Title: Dominance-driven autocratic political orientations predict political violence in non-WEIRD and WEIRD samples

Running head: Autocratic political orientations predict political violence

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Abstract. Given the costs of political violence, scholars have long sought to identify its causes. We examined individual differences related to participation in political violence, emphasizing the central role of political orientations. We hypothesized, specifically, that individuals with dominance-driven autocratic political orientations are prone to political violence. Multilevel analysis of survey data from 34 African countries ($N = 51,587$) indicated that autocracy-oriented individuals, compared to democracy-oriented individuals, are considerably more likely to participate in political violence. As a predictor of violence (indexed with attitudinal, action intent, and behavioral measures), autocratic orientation outperformed other variables highlighted in existing research, including socioeconomic status and group-based injustice. Additional analyses of original data from South Africa ($N = 2,170$), Denmark ($N = 1,012$), and the United States ($N = 1,539$) indicated that the autocratic orientation-political violence link reflects individual differences in dominance orientations, and that the findings generalize to societies extensively socialized to democratic values.

Keywords. Political violence, political orientation, autocracy, dominance, aggression

Coalitional aggression for a political cause, or political violence,¹ is a chief contributor to human mortality and suffering around the world. Understanding the causes of political violence is thus “a major project in the social sciences” (Hsiang, Burke, & Miguel, 2013, p. 1). The study of political violence has been dominated by political science (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and economics (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), and has emphasized macro-level predictors, such as political regime type or economic development (Dixon, 2009). Here, we present a micro-level, psychological account focused on individual differences associated with participation in political violence.

Despite the importance of understanding political violence, its psychological predictors have not yet received adequate attention. While a large psychological literature exists on nonviolent collective actions, such as protests (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), only a handful of studies have analyzed “nonnormative” (violent) collective actions (Becker & Tausch, 2015). A related literature on radicalization is more voluminous (Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018). Yet “radicalization” is not synonymous with “political violence”. One may be radicalized (e.g., join a radicalized group) and yet refrain from using violence; and one may use political violence without being radicalized (e.g., fight in a civil war).

The few existing psychological studies on political violence (and most research on non-violent collective action) have centered on Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) populations. It is unclear whether their findings generalize to non-WEIRD

¹ “Coalitional aggression” refers to the use of armed force by one collective against another, and “political cause” to incompatibilities over national-level politics (e.g., a country’s system of governance or the distribution of political power). This definition draws on standard conceptualizations in political science (Gleditsch et al., 2002), and excludes inter-state wars. Examples of intra-state political violence include the uprisings during the Arab Spring and its aftermath.

countries (Becker & Tausch, 2015, pp. 76–77), where most political violence occurs. The lack of data from violence-ridden populations also implies that existing psychological research on political violence has largely focused on attitudes toward or intentions to engage in violence, rather than the key variable of interest: participation.

Finally, existing studies have not yet explored the role of individual differences in political orientations. Political violence, by definition, involves incompatibilities over political issues, typically a country’s system of governance, the distribution of power, or a state’s territorial integrity (Gleditsch et al., 2002). It would seem natural that people’s orientations toward these issues play a central role in their motivations to participate in violence (consider, e.g., the Arab Spring and its aftermath, where political regime type and hierarchies were at the core of the conflicts; e.g., Bellin, 2012). We propose that identifying commonalities in such political orientations is a fruitful starting point for a cross-culturally robust account of the psychology of political violence.

Political scientists have typically focused on left- and right-wing preferences. Such orientations, however, are particular to developed democracies (Malka, Lelkes, & Soto, 2019). We therefore focus on a more foundational difference in political orientations as identified by Popper (1945/2012) and Russell (1945/2013) in their histories of political thought: preferences for autocratic versus democratic forms of governance. Autocratic governance is characterized by political hierarchy, where decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of a non-elected (or fraudulently elected) elite, who maintain power via intimidation and force. Democratic governance, by contrast, is characterized by equality in opportunities to compete for political power, where decision-making power is distributed among political actors on the basis of their popular vote rather than force. Hence, political orientations toward autocracy reflect preferences for unequal and hierarchically structured relations among political actors (political parties, political leaders, etc.), maintained by force.

We argue that this individual difference in preference for autocracy is the reflection—in the domain of national politics—of a set of motivations (i) that exist in several other domains including the interpersonal and intergroup, and (ii) which, in these domains, strongly relate to precursors of political violence.

Autocratic Orientation as Dominance in the Domain of National Politics

To specify the first claim: individual differences in support for autocracy, at the psychological level, reflect individual differences in orientations toward the use of dominance as a status attainment strategy. Understood as relative access to contested resources within a group, status plays a key role in the lives of social organisms, including non-human animals and virtually all human societies (Cheng et al., 2013). Differences in status or social hierarchies are considered (near) universal, with higher status predicting a range of important outcomes, including increased biological fitness and greater overall wellbeing (Cheng et al., 2013). Recent psychological research has distinguished between two overarching strategies for pursuing status (Maner, 2017). The first, prestige-based, seeks freely conferred status in return for competence. The second, force-based, is dominance: “the induction of fear, through intimidation and coercion, to attain social rank” (Cheng et al., 2013, p. 105). Dominance reflects not only force-based pursuit of status but also support for inequality and hierarchy in social relations (Kunst et al., 2017).

Individual differences in status-seeking strategies and support for hierarchies exist beyond the interpersonal domain. In the intergroup domain, some individuals have a higher, and others a lower, desire for “unequal and dominant/subordinate relations among salient social groups” (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006, p. 282), as reflected in the conceptualization and measurement of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Here, we suggest that a political

orientation toward autocracy is, in essence, the national-level instantiation of these same psychological motivations.

Autocratic Orientation and Political Violence: Hypotheses

Dominance predicts a range of outcomes that we see as antecedents of political violence. In the interpersonal domain, individuals who score high on dominance are more likely to use interpersonal aggression (e.g., Johnson, Burk, & Kirkpatrick, 2007). In the intergroup domain—and of particular relevance for political violence—SDO predicts racism, punitiveness, dehumanization, and ethnic persecution (reviewed in Kunst et al., 2017). Based on this, and turning to the domain of national politics, we hypothesized that autocratic political orientations positively relate to participation in political violence (H1); and that autocratic political orientations mediate the association between dominance orientations and participation in political violence (H2).

Overall Analysis Strategy

Studies 1 and 2 tested, respectively, H1 and H2, utilizing non-WEIRD samples. Studies 3 and 4 assessed generalizability to WEIRD settings. Two qualifications are due.

First, we used slightly different operationalizations in some of the studies. Study 1 aimed to maximize external validity within a non-WEIRD setting by utilizing a large multinational dataset. This study relied on secondary data and hence we could not use existing measures of key psychological constructs. Study 2 (in addition to testing H2) aimed to replicate the findings of Study 1 using standard psychological scales. The shift in Study 3 to a WEIRD setting prompted us to make several changes to the research design. Finally, Study 4—a direct replication of Study 2—assessed whether differences between Studies 2 and 3 reflected the design differences or differences between WEIRD and non-WEIRD settings.

Second, we relied on non-experimental survey data. Hence, we cannot rule out the possibility of omitted variables confounding the relationships of interest. Hence, the results below should be interpreted as associations (although, in some parts, following conventions, we use causal terms, e.g., “random effects” in multilevel analyses). Likewise, the mediation analyses in Studies 2–4 are mute on causal order: dominance can be a predictor of both autocratic orientations and (via autocratic orientations) political violence, but dominance may also be a mediator through which autocratic orientations influence violence. Theoretically, we see the former scenario as being more likely, with individual differences in dominance determining both political orientations and propensity to political violence.

Study 1: Are Autocratic Political Orientations Associated with Political Violence?

Method

Data. Research on political violence has typically focused on states or groups as units of analysis. The dearth of individual-level studies within this literature has largely been due to the lack of micro-level data from violence-affected states. Here, we utilized a recently established dataset, which—uniquely—contains items on individual participation in political violence: Afrobarometer Data (2015).

Afrobarometer Data (2015) contain representative cross-sections of all citizens of voting age from 34 African countries on topics related to governance, markets, and civil society. Depending on demographic heterogeneity, each country sample spans either ~1,200 or ~2,400 (total $N = 51,587$), resulting in a margin of sampling error of $\pm 2.8\%$ and 2.0% , respectively (at 95% CI). The surveys used clustered, stratified, multi-stage probability sampling, where random selection with probability proportionate to population size was applied at every stage.

The coverage of this dataset is extraordinary. In addition to enhanced external validity, such coverage confers several methodological advantages. First, it allows us to analyze a large number of participants in political violence—who typically compose only a tiny fraction of a country’s population (Figure 1)—selected via probability sampling. Second, it allows accounting for country-specific factors that potentially confound or moderate the associations between our key variables.

Fig. 1. African countries included in the analysis with sample sizes and counts of interviewees reporting participation in political violence.

Outcomes. *Participation* in political violence was measured with self-reported use of violence for a political cause. Although self-reported, the measure explicitly focuses on actual behavior as opposed to mere intentions or attitudes toward violence: “*Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Used force or violence for a political cause?*”, with answer options: “*No, would never do this*”, “*No, but would do if had the chance*”, “*Yes, once or twice*”, “*Yes, several times*”, “*Yes, often*”, and “*Don’t know*”. This item followed four other items on political activism (“*Attended a community meeting*”; “*Got together with others to raise an issue*”; “*Refused to pay a tax or fee to government*”; and “*Attended a demonstration or a protest march*”), suggesting that the question about violence refers to participation in a protest-like, violent anti-government action.

“Violence for a political cause” is a broader construct that likely subsumes various specific types of violence. We assume that variables that increase people’s general motivations to use violence for a political cause, *ceteris paribus*, also increase people’s willingness to engage in more specific types of violence, including low-intensity violence during protests and high-intensity violence during civil conflicts (e.g., Gleditsch et al. 2002).

We were primarily interested in whether people participated in violence, not how frequently they did so. Therefore, in the main analysis we recoded this variable as binary, aggregating the first two responses into “no” = 0 and the last three into “yes” = 1. This distinction follows macro-level research considering onset and intensity/frequency of violence as distinct phenomena, caused by different factors (Dixon, 2009). Analysis of the original, ordinal scale (coded 0–4), reported in supplemental material online (SOM-R; Table S6), generates the same substantive conclusions.

To support the validity of this measure, we implemented a range of tests (specified below), and introduced an alternative measure, *willingness* to participate in political violence, which reflects a subset of the data used for the primary measure (“*No, would never do this*” = 0, “*No, but would do if had the chance*” = 1). While this measure does not indicate actual conflict behavior, it reflects action tendency to partake in political violence. Arguably, individuals who report a willingness to participate in violence if they had a chance will more likely take part in such violence once the chance arises, *ceteris paribus*. Studies show that expressed willingness to engage in political violence predicts actual participation (Gómez et al., 2017; see also Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Action tendencies are distinct from mere attitudes, such as support for violence. Attitudes can be idealistic, whereas intentions consider practical limitations and opportunities (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977).

This measure also confers several methodological advantages. First, given that willingness to partake in violence does not constitute actual violence, this measure may suffer less from reporting bias. Second, it allows for assessing willingness to engage in violence independent of opportunities for violence. Individuals who reported not having participated in political violence might have taken part in such violence if they had the opportunity to do so (and such opportunities may be lacking for various reasons that are beyond our study’s scope).

Finally, we also analyzed *support* for violence using the following question: “*Which of the following statements is closest to your view? [...] 1: The use of violence is never justified in [country name] politics today. 2: In [country name], it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause*”. The answer options were “*Agree very strongly with statement 1*”, “*Agree with statement 1*”, “*Agree with statement 2*”, and “*Agree very strongly with statement 2*”. We coded the first two replies “0” and the last two “1” (“1” thus indicates support for political violence).

Predictors. The political science literature does not contain a standard indicator of individual preference for autocratic versus democratic forms of governance (for a discussion, see, e.g., Norris, 1999). In the psychological literature, several measures of related constructs exist, such as SDO (Ho et al., 2015) or Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) (Duckitt et al., 2010). However, these measures were not included in the Afrobarometer questionnaire (we were not involved in the Afrobarometer project), and they do not directly tap preference for autocratic versus democratic forms of governance at the national level.

The Afrobarometer questionnaire contains more than 100 questions, with a wide range of items on political views. This allowed us to construct a measure of autocratic political orientations—the *Autocratic Orientation Scale* (AOS)—with satisfactory content validity and internal consistency. Initially, we identified ten items that reflect preferences for an autocratic or a democratic form of governance (Q18–Q21; Q31A–C; Q33–Q35; see S1 for full formulations). Subsequently, we performed an exploratory factor analysis, and derived a three-item scale (AOS₃), serving as our primary predictor (for details on the factor analysis, see S2). The selected items indicate approval on a five-point scale (“*Strongly disapprove*” = 0, “*Strongly approve*” = 4) of the following statements: “*Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office*”; “*The army comes in to govern the country*”; “*Elections and parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything*”. We computed each interviewee’s autocratic orientation as the mean score over the three items (higher values indicate a more autocratic orientation). Estimated across all countries, Cronbach’s α for the three-item scale amounted to .63. While this is below the conventional .7 threshold, this reflects a low number of items rather than problems of multidimensionality (see S2 and S4 for elaboration). We also replicated our analyses using an alternative scale of autocratic orientations, reflecting responses to the other seven questions (AOS₇), and

generated substantively the same results (Table S7). To assess whether AOS₃ indeed measures individual differences pertaining to dominance, we compare AOS₃ to other established scales (e.g., SDO) in Studies 2–4.

To control for potential confounders and compare the predictive power of autocratic orientations, we analyzed a number of other individual-level variables. We focused on three categories of predictors. The first category was basic demographic correlates of interpersonal aggression and risk-taking, *sex*, *age* (Daly & Wilson, 1988), and *education* (“*No formal schooling*” = 0, “*Post-graduate*” = 9).

The second category included variables related to socioeconomic status (SES) highlighted in macro-level research. Gross domestic product per capita (GDP/cap.) is among the most robust country-level predictors of large-scale political violence. Collier & Hoeffler (2004) claim that this reflects lower opportunity costs for rebel recruitment: low-SES individuals (in low-GDP/cap. countries) have less to lose and more to gain from participating in rebel organizations (which offer economic rewards). In the main analysis, we proxied SES with subjective *economic status* (“*Let’s discuss economic conditions. In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?*”; “*Very bad*” = 0, “*Very good*” = 4). In additional analyses reported in SOM-R, we used an alternative, *employment status*: “*Do you have a job that pays a cash income?*” (“*No (not looking)*”, “*No (looking)*”, “*Yes, part time*”, and “*Yes, full time*”, recoded into a binary variable: “unemployed” = 0, “employed” = 1).

The third category included variables highlighted in existing psychological studies on nonnormative collective action and radicalization. Becker & Tausch (2015) suggest perceived injustice, contempt toward state authorities, and group or political efficacy (to influence political decisions) as predictors of nonnormative collective action. We proxied perceived injustice with subjective ethnic *discrimination* (“*How often is [interviewee’s ethnic*

group] *treated unfairly by the government?*"; "Never" = 0, "Always" = 3). As an alternative measure, we analyzed economic *inequality* ("Let's discuss economic conditions. In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other [name of nationals]?"; "Much worse" = 0, "Much better" = 4). Political efficacy was measured with feeling *heard by members of parliament* ("How much of the time do you think...members of parliament...try their best to listen to what people like you have to say?"; "Never" = 0, "Always" = 3). We also used an alternative, analogous measure, referring to *local government councilors* (instead of MPs). The Afrobarometer questionnaire lacks explicit questions about contempt toward state authorities. However, a refusal to vote (*voting refusal*) is a plausible proxy of this construct. Tausch et al. (2011) report a negative correlation between voting intention (expressed likelihood of voting in forthcoming elections) and an explicit measure of contempt toward state authorities. We coded voting in the most recent national elections, "You decided not to vote" = 1, all other replies = 0. People may not vote for a number of other reasons; hence, this measure potentially captures several other constructs. Note, however, that the interviewees could choose from a number of other reply options: "You were too young to vote"; "You were not registered to vote"; "You voted in the elections"; "You could not find the polling station"; "You were prevented from voting"; "You did not have time to vote"; "You did not vote because you could not find your name in the voters' register"; and "Did not vote for some other reason". Hence, our *voting refusal* measure indicates a deliberate refusal to vote, which likely reflects disaffection with state authorities. Tausch et al. (2011) also report a negative correlation between voting intention and perceived political efficacy, suggesting that this variable potentially accounts for both contempt and efficacy. Given this, we did not regress voting refusal and political efficacy simultaneously; we included the former in the main models, and the latter in additional analyses. Finally, both studies on nonnormative action and studies on radicalization emphasize social identification,

particularly with disadvantaged groups (e.g., Becker & Tausch, 2015; Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2018). Hence, we added a measure of *identification* with an ethnic group vs. national identification (“*Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [e.g., Kenyan] and being a [e.g., Luo]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings: “I feel only Kenyan”, “I feel more Kenyan than Luo”, “I feel equally Kenyan and Luo”, “I feel more Luo than Kenyan”, and “I feel only Luo”, coded 0–4*); we also interacted this variable with ethnic discrimination. In robustness tests presented below, we tested a number of other predictors.

We also analyzed a number of country-level variables, shown to predict political violence in the macro-level literature (Dixon, 2009). We included national-level *democracy*, indexed by Polity2 (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2018), a widely used composite index accounting for executive recruitment, executive constraints, and competitiveness of national elections. We also added national-level *support for autocracy*, measured by country-mean autocratic orientation (AOS₃), and political *instability*, measured by the proportion of interviewees indicating “*political instability/ethnic tensions*” among the three “*most important problems facing [country name]*”. Further, we included *violent crime*, measured by intentional homicide rate per 100,000 (The World Bank, 2019), and *violent protests*, proxied by the count of “social conflict” events coded in the Social Conflict Analysis Database (Salehyan et al., 2012) (the events were counted in the year before the Afrobarometer surveys, and the variable was adjusted to population size; rate per 1,000,000). We also added national *economic status*, measured with GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD) (The World Bank, 2019), *conflict history*, measured with years since the last “internal armed conflict” coded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002), and *population size* (The World Bank, 2019). See Table S1 and Figures S1–S3 for summary and descriptive statistics and Table S2 for bivariate correlations for all variables.

Modeling. Given the hierarchical structure of our data—with individuals (level-1 units) nested within countries (level-2 units)—and binary outcomes, we used hierarchical generalized linear models with the logit link function. To identify the most appropriate multilevel specification, we followed the “bottom-up” strategy recommended by Hox, Moerbeek, and van de Schoot (2018, pp. 42–46). For details on this analysis strategy and other modeling choices, see S3. Below, we report results of our main models with level-1 and level-2 variables and random intercepts and randomly varying slopes for autocratic orientations and other level-1 predictors. In SOM-R, we provide a range of alternative specifications, producing the same substantive conclusions.

To aid interpretation of regression coefficients, we normalized all variables to range from 0 to 1. Normalizing variables to the same narrow range also improves convergence in maximum likelihood estimation that uses numerical integration.² The main analyses were performed using *melogit* in parallel-processing Stata/MP (15-version) on an 8-core computer; the analyses reported in SOM-R were performed using Stata’s *mixed*, *meologit*, and *clogit*.

² The main models were estimated using the mode-curvature adaptive Gauss–Hermite quadrature. Hox, Moerbeek, and van de Schoot (2018, p. 111) advise grand-mean centering variables to improve convergence and computation time. In our setup, however, models with 0–1 normalization were twice as fast as models with grand-mean centering. Note that random effects in models with randomly varying slopes are not invariant to linear transformations of predictors. However, our primary interest was in individual-level associations, and fixed effects are invariant to linear transformations. The average predicted probabilities reported below are also invariant to the linear transformations of data. Hence, we did not use grand-mean centering (also note that our key binary predictors have a meaningful zero value). However, in additional analyses, we explored group-mean centering, which accounts for level-2 confounding (discussed below). Note that modeling multiple randomly varying

Results

Does an autocratic political orientation predict participation in political violence? Only a small fraction (2.86%) of the interviewees reported participation in violence. The figures were highest in Uganda (9.46%) and Sierra Leone (6.56%), lowest in Botswana (0.67%) and Tunisia (0.42%). For other countries, see Table S3. Overall, 49,168 interviewees indicated not having participated in political violence and 1,473 indicated having done so.

Importantly, participation in political violence significantly varied with autocratic orientations, as measured by AOS₃. As shown in Table 1, AOS₃ was positively and significantly associated with participation in political violence. This association remained significant when controlling for the individual- and country-level variables introduced above (Models 1 and 2). The table reports results in log odds (or logit), which represent the natural log of the change in odds of participation in political violence associated with a one-unit increase in a predictor.

slopes simultaneously in numerical integration-based hierarchical generalized linear models is computationally intensive. Therefore, in addition to 0–1 normalization, we introduced a number of other adjustments to the specification and estimation method to improve computations (elaborated in S3).

Table 1. Political orientation and political violence: A multilevel analysis

	Participation in Political Violence				Willingness to Participate in Political Violence				Support for Political Violence			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Logit	95% CI	Logit	95% CI	Logit	95% CI	Logit	95% CI	Logit	95% CI	Logit	95% CI
<i>FIXED EFFECTS</i>												
<i>AOS₃</i>	0.97****	[0.49, 1.46]	1.21****	[0.72, 1.70]	0.75****	[0.42, 1.08]	0.82****	[0.42, 1.21]	0.55**	[0.22, 0.88]	0.43*	[0.08, 0.79]
<i>Sex</i>	-0.33****	[-0.44, -0.22]	-0.28****	[-0.40, -0.16]	-0.33****	[-0.45, -0.21]	-0.26****	[-0.36, -0.15]	-0.12****	[-0.17, -0.07]	-0.10***	[-0.15, -0.05]
<i>Age</i>	-0.49	[-1.01, 0.03]	-0.41	[-1.02, 0.19]	-1.17****	[-1.48, -0.86]	-1.03****	[-1.40, -0.65]	-0.74****	[-0.97, -0.51]	-0.65****	[-0.88, -0.42]
<i>Education</i>	-0.15	[-0.41, 0.11]	-0.33*	[-0.63, -0.03]	-0.01	[-0.19, 0.16]	-0.04	[-0.25, 0.17]	0.20*	[0.01, 0.39]	0.12	[-0.05, 0.30]
<i>Economic status</i>			-0.07	[-0.37, 0.24]			0.01	[-0.13, 0.16]			0.13	[-0.05, 0.31]
<i>Discrimination</i>			0.51**	[0.16, 0.87]			0.42****	[0.24, 0.61]			0.22***	[0.09, 0.34]
<i>Voting refusal</i>			-0.12	[-0.36, 0.60]			-0.17	[-0.01, 0.35]			-0.08	[-0.14, 0.30]
<i>Identification</i>			-0.26	[-0.71, 0.18]			-0.16	[-0.50, 0.17]			-0.15	[-0.39, 0.08]
<i>Constant</i>	-3.73****	[-4.02, -3.45]	-3.64****	[-4.72, -2.55]	-2.53****	[-2.75, -2.30]	-3.02****	[-4.05, -1.99]	-1.54****	[-1.76, -1.31]	-0.37	[-1.75, 1.01]
<i>COUNTRY-LEVEL</i>												
<i>Democracy</i>			0.64	[-0.36, 1.64]			-0.76	[-1.63, 0.11]			-1.17*	[-2.34, -0.00]
<i>Country-mean AOS₃</i>			0.02	[-3.24, 3.28]			4.60**	[1.76, 7.43]			0.22	[-3.70, 4.13]
<i>Instability</i>			-0.93	[-2.31, 0.45]			-1.12*	[-2.18, -0.06]			-0.04	[-1.44, 1.36]
<i>Violent crime</i>			1.33**	[0.48, 2.19]			0.83*	[0.03, 1.63]			0.23	[-0.79, 1.26]
<i>Violent protests</i>			-1.73	[-4.84, 1.38]			-1.42	[-3.98, 1.14]			-0.34	[-3.83, 3.14]
<i>Economic status</i>			-1.59**	[-2.59, -0.58]			-0.37	[-1.21, 0.47]			0.24	[-0.76, 1.23]
<i>Conflict history</i>			-0.96**	[-1.54, -0.38]			0.01	[-0.50, 0.51]			-0.83*	[-1.51, -0.15]
<i>Population size</i>			0.33	[-0.62, 1.28]			0.24	[-0.56, 1.03]			-0.46	[-1.54, 0.63]
<i>RANDOM EFFECTS</i>												
<i>Var(constant)</i>	0.42	[0.23, 0.77]	0.06	[0.01, 0.41]	0.33	[0.18, 0.57]	0.09	[0.03, 0.24]	0.40	[0.24, 0.67]	0.23	[0.12, 0.44]
<i>Var(AOS₃)</i>	1.27	[0.59, 2.72]	1.02	[0.42, 2.50]	0.63	[0.31, 1.28]	0.79	[0.37, 1.67]	0.82	[0.45, 1.47]	0.76	[0.25, 1.26]
<i>Var(Sex)</i>	†	†	†	†	0.06	[0.02, 0.17]	0.03	[0.01, 0.13]	†	†	†	†
<i>Var(Age)</i>	0.93	[0.37, 2.32]	1.27	[0.53, 3.03]	0.20	[0.04, 0.98]	0.33	[0.08, 1.38]	0.20	[0.07, 0.56]	0.13	[0.03, 0.53]
<i>Var(Education)</i>	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	0.19	[0.09, 0.42]	0.08	[0.02, 0.30]
<i>Var(Economic status)</i>			0.20	[0.06, 0.74]			†	†			0.16	[0.08, 0.35]
<i>Var(Discrimination)</i>			0.49	[0.20, 1.17]			0.09	[0.03, 0.31]			0.04	[0.01, 0.20]
<i>Var(Voting refusal)</i>			0.50	[0.15, 1.65]			†	†			0.13	[0.04, 0.46]
<i>Var(Identification)</i>			0.94	[0.45, 2.00]			0.60	[0.28, 1.26]			0.31	[0.16, 0.62]
<i>N</i>	49,170		39,205		47,713		37,950		47,394		38,052	
<i>AIC</i>	12334.7		10240.3		23105.3		18492.7		43821.8		35927.7	
<i>BIC</i>	12405.1		10446.2		23184.2		18689.2		43900.7		36141.4	
<i>chi2</i>	51.04		94.96		101.5		122.7		77.88		80.00	

Note: The table reports fixed and random effects in logit/log odds. An exponentiated logit of 1 (similar to that of AOS₃ in Model 1) = 2.7 (to 1 dp). In a one-level model, this would indicate that the odds of participating in political violence when AOS₃ = 1 are 2.7 of the odds of participating in political violence when AOS₃ = 0. The questions about ethnic discrimination and identification were not asked in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia; therefore, *N* is reduced in Models 2, 4, and 6. Bivariate correlations between predictors all are < 0.45; and the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) = 1.40 (with a max VIF score = 2.26). † = excluded randomly varying slopes due to no significant improvement in the model fit (see S3).

Using Stata's *margins* post-estimation command, we estimated probabilities of participation in political violence following Model 2. The predictive power of autocratic orientations is of substantive significance. Autocracy-oriented individuals ($AOS_3 = 1$) are considerably more likely than democracy-oriented individuals ($AOS_3 = 0$) to report participation in political violence (average predicted probabilities = 9.88% and 2.48%, respectively).

Do these results generalize across measures of political violence? The analyses demonstrate that, controlling for other (level-1 and -2) variables, political orientation was also positively associated with willingness to partake in political violence (Models 3 and 4) and general support for political violence (Models 5 and 6). Autocrats ($AOS_3 = 1$) were considerably more likely than democrats (i.e., $AOS_3 = 0$) to report willingness to participate in political violence (average predicted probabilities = 15.17% and 6.18%, respectively) and support for political violence (27.81 % and 18.64%, respectively).

How does the predictive power of autocratic orientations compare to those of other predictors of political violence? As shown in Table 1, several other variables were significantly associated with participation in political violence. Below, we report average predicted probabilities for the min/max scores of each significant predictor and (for analyses not reported in Table 1) log-odds estimates with 95% CI from the fixed part of the hierarchical models. Males were more likely than females to report participation in political violence (3.88% versus 2.99%; based on Model 2). Males were also more likely than females to report willingness to participate (8.40% versus 6.76%; Model 4) and support for political violence (21.00% versus 19.52%; Model 6). Note that these analyses include a number of “post-treatment” variables that are likely to be outcomes of sex (which, in turn, affect

political violence). Age was not significantly associated with participation in political violence; however, it was negatively and significantly associated with willingness to participate in (Models 3 and 4) and support for (Models 5 and 6) violence.

Subjective economic status was not significantly associated with the three outcomes (Table 1). The same was true for employment (Table S5). In contrast, high-education individuals were significantly less likely than low-education individuals to report participation in political violence (2.81% versus 3.81%; based on Model 2). The association between education and willingness to participate in political violence was not significant (Models 3 and 4), and the association with support for political violence was only significant in the reduced specification (Model 5).

Turning to the psychological predictors highlighted in existing research, a proxy of perceived group-based injustice—ethnic discrimination—was positively and significantly associated with participation in political violence (Model 2). Individuals who perceive their ethnic group as “*always treated unfairly*”, compared to those who perceive their ethnic groups as “*never treated unfairly*”, were more likely to report participation in political violence (5.60% versus 2.96%; based on Model 2). The former were also more likely than the latter to report willingness to participate (10.27% versus 6.92%) and support for political violence (22.97% versus 19.55%). Subjective economic inequality was significantly associated with participation in political violence (logit = -0.32, [-0.62, -0.01]), but not with the other two outcomes (Table S5). Ethnic identification was not significantly associated with the three outcomes (Table 1), whereas the multiplicative term of discrimination and identification negatively (logit = -0.51, [-0.93, -0.09]) predicted willingness to participate in violence, but not the other two outcomes (Table S5).

Voting refusal, a proxy of contempt toward state authorities, was not significantly associated with the three outcomes (Table 1). Being heard by MPs, a proxy of political efficacy, significantly predicted participation (logit = 0.64, [0.22, 1.05]) and willingness to participate in political violence (logit = 0.29, [0.14, 0.44]) (Table S5). Note that our main model includes injustice, contempt, and efficacy as predictors, whereas Tausch et al. (2011) consider injustice and efficacy as predictors and contempt as a mediator. However, excluding voting refusal from Models 2, 4, and 6 did not notably change the coefficients associated with injustice and contempt.

Importantly, none of the coefficients reported in the models of participation (Models 1 and 2) are larger than that of the Autocratic Orientation Scale, AOS₃. The coefficient of the second-best predictor of participation in political violence, being heard by MPs, is nearly twice as small as that of AOS₃. With respect to effect sizes, AOS₃ is also the second-best predictor of willingness to participate in political violence (Model 4), and support for political violence (Model 6), second only to age.

If data is skewed, and AOS₃ is positively skewed (Figure S2), the change in probabilities due to a min-to-max change in a predictor may poorly represent the predictor's influence on the outcome along the range of typical values. Therefore, we also examined changes in predicted probabilities due to a 1-SD increase from the mean. The probabilities of participation in violence due to a 1-SD increase in AOS₃ change from 3.27% to 4.43%. For comparison, analogous probabilities change from 3.31% to 4.00% for ethnic discrimination and from 3.42% to 4.18% for being heard by MPs.

Do country-level characteristics moderate the association between autocratic orientations and political violence? We focused on individual-level, psychological processes; however, we also explored country-level variables, finding several notable patterns.

Economic status, violent crime, and conflict history predicted participation in political violence (Model 2). However, only one country-level variable, conflict history, significantly (positively) predicted between-country variation in the association between autocratic orientations (AOS_3) and political violence. Given the exploratory nature of this analysis, the results need further replication. If valid, they suggest that the difference in engagement in political violence between autocratic and democratic individuals is more pronounced in peaceful settings, presumably because existing (or recent) armed conflict pushes non-autocrats to join in violence even against their preferences. In a further attempt to explain the between-country variation in the AOS_3 coefficient, we ran one-level models (analogous to Model 1) for each country separately. Subsequently, we plotted the AOS_3 coefficient by country (see Figure 2). Inspecting Figure 2, we have not identified any additional substantive patterns that could potentially account for the unaccounted between-country variation in the AOS_3 coefficient. However, Figure 2 shows that most of the negative or non-significant coefficients come from countries with a very small number of interviewees reporting participation in political violence (reported in parentheses next to country names).

Fig. 2. The association between autocratic orientation and political violence by country. The figure shows logit (with 95% CI) of participation in political violence, as a function of autocratic orientation scale (AOS₃). The numbers in parentheses indicate counts of interviewees reporting participation in political violence. Dashed vertical lines indicate 95% CI of fixed-effect logit estimated across all countries in multilevel analysis (Model 1, Table 1).

How robust are the results? We demonstrate in SOM-R that these results are not sensitive to alternative modeling choices, including specifications with alternative outcome measures and alternative estimators, hierarchical models with the cumulative logit link function (i.e., ordered logit), or the identity link function (hierarchical linear models) (see S3 for elaboration and Table S6 for estimates). We also examined whether the results were driven by: (i) particular operationalization of autocratic orientations (i.e., we analyzed AOS₇ as an alternative); (ii) autocracy-oriented individuals engaging in violence in support of the government; (iii) democracy-oriented individuals providing biased responses due to self-presentation concerns; (iv) democracy-oriented individuals suffering more from political repression; (v) dishonest or influenced answering; and (vi) lack of comprehension of the survey questions (Tables S7–S13). None of these alternative processes account for the results.

Adding level-2 predictors considerably reduces the between-country variation in the intercepts (see Table 1); yet the $var(\text{constant})$ remains above 0, suggesting that some level-2 influences on the individual-level propensity to violence remain unaccounted for, pointing to potential higher-level omitted variable bias (i.e., confounding by country-level characteristics). To account for such unobserved level-2 factors, we used country-mean centering and Mundlak (1978) specification. These techniques remove all level-2 influences from the estimates of fixed effects (McNeish & Kelley, 2019) (though see the qualifications in S3). These analyses produced nearly identical results (Table S14), suggesting that level-2 characteristics do not confound the association between individual-level autocratic orientations and political violence.

Study 2: Assessing Underlying Motivations: The Role of Dominance Orientations

Study 1 found that autocratic orientations relate to political violence. Study 2 examined the underlying motivations. Specifically, we tested whether measures of political orientation statistically mediate (or confound) the association between measures of dominance orientations and political violence (i.e., H2).

Method

Data. We conducted a survey in South Africa ($N = 2,170$) via the survey agency YouGov. The survey was administered in English in October 2017 and was quota-sampled for age, sex, geography, and education to obtain an approximately nationally representative sample. We selected South Africa because we predicted this sample to generate a sufficient number of participants in political violence (based on Study 1; see Figure 1; other countries with large counts of participants in violence, such as Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, or Sierra Leone, were not accessible to the agency at the time).

Outcomes. The questionnaire included analogous measures of participation and willingness to participate in political violence as Study 1. In contrast to Study 1, we did not measure support for political violence. Instead, we included an alternative, validated four-item measure of willingness to participate in political violence: the Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS) (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009) (e.g., “*I would participate in a public protest against oppression of my group even if I thought the protest might turn violent*”; “*Strongly disagree*” = 0, “*Strongly agree*” = 6; see S5 for other items).

Predictors. The questionnaire included the same ten questions used in Study 1 to generate measures of autocratic orientations, AOS₃ ($\alpha = .75$) and AOS₇ ($\alpha = .60$). Confirmatory

factor analysis indicated that AOS₃ was a unidimensional scale, i.e., the three items of AOS₃ loaded highly on a single latent factor (S4 provides details).

To assess H2, we first analyzed measures of a well-established psychological construct of an orientation toward dominance at the intergroup level: Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). We used the 16-item SDO₇ scale (Ho et al., 2015), which in the South African sample showed satisfactory reliability ($\alpha = .82$). We also analyzed the subdimensions of SDO: SDO-Dominance (“preference for systems of group-based dominance in which high status groups forcefully oppress lower status groups”) and SDO-Egalitarianism (“preference for systems of group-based inequality that are maintained by an interrelated network of subtle hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and social policies”) (Ho et al., 2015, p. 1003). The sub-scales, SDO-D and SDO-E, showed satisfactory reliability ($\alpha = .70$ and $.73$, respectively).

Note that SDO refers to a preference for dominance hierarchies in general, rather than support for hierarchies benefiting one’s group. SDO₇ was developed to explicitly measure the former construct. We expect, however, that both (dominance-based seeking of ingroup status and general support for dominance hierarchies) relate to violence, because both—as we have argued—are outcomes of a general preference for dominance as a status-attainment strategy. Using SDO₇, hence, we can only assess one part of our argument. Moreover, SDO exclusively refers to the intergroup domain.

Given this, we introduced two additional variables: a measure of individual differences in dominance-based pursuit of *ingroup* status; and a measure of dominance-based pursuit of individual status. These measures were part of the Domain-Specific Risk Scale (DSRS) (Wilke et al., 2014). DSRS covers risk-taking in ten key domains of human life. The original scale was designed for undergraduate populations, with some items not applicable to na-

tionally representative samples. Therefore, we only focused on risk-taking within the following domains: (i) in between-group competition, (ii) to gain power and status, (iii) in within-group competition for leadership, (iv) when exploring environments, (v) for acquiring food, (vi) on behalf of kin, and (vii) to attract mates. The adjusted 21-item scale includes three items per domain. The questionnaire asked interviewees to indicate “*the likelihood that you would engage in the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation*” (“*Very unlikely*” = 0, “*Very likely*” = 4). The first two domains refer to risk-taking or status-seeking based on dominance (e.g., “*Adamantly defending the honor of your local community against a person from a different community, even if it may cause a fight*” and “*Blackmailing your opponent to win an election*”, respectively). The third domain refers to risk-taking/status-seeking without reference to dominance (e.g., “*Trying to take a leadership role in any group you join*”), and all other domains lack reference to status entirely (see S6). As such, the scale provides an opportunity to test H2 with discriminatory validity. If the autocratic orientation-political violence link reflects dominance-driven risk taking (as contrasted to risk-taking driven by other motivations), then autocratic orientation should only confound/mediate the associations between violence and risk-taking within the first two domains while controlling for risk-taking in the other domains.

Finally, to assess the construct validity of our overall conclusions, we also included a measure of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), defined as “submission to in-group authority figures” (Zakrisson, 2005, p. 864). Although both measures pertaining to dominance and measures pertaining to RWA may relate to political violence, our claim that political violence is driven by dominance-based status seeking, and preference for social hierarchies, implies that SDO but not RWA should predict violence. We utilized the RWA scale from Duckitt et al. (2010), showing satisfactory reliability ($\alpha = .78$).

We also obtained measures of sex, age, education, and SES. As in Study 1, all predictors were 0–1 normalized. See Table S16 and Figures S4–S6 for summary and descriptive statistics and Table S17 for a bivariate correlation matrix. For comparability, we used logit models analogous to Study 1, with the exception of an OLS model in the analysis of the continuous Radicalism Intention Scale.

Results

Do the main results replicate in the South African sample? 3.00% of interviewees (65 of 2,170) reported participation in political violence, similar to 3.12% (75 out of 2,400) reporting in Study 1. Subsequently, consistent with Study 1, we found that autocratic orientations, as indexed by AOS₃, predicted participation in political violence (logit = 4.28, 95% CI [3.24, 5.32]), willingness to participate in political violence (logit = 1.94, [1.09, 2.79]), and the willingness to participate in political violence as measured by the Radicalism Intention Scale, RIS ($b = 0.36$, [0.31, 0.42]) (Table S18 shows detailed estimates). Similarly, proneness to political violence was higher among males than females (logit [participation] = -0.81, [-1.38, -0.23]; logit [willingness] = -0.74, [-1.15, -0.33]; b [RIS] = -0.08, [-0.10, -0.05]). Likewise, age was significantly associated with willingness to participate in political violence (logit = -1.06, [-2.03, -0.10]) and RIS ($b = -0.12$, [-0.17, -0.07]), but not with participation in political violence (logit = -1.07, [-2.65, 0.50]). Education was significantly and positively associated with participation in political violence (logit = 2.94, [1.19, 4.69]) and RIS ($b = 0.16$, [0.09, 0.23]), but not with willingness to participate in political violence (logit = 0.91, [-0.35, 2.16]). SES was only significantly associated with RIS ($b = 0.06$, [0.002, 0.11]). Note, once again, that none of the coefficients reported above are larger than those of AOS₃. We also analyzed the alternative measure of autocratic orientations, AOS₇, finding similar results (Table S19). These results are not sensitive to alternative modeling choices, including

specifications with alternative outcome measures and alternative estimators (Tables S18 and S19).

Does an autocratic orientation confound/mediate the association between SDO and political violence? We first assessed the correlation between social dominance (SDO₇) and autocratic orientations (AOS₃), which amounted to $r = .36$ (Table S17). Subsequently, we tested whether SDO₇ independently predicted the three outcomes, and found significant estimates (logit [participation] = 3.16, [1.74, 4.58]; logit [willingness] = 1.80, [0.84, 2.76]; b [RIS] = 0.21, [0.16, 0.26]) (Table S20 provides details). In turn, we analyzed SDO₇ and AOS₃ in one block, and found that the coefficients for the former were substantially attenuated (logit [participation] = 1.14, [-0.45, 2.74]; logit [willingness] = 1.23, [0.20, 2.26]; b [RIS] = 0.10, [0.04, 0.16]) (Table S21). In generalized linear models, such as logit, coefficients are not directly comparable across different (nested) specifications. Kohler, Karlson, and Holm (2011) have developed a method that allows such direct comparisons, decomposing the total effect into direct effects and indirect effects, i.e., effects attributable to a confounding or mediating variable (following conventions, here we refer to “effects” rather than associations). Using this method, we estimated that, holding sex and age constant, 42.15% of the total SDO₇ effect on participation in violence, 25.58% of the total SDO₇ effect on willingness to participate in violence, and 50.43% of the total SDO₇ effect on RIS was significantly ($ps < 0.001$; = 0.01; > 0.001 , respectively) confounded/mediated by AOS₃ (Table S22). Analogous percentages for models with SDO-Dominance were 44.35%, 28.88%, and 46.92% ($ps \leq 0.001$), and with SDO-Egalitarianism: 44.65%, 26.15%, and 55.87% ($ps \leq 0.001$). The total effects of SDO-D were larger than the total effects of SDO-E: logit [participation] = 2.90 vs. 2.53; logit [willingness] = 1.71 vs. 1.63; b [RIS] = 0.23 vs. 0.18 (Tables S23 and S24). Subsequently, we substituted SDO₇ with the Autocratic Orientation Scale

and examined the possibility that AOS₃ relates to political violence via SDO₇. We found that SDO₇ was a significant but much weaker confounder/mediator of the AOS₃ effects: analogous percentages were 14.33%, 23.17%, and 10.75% ($ps = 0.035; 0.012; < 0.001$) (Table S25).

Social dominance orientation, autocratic orientations, and political violence can relate in multiple ways: SDO and autocratic orientations may have independent effects on violence; autocratic orientations may partly or fully mediate the effects of SDO on violence; and SDO may partly or fully mediate the effects of autocratic orientations on violence. Our non-experimental data does not allow for adjudicating between these alternative theoretical models (Fiedler, Harris, & Schott, 2018); however, the estimates above are consistent with the model where autocratic orientation partly mediates the SDO effects on violence, and where SDO and political orientation have partly independent effects on violence. These results are in line with H2.

Analyses of an alternative measure of dominance motivations, the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale or DSRS, also produced results consistent with H2. Risk-taking within the first and second domains (between-group competition and status/power) correlated with autocratic orientations as indexed by AOS₃ at $r = .31$ and $.42$, respectively. DSRS (between-group competition) independently predicted the three outcomes (logit [participation] = 5.78, [4.48, 7.08]; logit [willingness] = 2.07, [1.17, 2.97]; b [RIS] = 0.45, [0.40, 0.51]) (Table S26). These coefficients were attenuated by the inclusion of AOS₃ (logit [participation] = 4.47, [3.06, 5.87]; logit [willingness] = 1.65, [0.70, 2.59]; b [RIS] = 0.38, [0.33, 0.43]) (Table S27). Similarly, DSRS (status/power) independently predicted the three outcomes (logit [participation] = 4.41, [3.45, 5.37]; logit [willingness] = 1.82, [1.02, 2.61]; b [RIS] = 0.45, [0.40, 0.50]) (Table S28); and the coefficients were attenuated by the inclusion of AOS₃ (logit [participation] = 3.26, [2.15, 4.37]; logit [willingness] = 1.28, [0.40, 2.16]; b [RIS] = 0.36, [0.30, 0.42])

(Table S29). A decomposition analysis indicated that, holding sex, age—and risk-taking in other domains—constant, 9.76% of the total DSRS (group competition) effect on participation in violence, 33.66% of the total DSRS (group competition) effect on willingness to participate in violence, and 16.28% of the total DSRS (group competition) effect on RIS was significantly ($ps = 0.017$; 0.050 ; and 0.002 , respectively) confounded/mediated by AOS₃ (Table S30). Analysis of DSRS (status/power) revealed similar patterns: AOS₃ partly (24.85%, $p = 0.002$) confounded/mediated the effects on participation in violence, fully confounded/mediated ($p = 0.011$) the effects on willingness to participate in violence, and partly confounded/mediated (32.08%, $p < 0.001$) the effects on RIS (Table S31). Subsequent decomposition analyses indicated that AOS₃ did not significantly mediate the effects of risk-taking in any of the other five domains (Tables S32–S36). In SOM-R (see S7), we also report an analysis of Status-Driven Risk-Taking Scale, as alternative to SDO and DSRS, and an analysis of RWA.

Study 3: Assessing Generalizability: Will WEIRD Democrats Fight for Democracy?

Studies 1 and 2 focused on non-WEIRD countries, with short or no histories of democratic governance. Hence, the interviewees may have had little socialization to democratic values and little motivation to engage in violence against non-democratic regimes. By contrast, in societies socialized to democratic values, democracy-oriented individuals may have higher motivation to oppose autocratic regimes, suggesting that our findings may not hold in WEIRD samples. To assess generalizability, Study 3 involved a survey in a highly democratic country: Denmark.

Method

Data. The survey was administered online in Danish via YouGov in October 2016. The survey was designed to generate a sample representative of the adult population ($N = 1,012$) with respect to gender, age, education, and geography. We selected Denmark because it continuously ranks among the most democratic countries in the world according to various indices (e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017), and has a history and salient memory of resistance against an autocratic regime during the Second World War.

Outcomes. There were no prominent events of political violence in Denmark during or prior to the survey. Therefore, we did not measure participation in political violence. We obtained two other outcome measures.

First, we aimed to assess general support for political violence. While designing the survey, we were concerned that Danish citizens may be reluctant to report such attitudes. Therefore, we opted for an indirect measure generated via a double list experiment (Glynn, 2013) embedded in the survey. A double list experiment is a variant of the simpler single list experiment. A list experiment allows for estimating the proportion of a sample that supports a sensitive statement without individual interviewees *explicitly* expressing support for it. Specifically, half of the interviewees are randomly assigned to a baseline list with four neutral statements (e.g., “I enjoy listening to music”) and are asked to indicate *how many* of the statements they agree with. The other half of the interviewees are assigned to the treatment list, a list that includes the same four neutral statements, plus the treatment item (i.e., the sensitive statement), and are similarly asked *how many* of the statements they agree with. In this study, the treatment item was “It is justifiable to use violence against the government of Denmark”. Given that the interviewees are asked to indicate the number of the statements they agree with, rather than agreement with particular statements, the list experiment is thought to decrease socially desirable responding.

The list experiment is based on the assumption that agreement with the neutral statements should (on average) be the same for those presented the baseline list and those presented the treatment list. Based on this assumption, the standard procedure for analyzing a list experiment involves estimating the proportion of interviewees that agree with the treatment item by computing the difference between the mean agreement for the treatment list and the mean agreement for the baseline list. The double list experiment was developed to produce more accurate measurement than the standard (single) list experiment. In the double list experiment, each interviewee is presented with two separate list experiments (A and B) and receives the baseline list for one list experiment and the treatment list for the other list experiment. The double list experiment thus produces two estimates of agreement with the treatment item, and takes the average of these two.

Our double list experiment followed the procedures described by Glynn (2013). Specifically, interviewees first received *List Experiment A* and later in the survey *List Experiment B* (see S8 for all statements). For both *A* and *B*, the baseline condition included four neutral statements, whereas the treatment condition included the same four neutral statements, plus the fifth treatment item (support for political violence). Interviewees who were in the treatment condition for *List Experiment A* were in the baseline condition for *List Experiment B*, and vice versa. *List Experiment B* included four different neutral statements and the same treatment item.

As mentioned, the standard procedure for analyzing data from a double list experiment yields an estimate of the *proportion* of interviewees in a sample that agree with the treatment item, not estimates of agreement for individual interviewees. Hence, extant research utilizing list experiments has typically examined associations with individual difference variables by splitting in subsamples (e.g., subsamples based on education; Kramon & Weghorst,

2019). Following this, we examined the association with autocratic orientation by computing estimates of agreement for three subsamples (high, average, and low scores for autocratic orientation), and then comparing these estimates. As an alternative procedure, we also analyzed scores reflecting agreement with the sensitive item for individual interviewees. We obtained these scores by subtracting the number of items an interviewee agrees with in the baseline list from the number of items the interviewee agrees with in the treatment list. We then used these scores as values on the outcome variable in an OLS regression model. This model also included a binary variable indicating whether an interviewee received the treatment list in the list experiment A or B, to control for differences in agreement across the two list experiments due to different neutral statements.

Second, we aimed to assess how far the difference between autocrats and democrats in terms of willingness to use violence goes. Accordingly, we introduced a measure of willingness to participate in political violence *in defense of democracy*. The questionnaire included an introductory text describing that Denmark may become more autocratic in the future (this text included a definition of an autocratic government: “*A regime in which the people do not elect the government*”; see S9 for details). The interviewees then received four vignettes describing that the Danish government had become autocratic, either due to a domestic political change or foreign aggression, and that there was a resistance movement fighting “*to make Denmark democratic again*”. To facilitate realism, the vignettes explicitly hinted at the historical resistance movements during the Second World War. Subsequently, for each vignette, interviewees indicated agreement with five statements on a seven-point scale (“*Strongly disagree*” = 0; “*Strongly agree*” = 6): “*If the resistance succeeds, people like me will have more influence on politics*”; “*I would participate in a protest march organized by the resistance movement*”; “*I would help members of the resistance movement*”; “*I*

would join the resistance movement”; “I would use physical violence for the cause of the resistance movement”.

As a score of willingness to use violence, we averaged responses for the fifth statement across the four vignettes ($\alpha = .93$). In the analyses below, we also include the first item, referring to the potential benefits of a successful resistance. We expected that such perceptions of benefits would relate to willingness to engage in violence, and might differ between autocrats and democrats. Responses for the first item were averaged across the four vignettes ($\alpha = .93$).

Predictors. We were wary of the possibility that statements like “*the army comes in to govern the country*” or “*elections and parliament abolished*” may not resonate with Danish citizens. Therefore, instead of using Afrobarometer questions, we created an alternative, ten-item *Autocratic Orientation Scale for Democracies* (AOS-D). This scale accounts for the more subtle differences between autocratic and democratic orientations. To generate an equal number of pro and con trait items, we included six items from the Support for Democratic Values Measure (Canetti-Nisim, 2004) (e.g., “*Public participation of the people is not necessary if decision making is left in the hands of a few trusted leaders*”); and four items from the Scale of Democratic Values (Miklikowska, 2012) (e.g., “*Society shouldn’t have to put up with the views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority*”) (see S10 for other items). The scale ranged from “*Strongly disagree*” = 0 to “*Strongly agree*” = 6, and showed satisfactory reliability ($\alpha = .81$). Corresponding to Studies 1 and 2, lower AOS-D scores indicate a democratic orientation and higher AOS-D scores indicate an autocratic orientation.

We also obtained measures of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA, 6-item Conservatism sub-scale), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO, 8-item short SDO₇ scale), sex, age,

SES, education, marital status, whether the interviewees had foreign parents, and identification with Danish society. All variables were 0–1 normalized. See Table S38 and Figures S7–S9 for summary and descriptive statistics and Table S39 for bivariate correlations for all variables.

Results

Does a democratic political orientation predict support for political violence in Denmark? Following conventions (Glynn, 2013; Kramon & Weghorst, 2019), we first estimated the proportion of interviewees that agreed with the treatment item for three subsamples. Specifically, we split the sample in terciles based on their scores on the Autocratic Orientation Scale, AOS-D, resulting in subsamples with a relatively “democratic orientation” ($n = 329$), “moderate orientation” ($n = 327$), and “autocratic orientation” ($n = 356$). We then estimated the proportion of interviewees in each subsample who agreed with the treatment item, following the estimation procedure by Glynn (2013; see Table S40). We found that support for political violence was lowest among interviewees with a democratic orientation (estimated proportion of interviewees who agreed with treatment item = 0.01 [0.05, 0.07]), somewhat higher among interviewees with a moderate orientation (0.11 [0.04, 0.17]), and highest among interviewees with an autocratic orientation (0.17 [0.10, 0.23]). The difference in support for political violence (i.e., the difference in the estimated proportion of interviewees who agreed with the treatment item) between the democratic and autocratic subsamples was significant, difference = 0.16 [0.07, 0.24], $t(683) = 3.51$, $p < .001$. As an alternative analysis, we regressed individual support for violence (measured by individual agreement with the sensitive item) on AOS-D, and found a significant association, $b = 0.05$ [0.01, 0.10] (Table S41 provides details). Thus, as in Study 1, a democratic political

orientation related to lower support for violence and an autocratic orientation related to higher support for violence.

Are democracy-oriented individuals willing to use violence to defend democracy? We regressed willingness to fight for democracy on autocratic orientations (AOS-D) and found insignificant estimates, $b = 0.02$ [-0.09, 0.12]. Thus, democrats and autocrats were equally willing to engage in political violence in defense of democracy. On the one hand, these results are inconsistent with the claim that autocrats, compared to democrats, are more prone to political violence. On the other, they reveal that autocrats are just as willing to use violence—in support of a cause that is antithetical to their preferences—as democrats, whose preferences perfectly align with the cause. Furthermore, once we controlled for perceived benefits of a successful resistance, AOS-D significantly predicted willingness to fight for democracy ($b = 0.17$ [0.06, 0.28]; Table S42). Unsurprisingly, perceived benefits also predicted willingness to fight for democracy, $b = 0.29$, [0.22, 0.37]. Controlling for perceived benefits allows us to account for democrats’ greater preference for a return to democracy. Once this difference between democrats and autocrats is removed, we see that autocrats are more willing to use political violence.

Overall, this analysis does not corroborate H1 in its original formulation; however, it provides additional evidence for a link between an autocratic orientation and willingness to engage in violence. Combined with the preceding analysis of the list experiment, we conclude that Study 3 partly supports H1.

Does an autocratic orientation confound/mediate the association between SDO and political violence? The standard procedure for analyzing a list experiment does not allow assessing confounding/mediation effects. Hence, to test H2, we analyzed the measure

of willingness to fight for democracy, and followed steps analogous to those in Study 2. We found that Social Dominance Orientation (SDO_7) correlated with autocratic orientations (AOS-D) at $r = .47$. SDO_7 also independently predicted willingness to fight for democracy ($b = 0.10$, $[0.004, 0.20]$). Without controlling for perceived benefits of a successful resistance, SDO_7 did not significantly predict the outcome, $b = 0.02$ $[-0.08, 0.12]$. The association between SDO_7 and violence (when controlling for perceived benefits) was substantially attenuated by the inclusion of AOS-D ($b = 0.02$, $[-0.09, 0.13]$) (Table S43). A decomposition analysis indicated that, holding sex, age, and perceived benefits constant, AOS-D significantly ($p < 0.001$) and fully confounded/mediated the total effect of SDO on willingness to fight for democracy (Table S44). Similarly, AOS-D significantly ($p < 0.001$) and fully confounded the effect of SDO-Dominance, and partly (77.10%, $p = 0.001$) the effect of SDO-Egalitarianism. In contrast to the South African sample, the total effects of SDO-D were smaller (and insignificant) than the total effects of SDO-E: $b_s = 0.05$ $[-0.04, 0.13]$ vs. 0.10 $[0.01, 0.19]$ (Tables S45 and S46). In sum, these estimates are consistent with H2; however, given that significant results were only produced by the models that control for perceived benefits of a successful resistance, Study 3 only partly supports H2. (S11 reports an analysis of the Conservatism sub-scale as an alternative to AOS-D.)

Study 4: Assessing Generalizability: Replicating Study 2 in a WEIRD Sample

Study 3 analyzed the boundary conditions of the difference between autocrats and democrats; hence, it measured willingness to use violence in support of democracy. Given this, we could not determine whether differences in results between Studies 2 and 3 reflect design

differences or differences between WEIRD and non-WEIRD settings. Therefore, we conducted Study 4, a direct replication (pre-registration: <https://osf.io/8wzms>) of Study 2 in a WEIRD country.

Method

Data. We conducted a survey in the United States ($N = 1,539$) via the survey agency YouGov. The survey was administered in October 2019, and was quota-sampled for age, sex, geography, and education to obtain an approximately nationally representative sample. The US is a paradigmatic case of a WEIRD country. In addition, it has experience with low-intensity political violence: Beyerlein et al. (2018) counted 1,037 unique protest events between June 2010 and August 2011, with 7% involving police arrests, 11% involving “participants throwing an object”, and 4% incurring property damage. Given this, we expected the US sample to contain at least some participants in political violence.

Outcomes and predictors. The questionnaire included outcome and predictor measures identical to those in Study 2. All variables were 0–1 normalized. See Table S47 and Figures S10–S12 for summary and descriptive statistics and Table S48 for a bivariate correlation matrix. To test H1 and H2, we followed procedures analogous to those of Study 2. All key scales showed satisfactory reliability, α s = .86, .86, and .89, respectively, for Radicalism Intention Scale (RIS), Autocratic Orientation Scale (AOS₃), and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO₇). Further, 7.21% of interviewees reported participation in political violence and 6.17% reported willingness to participate in political violence.

Results

Do the main results replicate in the US sample? Consistent with Study 2, autocratic orientations (AOS₃) predicted participation in political violence (logit = 6.29, 95% CI [5.22, 7.36]), willingness to participate in political violence (logit = 1.99, [1.09, 2.90]), and the willingness to participate in political violence as measured by the Radicalism Intention Scale, RIS ($b = 0.37$, [0.32, 0.43]) (Table S49 shows detailed estimates). Similarly, proneness to political violence was higher among males than females (logit [participation] = -0.70, [-1.26, -0.14]; logit [willingness] = -0.97, [-1.46, -0.49]; b [RIS] = -0.07, [-0.10, -0.05]). Age was also significantly associated with participation in political violence (logit = -5.12, [-6.70, -3.56]), willingness to participate in political violence (logit = -3.06, [-3.99, -2.12]), and RIS ($b = -0.25$, [-0.30, -0.21]). Education was significantly and positively associated with RIS ($b = 0.06$, [0.02, 0.11]), but not with participation in political violence (logit = 0.35, [-0.58, 1.29]) or willingness to participate in political violence (logit = 0.11, [-0.72, 0.93]). The associations between SES and the three outcomes were insignificant. Note, that, save for the age coefficient in the model of willingness, none of the coefficients reported above are larger than those of AOS₃. We also analyzed the alternative Autocratic Orientation Scale, AOS₇, finding similar results (Table S50). These results are not sensitive to alternative modeling choices, including specifications with alternative outcome measures and alternative estimators (Tables S51 and S52). In sum, Study 4 provides unequivocal support for H1.

Does an autocratic orientation confound/mediate the association between SDO and political violence? Social dominance orientation (SDO₇) and autocratic orientation (AOS₃) correlated at $r = .39$ (Table S53). SDO₇ also independently predicted participation (logit = 6.24, [4.70, 7.77]) and willingness to participate in political violence (logit = 2.15, [0.99, 3.31]), but not RIS ($b = -0.02$, [-0.08, 0.05]) (Table S51). These coefficients were

attenuated by the inclusion of AOS₃ (logit [participation] = 4.51, [2.29, 6.73]; logit [willingness] = 1.42, [0.13, 2.70]; b [RIS] = -0.21, [-0.28, -0.14]) (Table S52). A decomposition analysis indicated that, holding sex and age constant, 39.33% of the total SDO₇ effect on participation in violence, and 29.71% of the total SDO₇ effect on willingness to participate in violence was significantly ($ps < 0.001$; = 0.003; respectively) confounded/mediated by AOS₃ (Table S53). In contrast to SDO₇, the total effects of the SDO-Dominance sub-scale were significant on all three outcomes (logit [participation] = 6.65, [4.75, 8.55]; logit [willingness] = 2.04, [0.93, 3.15]; b [RIS] = 0.08, [0.02, 0.14]) (Table S54). A decomposition analysis indicated that AOS₃ partly confounded/mediated the SDO-D effects on participation in violence (46.87%, $p < 0.001$) and willingness to participate in violence (29.61%, $p = 0.011$), and fully confounded/mediated the SDO-D effects on RIS ($p < 0.001$). Similar to SDO₇, the total effects of the SDO-Egalitarianism sub-scale were positive and significant in the models of participation and willingness (logit [participation] = 4.02, [2.44, 5.61]; logit [willingness] = 1.09, [0.11, 2.06]), but not in the model of RIS (Table S55). In this model, the point-estimate for the SDO-E was negative but not significant ($b = -0.05$, [-0.10, 0.004]). If SDO-Egalitarianism has no (or a negative) association with radicalism intentions, then this explains why RIS had a weaker association with the overall SDO₇ scale than with the SDO-D sub-scale.

Subsequently, we analyzed the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DSRS). Risk-taking within the first and second domains (between-group competition and status/power) correlated with AOS₃ at $r = .47$ and $.65$, respectively. DSRS (between-group competition) independently predicted the three outcomes (logit [participation] = 5.84, [4.70, 6.97]; logit [willingness] = 2.21, [1.20, 3.22]; b [RIS] = 0.42, [0.37, 0.48]) (Table S56). These coefficients were attenuated by the inclusion of AOS₃ (logit [participation] = 2.66, [1.36, 3.97]; logit [willing-

ness] = 1.77, [0.68, 2.87]; b [RIS] = 0.32, [0.26, 0.38]) (Table S57). Similarly, DSRS (status/power) independently predicted the three outcomes (logit [participation] = 5.71, [4.75, 6.68]; logit [willingness] = 3.34, [2.44, 4.24]; b [RIS] = 0.48, [0.42, 0.53]) (Table S58); and the coefficients were attenuated by the inclusion of AOS₃ (logit [participation] = 3.30, [2.18, 4.41]; logit [willingness] = 3.27, [2.18, 4.35]; b [RIS] = 0.38, [0.31, 0.45]) (Table S59). A decomposition analysis indicated that, holding sex, age—and risk-taking in other domains—constant, 63.65% of the total DSRS (group competition) effect on participation in violence and 30.63% of the total DSRS (group competition) effect on RIS was significantly ($ps < 0.001$) confounded/mediated by AOS₃; however, AOS₃ did not significantly confound/mediate the total DSRS (group competition) effect on willingness to participate in violence ($p = 0.103$) (Table S60). For DSRS (status/power), we found that 51.44% of the total effect on participation in violence, and 38.93% of the total effect on RIS was significantly ($ps < 0.001$) confounded/mediated by AOS₃; again, AOS₃ did not significantly confound/mediate the total DSRS (status/power) effect on willingness to participate in violence ($p = 0.540$) (Table S61). Subsequent decomposition analyses indicated that AOS₃ did not significantly mediate the effects of risk-taking in any of the other five domains (Tables S62–S66). In SOM-R (S12), we also report an analysis of Status-Driven Risk-Taking Scale, as an alternative to SDO and DSRS, and an analysis of RWA. Altogether, the above estimates provide support for H2, with only slight differences compared to Study 2.

Discussion

Studies 1, 2, and 4 corroborated H1, suggesting that political violence across WEIRD and non-WEIRD populations relates to autocratic political orientations. Study 3 examined boundary conditions in another WEIRD sample, and found that it is possible to push against the relationship between autocratic orientations and violence if the violence occurs

to promote democracy. Still, even under these “most likely” conditions for democrats to favor political violence, we found that autocrats were just as willing to engage in such violence. In addition, part of Study 3 (the list experiment) supported H1. Subsequently, Studies 2–4 supported H2, suggesting that the association between autocratic orientations and political violence, across WEIRD and non-WEIRD populations, reflects dominance orientations. However, whereas Study 2 unequivocally supported H2, some analyses in Studies 3 and 4 only partly corroborated H2. In sum, the net evidence across the four studies provides unequivocal support for H1 and weaker but considerable support for H2.

In line with research on interpersonal aggression (Daly & Wilson, 1988), we also found that sex robustly relates to all outcome measures, whereas age robustly predicts willingness to participate and support for political violence, but not actual participation. This suggests that, although young individuals may be more prone to violence, they may not have opportunities to engage in it. Sex and age relate to dominance orientations; hence, the fact that sex and age predicted political violence provides additional support to our overarching argument that political violence relates to dominance.

Concurring with existing psychological studies (Becker & Tausch, 2015), our analyses indicated that perceived injustice and political efficacy relate to political violence. In contrast to prior research, we found that political efficacy predicts violence positively. In an analysis of WEIRD samples, Tausch et al. (2011) argue that *low* efficacy should predict violence. Low efficacy, according to Tausch et al., reflects powerlessness to effect political change through more conventional channels, e.g., protest. Yet such conventional channels do not always exist in non-WEIRD settings, pointing to important differences between collective actions—and their predictors—in WEIRD and non-WEIRD contexts (also Becker & Tausch, 2015, p. 77). Finally, our analyses indicated no or a weak association between

SES and violence. This is striking, given the prominent theoretical claims in the macro-level literature stressing the role of low income in rebel recruitment (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).

Altogether, the findings point to two major implications. First, political violence is characterized by incompatibilities over political issues; hence, a comprehensive account of the psychology of political violence cannot exist without including the role of political orientations. Indeed, our analyses indicated that autocratic political orientation, as a predictor of political violence, outperformed most other variables emphasized in existing research, including SES, perceived group-based injustice, and political efficacy. While there are some methodological concerns (see below), these results suggest that political orientations must be considered among the key explanatory factors for political violence in future research.

Second, individual differences in dominance orientations—a major predictor of interpersonal aggression and intergroup hostility—also predicts political violence. This finding underscores the importance of crossing the boundaries of research fields, particularly the integration of psychological research into the study of political violence, a subject primarily studied by political scientists and economists. We found the constructs of dominance (as a status-seeking strategy) and dominance orientations (as the preference for social hierarchies) to be central to our theorizing on political violence. To understand a pressing phenomenon such as political violence, it is essential to integrate psychological research into other social sciences.

Limitations

First, we opted for a research strategy based on interview data to prioritize external validity. While this strategy is consistent with prior research on the associations of stable individual differences (e.g., personality traits and political ideology), it implies that we cannot buttress

causal claims. Future studies are required to explore the possibilities of utilizing experimental designs that allow for causal traction without compromising ethical standards.

Second, while we have taken care to gather observations from culturally different contexts, these contexts are still limited to Africa, Northern Europe, and the United States. Thus, it is possible that the identified relationships will not hold under conditions in other regions. Exploratory analyses suggested that the association between political orientation and violence might be moderated under the conditions or recent history of high-intensity violence. This implies that autocratic orientations may not reliably predict participation in large-scale violence and, conversely, that the identified relationships are particularly likely to hold in the more peaceful conditions that exist in most WEIRD countries.

Finally, as Study 1 analyzed existing cross-cultural survey data, we relied on an ad hoc measure of political orientations. This measure consisted of only three items and therefore had low reliability in some samples. Furthermore, as this measure has not yet been validated, it is possible that the scales used to measure autocratic orientation across Studies 1–4 capture several related constructs. More generally, currently there is no validated dominance scale beyond the individual and intergroup domains. There is thus a need to develop and validate a scale of dominance-driven status-seeking in politics, to examine the causes and consequences of such orientations. The present findings suggest that such a scale would constitute a—if not *the*—key predictor of disruptive political behavior in both WEIRD and non-WEIRD contexts.

Author Contributions

All authors contributed to developing the study concept, designing research, collecting the data, analyzing the data, and drafting the manuscript. All authors approved the final manuscript for submission.

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Supplemental Material Online (SOM-R)

Dominance-driven autocratic political orientations predict political violence in non-WEIRD and WEIRD samples

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S1: Afrobarometer questions used to derive AOS (Study 1)

We identified 10 items in the original Afrobarometer questionnaire that reflected preferences for an autocratic/democratic form of governance: Q18–Q21; Q31A–C; Q33–Q35. For Q31A–C, interviewees were asked: “*There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?*” The statements are listed below:

- Q31A: *Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.*
- Q31B: *The army comes in to govern the country.*
- Q31C: *Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything.*

For these 3 items the answer options were “*strongly disapprove*”, “*disapprove*”, “*neither approve nor disapprove*”, “*approve*”, “*strongly approve*”, and “*don’t know*” coded 0–4 respectively, with “don’t know” set to missing (note that Q31C was not asked in Swaziland).

The other seven questions asked interviewees to indicate which of two statements was closest to their views about the kind of society they would like to have in their countries. The statements are listed below:

- Q18:
 - Statement 1: *Once in office, elected leaders are obliged to help their home community or group first.*
 - Statement 2: *Since elected leaders should represent everyone, they should not do anything that favors their own group over others.*
- Q19:

- Statement 1: *Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies.*
- Statement 2: *We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it.*
- Q20:
 - Statement 1: *The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control.*
 - Statement 2: *The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society.*
- Q21:
 - Statement 1: *The government is like a parent. It should decide what is good for us.*
 - Statement 2: *The government is like our employee. We are the bosses and should tell government what to do.*
- Q33:
 - Statement 1: *It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does.*
 - Statement 2: *It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.*
- Q34:
 - Statement 1: *We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections.*
 - Statement 2: *Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.*

- Q35:
 - Statement 1: *Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in [country name].*
 - Statement 2: *Many political parties are needed to make sure that [people of country] have real choices in who governs them.*

For these 7 items, the answer options were “agree very strongly with statement 1”, “agree with statement 1”, “agree with statement 2”, “agree very strongly with statement 2”, “agree with neither”, and “don’t know”, which were coded 0–3, respectively (with “don’t know” and “agree with neither” set to missing). The complete survey instrument and the dataset is publicly available online at <http://afrobarometer.org/>.

S2: Exploratory factor analysis to derive AOS (Study 1)

To select the items best capturing the variability in the political preferences (from among Q18–Q21; Q31A–C; Q33–Q35), we performed a factor analysis. We examined whether responses to the ten items reflected one or more dimensions. The analysis revealed one factor with Eigenvalue > 1 (1.31; overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy = 0.70). However, the scree plot indicated a two-factor solution. The first factor explained 13.1% of variance; the second factor explained 3.9%. With one factor retained, three items (Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C) had loadings $> .40$, and only 1 other item had a loading $> .30$ (item Q35 loaded .34).

With two factors retained, only Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C had loadings $> .40$ on the first unrotated factor. However, no items had loadings $> .40$ on the second unrotated factor (the highest loading on the second factor was .30 for item Q33). An orthogonal varimax rotation resulted in only four items (Q19, Q19, Q21, Q33) having a loading $> .30$ on the second factor. In other words, while the Q18–Q21 and Q33–Q35 did not load highly on the first factor, they also did not load highly on a second orthogonal factor. We therefore performed an oblique oblimin rotation on the two factors (see Table S4 for the factor loadings). After rotation, only three items (Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C) had loadings $> .40$ on the first factor. Again, no items had loadings $> .40$ on the second factor and four items had loadings $> .30$ on the second factor. The two factors were moderately correlated, $r = .42$. In summary, the items Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C loaded highly on the first factor, while most of the other items had higher loadings on the second factor than on the first.

Based on these results, we concluded that of the 10 items pertaining to political preferences, Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C appear related to an underlying factor and that

the other items might relate to a second factor. Therefore, we computed each interviewee's autocratic orientation as the mean score over the items Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C. These three items showed better internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = .63$) than the other seven items ($\alpha = .40$) or all ten items ($\alpha = .56$).

In S4 below, we report a confirmatory factor analysis (based on Study 2), which supported the findings from the exploratory factor analysis that AOS₃ was a unidimensional scale, i.e., Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C loaded highly on a single latent factor pertaining to political preferences.

S3: Modeling and robustness checks (Study 1)

Study 1 relied on hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLMs), also known as generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs). To identify the most appropriate hierarchical specification, we followed the “bottom-up” strategy recommended by Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot (2018, pp. 42–46) consisting of the following five steps:

- Step 1: We started with an intercept-only (or “fully unconditional”) model, which revealed significant intra-class correlation (ICC, $\rho = .14$, 95% CI [.09, .21]), thereby substantiating the modeling of random intercepts.
- Step 2: We then added all the individual-level predictors “fixed” (i.e., with between-country variance of the corresponding slopes fixed at zero). AOS₃ significantly predicted all outcomes.
- Step 3: Subsequently, we added all the country-level variables. The AOS₃ coefficient remained virtually the same.
- Step 4: In Steps 2 and 3, we assumed that the intercepts vary across countries, but that the slopes are fixed. In Step 4, we explicitly assessed this assumption in random-coefficients models (i.e., with random intercepts and randomly varying slopes). Specifically, this model tested whether any of the slopes of the individual-level predictors significantly varied across countries. Likelihood ratio tests indicated that modeling random slopes for each individual-level predictor (including AOS₃), save for sex and education,¹ significantly improved the model fit ($ps < 0.05$).

¹ Also for education and voting refusal in the model of willingness to participate in political violence; and sex in the model of support for political violence.

At this stage, Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot (2018, p. 45) advice adding all significantly varying slopes simultaneously. However, modeling multiple random slopes simultaneously is computationally very intensive, and with large samples (such as in Study 1) such computations on general-purpose computers/software are prohibitively slow. Although we had access to greater computing power (and we did estimate some of the models via parallel processing), extremely long computations pose a replication problem: interested researchers, without access to greater computing power, would not be able to replicate our analyses. Hence, we attempted to speed up the processing time via several basic adjustments to the estimation method, with negligible consequences for the accuracy of parameter estimates.

Our main analysis reported in Table 1 uses Stata’s *melogit*, which by default calls maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with numerical integration. While numerical methods produce more accurate estimates than most other alternatives, they are computationally intensive (for succinct review of estimation methods for HGLMs, see Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot, 2018, pp. 108–111; also StataCorp, 2017, pp. 14–15). Stata allows for choosing between three integration methods, with the mode-curvature adaptive Gauss–Hermite quadrature being the fastest in our setup (nearly twice as fast as Stata’s default option: mean–variance adaptive Gauss–Hermite quadrature).²

Stata also allows for changing the number of integration points in the estimation (the default is seven). There is a tradeoff between computation time and

² In our setup, the two estimation methods produce nearly indistinguishable coefficients, in most cases identic to the fifth significant figure.

bias in parameter estimates (see StataCorp, 2017, pp. 15–16), with every additional integration point slightly reducing bias, but disproportionately increasing processing time (see e.g., Pinheiro & Chao, 2006; Zhang et al., 2011). We set the number of integration points to four, which for most level-1 parameters produced estimates identical to the third significant figure to those produced with five integration points, but decreased processing time up to five times (depending on the number of random slopes).³

Another aid in numerical integration-based MLE is normalization of predictors to the same (narrow) range. Our main models therefore normalized all covariates to range from 0 to 1. Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot (2018) advice grand-mean centering covariates to improve convergence and computation time. In our setup, however, models with 0–1 normalization were twice as fast as models with grand-mean centering (and four times faster than models with raw data). Importantly, random effects in models with randomly varying slopes are not invariant to linear transformations of predictors (Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot, 2018, pp. 46–52). However, our primary interest was individual-level associations, and fixed effects in multilevel models are invariant to linear transformations (i.e., transforming covariates transforms the parameter estimates in the same way). The average predicted probabilities reported in the main text for Study 1 were also unaffected by linear transformations of data. Hence, we did not use grand-mean centering.

³ Increasing the number of integration points to seven would increase processing time by 15 to 50 times (depending on the number of random slopes); however, as noted above, increasing this number from four to five resulted in a negligible increase in the accuracy of the parameter estimates. Hence, there was no necessity to further increase the number of integration points.

Note that (1) analyses of non-centered predictors produces coefficients that are a mix of the within- and between-group effects (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, p. 139); and (2) if the between-group effect is non-zero, after conditioning on group-level predictors, such blended coefficients will be biased estimates of the within-group effects (i.e., fixed effects). To account for this bias, we explored several techniques (e.g., group-mean centering), which partition between-country effects from within-country effects (we return to this below).

Finally, we also introduced reduced specifications (Models 1, 3, and 5), in addition to complete models (Models 2, 4, and 6), which only controlled for sex, age, and education. If run on general-purpose computers/software, we suggest replicating only these reduced models (the code script uploaded online is annotated with our comments throughout).

These adjustments reduced the time to compute the main models (i.e., Models 2, 4, and 6) from days to hours. Note, however, that we used an upgraded Stata/MP version (with an 8-core computer), which allows for parallel processing. These computations may take up to three times longer via serial processing on standard software/hardware.

Given these computational difficulties, and the possibility that interested researchers may wish to replicate our analyses, we only estimated these complex models (with multiple random slopes) for our main results reported in Tables 1 and S5 (we also used these estimates to derive the predicted probabilities reported in Study 1 Results). Other analyses, robustness tests (reported below), were based on simpler models that only modeled random slopes for AOS₃, the key predictor of interest. We have crosschecked these analyses by

estimating the more complex models with multiple randomly varying slopes, finding substantively the same results. The simpler analyses are readily replicable on a general-purpose computer/software. Our code script also includes commands for the more complex models, in case interested researchers have access to greater computing power.

- Step 5: Finally, we added cross-level interactions (i.e., intercepts- and slopes-as-outcomes models). We interacted AOS₃ with each country-level variable described in the main text. However, only one such variable, conflict history, significantly moderated the AOS₃-political violence association. We provide an interpretation of this interaction in the main text.

In a further attempt to explain the between-country variation in the AOS₃ coefficient, we ran one-level models (analogous to Model 1) for each country separately. Subsequently, we plotted AOS₃ coefficients in a figure (see Figure 2). Inspecting the figure, we identified only one relevant pattern: most of the negative or non-significant coefficients come from countries with a very small number of interviewees reporting participation in violence. In sum, we have to acknowledge that our current understanding of the factors that moderate the AOS₃-political violence association is limited. At present, there simply is too little theoretical and empirical basis to build on to understand such interactions, and given that our primary focus was on individual-level, psychological processes, we did not pursue this subject further.

For the sake of clarity, we do not report all these steps in detail in the main text. Results of Study 1 only reports the main models as described in Step 4. The details and additional tests are reported here and in the code script.

We now turn to considering the robustness of the main results generated by these models (i.e., those reported in Table 1). We start by examining the sensitivity of the results to alternative modeling choices, including specifications with alternative outcome measures and alternative estimators, including hierarchical models with the cumulative logit link function (i.e., ordered logit), and the identity link function (i.e., hierarchical linear models).

In the main text, we report logit estimates on dichotomized outcome variables. This reflects our interest in estimating the probability of participation versus non-participation in political violence (as contrasted to frequency of participation in violence). We also find estimates of logit models (as contrasted to ordered logit) easier to interpret. Alternatively, we could analyze the original ordinal scales with a linear estimator; however, the response variables contain too few categories (and an ordered logit regression indicates unequal cut-off points).

Here, we report estimates of these alternative models. As indicated in the main text, participation in political violence (hereafter PVparticipation) was measured with the following question: *Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance?* The list of actions included “*Used force or violence for a political cause*”. The interviewees could choose from among “*no, would never do this*”, “*no, but would do if had the chance*”, “*yes, once or twice*”, “*yes, several times*”, “*yes, often*”, and “*don't know*”. For the alternative models, we coded these choices with integers 0–4 (dropping

“*don’t know*”) (hereafter PVparticipation04). We also tested whether the results remained the same when the first two categories were combined, representing a more general response “*no*” (coded 0) (PVparticipation03).

Similarly, we tested whether the results remained the same when we used an alternative measure of support for political violence (hereafter PVsupport). As indicated in the main text, support for political violence was measured with the following question: “*Which of the following statements is closest to your view? [...] 1: The use of violence is never justified in [country name] politics today. 2: In [country name], it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause*” (“*agree very strongly with statement 1*”, “*agree with statement 1*”, “*agree with statement 2*”, “*agree very strongly with statement 2*”, “*agree with neither*”, and “*don’t know*”). For the alternative models, we coded these choices with integers 0–3 (dropping “*agree with neither*” and “*don’t know*”) (hereafter PVsupport03).

We started the alternative analyses by regressing PVparticipation04, PVparticipation03, and PVsupport03 on AOS₃ in hierarchical linear models (HLM). The coefficients of AOS₃ (0–1 normalized) were positive (β s = 0.20, 0.09, 0.30; $ps < 0.0001$) (see Table S6 for details). These analyses treated the outcomes as interval variables. We estimated analogous HGLMs with the cumulative logit link function (i.e., ordered logit) that did not make this assumption. The coefficients remained positive (proportional logits = 1.08, 1.28, 1.11; $ps < .0001$) (see Table S6). Finally, we estimated fixed-effects regression models (see McNeish & Kelley, 2019), which fully remove level-2 confounding (elaborated in detail below). The coefficients of AOS₃ remained positive (β s = 0.20, 0.10, 0.38; $ps < 0.0001$). In sum, these analyses indicate that our

main results are not sensitive to alternative measurement of the outcomes or alternative analysis techniques.

Subsequently, we examined whether the results were driven by: (i) particular operationalization of autocratic orientation; (ii) autocracy-oriented individuals engaging in political violence in support of governments; (iii) democracy-oriented individuals providing biased responses due to self-presentation concerns; (iv) democracy-oriented individuals suffering more from political repression; (v) dishonest or influenced answering; and (vi) lack of comprehension of the survey questions.

Below we elaborate the results of these tests in detail. We then discuss potential level-2 confounding.

(i) A test of whether the results were driven by particular operationalization of autocratic orientation

Our main analyses used a 3-item autocratic orientation scale (i.e., AOS₃) derived from a factor analysis, described in Method of Study 1 (also S2). We analyzed whether our findings hold when we use an alternative scale that reflects responses to other questions, AOS₇ (see S2 and S4). As shown in Table S7, compared to the main results reported in Table 1, the coefficients nearly double in both the reduced (logit = 1.71, 95% CI [0.94, 2.48]; Model 25) and fully controlled (logit = 2.26, [1.52, 2.99]; Model 26) PVparticipation models. However, the associations are weaker in both the reduced (logit = 0.11, [-0.55, 0.78]; Model 27) and fully controlled (logit = 0.63, [0.04, 1.23]; Model 28) PVwillingness models. Finally, the coefficients are larger in both PVsupport models (logit = 0.59, [0.16, 1.03]; Model 29; and logit 0.81, [0.39, 1.23] Model 30).

(ii) A test of whether the results were driven by autocracy-oriented individuals engaging in political violence in support of governments

The question about participation in political violence does not explicitly mention the target of the violence. It is therefore not certain whether our main results reflect a general pattern or only political violence aimed at particular goals. For example, autocracy-oriented citizens might be part of a pro-regime movement engaging in political violence against opposition or anti-government movements. Hence, we cannot rule out the possibility that our results are driven by autocrats fighting in support of autocratic governments.

To address this, we conducted analyses differentiating between participation in pro- or anti-government violence. One question allowed us to identify interviewees who are very unlikely to take part in pro-government violence: “*Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?*” (with “*president/prime minister*”, “*your member of parliament*”, and “*your elected assemblyman/woman*” listed as answer options). Interviewees expressing disapproval of these key government officials are unlikely to fight in support of government.

Table S8 reports estimates of models analogous to those reported in Table 1 but controlling for “supporters of PM”, “supporters of MP”, and “supporters of LR”. The results for the key variables remain similar (with slightly larger coefficients for all three outcomes). This suggest that our results are unlikely to be driven by autocracy-oriented individuals engaging in violence in support of governments.

(iii) A test of whether the results were driven by democracy-oriented individuals providing biased responses due to self-presentation concerns

Violence is antithetical to democratic values. Democracy-oriented individuals might therefore be unwilling to report that they had participated in political violence. Such self-presentation concerns are likely to be absent for questions about participation in demonstrations or protest marches, as participation in such events is consistent with democratic values. If the findings for participation in violence are driven by a self-presentation bias among democratic interviewees, then we might see that a democratic orientation is associated with higher participation in demonstrations. However, if a democratic orientation is associated with lower participation in demonstrations, then this would be consistent with democratic individuals having generally higher thresholds for political mobilization (whether violent or not).

To address this concern we analyzed two additional outcomes, PDparticipation and PDwillingness, which reflect interviewees' willingness to participate and actual participation in a protest march or demonstration (the two indicators are identical to PVparticipation and PVwillingness but focus on whether interviewees "*Attended a demonstration or a protest march*"). As reported in Table S9, AOS₃ has *positive* coefficients in models of PDparticipation, marginally significant in the reduced specification (logit = 0.36, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.74]; Model 40), and highly significant in the fully controlled specification (logit = 0.78, [0.45, 1.10]; Model 41).

If anything, this indicates that democracy-oriented individuals are unlikely to take part in protest marches or demonstrations; despite the fact that analyses of PDwillingness show that democracy-oriented individuals are more likely to report willing-

ness to take part in protest or demonstration (although this estimate is only significant in the reduced specification; see Models 42 and 43). In summary, these results suggest that our main findings are not driven by self-presentation concerns among democracy-oriented individuals.

(iv) A test of whether the results were driven by democracy-oriented individuals suffering more from state repression than autocracy-oriented individuals

The fact that democracy-oriented individuals are less likely to participate in protest marches or demonstrations despite their willingness to do so potentially indicates that mobilization opportunities are low or absent. For example, mobilization opportunities may be low due to state repression, and such repression may specifically target the supporters of opposition movements that are democratic.

To address this concern, we introduced three additional variables: political intimidation, non-anonymous voting, and restricted political expression. The questions were, respectively: “*During electoral campaigns in [country name], how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?*”; “*How likely do you think it is that powerful people can find out how you voted, even though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in [country name]?*”; and “*In your opinion, how often, in [country name] people have to be careful of what they say about politics?*”. Controlling for these three variables does not affect our main results (see Table S10). These analyses thus indicate that our findings are not driven by state repression specifically targeted at democracy-oriented individuals.

Controlling for perceived political repression may also address potential reporting problems (as interviewees may not honestly report participation in violence if they fear state reprisals).

(v) A test of whether the results were driven by dishonest or influenced answering

Given that political violence is a sensitive issue, questions related to it may not have been answered honestly or could have been influenced by third parties present during the interviews. We therefore reran the main analyses while controlling for checked answering, influenced answering, suspicious interviewees, and misleading interviewees. These variables reflect interviewers' assessment of the quality of the interviewees' answers: "*Did the respondent check with others for information to answer any question?*" (0 = "no"; 1 = "yes"); "*Do you think anyone influenced the respondent's answers during the interview?*" (0 = "no"; 1 = "yes"); "*What was the respondent's attitude towards you during the interview? E. Was he or she at ease, in between, suspicious?*" (1 = "at ease"; 2 = "in between"; 3 = "suspicious"); "*What was the respondent's attitude towards you during the interview? F. Was he or she honest, in between, misleading?*" (1 = "honest", 2 = "in between", 3 = "misleading"). Tables S11 and S12 report estimates that are nearly identical to our main results.

(vi) A test of whether the results were driven by lack of comprehension of the survey questions

There is a risk of interviewees not fully comprehending the questions on political violence and political attitudes we used to construct our key variables. We therefore reran our main analyses while controlling for comprehension, which reflects interviewers' assessment of whether interviewees' understood the posed questions. The question was: "*What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?*" (0 = "*none*"; 1 = "*few*"; 2 = "*some*"; 3 = "*most*"; 4 = "*all*") (coded 0–4, respectively). Table S13 indicates that our main results remain unaffected.

Table S15 reports summary statistics for all the variables added in robustness tests.

Although we control for a number of country-level variables, we cannot rule out the possibility of omitted variable bias due to unobserved country-level factors. Such unobservables can correlate with both our individual-level predictors and outcomes, leading to biased level-1 parameter estimates. Several approaches exist to tackle this problem (for reviews, see Bell et al. 2019; and McNeish & Kelley, 2019): i) adding country means of level-1 predictors as controls in multilevel models;⁴ ii) group-de-meaning predictors in multilevel models; and iii) fixed-effects regression models. These techniques partition the variation in the outcome due to predictors' variation *between* countries from the estimation of the level-1 coefficients (i.e., fixed effects). In this way, all (observed and unobserved) level-2 confounders are controlled for.

Note that level-2 means of level-1 variables in multilevel specification only reliably account for confounding by level-2 characteristics in linear models (Bell et al. 2019, pp. 1066–7). In generalized linear models, such as logit (i.e., our main model), such an approach does not reliably partition between-level-2 effects from within-level-2 effects. Simulation research has shown that this can introduce some bias in the esti-

⁴ This is the so-called “Mundlak specification” after Mundlak (1978). Two recent articles—one by political scientists/sociologists and another by psychologists—elaborate the advantages of this specification to applied audiences: Bell et al. (2019) and McNeish & Kelley (2019). Adding a group/cluster mean of the predictor as a control variable is mathematically equivalent to group de-meaning of the predictor (Bell et al., 2019; see also Chris, Sibley, & Wagner 2018, p. 246; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, pp. 139–141; Hox, Moerbeek, & Schoot, 2018, p. 51). Note that both Bell et al. (2019) and McNeish & Kelley (2019) advocate using an extension of the Mundlak’s specification, the so-called within-between random effects (or “hybrid”) model. This model, in addition to adding a group mean of the predictor as a control variable, also applies group de-meaning of the predictor. This not only partitions within-group effect from between-group effect, but also the between-group effect from within-group effect (i.e., the model produces “clean” coefficients of both pure within-group effect and pure between-group effect; see also Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, p. 140; Hox et al. 2018, pp. 51–52). In our case, however, de-meaning was not necessary, as we were not interested in the between-country effect of AOS₃. Our goal was to account for the likely country-level confounders of the individual-level association between autocratic orientation and political violence.

mates of level-1 coefficients (Brumback et al. 2010; 2013). Luckily, these same simulations show that, under most conditions, the remaining bias in level-1 coefficients due to level-2 confounding is negligible. To our knowledge, the only currently available approach to fully remove between-level-2 effects from within-level-2 effects in logit models are the fixed-effects regression models, less known in the psychological literature (see McNeish & Kelley, 2019). These models typically remove between-level-2 effects from level-1 coefficients via conditional maximum likelihood. Table S14 replicates analyses reported in Table 1 with country-level means of level-1 predictors as control variables, country demeaned level-1 predictors, and fixed-effects models. These models demonstrate that unobserved level-2 characteristics do not confound our main results.

S4: Confirmatory factor analysis to verify AOS (Study 2)

In Study 2, we included the same 10 items about political preferences. This allowed for a confirmatory analysis that the items Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C load highly on a single factor. We performed a confirmatory factor analysis using the *sem* command in Stata. We evaluated two models. In Model 1, we estimated paths from one latent factor to each of the 10 items. In Model 2, we estimated paths from one latent factor to items Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C and paths from a second latent factor to the other 7 items (Q18–Q21; Q33–Q35; see the path graph below). In Model 2, the two latent factors were allowed to correlate. Because only 1,048 respondents had complete data for all 10 items, the models were fitted using maximum likelihood with missing values ($N = 2,056$). Goodness-of-fit statistics were better for Model 2 ($\chi^2(34) = 171.84$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.044 with 90% CI [0.038, 0.051], CFI = 0.953, TLI = 0.938) than for Model 1 ($\chi^2(35) = 386.71$, $p < .001$, RMSEA = 0.070 with 90% CI [0.064, 0.076], CFI = 0.881, TLI=0.847). A chi-square difference test showed that the fit of Model 2 was significantly better than the fit of Model 1, $\chi^2_D(1) = 241.87$, $p < .001$. Similarly, the confidence interval of the RMSEA of Model 2 did not overlap with the confidence interval of Model 1, and the difference in CFI (0.057) was larger than the recommended cutoff value for model comparison (i.e., 0.01; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). In addition, Model 2 satisfied standard criteria for good fit (i.e., RMSEA $\leq$ 0.05, CFI $>$ 0.90, TLI $>$ 0.90; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005), while Model 1 did not. In summary, the confirmatory factor analysis supported the findings from the exploratory factor analysis in Study 1: the items Q31A, Q31B, and Q31C relate to an underlying factor about political preferences.

The figure reports standardized path coefficients computed for Model 2. Rectangular boxes represent observed variables and circles represent latent factors. For all path coefficients $p < .001$. The question labels are the same as in Study 1.

S5: Radicalism Intention Scale (Study 2)

The following are some statements about things people might do as citizens. Please indicate how much you agree with each statement.

- Q1: I would continue to support an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes breaks the law.
- Q2: I would continue to support an organization that fights for my group's political and legal rights even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence.
- Q3: I would participate in a public protest against oppression of my group even if I thought the protest might turn violent.
- Q4: I would attack police or security forces if I saw them beating members of my group.

The answer options ranged from “*Strongly disagree*” = 0 to “*Strongly agree*” = 6 (and included “*Prefer not to state*”). See the original article for details (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009).

S6: Domain-Specific Risk Scale (DSRS) (Study 2)

For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in the described activity or behavior if you were to find yourself in that situation. (The categories in brackets were not included in the questionnaire; they indicate risk-taking domains.)

[Between-group competition]

- If going to a sports event, you take seats in the section for fans of the opposing team with a group of friends while wearing your team's colours.
- Adamantly defending the honour of your local community against a person from a different community, even if it may cause a fight.
- Starting a rivalry with people from another neighbourhood or community.

[Status/power]

- Blackmailing your opponent to win an election.
- Carrying around a weapon to appear strong and in control to your peers.
- At your work, you tell a lie to your boss about a co-worker to appear more trustworthy than the other person (i.e., to get ahead).

[Within-group competition for leadership]

- Trying to take a leadership role in any group you join.
- If people in your community come together to work on a collective project, you argue with others over what should be done.
- Attempting to influence people in your social group to advance your own agenda.

[Environmental exploration]

- Swimming far out from shore to reach a diving platform.

- Hiking on a mountain trail with a beautiful view but with a high chance of a landslide.
- Going on an expedition into the desert where there will be no one else around.

[Food selection]

- Not boiling or filtering water from a questionable source before drinking it.
- Eating at a restaurant where your friend got food poisoning.
- Eating a piece of food that has fallen on the floor.

[Kinship]

- Risking your life to drag your parents from a burning building.
- Staying up all night to help your sibling with fixing the roof of his or her house.
- Donating a kidney to your sibling.

[Mate attraction]

- Taking part in sexual acts that you may not usually do to look more sexually appealing to the opposite sex.
- Having a romantic relationship with more than one person at a time.
- Having a consistent sexual partner with whom you are not romantically involved.

The answer options ranged from “*Very unlikely*” = 0 to “*Very likely*” = 4 (and included “*Prefer not to state*”). See the original article for details (Wilke et al., 2014).

S7. Supplementary methods and analysis for Study 2

In addition to SDO₇ and DSRS, we also analyzed the Status-Driven Risk Taking (SDRT) Scale (Ashton et al., 2010), and RWA. The 14-item SDRT measures individual differences in risk taking “motivated entirely by the prospect of gains in money, power, or prestige” (p. 734) (e.g., “*I would rather live as an average person in a safe place than live as a rich and powerful person in a dangerous place*”; “*For a very high-status job, I would be willing to live in a place that had an extremely high crime rate*”). Ashton et al. designed SDRT to contrast it to other types of risk-taking scales that tap, for example, sensation seeking motivated by adventurousness or the sense of thrill (p. 734). In the South African sample, SDRT showed satisfactory reliability ($\alpha = .83$).

Does AOS₃ confound/mediate the association between SDRT and political violence?

We first assessed the correlation between SDRT and AOS₃, which amounted to $r = .29$. Subsequently, we tested whether SDRT independently predicted the three outcomes, and found significant estimates (logit [PVparticipation] = 4.46, [2.97, 5.94]; logit [PVwillingness] = 2.78, [1.71, 3.88]; b [RIS] = .53, [.46, .59]). In turn, we analyzed SDRT and AOS₃ in one block, and found that the coefficients for the former were attenuated (logit [PVparticipation] = 2.99, [1.31, 4.66]; logit [PVwillingness] = 2.42, [1.29, 3.55]; b [RIS] = .44, [.38, .51]). Subsequently, we estimated the direct and indirect (i.e., via AOS₃) effects of SDRT on the three outcomes, following Kohler, Karlson, & Holm (2011). Holding gender and age constant, 22.15% of the total SDRT effect on participation in political violence, 12.25% of the total SDRT effect on willingness to participate in political violence, and 14.89% of the total SDRT effect on

willingness to participate in political violence as measured by RIS, was significantly ($ps < 0.001$; $= 0.002$; < 0.001) confounded/mediated by AOS₃.

We did not use SDRT as the main scale in Study 2 because most of the items composing SDRT do not clearly refer to force-based pursuit of status. That is, SDRT seems to reflect the general pursuit of status, without clearly differentiating between dominance- or prestige-based strategies.

Does RWA predict political violence?

Finally, we tested whether Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) predicted political violence, and identified an inverse significant association (logit [participation] = -3.48, [-5.21, -1.74]; logit [willingness] = -1.41, [-2.74, -0.07]; b [RIS] = -.43, [-.51, -.35]; Table S37). In line with our expectations, these results indicate the unique psychological importance of dominance and support for hierarchy (as contrasted to submission to in-group authority figures) for engagement in violence.

S8: List experiment items (Study 3)*List A*

[Neutral items]:

- I enjoy listening to music
- Schools should teach more science
- Schools should teach more religion
- I would like to work as a cleaner

[Treatment item]:

- It is justifiable to use violence against the government of Denmark.

List B

[Neutral items]:

- I enjoy watching movies
- Schools should teach more biology
- Schools should teach more Christian values
- I would like to be a garbage collector

[Treatment item]:

- It is justifiable to use violence against the government of Denmark.

S9: Introductory text and vignettes (Study 3)

Introductory text (all materials were presented in Danish)

Many of us have grown up in remarkably peaceful times and we often take peace and democracy for granted. Yet, today Europe is experiencing a wave of instability. Great Britain is leaving the European Union, Denmark again feels a need to control its borders, Europe is experiencing an unprecedented refugee crisis, Russia is increasingly acting aggressively and extremist political movements and parties gain support across the Western World. Historians are increasingly pointing out parallels between the events of today and the events that preceded the World Wars. While it might not happen within the next 10 or 20 years, it is not entirely impossible that we, in the future, no longer can take peace and democracy for granted.

In this light, we would like you to consider how you would react to a range of different scenarios that might happen in the future. Over the next pages, we will describe a number of short stories about ways in which the government of Denmark might become less democratic and more authoritarian. By authoritarian government, we mean a regime in which the people do not elect the government. (In other words, a regime in which the people do not decide about who rules the country.)

Please read each story and although each story describes a hypothetical situation, please try to imagine yourself in the described situation as realistically as possible. Please answer the questions by selecting the option that best matches your answer.

Vignettes (presented in random order)

(1) Imagine that while in power, a Danish political party has become increasingly authoritarian. When the party was in the government, it steadily reduced people's influence on government of the country. The party now rules the country by itself, with other parties and citizens having no say when decisions are made. You have heard that there is a resistance movement that fights to make the Danish government democratic again.

(2) Imagine that, by using intimidation and violence, a new Danish authoritarian political party has taken over the government of Denmark. This new authoritarian government has banned all political opposition. You have heard that there is a resistance movement that fights to reinstall democracy.

(3) Imagine that, with use of armed forces and violence, a country with an authoritarian government has annexed the region of Denmark in which you live. Your region is now governed by the occupiers. These politicians were not elected by the people in your region. You have heard that there is a resistance movement that fights to overturn the annexation and re-unite your region with Denmark.

(4) Imagine that, with use of armed forces and violence, a country with an authoritarian government has invaded Denmark and has taken control of the government. You have heard there is a resistance movement that fights for liberation from the foreign invaders and wants to re-install a Danish democratic government.

S10: Autocratic orientation scale for Denmark (Study 3)

The following statements are about political values people may or may not hold.

Please indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with each statement.

1. The state must provide equal social and political rights to all citizens, regardless of religion, race or gender.*
2. Open and public criticism of the government is permissible even in states of national emergency.*
3. The slightest threat to the security of the state is enough to justify serious restrictions on democracy.
4. I prefer a democratic government whose actions and views are opposed to mine over a non-democratic government with whose views I agree.*
5. Every citizen has the right to take his convictions to the street if necessary.*
6. Public participation of the people is not necessary if decision making is left in the hands of a few trusted leaders.
7. I don't mind a politician's methods if he manages to get the right things done.
8. Because demonstrations frequently become disorderly and disruptive, radical and extremist political groups shouldn't be allowed to demonstrate.
9. Society shouldn't have to put up with the views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority.
10. No matter what a person's beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protection as anyone else.*

*Reverse-scored. Items 1–6 adapted from Canetti-Nisim (2004). Items 7–10 from Miklikowska (2012). Reply options: “*Strongly disagree*” = 0, “*Strongly agree*” = 6.

S11. Supplementary methods and analysis for Study 3

Here, we report additional analyses of the main effects of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and authoritarian submission on political violence. SDO was measured with the 8-item SDO₇ scale (Ho et al., 2015), which showed satisfactory reliability ($\alpha = .81$). This is the short version of the SDO scale used in Study 2. Example items are “*An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom*” and “*We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups*”. Authoritarian submission was measured with the 6-item Conservatism subscale of the RWA scale (Duckitt et al. 2010), which showed sufficient reliability ($\alpha = .75$). Example items are “*Our country will be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders*” and “*It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority*”. AOSD positively correlated with SDO ($r = .47, p < .001$) and authoritarian submission ($r = .54, p < .001$).

Does SDO predict support for political violence in Denmark?

We split the sample in tertiles based on SDO₇ scores and estimated the proportion of participants in each subsample agreeing with the treatment item (“*It is justifiable to use violence against the government of Denmark*”). The estimated proportion that supported political violence in each subsamples was: egalitarian oriented 0.10 [0.04, 0.17]; moderate orientation 0.12 [0.06, 0.18]; hierarchy oriented 0.06 [0.002, 0.12]. The difference between the egalitarian and hierarchy-oriented subsamples was not significant, $t(705) = -0.95, p = .342$.

Are egalitarian individuals willing to use political violence to defend democracy?

We regressed willingness to fight for democracy on SDO₇. When included as the only predictor, SDO₇ did not significantly predict willingness to fight for democracy, $b = 0.04$ [-0.07, 0.14]. When controlling for perceived benefits of a successful resistance, SDO significantly predicted willingness to fight for democracy, $b = 0.11$ [0.005, 0.21].

Does Conservatism subscale predict support for political violence in Denmark?

We split the sample in tertiles based on scores for authoritarian submission and estimated proportions of participants in each subsample agreeing with the treatment item. The estimated proportion of support for violence for the subsamples were: defiance oriented 0.06 [0.01, 0.12]; moderate orientation 0.10 [0.03, 0.17]; submission oriented 0.11 [0.05, 0.17]. The difference between the defiance-oriented and submission-oriented subsamples was not significant, $t(705) = 1.15$, $p = .249$.

Are defiance-oriented individuals willing to use violence to defend democracy?

We regressed willingness to fight for democracy on authoritarian submission. When included as the only predictor, authoritarian submission did not significantly predict willingness to fight for democracy, $b = -0.02$ [-0.12, 0.08]. Controlling for perceived benefits, authoritarian submission also did not significantly predict willingness to fight for democracy, $b = 0.06$ [-0.04, 0.16].

S12. Supplementary methods and analysis for Study 4

In addition to SDO₇ and DSRS, we also analyzed the Status-Driven Risk Taking (SDRT) Scale, and RWA, as in Study 2 (see S7 above).

Does AOS₃ confound/mediate the association between SDRT and political violence?

SDRT and AOS₃ correlated at $r = .42$. SDRT also independently predicted the three outcomes, and found significant estimates (logit [PVparticipation] = 8.10, [6.43, 9.77]; logit [PVwillingness] = 3.76, [2.51, 5.02]; b [RIS] = .57, [.50, .64]). In turn, we analyzed SDRT and AOS₃ in one block, and found that the coefficients for the former were attenuated (logit [PVparticipation] = 5.31, [4.19, 6.43]; logit [PVwillingness] = 3.51, [2.20, 4.81]; b [RIS] = .46, [.38, .53]). A decomposition analysis indicated that, holding gender and age constant, 29.60% of the total SDRT effect on participation in political violence, 8.43% of the total SDRT effect on willingness to participate in political violence, and 19.60% of the total SDRT effect on willingness to participate in political violence as measured by RIS, was significantly ($ps < 0.001$; = 0.019; < 0.001) confounded/mediated by AOS₃.

Does RWA predict political violence?

In contrast to Study 2, RWA positively predicted participation in political violence (logit = 1.90, [0.74, 3.06]). Consistent with Study 2, RWA negatively predicted RIS ($b = -.31$, [-.37, -.25]; Table S67). The coefficient of RWA in the model of willingness to participate in political violence was insignificant (logit = 0.08, [-0.98, 1.14]).

Figure S1. Histograms of PVparticipation, PVwillingness, and PVsupport (Study 1)

Figure S2. Histograms of autocratic orientation scale, sex, and age (Study 1)

Figure S3. Histograms of education, economic status, ethnic discrimination, voting refusal, and ethnic identification (Study 1)

Table S1. Summary statistics for the main variables (0–1 normalized) (Study 1)

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>Level 1</i>						
PVparticipation (binary)	50641	.0290871	0	.1680524	0	1
PVwillingness	49168	.0695778	0	.2544367	0	1
PVsupport (binary)	48628	.1892325	0	.3916973	0	1
AOS3	50456	.2248741	.25	.2210702	0	1
Sex	51587	.5004555	1	.5000046	0	1
Age	51143	.2206019	.183908	.1677482	0	1
Education	51461	.3635698	.3333333	.2369849	0	1
Economic status	51387	.4146574	.5	.2939671	0	1
Discrimination	41150	.2158607	0	.3125135	0	1
Voting refusal	51389	.0520929	0	.2222165	0	1
Identification	42632	.315391	.5	.2900456	0	1
<i>Level 2</i>						
Democracy	51587	.6671918	.7368421	.2401267	0	1
Country mean AOS3	51587	.2259008	.2213288	.0633291	.1078186	.3312445
Instability	51587	.0996875	.0427083	.1610027	0	1
Violent crime	50388	.2609666	.2042733	.2461813	0	1
Violent protests	51587	.120246	.0458393	.196308	0	1
Economic status	51587	.217938	.1023108	.2589675	0	1
Conflict history	51587	.4415957	.4423077	.3254404	0	1
Population size	51587	.1710034	.1045889	.2111677	0	1

Table S2. Bivariate correlation matrix for the main variables (Study 1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
<i>Level 1</i>																		
(1) PVparticipation	1.000																	
(2) PVsupport	0.067	1.000																
(3) AOS3	0.046	0.047	1.000															
(4) Sex	-0.024	-0.017	0.067	1.000														
(5) Age	-0.009	-0.055	0.007	-0.095	1.000													
(6) Education	-0.003	0.013	-0.142	-0.123	-0.264	1.000												
(7) Economic status	-0.008	0.016	0.027	0.001	-0.081	0.124	1.000											
(8) Discrimination	0.050	0.058	-0.014	-0.023	-0.030	0.056	-0.088	1.000										
(9) Voting refusal	0.018	0.021	0.022	0.000	-0.028	0.057	-0.006	0.034	1.000									
(10) Identification	0.002	-0.005	-0.033	0.025	-0.021	0.003	0.006	0.162	0.002	1.000								
<i>Level 2</i>																		
(11) Democracy	-0.023	-0.065	-0.070	0.000	0.037	-0.032	0.042	-0.078	-0.040	-0.013	1.000							
(12) Country mean AOS3	-0.017	0.021	0.286	-0.000	0.014	-0.006	0.028	-0.044	0.074	-0.142	-0.248	1.000						
(13) Instability	-0.024	0.026	0.100	-0.000	0.028	-0.090	-0.045	-0.022	-0.013	-0.036	-0.248	0.346	1.000					
(14) Violent crime	0.028	0.051	0.033	-0.000	0.039	0.103	-0.020	0.007	0.006	-0.044	0.120	0.106	0.015	1.000				
(15) Violent protests	-0.027	-0.026	0.094	0.000	0.047	0.033	-0.051	0.053	0.024	0.020	-0.355	0.324	0.326	0.038	1.000			
(16) Economic status	-0.039	-0.030	0.022	-0.000	0.070	0.200	0.101	0.021	0.085	0.050	0.244	0.073	-0.167	0.435	0.101	1.000		
(17) Conflict history	-0.035	-0.080	-0.076	0.000	0.042	0.035	-0.056	-0.071	-0.035	-0.057	0.103	-0.267	-0.243	-0.104	0.007	0.153	1.000	
(18) Population size	0.014	0.029	0.032	-0.000	-0.060	0.115	-0.003	0.165	0.044	0.127	-0.116	0.114	-0.005	0.075	-0.012	0.054	-0.328	1.000

Table S3. Afrobarometer question Q26E (“Used force or violence for a political cause”) by country

	<i>Missing</i>	<i>No, would never do this</i>	<i>No, but would do if had the chance</i>	<i>Yes, once or twice</i>	<i>Yes, several times</i>	<i>Yes, often</i>	<i>Don't know</i>	<i>Refused</i>
Algeria	0.00	92.52	4.82	0.08	0.17	0.00	2.41	0.00
Benin	0.00	88.00	7.92	1.83	1.17	0.92	0.17	0.00
Botswana	0.17	94.75	3.83	0.50	0.08	0.08	0.58	0.00
Burkina	0.00	88.75	7.58	0.58	0.25	0.33	2.50	0.00
Burundi	0.00	94.58	3.83	0.17	0.08	0.50	0.83	0.00
Cameroon	0.08	85.75	6.75	1.25	0.58	0.42	5.17	0.00
Cape Verde	0.00	86.67	8.36	1.16	0.17	0.58	3.06	0.00
Ivory Coast	0.00	94.42	3.08	0.92	0.42	0.67	0.50	0.00
Egypt	0.00	87.31	8.07	1.43	0.67	0.42	2.10	0.00
Ghana	0.00	92.92	4.58	1.17	0.46	0.04	0.83	0.00
Guinea	0.00	92.58	4.92	1.00	0.50	0.42	0.58	0.00
Kenya	0.13	90.83	4.79	1.33	1.13	0.42	1.38	0.00
Lesotho	0.00	86.38	6.52	1.50	3.01	1.00	1.59	0.00
Liberia	0.33	90.49	4.25	1.92	0.83	0.83	1.33	0.00
Madagascar	0.00	86.00	6.08	1.00	0.50	0.17	6.17	0.08
Malawi	0.04	92.65	5.53	1.08	0.21	0.25	0.25	0.00
Mali	0.00	91.08	7.17	0.75	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.00
Mauritius	0.00	98.50	0.50	0.17	0.17	0.33	0.33	0.00
Morocco	0.00	91.72	4.26	0.50	0.25	0.67	2.59	0.00
Mozambique	0.29	74.58	15.83	2.42	1.42	0.71	4.75	0.00
Namibia	0.00	82.75	13.58	0.75	1.08	1.08	0.75	0.00
Niger	0.00	91.16	4.50	1.00	1.17	1.00	1.17	0.00
Nigeria	0.00	87.96	8.00	1.38	0.88	0.42	1.38	0.00
Senegal	0.00	90.25	6.83	0.75	0.67	0.67	0.83	0.00
Sierra Leone	0.00	86.81	5.88	2.86	2.69	1.01	0.76	0.00
South Africa	0.00	83.53	11.42	1.79	1.00	0.33	1.92	0.00
Sudan	0.58	80.98	8.09	1.42	0.83	2.17	5.92	0.00
Swaziland	0.00	91.42	5.92	0.92	0.42	0.25	1.08	0.00
Tanzania	0.00	88.50	5.71	1.42	3.46	0.58	0.33	0.00
Togo	0.17	82.00	11.33	1.50	0.67	0.58	3.75	0.00
Tunisia	0.00	97.83	1.08	0.25	0.00	0.17	0.67	0.00
Uganda	0.25	78.88	7.71	5.50	2.96	1.00	3.71	0.00
Zambia	0.08	93.50	4.75	0.67	0.17	0.17	0.67	0.00
Zimbabwe	0.13	93.63	4.04	1.25	0.46	0.13	0.38	0.00
<i>Total</i>	<i>0.07</i>	<i>88.68</i>	<i>6.63</i>	<i>1.38</i>	<i>0.95</i>	<i>0.52</i>	<i>1.76</i>	<i>0.00</i>

Table S4. Rotated factor loadings (N = 39,507)

<i>Item</i>	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>
Q31A	0.56	0.01
Q31B	0.52	-0.03
Q31C	0.61	0.02
Q18	0.04	0.36
Q19	0.13	0.35
Q20	0.13	0.01
Q21	-0.02	0.37
Q33	-0.05	0.38
Q34	0.26	-0.03
Q35	0.20	0.22

The highest loading for each item is in bold. Items 18, 19, 21, 33, and 35 were reverse coded.

Table S5. Analogous to Table 1 but with alternative predictors

	Participation in Political Violence						Willingness to Participate in Political Violence						Support for Political Violence					
	(7)		(8)		(9)		(10)		(11)		(12)		(13)		(14)		(15)	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
<i>FIXED EFF.</i>																		
AOS3	1.21****	0.72,1.70	1.16****	0.64,1.68	1.14****	0.61,1.67	0.81****	0.42,1.21	0.86****	0.50,1.22	0.90****	0.55,1.26	0.43*	0.08,0.79	0.48**	0.15,0.82	0.43*	0.06,0.80
Sex	-0.28****	-0.40,-0.16	-0.27****	-0.39,-0.15	-0.26****	-0.38,-0.14	-0.26****	-0.36,-0.15	-0.25****	-0.35,-0.15	-0.25****	-0.36,-0.15	-0.10****	-0.15,-0.05	-0.10****	-0.16,-0.05	-0.11****	-0.17,-0.06
Age	-0.41	-1.02,0.19	-0.42	-1.04,0.19	-0.39	-0.98,0.21	-1.03****	-1.41,-0.65	-0.96****	-1.30,-0.61	-0.97****	-1.34,-0.60	-0.65****	-0.88,-0.42	-0.71****	-0.96,-0.45	-0.65****	-0.90,-0.41
Education	-0.33*	-0.63,-0.03	-0.28	-0.59,0.03	-0.25	-0.56,0.06	-0.04	-0.25,0.17	-0.01	-0.23,0.21	0.06	-0.16,0.28	0.12	-0.05,0.30	0.11	-0.07,0.30	0.16	-0.03,0.34
Eco. status	-0.06	-0.37,0.24					0.01	-0.13,0.15					0.13	-0.05,0.31				
Discrim.	0.48*	0.07,0.89					0.59****	0.36,0.82					0.16	-0.00,0.32				
Voting	0.12	-0.36,0.60					0.17	-0.01,0.36					0.08	-0.14,0.30				
Ident.	-0.30	-0.77,0.18	-0.16	-0.61,0.29	-0.08	-0.55,0.38	-0.03	-0.37,0.32	-0.17	-0.50,0.16	-0.11	-0.47,0.26	-0.19	-0.44,0.05	-0.14	-0.39,0.10	-0.10	-0.36,0.15
Discrim.#Ident.	0.11	-0.49,0.71					-0.51*	-0.93,-0.09					0.16	-0.12,0.44				
Employ.			0.02	-0.24,0.29	0.09	-0.16,0.35			0.03	-0.07,0.12	0.01	-0.08,0.11			-0.04	-0.19,0.10	-0.07	-0.20,0.07
Inequal.			-0.32*	-0.63,-0.01	-0.32	-0.65,0.02			-0.12	-0.29,0.06	-0.17	-0.35,0.01			0.08	-0.10,0.26	0.10	-0.09,0.29
Heard MPs			0.64**	0.22,1.05					0.29***	0.14,0.44					0.07	-0.11,0.25		
Heard Counc.					0.37	-0.04,0.77					0.10	-0.08,0.29					-0.01	-0.23,0.20
Constant	-3.62****	-4.71,-2.52	-4.34****	-5.64,-3.03	-4.29****	-5.66,-2.93	-3.09****	-4.11,-2.06	-3.16****	-4.22,-2.11	-2.90****	-3.96,-1.84	-0.35	-1.73,1.03	-0.32	-1.83,1.19	-0.49	-2.00,1.03
<i>COUNTRY-LEVEL.</i>																		
Democracy	0.62	-0.38,1.63	1.40*	0.22,2.57	1.43*	0.19,2.67	-0.73	-1.60,0.13	-0.74	-1.62,0.13	-0.86	-1.75,0.04	-1.18*	-2.36,-0.01	-1.03	-2.30,0.24	-0.86	-2.15,0.43
AOS mean	-0.00	-3.27,3.26	1.73	-2.05,5.50	1.69	-2.24,5.61	4.65**	1.84,7.45	5.28***	2.36,8.21	4.79**	1.87,7.71	0.20	-3.72,4.12	-0.16	-4.44,4.12	-0.25	-4.52,4.02
Instability	-0.93	-2.32,0.45	-1.04	-2.63,0.54	-1.27	-2.88,0.34	-1.10*	-2.15,-0.05	-0.99	-2.09,0.11	-1.33*	-2.41,-0.25	-0.05	-1.45,1.35	-0.18	-1.75,1.39	-0.10	-1.64,1.44
Crime	1.33**	0.47,2.18	0.65	-0.42,1.71	0.41	-0.68,1.51	0.85*	0.05,1.64	0.98*	0.16,1.80	0.87*	0.05,1.69	0.23	-0.80,1.25	0.28	-0.85,1.41	0.38	-0.75,1.50
Protests	-1.71	-4.82,1.40	-0.85	-4.50,2.79	-0.28	-3.98,3.43	-1.53	-4.07,1.02	-1.41	-4.07,1.24	-1.00	-3.61,1.62	-0.31	-3.80,3.18	0.35	-3.55,4.24	0.26	-3.57,4.10
Econ. status	-1.58**	-2.58,-0.57	-1.59*	-2.81,-0.38	-1.48*	-2.71,-0.26	-0.39	-1.23,0.44	-0.58	-1.45,0.30	-0.38	-1.24,0.48	0.24	-0.75,1.24	0.25	-0.88,1.37	0.06	-1.05,1.17
Conf. history	-0.96**	-1.54,-0.38	-0.99**	-1.69,-0.29	-1.15**	-1.90,-0.40	0.01	-0.49,0.52	0.10	-0.44,0.64	-0.11	-0.66,0.44	-0.83*	-1.52,-0.15	-0.97*	-1.75,-0.19	-0.81*	-1.59,-0.04
Population	0.34	-0.62,1.29	0.24	-0.84,1.32	0.20	-0.92,1.33	0.19	-0.60,0.99	0.30	-0.51,1.11	0.21	-0.60,1.02	-0.44	-1.53,0.64	-0.58	-1.76,0.59	-0.56	-1.75,0.63
<i>RANDOM EFF.</i>																		
var(constant)	0.06	0.01,0.40	0.11	0.03,0.40	0.13	0.04,0.44	0.09	0.03,0.23	0.10	0.04,0.24	0.10	0.04,0.25	0.23	0.12,0.44	0.27	0.14,0.53	0.28	0.14,0.54
var(AOS3)	1.02	0.42,2.50	1.20	0.50,2.89	1.25	0.51,3.04	0.78	0.37,1.66	0.58	0.27,1.26	0.56	0.25,1.23	0.76	0.39,1.47	0.64	0.32,1.30	0.79	0.40,1.55
var(Sex)	†	†	†	†	†	†	0.03	0.01,0.13	0.01	0.00,0.14	0.02	0.00,0.13	†	†	†	†	†	†
var(Age)	1.27	0.53,3.03	1.19	0.47,3.02	1.03	0.37,2.81	0.33	0.08,1.40	0.18	0.02,1.30	0.24	0.05,1.27	0.13	0.03,0.53	0.18	0.06,0.60	0.15	0.04,0.57
var(Education)	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	†	0.08	0.02,0.30	0.08	0.02,0.30	0.08	0.02,0.30
var(Eco. status)	0.20	0.06,0.74					†	†					0.16	0.08,0.35				
var(Discrim.)	0.49	0.20,1.18					0.10	0.03,0.32					0.04	0.01,0.20				
var(Voting)	0.50	0.15,1.65					†	†					0.13	0.04,0.46				
var(Ident.)	0.95	0.45,2.00	0.95	0.45,2.02	1.00	0.47,2.12	0.58	0.27,1.23	0.55	0.25,1.21	0.70	0.33,1.45	0.31	0.16,0.62	0.32	0.16,0.65	0.36	0.18,0.74
var(Employ.)			0.27	0.12,0.61	0.24	0.11,0.55			†	†	†	†			0.11	0.05,0.23	0.09	0.04,0.21
var(Inequal.)			0.14	0.03,0.68	0.19	0.04,0.78			†	†	†	†			0.12	0.05,0.30	0.14	0.05,0.35
var(Heard MPs)			0.69	0.29,1.66					†	†					0.13	0.05,0.33		
var(Heard counc.)					0.66	0.27,1.60					0.07	0.01,0.51					0.24	0.11,0.52
N	39205		37142		36177		37950		35932		34986		38052		36052		35085	
AIC	10242.2		9825.4		9683.8		18489.0		17609.4		17200.6		35928.5		34089.5		33035.4	
BIC	10456.6		10029.9		9887.7		18694.0		17796.2		17395.2		36150.7		34301.8		33247.0	
chi2	94.89		79.90		70.87		128.7		126.5		110.0		80.86		66.89		62.14	

The table reports estimates from the fixed and random parts of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

† = excluded randomly varying slopes due to no significant improvement in the model fit (see S3).

Table S6. Analogous to Table 1 but using alternative outcomes and estimators

	Participation in political violence (coded 0–4)				Participation in political violence (coded 0–3)				Support for political violence (coded 0–3)									
	(16) HLM		(17) Ologit HGLM		(18) Fixed effects estimator		(19) HLM		(20) Ologit HGLM		(21) Fixed effects estimator		(22) HLM		(23) Ologit HGLM		(24) Fixed effects estimator	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
Level 1																		
AOS3	0.20****	0.12,0.28	1.08****	0.72,1.44	0.20****	0.18,0.23	0.09****	0.05,0.14	1.28****	0.81,1.75	0.10****	0.08,0.11	0.40****	0.28,0.53	1.11****	0.85,1.38	0.38****	0.33,0.42
Sex	-0.04****	-0.05,-0.03	-0.27****	-0.34,-0.20	-0.04****	-0.05,-0.03	-0.02****	-0.02,-0.01	-0.28****	-0.40,-0.17	-0.02****	-0.02,-0.01	-0.03***	-0.05,-0.01	-0.06**	-0.10,-0.02	-0.03***	-0.05,-0.01
Age	-0.07****	-0.10,-0.04	-0.68****	-0.90,-0.46	-0.06***	-0.10,-0.03	-0.01	-0.03,0.01	-0.22	-0.59,0.14	-0.01	-0.03,0.01	-0.21****	-0.27,-0.16	-0.44****	-0.56,-0.32	-0.21****	-0.27,-0.16
Education	-0.03*	-0.06,-0.00	-0.14	-0.32,0.03	-0.03*	-0.05,-0.00	-0.02*	-0.03,-0.00	-0.34*	-0.64,-0.05	-0.02*	-0.03,-0.00	0.00	-0.05,0.05	-0.06	-0.16,0.03	0.00	-0.05,0.05
Eco. status	0.01	-0.01,0.03	0.05	-0.07,0.17	0.01	-0.01,0.03	0.01	-0.00,0.02	0.11	-0.09,0.31	0.01	-0.00,0.02	0.03	-0.00,0.06	0.10**	0.04,0.17	0.03*	0.00,0.07
Discrim.	0.10****	0.08,0.11	0.57****	0.46,0.68	0.10****	0.08,0.12	0.04****	0.03,0.06	0.75****	0.58,0.93	0.04****	0.03,0.06	0.12****	0.09,0.15	0.24****	0.18,0.31	0.12****	0.09,0.15
Voting	0.05****	0.03,0.08	0.29***	0.13,0.44	0.06****	0.03,0.08	0.03**	0.01,0.04	0.45****	0.21,0.69	0.03***	0.01,0.04	0.08***	0.03,0.13	0.17***	0.07,0.27	0.08***	0.03,0.13
Ident.	-0.02	-0.04,0.00	-0.11	-0.23,0.01	-0.02	-0.04,0.00	-0.01	-0.02,0.01	-0.11	-0.33,0.10	-0.01	-0.02,0.01	-0.03*	-0.07,-0.00	-0.10**	-0.17,-0.03	-0.04*	-0.07,-0.00
Level 2																		
Democracy	-0.02	-0.12,0.08	-0.47	-1.37,0.43			0.01	-0.04,0.06	-0.21	-1.29,0.87			-0.61***	-0.96,-0.26	-1.30**	-2.08,-0.52		
Mean AOS	0.35*	0.01,0.69	3.82*	0.80,6.84			0.01	-0.15,0.18	0.82	-2.78,4.42			-0.04	-1.21,1.14	0.18	-2.44,2.80		
Instability	-0.12	-0.25,0.00	-1.05	-2.16,0.05			-0.04	-0.10,0.03	-1.26	-2.68,0.15			0.20	-0.22,0.63	0.57	-0.38,1.51		
Crime	0.08	-0.01,0.17	1.14**	0.33,1.94			0.03	-0.01,0.08	1.15*	0.19,2.11			0.26	-0.05,0.56	0.35	-0.33,1.03		
Protests	-0.21	-0.52,0.10	-1.66	-4.37,1.04			-0.12	-0.27,0.04	-2.48	-5.78,0.81			-0.41	-1.46,0.64	-0.87	-3.21,1.46		
Eco. status	-0.08	-0.16,0.01	-1.02*	-1.82,-0.22			-0.06**	-0.10,-0.01	-1.66**	-2.67,-0.66			0.12	-0.17,0.41	0.61	-0.04,1.26		
Conf. Hist.	-0.05	-0.11,0.01	-0.19	-0.72,0.34			-0.03*	-0.06,-0.01	-0.62	-1.26,0.02			-0.18	-0.38,0.03	-0.41	-0.87,0.04		
Population	-0.02	-0.11,0.07	0.08	-0.75,0.90			-0.01	-0.06,0.03	0.16	-0.81,1.12			-0.08	-0.40,0.24	-0.11	-0.83,0.61		
Constant	0.12*	0.00,0.25			0.13****	0.11,0.15	0.06*	0.00,0.12			0.04****	0.02,0.05	1.20****	0.79,1.62			0.74****	0.71,0.78
N	39205		39205		39205		39205		39205		39205		38052		38052		38052	
AIC	61623.6		31705.4		61728.9		22027.1		12920.1		22111.1		101043.9		86261.6		100986.0	
BIC	61795.2		31894.1		61806.0		22198.7		13100.2		22188.3		101214.8		86441.1		101062.9	
chi2	243.4		277.7				140.1		168.1				205.8		225.9			

The table reports estimates from the fixed part of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

All models, save for 18, 21, and 24, include random intercepts and randomly varying slopes for AOS3 (estimates from the random part of the models are not reported in the table).

Table S7. Analogous to Table 1 but with AOS7

	<i>Participation in political violence</i>				<i>Willingness to participate in political violence</i>				<i>Support for political violence</i>			
	(25)		(26)		(27)		(28)		(29)		(30)	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
<i>Level 1</i>												
AOS (7-item)	1.71****	0.94,2.48	2.26****	1.52,2.99	0.11	-0.55,0.78	0.63*	0.04,1.23	0.59**	0.16,1.03	0.81***	0.39,1.23
Sex	-0.36****	-0.46,-0.25	-0.29****	-0.41,-0.17	-0.28****	-0.35,-0.21	-0.24****	-0.32,-0.16	-0.11****	-0.16,-0.06	-0.10***	-0.15,-0.04
Age	-0.30	-0.64,0.04	-0.15	-0.51,0.21	-1.08****	-1.32,-0.84	-0.92****	-1.19,-0.66	-0.67****	-0.82,-0.52	-0.60****	-0.77,-0.43
Education	-0.07	-0.33,0.19			-0.11	-0.28,0.07	-0.11	-0.32,0.09	0.18**	0.07,0.29	0.13*	0.00,0.26
Eco. status			0.06	-0.14,0.25			-0.00	-0.14,0.14			0.06	-0.03,0.15
Discrimination			0.74****	0.57,0.92			0.43****	0.30,0.56			0.27****	0.18,0.35
Voting			0.44***	0.20,0.68			0.20*	0.02,0.38			0.19**	0.07,0.32
Identification			-0.09	-0.30,0.13			-0.10	-0.24,0.05			-0.03	-0.13,0.06
<i>Level 2</i>												
Democracy			-0.12	-1.07,0.84			-1.16	-2.49,0.17			-1.56*	-3.00,-0.12
Mean AOS			-0.07	-2.95,2.80			4.11	-0.31,8.54			1.35	-3.48,6.17
Instability			-2.32**	-3.75,-0.89			-1.52	-3.14,0.10			-0.43	-2.17,1.31
Violent crime			0.54	-0.29,1.38			0.86	-0.37,2.08			0.60	-0.66,1.86
Violent protests			1.52	-1.37,4.41			0.76	-3.21,4.73			-0.78	-5.09,3.54
Eco. status			-1.35**	-2.33,-0.36			-0.53	-1.78,0.71			-0.37	-1.59,0.85
Conflict history			-1.65****	-2.30,-1.00			-0.16	-0.95,0.63			-0.64	-1.48,0.21
Population size			-0.64	-1.52,0.24			-0.64	-1.89,0.60			0.60	-0.73,1.93
Constant	-4.31****	-4.65,-3.96	-3.53****	-4.55,-2.51	-2.46****	-2.76,-2.16	-2.65***	-4.22,-1.07	-1.65****	-1.93,-1.37	-0.71	-2.42,1.00
N	50043		39674		48580		38354		48114		38377	
AIC	12221.1		10228.7		23447.5		18821.6		44441.0		36337.8	
BIC	12282.8		10383.2		23509.1		18984.1		44502.4		36500.4	
chi2	59.73		190.9		125.9		144.3		124.6		151.9	

The table reports estimates from the fixed part of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

All models include random intercepts and randomly varying slopes for AOS3 (estimates from the random part of the models are not reported in the table).

Table S8. Analogous to Table 1 but controlling for government supporters

	Participation in political violence						Willingness to participate in political violence						Support for political violence					
	(31)		(32)		(33)		(34)		(35)		(36)		(37)		(38)		(39)	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
<i>Level 1</i>																		
AOS3	1.37****	0.88,1.87	1.39****	0.93,1.86	1.34****	0.84,1.84	0.88****	0.46,1.29	0.85***	0.42,1.28	0.86****	0.44,1.29	0.49*	0.11,0.86	0.46*	0.07,0.84	0.48*	0.11,0.85
Sex	-0.28****	-0.40,-0.16	-0.28****	-0.41,-0.16	-0.30****	-0.43,-0.18	-0.24****	-0.32,-0.16	-0.23****	-0.31,-0.14	-0.24****	-0.32,-0.15	-0.10***	-0.16,-0.05	-0.09***	-0.15,-0.04	-0.11***	-0.16,-0.05
Age	-0.20	-0.58,0.18	-0.25	-0.63,0.14	-0.25	-0.64,0.14	-0.84****	-1.12,-0.57	-0.79****	-1.06,-0.51	-0.86****	-1.14,-0.57	-0.57****	-0.74,-0.39	-0.60****	-0.78,-0.42	-0.57****	-0.75,-0.39
Education	-0.51****	-0.81,-0.21	-0.42**	-0.72,-0.11	-0.41**	-0.71,-0.10	-0.05	-0.26,0.16	-0.05	-0.26,0.16	-0.05	-0.26,0.17	0.08	-0.05,0.22	0.07	-0.06,0.21	0.10	-0.03,0.24
Eco. status	0.26*	0.05,0.46	0.19	-0.01,0.39	0.17	-0.03,0.38	0.06	-0.08,0.21	0.06	-0.09,0.21	0.05	-0.11,0.20	0.10*	0.01,0.19	0.07	-0.02,0.17	0.05	-0.04,0.15
Discrim.	0.62****	0.44,0.80	0.70****	0.52,0.88	0.74****	0.56,0.93	0.38****	0.25,0.51	0.40****	0.27,0.53	0.42****	0.29,0.56	0.21****	0.12,0.29	0.21****	0.12,0.30	0.20****	0.11,0.29
Voting	0.39**	0.14,0.63	0.43***	0.18,0.68	0.46***	0.21,0.71	0.12	-0.07,0.31	0.17	-0.02,0.36	0.13	-0.06,0.33	0.18**	0.05,0.31	0.19**	0.06,0.33	0.21**	0.07,0.34
Ident.	-0.09	-0.30,0.13	-0.14	-0.36,0.08	-0.09	-0.31,0.14	-0.12	-0.27,0.03	-0.12	-0.27,0.03	-0.14	-0.30,0.01	-0.04	-0.14,0.05	-0.04	-0.14,0.06	-0.09	-0.19,0.02
Supp. PM	-0.59****	-0.72,-0.47					-0.32****	-0.41,-0.23					-0.18****	-0.24,-0.12				
Supp. MPs			-0.29****	-0.41,-0.17					-0.25****	-0.34,-0.16					-0.09**	-0.14,-0.03		
Supp. LR					-0.35****	-0.47,-0.22					-0.17***	-0.26,-0.08					-0.06	-0.11,0.00
<i>Level 2</i>																		
Democracy	-0.08	-1.20,1.04	-0.27	-1.40,0.87	-0.12	-1.24,1.00	-0.59	-1.65,0.46	-0.71	-1.75,0.32	-0.73	-1.79,0.33	-1.28*	-2.50,-0.05	-1.37*	-2.56,-0.18	-1.55*	-2.77,-0.34
Mean AOS	0.82	-2.91,4.56	1.07	-2.72,4.86	1.10	-2.58,4.78	4.91**	1.38,8.45	4.98**	1.50,8.46	4.85**	1.33,8.37	0.94	-3.18,5.06	1.21	-2.79,5.21	0.92	-3.13,4.97
Instability	-1.26	-2.73,0.21	-1.01	-2.49,0.46	-1.19	-2.64,0.27	-1.01	-2.31,0.28	-0.98	-2.25,0.30	-0.90	-2.18,0.39	-0.19	-1.67,1.29	-0.27	-1.71,1.17	-0.23	-1.68,1.23
Crime	1.08*	0.08,2.08	1.18*	0.17,2.20	1.12*	0.12,2.12	1.11*	0.15,2.07	1.17*	0.22,2.11	1.19*	0.22,2.15	0.72	-0.35,1.79	0.75	-0.29,1.79	0.81	-0.25,1.86
Protests	-2.86	-6.27,0.55	-3.12	-6.60,0.36	-2.92	-6.34,0.50	-1.19	-4.35,1.98	-1.41	-4.54,1.71	-1.50	-4.68,1.68	-0.48	-4.16,3.19	-0.54	-4.10,3.03	-0.81	-4.44,2.82
Eco. status	-1.60**	-2.63,-0.56	-1.66**	-2.72,-0.61	-1.86***	-2.91,-0.81	-0.77	-1.72,0.19	-0.75	-1.70,0.20	-0.69	-1.65,0.27	-0.31	-1.33,0.71	-0.29	-1.29,0.70	-0.11	-1.13,0.90
Conf. hist.	-0.59	-1.26,0.07	-0.59	-1.26,0.08	-0.53	-1.22,0.16	0.11	-0.51,0.73	0.04	-0.58,0.65	-0.02	-0.68,0.63	-0.47	-1.19,0.25	-0.52	-1.22,0.18	-0.72	-1.46,0.01
Population	0.06	-0.95,1.06	0.18	-0.84,1.19	0.14	-0.85,1.14	0.08	-0.89,1.05	0.03	-0.92,0.98	0.07	-0.89,1.04	-0.06	-1.19,1.07	-0.11	-1.21,0.99	-0.17	-1.28,0.94
Constant	-3.01****	-4.32,-1.71	-3.20****	-4.52,-1.88	-3.25****	-4.54,-1.95	-3.12****	-4.37,-1.87	-3.09****	-4.32,-1.86	-3.09****	-4.35,-1.84	-0.56	-2.02,0.89	-0.57	-1.98,0.85	-0.36	-1.81,1.08
N	37469		35845		34687		36246		34661		33528		36371		34828		33643	
AIC	9975.7		9676.4		9427.8		17733.0		17142.6		16491.5		34649.8		33275.7		31889.7	
BIC	10146.4		9846.1		9596.9		17903.0		17311.6		16659.9		34819.8		33444.8		32058.1	
chi2	245.2		181.8		195.5		200.9		174.2		159.8		163.6		128.0		121.8	

The table reports estimates from the fixed part of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

All models include random intercepts and randomly varying slopes for AOS3 (estimates from the random part of the models are not reported in the table).

Table S9. Analogous to Table 1 but with protest/demonstration outcomes

	<i>Participation in protest/demonstration</i>				<i>Willingness to participate in protest/demonstration</i>			
	(40)		(41)		(42)		(43)	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
<i>Level 1</i>								
AOS3	0.36	-0.02,0.74	0.78****	0.45,1.10	-0.28*	-0.55,-0.01	-0.12	-0.38,0.15
Sex	-0.39****	-0.46,-0.33	-0.33****	-0.40,-0.25	-0.29****	-0.34,-0.25	-0.28****	-0.33,-0.22
Age	-0.60****	-0.81,-0.39	-0.47****	-0.71,-0.24	-1.38****	-1.54,-1.23	-1.32****	-1.50,-1.15
Education	1.41****	1.26,1.56	1.30****	1.12,1.47	0.53****	0.41,0.64	0.47****	0.34,0.61
Economic status			0.05	-0.08,0.17			-0.04	-0.14,0.05
Discrimination			0.50****	0.39,0.61			0.43****	0.34,0.51
Voting			-0.19*	-0.38,-0.00			-0.15*	-0.28,-0.01
Identification			-0.07	-0.20,0.06			0.04	-0.06,0.13
<i>Level 2</i>								
Democracy			-0.63	-1.78,0.52			-0.51	-1.86,0.84
Country mean AOS			1.46	-2.41,5.34			2.34	-2.21,6.88
Instability			-0.97	-2.37,0.44			-0.60	-2.23,1.03
Violent crime			0.40	-0.61,1.41			1.05	-0.13,2.23
Violent protests			0.72	-2.73,4.16			-0.11	-4.17,3.95
Economic status			0.09	-0.88,1.06			0.49	-0.63,1.62
Conflict history			-0.16	-0.84,0.52			0.47	-0.32,1.27
Population size			-0.35	-1.41,0.70			-0.69	-1.94,0.56
Constant	-2.71****	-2.91,-2.50	-2.71***	-4.07,-1.34	-1.01****	-1.26,-0.77	-1.64*	-3.24,-0.03
N	49115		39155		44636		35612	
AIC	28493.2		22649.9		43856.7		35443.2	
BIC	28554.8		22812.8		43917.6		35604.3	
chi2	636.7		476.7		636.6		549.4	

The table reports estimates from the fixed part of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

All models include random intercepts and randomly varying slopes for AOS3 (estimates from the random part of the models are not reported in the table).

Table S10. Analogous to Table 1 but controlling for repression

	<i>Participation in political violence</i>						<i>Willingness to participate in political violence</i>						<i>Support for political violence</i>					
	(44)		(45)		(46)		(47)		(48)		(49)		(50)		(51)		(52)	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
<i>Level 1</i>																		
AOS3	1.29****	0.82,1.76	1.16****	0.67,1.65	1.28****	0.81,1.75	0.88****	0.49,1.26	0.85****	0.46,1.24	0.87****	0.47,1.26	0.45*	0.09,0.81	0.40*	0.06,0.75	0.47**	0.12,0.83
Sex	-0.29****	-0.41,-0.18	-0.29****	-0.41,-0.17	-0.27****	-0.39,-0.15	-0.25****	-0.33,-0.17	-0.26****	-0.34,-0.17	-0.24****	-0.33,-0.16	-0.10***	-0.16,-0.05	-0.10***	-0.15,-0.04	-0.10***	-0.15,-0.05
Age	-0.19	-0.57,0.18	-0.23	-0.61,0.15	-0.17	-0.54,0.20	-0.85****	-1.11,-0.58	-0.86****	-1.13,-0.59	-0.89****	-1.16,-0.62	-0.58****	-0.75,-0.40	-0.61****	-0.79,-0.44	-0.61****	-0.78,-0.43
Education	-0.35*	-0.65,-0.06	-0.41**	-0.71,-0.11	-0.31*	-0.61,-0.02	-0.00	-0.21,0.21	-0.02	-0.24,0.19	-0.04	-0.25,0.17	0.14*	0.01,0.27	0.12	-0.02,0.25	0.13	-0.00,0.26
Eco. status	0.13	-0.07,0.33	0.14	-0.06,0.35	0.11	-0.08,0.31	0.03	-0.11,0.18	0.04	-0.10,0.19	0.02	-0.12,0.16	0.07	-0.02,0.16	0.07	-0.02,0.16	0.06	-0.03,0.15
Discrim.	0.73****	0.56,0.91	0.66****	0.48,0.84	0.77****	0.59,0.95	0.41****	0.28,0.54	0.38****	0.25,0.51	0.44****	0.31,0.57	0.21****	0.13,0.30	0.19****	0.10,0.28	0.23****	0.15,0.32
Voting	0.47***	0.22,0.71	0.42***	0.18,0.67	0.44***	0.19,0.68	0.16	-0.02,0.35	0.15	-0.05,0.34	0.15	-0.04,0.34	0.19**	0.06,0.32	0.18**	0.05,0.31	0.19**	0.06,0.32
Ident.	-0.11	-0.32,0.11	-0.19	-0.41,0.03	-0.09	-0.30,0.13	-0.10	-0.25,0.04	-0.11	-0.26,0.04	-0.12	-0.27,0.03	-0.05	-0.15,0.05	-0.04	-0.14,0.06	-0.04	-0.13,0.06
Intimid.	-0.25**	-0.41,-0.10					-0.16**	-0.27,-0.05					-0.26****	-0.33,-0.18				
Non-anon.			0.95****	0.78,1.11					0.34****	0.21,0.47					0.43****	0.35,0.52		
Restric.					-0.22*	-0.39,-0.04					-0.02	-0.14,0.11					0.22****	0.14,0.30
<i>Level 2</i>																		
Democracy	-0.23	-1.34,0.88	-0.21	-1.32,0.91	-0.27	-1.35,0.80	-0.60	-1.65,0.44	-0.60	-1.62,0.42	-0.63	-1.64,0.38	-1.32*	-2.56,-0.09	-1.27*	-2.46,-0.08	-1.31*	-2.53,-0.10
Mean AOS	0.98	-2.73,4.69	0.78	-2.96,4.51	0.79	-2.80,4.38	4.99**	1.48,8.49	4.73**	1.30,8.16	4.88**	1.48,8.27	1.18	-2.98,5.34	1.18	-2.81,5.18	1.02	-3.06,5.11
Instability	-1.30	-2.75,0.16	-1.37	-2.83,0.09	-1.23	-2.64,0.18	-0.95	-2.22,0.33	-0.91	-2.16,0.34	-0.98	-2.21,0.26	-0.15	-1.65,1.34	-0.20	-1.64,1.24	-0.23	-1.69,1.24
Crime	1.07*	0.09,2.06	1.10*	0.11,2.09	1.11*	0.15,2.07	1.11*	0.17,2.06	1.13*	0.20,2.06	1.17*	0.25,2.09	0.66	-0.42,1.73	0.69	-0.34,1.73	0.71	-0.35,1.77
Protests	-2.53	-5.92,0.86	-2.41	-5.84,1.02	-2.51	-5.80,0.77	-1.14	-4.27,2.00	-1.09	-4.16,1.98	-1.08	-4.11,1.95	-0.67	-4.38,3.04	-0.34	-3.90,3.22	-0.37	-4.01,3.26
Eco. status	-1.59**	-2.63,-0.56	-1.73**	-2.76,-0.69	-1.65**	-2.66,-0.65	-0.74	-1.69,0.21	-0.78	-1.71,0.15	-0.78	-1.70,0.14	-0.22	-1.26,0.81	-0.28	-1.27,0.71	-0.26	-1.27,0.76
Conf. hist.	-0.65	-1.31,0.01	-0.61	-1.27,0.05	-0.65*	-1.29,-0.01	0.10	-0.52,0.72	0.11	-0.50,0.71	0.11	-0.48,0.71	-0.51	-1.23,0.22	-0.48	-1.18,0.22	-0.47	-1.18,0.24
Population	0.16	-0.84,1.15	0.09	-0.91,1.09	0.14	-0.83,1.10	0.12	-0.83,1.08	0.12	-0.81,1.06	0.12	-0.80,1.05	-0.04	-1.18,1.10	-0.08	-1.17,1.02	-0.04	-1.16,1.08
Constant	-3.19****	-4.48,-1.89	-3.45****	-4.75,-2.15	-3.18****	-4.44,-1.92	-3.27****	-4.51,-2.03	-3.37****	-4.59,-2.16	-3.30****	-4.51,-2.10	-0.52	-1.99,0.96	-0.82	-2.23,0.60	-0.84	-2.29,0.60
N	38784		37387		38498		37543		36180		37260		37652		36349		37413	
AIC	10229.6		9801.7		10205.1		18296.6		17565.5		18211.0		35598.9		34277.0		35435.4	
BIC	10400.9		9972.3		10376.3		18467.3		17735.4		18381.5		35769.6		34447.0		35606.0	
chi2	178.4		286.8		169.1		166.1		179.0		164.0		182.6		233.5		165.4	

The table reports estimates from the fixed part of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

All models include random intercepts and randomly varying slopes for AOS3 (estimates from the random part of the models are not reported in the table).

Table S11. Analogous to Table 1 but controlling for checked or influenced answering

	<i>Participation in political violence</i>				<i>Willingness to participate in political violence</i>				<i>Support for political violence</i>			
	(53)		(54)		(55)		(56)		(57)		(58)	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
<i>Level 1</i>												
AOS3	1.27****	0.81,1.74	1.28****	0.81,1.74	0.85****	0.47,1.24	0.86****	0.47,1.24	0.46*	0.10,0.82	0.46*	0.10,0.82
Sex	-0.29****	-0.41,-0.17	-0.29****	-0.41,-0.17	-0.25****	-0.34,-0.17	-0.25****	-0.34,-0.17	-0.10***	-0.15,-0.05	-0.10***	-0.15,-0.04
Age	-0.25	-0.62,0.12	-0.23	-0.60,0.14	-0.90****	-1.16,-0.63	-0.89****	-1.16,-0.63	-0.60****	-0.77,-0.43	-0.60****	-0.77,-0.43
Education	-0.31*	-0.60,-0.02	-0.32*	-0.61,-0.02	-0.03	-0.23,0.18	-0.02	-0.22,0.19	0.14*	0.01,0.27	0.14*	0.01,0.27
Economic status	0.11	-0.09,0.31	0.11	-0.09,0.30	0.02	-0.12,0.16	0.02	-0.12,0.16	0.06	-0.03,0.15	0.06	-0.03,0.15
Discrimination	0.74****	0.57,0.92	0.75****	0.57,0.92	0.44****	0.31,0.57	0.44****	0.31,0.56	0.25****	0.16,0.34	0.25****	0.17,0.34
Voting	0.45***	0.20,0.69	0.45***	0.21,0.69	0.17	-0.01,0.36	0.18	-0.01,0.36	0.19**	0.06,0.32	0.19**	0.07,0.32
Identification	-0.12	-0.33,0.09	-0.12	-0.33,0.10	-0.10	-0.25,0.04	-0.10	-0.24,0.05	-0.04	-0.13,0.06	-0.04	-0.13,0.06
Checked	0.56****	0.31,0.80			0.29**	0.09,0.48			0.08	-0.06,0.22		
Influenced			0.38**	0.09,0.68			0.35**	0.14,0.55			0.02	-0.14,0.17
<i>Level 2</i>												
Democracy	-0.21	-1.28,0.86	-0.19	-1.27,0.88	-0.59	-1.60,0.43	-0.56	-1.57,0.45	-1.32*	-2.52,-0.13	-1.32*	-2.52,-0.13
Country mean AOS	0.78	-2.81,4.37	0.77	-2.83,4.37	4.95**	1.53,8.36	4.93**	1.53,8.33	0.92	-3.09,4.93	0.90	-3.10,4.91
Instability	-1.25	-2.66,0.17	-1.24	-2.66,0.18	-0.97	-2.21,0.28	-0.96	-2.20,0.28	-0.18	-1.62,1.26	-0.18	-1.62,1.26
Violent crime	1.15*	0.19,2.10	1.14*	0.18,2.10	1.11*	0.19,2.04	1.11*	0.19,2.03	0.67	-0.37,1.71	0.67	-0.37,1.70
Violent protests	-2.38	-5.67,0.91	-2.44	-5.74,0.86	-1.08	-4.13,1.98	-1.05	-4.09,1.99	-0.43	-4.00,3.15	-0.43	-4.00,3.14
Economic status	-1.66**	-2.66,-0.65	-1.66**	-2.67,-0.66	-0.77	-1.70,0.15	-0.78	-1.70,0.14	-0.27	-1.27,0.72	-0.27	-1.26,0.73
Conflict history	-0.60	-1.24,0.03	-0.61	-1.25,0.03	0.09	-0.51,0.69	0.09	-0.51,0.69	-0.51	-1.21,0.18	-0.52	-1.21,0.18
Population size	0.17	-0.79,1.14	0.18	-0.79,1.15	0.12	-0.81,1.05	0.13	-0.80,1.06	-0.04	-1.14,1.06	-0.04	-1.14,1.06
Constant	-3.39****	-4.64,-2.14	-3.38****	-4.64,-2.12	-3.35****	-4.56,-2.15	-3.38****	-4.58,-2.18	-0.65	-2.07,0.77	-0.64	-2.06,0.77
N	39181		39151		37926		37896		38030		37999	
AIC	10347.7		10357.1		18529.9		18519.6		36021.7		35988.8	
BIC	10519.2		10528.6		18700.7		18690.4		36192.7		36159.7	
chi2	186.5		173.6		176.4		178.9		140.8		140.1	

The table reports estimates from the fixed part of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

All models include random intercepts and randomly varying slopes for AOS3 (estimates from the random part of the models are not reported in the table).

Table S12. Analogous to Table 1 but controlling for suspicious and misleading interviewees

	<i>Participation in political violence</i>				<i>Willingness to participate in political violence</i>				<i>Support for political violence</i>			
	(59)		(60)		(61)		(62)		(63)		(64)	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
<i>Level 1</i>												
AOS3	1.27****	0.80,1.73	1.28****	0.81,1.75	0.85****	0.46,1.24	0.86****	0.47,1.25	0.44*	0.09,0.80	0.44*	0.08,0.80
Sex	-0.29****	-0.41,-0.17	-0.28****	-0.40,-0.17	-0.25****	-0.34,-0.17	-0.25****	-0.33,-0.17	-0.10***	-0.15,-0.05	-0.10***	-0.15,-0.05
Age	-0.23	-0.60,0.14	-0.24	-0.61,0.13	-0.88****	-1.15,-0.62	-0.89****	-1.15,-0.62	-0.59****	-0.76,-0.42	-0.59****	-0.76,-0.42
Education	-0.32*	-0.61,-0.03	-0.34*	-0.64,-0.05	-0.01	-0.22,0.20	-0.01	-0.22,0.19	0.15*	0.02,0.28	0.16*	0.03,0.29
Economic status	0.11	-0.09,0.31	0.11	-0.09,0.30	0.01	-0.13,0.16	0.02	-0.13,0.16	0.06	-0.03,0.15	0.06	-0.03,0.15
Discrimination	0.75****	0.57,0.92	0.75****	0.58,0.93	0.44****	0.31,0.57	0.44****	0.31,0.57	0.25****	0.16,0.34	0.25****	0.16,0.34
Voting	0.44***	0.20,0.69	0.45***	0.20,0.69	0.17	-0.01,0.36	0.17	-0.01,0.36	0.19**	0.06,0.32	0.19**	0.06,0.31
Identification	-0.12	-0.33,0.10	-0.11	-0.32,0.10	-0.11	-0.25,0.04	-0.11	-0.25,0.04	-0.04	-0.13,0.06	-0.04	-0.14,0.05
Suspicious	0.23*	0.00,0.45			0.14	-0.02,0.30			0.17**	0.07,0.28		
Misleading			-0.08	-0.35,0.19			0.09	-0.10,0.27			0.37****	0.25,0.49
<i>Level 2</i>												
Democracy	-0.18	-1.26,0.89	-0.23	-1.30,0.85	-0.57	-1.59,0.44	-0.58	-1.60,0.43	-1.29*	-2.49,-0.10	-1.27*	-2.47,-0.07
Country mean AOS	0.78	-2.82,4.39	0.82	-2.77,4.41	4.94**	1.53,8.35	4.97**	1.56,8.37	0.91	-3.11,4.93	0.96	-3.06,4.99
Instability	-1.26	-2.67,0.16	-1.26	-2.67,0.16	-0.97	-2.22,0.27	-0.98	-2.22,0.26	-0.18	-1.62,1.27	-0.20	-1.64,1.25
Violent crime	1.13*	0.17,2.09	1.14*	0.18,2.10	1.10*	0.18,2.03	1.10*	0.18,2.03	0.66	-0.38,1.70	0.65	-0.39,1.69
Violent protests	-2.42	-5.72,0.88	-2.50	-5.79,0.79	-1.07	-4.12,1.98	-1.07	-4.11,1.98	-0.41	-3.99,3.17	-0.32	-3.90,3.27
Economic status	-1.67**	-2.68,-0.66	-1.65**	-2.65,-0.65	-0.78	-1.71,0.14	-0.77	-1.70,0.15	-0.28	-1.28,0.71	-0.27	-1.27,0.72
Conflict history	-0.61	-1.25,0.03	-0.62	-1.25,0.02	0.09	-0.51,0.69	0.08	-0.52,0.68	-0.51	-1.21,0.19	-0.52	-1.22,0.18
Population size	0.18	-0.79,1.15	0.16	-0.81,1.12	0.13	-0.80,1.06	0.12	-0.81,1.05	-0.03	-1.13,1.08	-0.01	-1.12,1.09
Constant	-3.40****	-4.65,-2.14	-3.33****	-4.58,-2.08	-3.36****	-4.57,-2.16	-3.35****	-4.56,-2.15	-0.69	-2.11,0.73	-0.73	-2.16,0.69
N	39181		39166		37926		37911		38028		38014	
AIC	10361.0		10363.5		18518.8		18517.4		36010.4		35976.2	
BIC	10532.5		10535.0		18689.7		18688.2		36181.4		36147.1	
chi2	170.9		167.4		171.0		169.0		149.6		174.9	

The table reports estimates from the fixed part of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

All models include random intercepts and randomly varying slopes for AOS3 (estimates from the random part of the models are not reported in the table).

Table S13. Analogous to Table 1 but controlling for comprehension

	<i>Participation in political violence</i>		<i>Willingness to participate in political violence</i>		<i>Support for political violence</i>	
	(65)		(66)		(67)	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
<i>Level 1</i>						
AOS3	1.27****	0.81,1.74	0.87****	0.49,1.26	0.46*	0.10,0.82
Sex	-0.30****	-0.41,-0.18	-0.25****	-0.33,-0.16	-0.10***	-0.15,-0.04
Age	-0.23	-0.60,0.14	-0.89****	-1.16,-0.63	-0.60****	-0.77,-0.43
Education	-0.29	-0.59,0.00	-0.06	-0.26,0.15	0.13	-0.00,0.26
Economic status	0.10	-0.10,0.30	0.01	-0.13,0.15	0.06	-0.03,0.15
Discrimination	0.74****	0.57,0.92	0.44****	0.32,0.57	0.25****	0.17,0.34
Voting	0.44***	0.20,0.69	0.18	-0.01,0.36	0.19**	0.07,0.32
Identification	-0.12	-0.33,0.09	-0.11	-0.25,0.04	-0.03	-0.13,0.06
Comprehension	0.41*	0.10,0.72	-0.26*	-0.50,-0.01	-0.08	-0.24,0.08
<i>Level 2</i>						
Democracy	-0.19	-1.25,0.88	-0.60	-1.62,0.43	-1.32*	-2.52,-0.13
Country mean AOS	0.76	-2.80,4.32	4.97**	1.54,8.41	0.91	-3.10,4.93
Instability	-1.26	-2.66,0.14	-0.98	-2.23,0.28	-0.18	-1.62,1.26
Violent crime	1.14*	0.19,2.09	1.11*	0.18,2.04	0.67	-0.37,1.71
Violent protests	-2.32	-5.59,0.94	-1.15	-4.23,1.92	-0.46	-4.03,3.12
Economic status	-1.65**	-2.64,-0.65	-0.78	-1.71,0.15	-0.27	-1.27,0.72
Conflict history	-0.62	-1.26,0.01	0.09	-0.51,0.70	-0.51	-1.21,0.19
Population size	0.19	-0.77,1.14	0.11	-0.83,1.05	-0.04	-1.14,1.06
Constant	-3.41****	-4.66,-2.17	-3.30****	-4.52,-2.09	-0.63	-2.05,0.78
N	39165		37910		38015	
AIC	10356.3		18529.7		36012.7	
BIC	10527.8		18700.6		36183.6	
chi2	174.1		172.6		141.5	

The table reports estimates from the fixed part of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

All models include random intercepts and randomly varying slopes for AOS3 (estimates from the random part of the models are not reported in the table).

Table S14. Analogous to Table 1 but “pure” within-country effects (controlling for level-2 confounding)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Support</i>		<i>Participation</i>		<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Support</i>		<i>Participation</i>		<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Support</i>	
	(68)		(69)		(70)		(71)		(72)		(73)		(74)		(75)		(76)	
	Mundlak's specification		Mundlak's specification		Mundlak's specification		Cluster de-meaned		Cluster de-meaned		Cluster de-meaned		Fixed effects estimator		Fixed effects estimator		Fixed effects estimator	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	B	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS3	1.35****	1.12,1.57	0.74****	0.58,0.90	0.57****	0.46,0.68	1.35****	1.12,1.57	0.74****	0.58,0.90	0.57****	0.46,0.68	1.34****	1.12,1.57	0.74****	0.58,0.90	0.57****	0.46,0.68
Sex	-0.33****	-0.43,-0.22	-0.30****	-0.37,-0.22	-0.12****	-0.17,-0.07	-0.33****	-0.43,-0.22	-0.30****	-0.37,-0.22	-0.12****	-0.17,-0.07	-0.32****	-0.43,-0.22	-0.30****	-0.37,-0.22	-0.12****	-0.17,-0.07
Age	-0.26	-0.60,0.08	-1.05****	-1.29,-0.81	-0.65****	-0.81,-0.50	-0.26	-0.60,0.08	-1.05****	-1.29,-0.81	-0.65****	-0.81,-0.50	-0.26	-0.60,0.08	-1.05****	-1.29,-0.81	-0.65****	-0.81,-0.50
Education	-0.12	-0.38,0.14	-0.01	-0.19,0.16	0.21***	0.10,0.33	-0.12	-0.38,0.14	-0.01	-0.19,0.17	0.21***	0.10,0.33	-0.12	-0.38,0.14	-0.01	-0.19,0.17	0.21***	0.10,0.33
N	49170		47713		47394		49170		47713		47394		49170		47713		47394	
AIC	12403.5		23152.4		43956.7		12400.9		23165.4		43965.4		12090.5		22803.3		43854.3	
BIC	12491.5		23240.2		44044.4		12453.7		23218.0		44018.0		12125.7		22838.3		44187.4	
chi2	177.9		230.4		232.3		172.2		204.9		211.4		163.6		206.1		2231.8	

The table reports estimates from the fixed part of the models (regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Models 68–70 contain country-level means of predictors as controls (not reported).

Models 68–73 include random intercepts (not reported).

Table S15. Summary statistics for the variables added in robustness tests (Study 1)

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Employment	51378	.331893	0	.4708974	0	1
Inequality	49953	.4698166	.5	.2461996	0	1
Heard by MPs	47698	.1997079	0	.270258	0	1
Heard by councilors	45535	.2523407	.3333333	.2975299	0	1
PVparticipation (0-4)	50641	.1460477	0	.5242506	0	4
PVparticipation (0-3)	50641	.0494066	0	.3134802	0	3
PVsupport (0-3)	48628	.7679115	1	.9263793	0	3
AOS7	51484	.3720308	.3809524	.1696827	0	1
Support PM	48123	.6657316	1	.471739	0	1
Support MPs	45694	.5249048	1	.4993848	0	1
Support LR	43337	.5480767	1	.497689	0	1
PDparticipation binary	50584	.0896924	0	.2857434	0	1
PDwillingness	46047	.2200143	0	.4142605	0	1
Political intimidation	50516	.6856046	1	.3820714	0	1
Non-anonymous voting	48229	.2048284	0	.3161619	0	1
Restricted political expression	50117	.6103385	.6666667	.3542155	0	1
Checked answering	51558	.0439699	0	.2050301	0	1
Influenced answering	51520	.0333851	0	.1796417	0	1
Suspicious interviewees	51555	.1414218	0	.2706317	0	1
Misleading interviewees	51540	.1107101	0	.2285348	0	1
Comprehension	51536	.1086134	0	.1967173	0	1

Figure S4. Histograms of PVparticipation, PVwillingness, and RIS (Study 2)

Figure S5. Histograms of AOS, SDO, RWA, and DSRS (Study 2)

Figure S6. Histograms of sex, age, subjective social class, and education (Study 2)

Table S16. Summary statistics for the main variables (0–1 normalized) (Study 2)

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
PVparticipation (binary)	2069	.0314161	0	.1744818	0	1
PVwillingness	2004	.0618762	0	.2409908	0	1
RIS	2060	.2179005	.125	.2582154	0	1
AOS3	2044	.1772668	.0833333	.2242355	0	1
SDO	1939	.4004577	.4237443	.2144055	0	1
SDO (Dominance)	1938	.3430064	.3409091	.2004704	0	1
SDO (Egalitarianism)	1939	.3363819	.3333333	.2041978	0	1
RWA	1893	.6461198	.6481481	.1505865	0	1
DSRS (between-group competition)	1873	.2976063	.25	.2118667	0	1
DSRS (status/power)	1873	.1374355	0	.2112206	0	1
Sex	2127	.535496	1	.4988557	0	1
Age	2132	.3455236	.296875	.2385191	0	1
SES (subj. social class; Operario et al. 2004)	1843	.4831495	.4444444	.2153037	0	1
Education	2097	.7044985	.6666667	.1651916	0	1

Table S17. Bivariate correlation matrix for the main variables (Study 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
(1) PVparticipation (binary)	1.000												
(2) RIS	0.341	1.000											
(3) AOS3	0.232	0.305	1.000										
(4) SDO	0.123	0.190	0.356	1.000									
(5) SDO (Dominance)	0.120	0.200	0.354	0.899	1.000								
(6) SDO (Egalitarianism)	0.101	0.141	0.281	0.897	0.615	1.000							
(7) RWA	-0.126	-0.294	-0.044	-0.006	0.018	-0.025	1.000						
(8) DSRS (group competition)	0.286	0.408	0.311	0.247	0.254	0.191	-0.245	1.000					
(9) DSRS (status/power)	0.342	0.412	0.423	0.349	0.323	0.309	-0.284	0.596	1.000				
(10) Sex	-0.050	-0.138	0.117	0.008	0.018	-0.004	0.122	-0.141	-0.120	1.000			
(11) Age	-0.097	-0.200	-0.326	-0.080	-0.135	-0.004	0.190	-0.203	-0.244	-0.064	1.000		
(12) SES (subj. social class)	0.075	0.090	0.044	0.084	0.070	0.077	-0.147	0.090	0.130	-0.056	0.054	1.000	
(13) Education	0.068	0.087	-0.143	-0.087	-0.080	-0.074	-0.178	0.035	0.069	-0.096	-0.023	0.257	1.000

Table S18. Autocratic orientation and political violence: Replicating the main results of Study 1

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(77)		(78)		(79)		(80)		(81)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS3	4.28****	3.24,5.32	0.67****	0.55,0.78	3.14****	2.46,3.81	1.94****	1.09,2.79	0.36****	0.31,0.42
Sex	-0.81**	-1.38,-0.23	-0.10****	-0.15,-0.05	-0.81****	-1.16,-0.47	-0.74***	-1.15,-0.33	-0.08****	-0.10,-0.05
Age	-1.08	-2.65,0.50	-0.08	-0.18,0.03	-1.04*	-1.87,-0.20	-1.06*	-2.03,-0.10	-0.12****	-0.17,-0.07
SES	0.59	-0.64,1.83	0.11	-0.00,0.23	0.81*	0.03,1.58	0.83	-0.10,1.76	0.06*	0.00,0.11
Education	2.94**	1.19,4.69	0.30****	0.15,0.45	1.80***	0.75,2.85	0.91	-0.35,2.16	0.16****	0.09,0.23
Constant	-6.48****	-8.06,-4.91	-0.16*	-0.29,-0.04			-3.51****	-4.58,-2.44	0.10**	0.04,0.16
N	1792		1792		1792		1733		1810	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S19. Analogous to Table S18 but with AOS7

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(82)		(83)		(84)		(85)		(86)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS (7 item)	4.01****	2.64,5.39	0.40****	0.28,0.53	2.23****	1.38,3.08	0.98	-0.06,2.02	0.16****	0.10,0.23
Sex	-0.73**	-1.29,-0.18	-0.09***	-0.14,-0.04	-0.73****	-1.07,-0.39	-0.69***	-1.09,-0.28	-0.07****	-0.09,-0.05
Age	-1.99**	-3.47,-0.50	-0.19***	-0.29,-0.08	-1.65****	-2.45,-0.85	-1.48**	-2.42,-0.55	-0.19****	-0.24,-0.14
SES	1.27*	0.06,2.49	0.17**	0.05,0.28	1.20**	0.43,1.96	1.03*	0.10,1.96	0.09**	0.03,0.14
Education	2.20*	0.51,3.90	0.21**	0.05,0.36	1.16*	0.15,2.18	0.49	-0.74,1.71	0.10**	0.03,0.17
Constant	-6.39****	-7.99,-4.79	-0.10	-0.23,0.04			-3.12****	-4.22,-2.02	0.16****	0.09,0.22
N	1790		1790		1790		1732		1809	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S20. Analogous to Table S18 but with SDO

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(87)		(88)		(89)		(90)		(91)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
SDO	3.16****	1.74,4.58	0.34****	0.23,0.46	2.33****	1.52,3.15	1.80***	0.84,2.76	0.21****	0.16,0.26
Sex	-0.52	-1.06,0.02	-0.07**	-0.12,-0.03	-0.61***	-0.94,-0.28	-0.63**	-1.03,-0.22	-0.06****	-0.09,-0.04
Age	-2.88****	-4.33,-1.43	-0.26****	-0.36,-0.16	-2.09****	-2.88,-1.31	-1.63***	-2.54,-0.72	-0.21****	-0.26,-0.16
SES	1.14	-0.11,2.38	0.15*	0.03,0.27	1.01*	0.24,1.79	0.86	-0.08,1.80	0.07*	0.02,0.13
Education	2.17*	0.52,3.82	0.20**	0.05,0.36	1.18*	0.17,2.18	0.55	-0.66,1.76	0.11**	0.04,0.18
Constant	-6.01****	-7.60,-4.43	-0.08	-0.21,0.06			-3.51****	-4.60,-2.42	0.13****	0.07,0.20
N	1795		1795		1795		1736		1815	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S21. Analogous to Table S18 but with both AOS3 and SDO

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(87) Logit		(88) OLS		(89) Ologit		(90) Logit		(91) OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS3	3.95****	2.82,5.08	0.62****	0.50,0.74	2.77****	2.04,3.49	1.56***	0.65,2.47	0.33****	0.27,0.38
SDO	1.14	-0.45,2.74	0.14*	0.02,0.26	1.21**	0.32,2.10	1.23*	0.20,2.26	0.10***	0.04,0.16
Sex	-0.77**	-1.35,-0.19	-0.10****	-0.14,-0.05	-0.79****	-1.13,-0.44	-0.71***	-1.13,-0.30	-0.08****	-0.10,-0.05
Age	-1.09	-2.67,0.48	-0.08	-0.19,0.02	-1.08*	-1.92,-0.24	-1.11*	-2.08,-0.14	-0.12****	-0.17,-0.07
SES	0.47	-0.77,1.71	0.10	-0.01,0.21	0.69	-0.09,1.47	0.72	-0.21,1.66	0.05	-0.01,0.10
Education	2.93**	1.19,4.68	0.31****	0.16,0.47	1.82***	0.77,2.87	0.94	-0.30,2.19	0.16****	0.09,0.23
Constant	-6.85****	-8.52,-5.18	-0.21**	-0.34,-0.08			-3.92****	-5.05,-2.79	0.07*	0.01,0.13
N	1787		1787		1787		1728		1806	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S22. A decomposition of the effects of SDO on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(97)	(98)	(99)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (SDO only)	2.925**** (0.742)	1.793*** (0.489)	0.208**** (0.026)
Full model (SDO and AOS3)	1.692* (0.788)	1.335** (0.517)	0.103*** (0.027)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	1.233**** (0.212)	0.459** (0.141)	0.105**** (0.013)
N	1898	1834	1917

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S23. A decomposition of the effects of SDO (Dominance) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(100)	(101)	(102)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (SDO (Dom.) only)	2.901*** (0.766)	1.712*** (0.517)	0.225**** (0.028)
Full model (SDO (Dom.) and AOS3)	1.614* (0.804)	1.217* (0.543)	0.120**** (0.029)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	1.286**** (0.217)	0.494*** (0.145)	0.106**** (0.013)
N	1898	1834	1917

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S24. A decomposition of the effects of SDO (Egalitarianism) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(103)	(104)	(105)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (SDO (Ega.) only)	2.534*** (0.731)	1.634** (0.498)	0.175**** (0.027)
Full model (SDO (Ega.) and AOS3)	1.402 (0.764)	1.207* (0.517)	0.077** (0.028)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	1.131**** (0.196)	0.427*** (0.124)	0.098**** (0.013)
N	1898	1834	1917

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S25. A decomposition of the effects of autocratic orientation on political violence using SDO as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(106)	(107)	(108)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (AOS3 only)	4.159 ^{****} (0.502)	1.961 ^{****} (0.417)	0.340 ^{****} (0.026)
Full model (AOS3 and SDO)	3.563 ^{****} (0.530)	1.506 ^{***} (0.440)	0.304 ^{****} (0.028)
Difference (indirect effect via SDO)	0.596 [*] (0.283)	0.454 [*] (0.181)	0.037 ^{***} (0.010)
N	1898	1834	1917

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S26. Analogous to Table S18 but with DSRS (group competition)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(109)		(110)		(111)		(112)		(113)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
DSRS (group competition)	5.78****	4.48,7.08	0.72****	0.60,0.83	3.73****	2.95,4.50	2.07****	1.17,2.97	0.45****	0.40,0.51
Sex	-0.25	-0.83,0.33	-0.03	-0.08,0.02	-0.41*	-0.76,-0.07	-0.51*	-0.91,-0.10	-0.04**	-0.06,-0.01
Age	-1.48	-3.04,0.08	-0.15**	-0.25,-0.05	-1.41***	-2.22,-0.60	-1.32**	-2.25,-0.39	-0.14****	-0.19,-0.10
SES	0.01	-1.32,1.34	0.12*	0.01,0.24	0.73	-0.07,1.53	0.85	-0.10,1.79	0.06*	0.01,0.11
Education	1.95*	0.16,3.74	0.16*	0.01,0.30	0.92	-0.13,1.96	0.33	-0.89,1.56	0.08*	0.01,0.15
Constant	-6.85****	-8.45,-5.25	-0.17**	-0.29,-0.04			-3.41****	-4.45,-2.37	0.07*	0.01,0.13
N	1797		1797		1797		1738		1815	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S27. Analogous to Table S18 but with both AOS3 and DSRS (group competition)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>		<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>			
	(114)		(115)		(116)		(117)		(118)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS3	2.69****	1.54,3.83	0.51****	0.40,0.63	2.29****	1.57,3.01	1.49**	0.60,2.39	0.26****	0.20,0.31
DSRS (group competition)	4.47****	3.06,5.87	0.58****	0.46,0.70	2.92****	2.12,3.73	1.65***	0.70,2.59	0.38****	0.33,0.43
Sex	-0.53	-1.14,0.08	-0.06*	-0.11,-0.01	-0.61***	-0.97,-0.26	-0.62**	-1.04,-0.20	-0.05****	-0.07,-0.03
Age	-0.50	-2.14,1.15	-0.02	-0.12,0.09	-0.70	-1.55,0.15	-0.88	-1.85,0.09	-0.08**	-0.13,-0.03
SES	-0.44	-1.79,0.91	0.08	-0.03,0.19	0.43	-0.38,1.23	0.68	-0.26,1.63	0.04	-0.02,0.09
Education	2.56**	0.68,4.44	0.27***	0.12,0.42	1.50**	0.42,2.59	0.76	-0.51,2.02	0.14****	0.07,0.20
Constant	-7.40****	-9.08,-5.72	-0.31****	-0.43,-0.18			-3.89****	-4.98,-2.79	0.01	-0.05,0.06
N	1787		1787		1787		1728		1805	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S28. Analogous to Table S18 but with DSRS (status/power)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(119)		(120)		(121)		(122)		(123)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
DSRS (status/power)	4.41****	3.45,5.37	0.86****	0.75,0.97	3.20****	2.57,3.83	1.82****	1.02,2.61	0.45****	0.40,0.50
Sex	-0.30	-0.88,0.28	-0.03	-0.07,0.02	-0.41*	-0.76,-0.07	-0.50*	-0.91,-0.10	-0.04***	-0.06,-0.02
Age	-1.27	-2.89,0.36	-0.09	-0.19,0.01	-1.20**	-2.04,-0.37	-1.23*	-2.18,-0.28	-0.12****	-0.17,-0.08
SES	-0.02	-1.33,1.28	0.07	-0.04,0.18	0.54	-0.25,1.34	0.74	-0.20,1.69	0.04	-0.02,0.09
Education	1.42	-0.38,3.22	0.13	-0.01,0.28	0.77	-0.28,1.82	0.27	-0.96,1.49	0.07*	0.01,0.14
Constant	-5.19****	-6.71,-3.67	-0.05	-0.17,0.06			-2.95****	-3.96,-1.95	0.15****	0.10,0.21
N	1798		1798		1798		1739		1815	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S29. Analogous to Table S18 but with both AOS3 and DSRs (status/power)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(124)		(125)		(126)		(127)		(128)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS3	2.48****	1.27,3.69	0.41****	0.29,0.53	2.06****	1.31,2.82	1.42**	0.49,2.35	0.22****	0.16,0.28
DSRS (status/power)	3.26****	2.15,4.37	0.70****	0.57,0.82	2.36****	1.65,3.06	1.28**	0.40,2.16	0.36****	0.30,0.42
Sex	-0.52	-1.12,0.09	-0.05*	-0.10,-0.01	-0.59**	-0.94,-0.23	-0.62**	-1.04,-0.20	-0.05****	-0.07,-0.03
Age	-0.57	-2.23,1.09	-0.00	-0.10,0.10	-0.69	-1.55,0.17	-0.89	-1.87,0.09	-0.08**	-0.13,-0.03
SES	-0.28	-1.60,1.04	0.05	-0.07,0.16	0.36	-0.44,1.16	0.64	-0.31,1.58	0.02	-0.03,0.07
Education	1.93*	0.08,3.78	0.23**	0.08,0.38	1.34*	0.25,2.42	0.69	-0.58,1.96	0.12***	0.05,0.19
Constant	-5.90****	-7.50,-4.31	-0.18**	-0.30,-0.05			-3.47****	-4.54,-2.40	0.09**	0.03,0.15
N	1788		1788		1788		1729		1805	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S30. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (group competition) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(129) Logit	(130) Logit	(131) OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (group competition) only)	4.404 ^{****} (0.933)	0.669 (0.604)	0.271 ^{****} (0.032)
Full model (DSRS (group competition) and AOS3)	3.974 ^{****} (0.951)	0.444 (0.616)	0.227 ^{****} (0.032)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	0.430 [*] (0.180)	0.225 (0.115)	0.044 ^{**} (0.014)
N	1826	1766	1846

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S31. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (status/power) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(132) Logit	(133) Logit	(134) OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (status/power) only)	3.301**** (0.786)	0.234 (0.587)	0.243**** (0.035)
Full model (DSRS (status/power) and AOS3)	2.481** (0.804)	-0.235 (0.613)	0.165**** (0.037)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	0.820** (0.269)	0.470* (0.184)	0.078**** (0.017)
N	1827	1767	1847

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S32. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (leadership) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(135)	(136)	(137)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (leadership) only)	2.186*	1.315*	0.153****
	(0.920)	(0.564)	(0.029)
Full model (DSRS (leadership) and AOS3)	2.228*	1.363*	0.157****
	(0.921)	(0.565)	(0.029)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	-0.042	-0.048	-0.004
	(0.135)	(0.090)	(0.013)
N	1827	1767	1847

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S33. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (environmental exploration) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(138)	(139)	(140)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (environmental exploration) only)	0.157 (0.795)	0.390 (0.469)	0.033 (0.024)
Full model (DSRS (environmental exploration) and AOS3)	0.063 (0.798)	0.334 (0.470)	0.024 (0.024)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	0.094 (0.138)	0.056 (0.090)	0.009 (0.013)
N	1827	1767	1847

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S34. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (food selection) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(141)	(142)	(143)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (food selection) only)	-1.013 (0.872)	0.139 (0.562)	0.039 (0.029)
Full model (DSRS (food selection) and AOS3)	-1.009 (0.872)	0.158 (0.562)	0.040 (0.029)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	-0.004 (0.135)	-0.019 (0.088)	-0.001 (0.013)
N	1827	1767	1847

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S35. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (kinship) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(144)	(145)	(146)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (kinship) only)	-1.666*	-0.565	-0.029
	(0.723)	(0.535)	(0.028)
Full model (DSRS (kinship) and AOS3)	-1.518*	-0.452	-0.014
	(0.728)	(0.538)	(0.028)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	-0.147	-0.112	-0.015
	(0.141)	(0.096)	(0.013)
N	1827	1767	1847

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S36. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (mate attraction) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(147)	(148)	(149)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (mate attraction) only)	0.935 (0.785)	1.155* (0.495)	0.153**** (0.028)
Full model (DSRS (mate attraction) and AOS3)	0.968 (0.785)	1.186* (0.495)	0.156**** (0.028)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	-0.033 (0.135)	-0.031 (0.089)	-0.003 (0.013)
N	1827	1767	1847

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S37. Analogous to Table S18 but with RWA instead of AOS3 (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(150)		(151)		(152)		(153)		(154)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
RWA	-3.48****	-5.21,-1.74	-0.37****	-0.54,-0.20	-2.28****	-3.38,-1.17	-1.41*	-2.74,-0.07	-0.43****	-0.51,-0.35
Sex	-0.48	-1.02,0.06	-0.06*	-0.11,-0.01	-0.55**	-0.88,-0.22	-0.59**	-0.99,-0.18	-0.05****	-0.07,-0.03
Age	-2.56***	-3.98,-1.14	-0.24****	-0.35,-0.14	-1.91****	-2.69,-1.12	-1.55***	-2.46,-0.63	-0.18****	-0.23,-0.13
SES	1.36*	0.10,2.62	0.16**	0.04,0.28	1.17**	0.40,1.95	0.99*	0.05,1.93	0.06*	0.01,0.12
Education	1.36	-0.33,3.05	0.11	-0.05,0.26	0.60	-0.42,1.61	0.13	-1.10,1.37	0.03	-0.04,0.10
Constant	-2.10*	-3.91,-0.29	0.35****	0.17,0.52			-1.66*	-3.01,-0.31	0.54****	0.46,0.62
N	1795		1795		1795		1736		1815	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Figure S7. Histograms of PVwillingness, AOSD, SDO, and Conservatism (RWA) (Study 3)

Figure S8. Histograms of sex, age, subjective social class, employment, and education (Study 3)

Figure S9. Histograms of marital status, foreign parents, and identification with Danish society (Study 3)

Table S38. Summary statistics for the main variables (0–1 normalized) (Study 3)

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
PVwillingness (defending democracy)	1012	.4215662	.5	.3013557	0	1
AOS for democracies (AOSD)	1012	.3545004	.368421	.1739012	0	1
SDO	1012	.4190775	.4468085	.1773776	0	1
Conservatism (RWA)	1012	.4573901	.4848485	.1852529	0	1
Sex	1012	.4950593	0	.5002228	0	1
Age	1012	.5235919	.5357143	.280558	0	1
SES (subj. social class; Operario et al. 2004)	1012	.554787	.5555556	.2077656	0	1
Employed in public sector	1012	.1837945	0	.387508	0	1
Unemployed	1012	.4081028	0	.4917254	0	1
Education	1012	.3120883	.1666667	.2803486	0	1
Single	1012	.1996047	0	.3999009	0	1
Divorced	1012	.0444664	0	.2062309	0	1
Foreign parents	1012	.0800395	0	.2714885	0	1
Danish Identity	1012	.7975543	.8333333	.2081098	0	1

Table S39. Bivariate correlation matrix (Study 3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
(1) PVwillingness	1.000													
(2) AOSD	0.010	1.000												
(3) SDO	0.023	0.473	1.000											
(4) Conservatism (RWA)	-0.014	0.537	0.480	1.000										
(5) Sex	-0.375	0.045	-0.054	-0.050	1.000									
(6) Age	0.108	-0.050	-0.052	-0.083	-0.023	1.000								
(7) SES (subj. social class)	-0.064	-0.036	0.214	0.089	0.020	0.050	1.000							
(8) Public sector	-0.022	-0.043	-0.032	-0.035	0.107	-0.062	0.106	1.000						
(9) Unemployed	-0.089	-0.004	-0.101	-0.065	0.111	0.161	-0.228	-0.394	1.000					
(10) Education	0.002	-0.249	-0.031	-0.139	0.006	0.007	0.303	0.218	-0.198	1.000				
(11) Single	-0.061	-0.034	-0.046	-0.061	0.005	-0.239	-0.171	-0.039	0.083	-0.037	1.000			
(12) Divorced	0.039	-0.024	-0.004	0.005	0.017	0.102	-0.084	-0.003	-0.013	-0.012	-0.108	1.000		
(13) Foreign parents	0.004	0.052	0.048	0.004	-0.015	-0.120	0.007	0.057	-0.030	0.077	0.044	0.007	1.000	
(14) Danish identity	0.075	-0.017	0.054	0.073	0.068	0.279	0.028	-0.010	0.009	-0.037	-0.102	0.040	-0.160	1.000

Table S40. List experiment: Estimated proportions of support for political violence by tertiles for autocratic orientation scale (AOSD) (Study 3)

<i>List</i>	<i>Condition</i>	<i>Autocratic Orientation Scale (AOSD)</i>		
		<i>Democratic</i> <i>n = 329</i>	<i>Moderate</i> <i>n = 327</i>	<i>Autocratic</i> <i>n = 356</i>
<i>A</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	2.16	2.11	2.01
		(0.81)	(0.84)	(0.82)
		n = 165	n = 169	n = 173
	<i>Treatment</i>	2.17	2.30	2.09
		(0.80)	(0.89)	(0.99)
	<i>Estimated proportion supporting political violence (Treatment – Baseline)</i>	n = 164	n = 158	n = 183
		0.01	0.19	0.08
<i>B</i>	<i>Baseline</i>	1.96	2.03	1.90
		(0.93)	(0.83)	(0.97)
		n = 164	n = 158	n = 183
	<i>Treatment</i>	1.97	2.05	2.15
		(0.95)	(0.98)	(1.06)
	<i>Estimated proportion supporting political violence (Treatment – Baseline)</i>	n = 165	n = 169	n = 173
		0.01	0.02	0.25
<i>Overall</i>	<i>Average estimated proportion supporting political violence</i>	0.01	0.11	0.17
		(0.53)	(0.59)	(0.62)

The table reports means with standard deviations in parentheses.

Table S41. Alternative list experiment procedure: Autocratic orientation (AOSD) and support for political violence (Study 3)

	<i>Support for political violence</i>			
	OLS (constrained)		OLS (full)	
	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOSD	0.05*	0.01,0.09	0.05*	0.01,0.10
listA_Treatment	0.04****	0.02,0.05	0.03****	0.02,0.05
Sex			-0.02*	-0.03,-0.00
Age			-0.01	-0.03,0.02
SES			-0.00	-0.04,0.03
Public sector			-0.00	-0.02,0.02
Unemployed			0.00	-0.02,0.02
Education			0.00	-0.03,0.03
Single			0.01	-0.01,0.03
Divorced			0.06**	0.02,0.09
Widow			-0.02	-0.07,0.03
Foreign parents			-0.01	-0.04,0.01
Danish Identity			-0.02	-0.06,0.01
Constant	0.41****	0.39,0.43	0.43****	0.39,0.48
N	1012		1012	
R^2	0.026		0.046	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S42. Autocratic orientation and willingness to participate in political violence in Denmark (Study 3)

<i>Willingness to participate in political violence in defense of democracy</i>								
	(155)		(156)		(157)		(158)	
	OLS		OLS		OLS		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOSD	0.02	-0.09,0.12	0.17**	0.06,0.28	-0.05	-0.33,0.23	0.20***	0.10,0.31
Comprehension			0.29****	0.22,0.37	0.18*	0.02,0.33	0.30****	0.23,0.38
AOSD#Comprehension					0.33	-0.06,0.72		
Sex							-0.22****	-0.25,-0.19
Age							0.11***	0.05,0.18
Subj. social class							-0.15***	-0.23,-0.06
Public sector							-0.01	-0.06,0.04
Unemployed							-0.05**	-0.09,-0.01
Education							-0.00	-0.07,0.06
Single							-0.03	-0.07,0.02
Divorced							0.03	-0.05,0.11
Widow							-0.02	-0.14,0.09
Foreign parents							0.03	-0.03,0.09
Danish Identity							0.04	-0.05,0.12
Constant	0.42****	0.37,0.46	0.17****	0.10,0.25	0.26****	0.13,0.38	0.28****	0.18,0.39
N	1012		1012		1012		1012	
R ²	0.000		0.053		0.056		0.224	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S43. Analogous to Table S42 but with both AOSD and SDO (Study 3)

<i>Willingness to participate in political violence in defense of democracy</i>						
	(159)		(160)		(161)	
	OLS		OLS		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOSD						
SDO	0.10*	0.00,0.20	0.02	-0.08,0.12	0.19**	0.07,0.31
Comprehension	0.27****	0.20,0.34			0.30****	0.23,0.38
Sex	-0.21****	-0.25,-0.18	-0.22****	-0.26,-0.19	-0.22****	-0.25,-0.19
Age	0.11***	0.05,0.18	0.10**	0.03,0.17	0.12***	0.05,0.18
SES	-0.16***	-0.25,-0.07	-0.14**	-0.23,-0.04	-0.15***	-0.24,-0.06
Public sector	-0.01	-0.06,0.04	-0.00	-0.05,0.05	-0.01	-0.06,0.04
Unemployed	-0.05**	-0.09,-0.01	-0.05*	-0.09,-0.01	-0.05**	-0.09,-0.01
Education	-0.02	-0.09,0.04	0.02	-0.05,0.09	-0.00	-0.07,0.06
Single	-0.03	-0.07,0.01	-0.03	-0.07,0.02	-0.03	-0.07,0.02
Divorced	0.03	-0.06,0.11	0.03	-0.06,0.11	0.03	-0.05,0.11
Widow	-0.03	-0.14,0.08	-0.05	-0.16,0.07	-0.02	-0.14,0.09
Foreign parents	0.03	-0.03,0.10	0.02	-0.04,0.09	0.03	-0.03,0.09
Danish Identity	0.03	-0.05,0.12	0.11*	0.03,0.20	0.03	-0.05,0.12
Constant	0.34****	0.24,0.44	0.47****	0.38,0.57	0.28****	0.17,0.39
N	1012		1012		1012	
R ²	0.216		0.170		0.224	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S44. A decomposition of the effects of SDO on political violence using autocratic orientation (AOSD) as a confounder/mediator (Study 3)

<i>Willingness to participate in political violence in defense of democracy</i>	
	(162) OLS
Reduced model (SDO only)	0.083 (0.049)
Full model (SDO and AOSD)	-0.007 (0.054)
Difference (indirect effect via AOSD)	0.090*** (0.026)
N	1012

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S45. A decomposition of the effects of SDO (Dominance) on political violence using autocratic orientation (AOSD) as a confounder/mediator (Study 3)

<i>Willingness to participate in political violence in defense of democracy</i>	
	(163)
	OLS
Reduced model (SDO (Dom.) only)	0.045 (0.046)
Full model (SDO (Dom.) and AOSD)	-0.034 (0.050)
Difference (indirect effect via AOSD)	0.079*** (0.021)
N	1012

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S46. A decomposition of the effects of SDO (Egalitarianism) on political violence using autocratic orientation (AOSD) as a confounder/mediator (Study 3)

<i>Willingness to participate in political violence in defense of democracy</i>	
	(164)
	OLS
Reduced model (SDO (Ega.) only)	0.100* (0.046)
Full model (SDO (Ega.) and AOSD)	0.023 (0.051)
Difference (indirect effect via AOSD)	0.077*** (0.023)
N	1012

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Figure S10. Histograms of PVparticipation, PVwillingness, and RIS (Study 4)

Figure S11. Histograms of AOS, SDO, RWA, and DSRS (Study 4)

Figure S12. Histograms of sex, age, subjective social class, and education (Study 4)

Table S47. Summary statistics for the main variables (0–1 normalized) (Study 4)

	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
PVparticipation (binary)	1459	.0760795	0	.2652162	0	1
PVwillingness	1348	.0704748	0	.2560405	0	1
RIS	1475	.2651977	.2083333	.2737047	0	1
AOS3	1471	.1780252	0	.256233	0	1
SDO	1486	.3238622	.3541667	.197847	0	1
SDO (Dominance)	1485	.29582	.3125	.2005077	0	1
SDO (Egalitarianism)	1485	.3506397	.375	.2346924	0	1
RWA	1486	.4823429	.5	.2191415	0	1
DSRS (between-group competition)	1481	.3293383	.3333333	.2341653	0	1
DSRS (status/power)	1486	.1761721	.0833333	.2481781	0	1
Sex	1539	.5191683	1	.4997948	0	1
Age	1539	.4475309	.4166667	.2859792	0	1
SES (subj. social class; Operario et al. 2004)	1411	.4993307	.5555556	.2278003	0	1
Education	1539	.4573099	.4	.298354	0	1

Table S48. Bivariate correlation matrix for the main variables (Study 4)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
(1) PVparticipation (binary)	1.000												
(2) RIS	0.464	1.000											
(3) AOS3	0.538	0.410	1.000										
(4) SDO	0.247	0.027	0.390	1.000									
(5) SDO (Dominance)	0.304	0.113	0.501	0.885	1.000								
(6) SDO (Egalitarianism)	0.155	-0.050	0.227	0.921	0.635	1.000							
(7) RWA	0.005	-0.311	0.216	0.545	0.473	0.511	1.000						
(8) DSRS (group competition)	0.415	0.435	0.468	0.324	0.332	0.256	0.027	1.000					
(9) DSRS (status/power)	0.575	0.505	0.647	0.440	0.498	0.313	0.074	0.637	1.000				
(10) Sex	-0.059	-0.130	0.027	-0.104	-0.068	-0.113	0.045	-0.133	-0.094	1.000			
(11) Age	-0.282	-0.365	-0.317	-0.037	-0.137	0.059	0.261	-0.230	-0.370	-0.013	1.000		
(12) SES (subj. social class)	0.113	0.045	0.126	0.148	0.123	0.140	0.064	0.147	0.143	-0.118	0.059	1.000	
(13) Education	-0.009	0.029	-0.157	-0.142	-0.165	-0.094	-0.210	-0.001	-0.090	-0.019	-0.001	0.264	1.000

Table S49. Autocratic orientation and political violence: Replicating the main results of Study 2

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(165)		(166)		(167)		(168)		(169)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS3	6.29****	5.22,7.36	1.74****	1.58,1.89	4.61****	3.96,5.26	1.99****	1.09,2.90	0.37****	0.32,0.43
Sex	-0.70*	-1.26,-0.14	-0.15****	-0.22,-0.07	-0.95****	-1.32,-0.58	-0.97****	-1.46,-0.49	-0.07****	-0.10,-0.05
Age	-5.13****	-6.69,-3.56	-0.50****	-0.63,-0.36	-3.80****	-4.63,-2.97	-3.06****	-3.99,-2.12	-0.25****	-0.30,-0.21
SES	-0.43	-1.65,0.79	0.17	-0.00,0.34	-0.26	-1.06,0.54	-0.25	-1.30,0.80	-0.03	-0.08,0.03
Education	0.35	-0.58,1.29	0.12	-0.01,0.25	0.61	-0.01,1.23	0.11	-0.72,0.93	0.06**	0.02,0.11
Constant	-2.90****	-3.81,-2.00	0.17**	0.04,0.30			-1.27***	-1.97,-0.57	0.34****	0.30,0.38
N	1341		1341		1341		1234		1366	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S50. Analogous to Table S49 but with AOS7

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(170)		(171)		(172)		(173)		(174)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS7	8.63****	6.93,10.33	1.76****	1.52,2.00	5.67****	4.60,6.73	2.01**	0.66,3.36	0.24****	0.16,0.32
Sex	-0.43	-0.94,0.08	-0.12**	-0.20,-0.04	-0.74****	-1.10,-0.38	-0.88***	-1.36,-0.40	-0.07****	-0.10,-0.04
Age	-4.82****	-6.26,-3.39	-0.66****	-0.80,-0.51	-3.72****	-4.52,-2.92	-3.05****	-3.99,-2.11	-0.31****	-0.36,-0.26
SES	0.57	-0.54,1.68	0.32***	0.14,0.51	0.44	-0.35,1.23	0.05	-1.00,1.10	0.02	-0.04,0.09
Education	0.61	-0.25,1.47	0.00	-0.14,0.14	0.32	-0.29,0.93	-0.10	-0.92,0.72	0.03	-0.02,0.07
Constant	-4.60****	-5.63,-3.57	0.06	-0.09,0.22			-1.53***	-2.32,-0.74	0.36****	0.31,0.41
N	1321		1321		1321		1216		1348	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S51. Analogous to Table S49 but with SDO

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(175)		(176)		(177)		(178)		(179)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
SDO	6.24****	4.70,7.77	0.98****	0.77,1.19	4.11****	3.17,5.05	2.15***	0.99,3.31	-0.02	-0.08,0.05
Sex	-0.22	-0.70,0.25	-0.08*	-0.17,-0.00	-0.59***	-0.94,-0.24	-0.83***	-1.31,-0.35	-0.07****	-0.10,-0.04
Age	-5.85****	-7.11,-4.59	-0.97****	-1.11,-0.82	-4.73****	-5.51,-3.95	-3.47****	-4.40,-2.53	-0.35****	-0.40,-0.31
SES	1.20*	0.14,2.26	0.39****	0.20,0.58	0.66	-0.13,1.44	-0.12	-1.19,0.94	0.06	-0.00,0.12
Education	0.07	-0.72,0.86	-0.05	-0.20,0.09	0.12	-0.48,0.71	-0.02	-0.82,0.79	0.00	-0.04,0.05
Constant	-3.76****	-4.76,-2.77	0.31****	0.16,0.46			-1.54****	-2.29,-0.79	0.44****	0.39,0.49
N	1353		1353		1353		1246		1379	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S52. Analogous to Table S49 but with both AOS3 and SDO

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(180)		(181)		(182)		(183)		(184)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS3	5.54****	4.43,6.65	1.66****	1.49,1.82	4.09****	3.40,4.78	1.57**	0.59,2.55	0.44****	0.38,0.50
SDO	4.51****	2.29,6.73	0.27*	0.06,0.47	2.18***	1.05,3.30	1.42*	0.13,2.70	-0.21****	-0.28,-0.14
Sex	-0.64*	-1.21,-0.07	-0.14***	-0.21,-0.06	-0.91****	-1.29,-0.53	-0.93***	-1.42,-0.44	-0.08****	-0.11,-0.06
Age	-5.11****	-6.71,-3.51	-0.52****	-0.65,-0.38	-3.92****	-4.76,-3.07	-3.22****	-4.18,-2.25	-0.24****	-0.29,-0.19
SES	-0.76	-2.02,0.51	0.14	-0.03,0.32	-0.45	-1.27,0.37	-0.43	-1.51,0.64	-0.01	-0.07,0.05
Education	0.40	-0.54,1.35	0.14*	0.01,0.27	0.69*	0.06,1.31	0.15	-0.67,0.97	0.05*	0.01,0.10
Constant	-4.40****	-5.71,-3.08	0.11	-0.03,0.24			-1.55****	-2.31,-0.79	0.39****	0.34,0.44
N	1339		1339		1339		1232		1364	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S53. A decomposition of the effects of SDO on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 4)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(185)	(186)	(187)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (SDO only)	6.691**** (1.078)	1.806** (0.588)	0.004 (0.032)
Full model (SDO and AOS3)	4.059*** (1.091)	1.269* (0.639)	-0.206**** (0.035)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	2.631**** (0.336)	0.537** (0.182)	0.210**** (0.021)
N	1397	1287	1423

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S54. A decomposition of the effects of SDO (Dominance) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 5)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(188)	(189)	(190)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (SDO (Dom.) only)	6.651**** (0.970)	2.038*** (0.568)	0.080* (0.032)
Full model (SDO (Dom.) and AOS3)	3.533*** (1.010)	1.435* (0.649)	-0.174**** (0.036)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	3.118**** (0.384)	0.604* (0.238)	0.254**** (0.023)
N	1397	1287	1423

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S55. A decomposition of the effects of SDO (Egalitarianism) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 4)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(191)	(192)	(193)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (SDO (Ega.) only)	4.021**** (0.809)	1.087* (0.497)	-0.049 (0.027)
Full model (SDO (Ega.) and AOS3)	2.465** (0.807)	0.768 (0.513)	-0.159**** (0.028)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	1.557**** (0.254)	0.319** (0.102)	0.110**** (0.016)
N	1397	1287	1423

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S56. Analogous to Table S49 but with DSRS (group competition)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(194)		(195)		(196)		(197)		(198)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
DSRS (group competition)	5.84****	4.70,6.97	1.34****	1.16,1.51	4.42****	3.65,5.19	2.21****	1.20,3.22	0.42****	0.37,0.48
Sex	-0.12	-0.63,0.39	-0.05	-0.13,0.03	-0.52**	-0.88,-0.16	-0.81***	-1.29,-0.33	-0.05***	-0.07,-0.02
Age	-4.87****	-6.20,-3.54	-0.71****	-0.85,-0.57	-3.92****	-4.70,-3.14	-3.12****	-4.05,-2.20	-0.27****	-0.32,-0.23
SES	0.57	-0.54,1.68	0.33***	0.15,0.51	0.43	-0.36,1.22	-0.03	-1.08,1.02	-0.01	-0.07,0.04
Education	-0.43	-1.27,0.41	-0.11	-0.25,0.02	-0.11	-0.70,0.48	-0.14	-0.94,0.66	0.02	-0.02,0.06
Constant	-3.80****	-4.73,-2.88	0.10	-0.04,0.25			-1.73****	-2.50,-0.96	0.27****	0.23,0.32
N	1350		1350		1350		1245		1375	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S57. Analogous to Table S49 but with both AOS3 and DSRS (group competition)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(199)		(200)		(201)		(202)		(203)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS3	5.07***	3.88,6.25	1.44***	1.27,1.61	3.58***	2.85,4.31	1.39**	0.40,2.39	0.24***	0.19,0.30
DSRS (group competition)	2.66***	1.36,3.97	0.71***	0.53,0.89	2.41***	1.55,3.27	1.77**	0.68,2.87	0.32***	0.26,0.38
Sex	-0.56	-1.14,0.03	-0.11**	-0.18,-0.03	-0.79***	-1.18,-0.41	-0.90***	-1.39,-0.40	-0.05***	-0.08,-0.03
Age	-4.79***	-6.40,-3.17	-0.44***	-0.58,-0.31	-3.59***	-4.43,-2.75	-3.00***	-3.95,-2.04	-0.23***	-0.27,-0.19
SES	-0.65	-1.91,0.62	0.11	-0.06,0.28	-0.50	-1.32,0.32	-0.40	-1.46,0.67	-0.05	-0.11,0.00
Education	0.09	-0.87,1.05	0.10	-0.02,0.23	0.45	-0.17,1.08	0.04	-0.79,0.86	0.06**	0.01,0.10
Constant	-3.58***	-4.60,-2.56	-0.02	-0.15,0.11			-1.73***	-2.50,-0.95	0.25***	0.21,0.30
N	1334		1334		1334		1229		1359	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S58. Analogous to Table S49 but with DSRS (status/power)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(204)		(205)		(206)		(207)		(208)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
DSRS (status/power)	5.71****	4.75,6.68	1.93****	1.77,2.09	5.00****	4.32,5.67	3.34****	2.44,4.24	0.48****	0.42,0.53
Sex	-0.27	-0.82,0.28	-0.05	-0.12,0.02	-0.66***	-1.03,-0.28	-0.90***	-1.40,-0.40	-0.05****	-0.08,-0.03
Age	-3.90****	-5.34,-2.45	-0.37****	-0.50,-0.23	-3.07****	-3.91,-2.23	-2.69****	-3.68,-1.71	-0.20****	-0.24,-0.15
SES	-0.23	-1.45,0.98	0.11	-0.06,0.28	-0.35	-1.18,0.49	-0.62	-1.71,0.47	-0.05	-0.11,0.01
Education	0.51	-0.39,1.41	0.09	-0.04,0.21	0.64*	0.01,1.27	0.39	-0.44,1.22	0.07**	0.03,0.11
Constant	-3.31****	-4.25,-2.38	0.07	-0.05,0.20			-1.72****	-2.46,-0.98	0.29****	0.25,0.34
N	1353		1353		1353		1246		1378	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S59. Analogous to Table S49 but with both AOS3 and DSRs (status/power)

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(208)		(209)		(210)		(211)		(212)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
AOS3	4.49****	3.27,5.72	1.02****	0.84,1.20	2.73****	1.95,3.52	0.28	-0.87,1.43	0.16****	0.10,0.23
DSRS (status/power)	3.30****	2.18,4.41	1.33****	1.14,1.52	3.48****	2.69,4.28	3.27****	2.18,4.35	0.38****	0.31,0.45
Sex	-0.59	-1.19,0.02	-0.08*	-0.15,-0.02	-0.81****	-1.19,-0.42	-0.88***	-1.39,-0.37	-0.06****	-0.08,-0.03
Age	-4.13****	-5.78,-2.47	-0.28****	-0.41,-0.15	-3.07****	-3.94,-2.20	-2.66****	-3.66,-1.67	-0.19****	-0.24,-0.14
SES	-1.05	-2.37,0.27	0.01	-0.15,0.17	-0.91*	-1.76,-0.06	-0.81	-1.92,0.29	-0.07*	-0.12,-0.01
Education	0.52	-0.48,1.51	0.18**	0.06,0.30	0.81*	0.17,1.46	0.37	-0.47,1.22	0.08***	0.04,0.13
Constant	-3.48****	-4.49,-2.47	-0.01	-0.13,0.11			-1.67****	-2.42,-0.93	0.29****	0.24,0.33
N	1336		1336		1336		1229		1361	

The table reports regression coefficients and the corresponding 95% CI.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S60. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (group competition) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 4)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(213)	(214)	(215)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (group competition) only)	2.480** (0.844)	0.820 (0.638)	0.192**** (0.033)
Full model (DSRS (group competition) and AOS3)	0.902 (0.863)	0.588 (0.660)	0.133*** (0.034)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	1.578**** (0.400)	0.232 (0.142)	0.059*** (0.016)
N	1380	1272	1407

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S61. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (status/power) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 4)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(216)	(217)	(218)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (status/power) only)	4.963**** (0.770)	2.009*** (0.576)	0.237**** (0.034)
Full model (DSRS (status/power) and AOS3)	2.410** (0.756)	1.824** (0.643)	0.144*** (0.039)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	2.553**** (0.488)	0.184 (0.300)	0.092**** (0.022)
N	1380	1271	1407

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S62. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (leadership) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 4)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(219)	(220)	(221)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (leadership) only)	0.684 (0.871)	1.537* (0.643)	0.177**** (0.031)
Full model (DSRS (leadership) and AOS3)	0.885 (0.869)	1.562* (0.643)	0.183**** (0.031)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	-0.201 (0.281)	-0.024 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.010)
N	1380	1271	1407

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S63. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (environmental exploration) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 4)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(222)	(223)	(224)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (environmental exploration) only)	0.725 (0.861)	-0.161 (0.593)	0.065* (0.029)
Full model (DSRS (environmental exploration) and AOS3)	0.510 (0.865)	-0.170 (0.595)	0.057* (0.029)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	0.215 (0.281)	0.009 (0.028)	0.008 (0.010)
N	1380	1271	1407

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S64. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (food selection) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(225)	(226)	(227)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (food selection) only)	1.185 (0.802)	-0.122 (0.614)	0.058 (0.031)
Full model (DSRS (food selection) and AOS3)	1.221 (0.802)	-0.106 (0.614)	0.059 (0.031)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	-0.036 (0.279)	-0.016 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.010)
N	1380	1271	1407

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S65. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (kinship) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(228)	(229)	(230)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (kinship) only)	-2.415*** (0.734)	-1.579** (0.528)	-0.018 (0.026)
Full model (DSRS (kinship) and AOS3)	-2.331** (0.733)	-1.567** (0.528)	-0.015 (0.026)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	-0.083 (0.279)	-0.012 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.010)
N	1380	1271	1407

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S66. A decomposition of the effects of DSRS (mate attraction) on political violence using autocratic orientation as a confounder/mediator (Study 2)

	<i>Participation</i>	<i>Willingness</i>	<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>
	(231)	(232)	(233)
	Logit	Logit	OLS
Reduced model (DSRS (mate attraction) only)	-0.031 (0.776)	0.989 (0.523)	0.144**** (0.028)
Full model (DSRS (mate attraction) and AOS3)	-0.015 (0.776)	0.991 (0.523)	0.146**** (0.028)
Difference (indirect effect via AOS3)	-0.016 (0.279)	-0.002 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.010)
N	1380	1271	1407

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, **** $p < 0.0001$.

Table S67. Analogous to Table S49 but with RWA instead of AOS3

	<i>Participation</i>		<i>Participation (coded 0-4)</i>				<i>Willingness</i>		<i>Willingness (RIS)</i>	
	(234)		(235)		(236)		(237)		(238)	
	Logit		OLS		Ologit		Logit		OLS	
	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95	b	ci95
RWA	1.90**	0.74,3.06	0.25*	0.05,0.46	1.01*	0.18,1.83	0.08	-0.98,1.14	-0.31****	-0.37,-0.25
Sex	-0.39	-0.84,0.05	-0.12**	-0.21,-0.04	-0.68****	-1.02,-0.34	-0.87***	-1.34,-0.39	-0.06****	-0.09,-0.03
Age	-5.68****	-6.85,-4.51	-1.04****	-1.19,-0.88	-4.62****	-5.38,-3.85	-3.28****	-4.22,-2.33	-0.29****	-0.34,-0.25
SES	1.95***	0.95,2.95	0.52****	0.33,0.72	1.32***	0.56,2.07	0.30	-0.74,1.34	0.09**	0.03,0.15
Education	-0.25	-1.00,0.51	-0.12	-0.27,0.03	-0.20	-0.78,0.38	-0.21	-1.02,0.60	-0.05*	-0.09,-0.00
Constant	-2.35****	-3.20,-1.51	0.51****	0.35,0.67			-1.04**	-1.78,-0.29	0.56****	0.51,0.61
N	1355		1355		1355		1248		1381	

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