611904>

[8] <https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/970380958431137793>

[9] <https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1199518211387088901>

[10] <https://twitter.com/XHNews/status/1335143397254819842>

[11] <https://twitter.com/PDChina/status/377521865474187264>

[12] Perhaps the news outlets try to mix propaganda with other reporting to increase their viewership, as is the case with *PengPai*.