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Title:

Further Evidence for the Role of Felt Understanding in Intergroup Relations: Japanese and Chinese Relations in Japan

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Abstract

Felt understanding in intergroup context is the belief that members of an outgroup understand and accept ingroup members' perspectives. A series of studies in Europe conducted by Livingstone, Fernández Rodríguez, and Rothers (2020) showed the unique effect of felt understanding in intergroup relations. The effects were apparent even when controlling for outgroup beliefs and metabeliefs. The present article reports a cross-cultural replication of the findings in Japanese and Chinese relations in Japan. Consistent with Livingstone et al. (2020), felt understanding uniquely predicted intergroup outcomes (e.g., action intentions, outgroup trust, and intergroup orientation). The effects remained significant after adjusting for multiplicity with multiple variables. However, there were two differences. Felt understanding did not predict (a) negative approach intentions and (b) institutional trust.

Keywords: beliefs, metabeliefs, felt understanding, intergroup relation, second-order theory of mind.

What do ingroup people think outgroup people in general tend to be like? The extensive literature on intergroup relations has focused on the impact of beliefs about outgroups. Recently, research has focused on metabeliefs or beliefs about what outgroup people tend to think of ingroup people. Furthermore, prior research has implied that felt understanding—how well ingroup people think outgroup people know about ingroup peoples’ beliefs—can be crucial for the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup. This study examines the role of felt understanding in intergroup relations.

Outgroup Beliefs and Metabeliefs

Extensive literature on intergroup relations has focused on the impact of beliefs about outgroups. Statements such as “they tend to be cold” represent beliefs. These beliefs include stereotypes, prejudiced attitudes, and general impressions of the outgroup (Allport, 1954; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Beliefs about the outgroup determine subsequent actions and intentions (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Wojciszke, 1994) as well as aggression toward specific target groups (Nawata & Yamaguchi, 2012). Recently, research has focused on metabeliefs. Metabeliefs are defined as our beliefs about beliefs of an outgroup (Frey & Tropp, 2006; Vorauer, Main, & O’Connell, 1998) and are typified in statements such as “they think we tend to be cold.” These beliefs include metastereotypes (Gordijn, 2010; Vorauer et al., 1998) and metaprejudice (Putra & Wagner, 2017). Metabeliefs can produce negative emotions (Vorauer et al., 1998) and intergroup attitudes (Kim & Oe, 2009).

Felt Understanding

Studies on metabeliefs in intergroup relations emphasize how we think about the beliefs of others; yet, there have been few studies on meta-metabeliefs, which are beliefs

about how our own beliefs are perceived by outgroup members. In particular, studies directly assessing felt understanding, one of the meta-metabeliefs, in intergroup relations are limited. Investigating felt understanding in intergroup relations is vital because addressing the misunderstandings that drive conflict is necessary to establish better intergroup relations (Demoulin, Leyens, & Dovidio, 2009; Saguy & Kteily, 2011).

Feeling understood is defined as the belief that another understands one's own needs, abilities, traits, wishes, beliefs, and preferences (Reis, Lemay, & Finkenauer, 2017). Felt understanding is exemplified in statements such as "they do not understand our beliefs." It involves second-order theory of mind (Dennet, 1987; Liddle & Nettle, 2006). Theory of mind is defined as the ability to make inferences about the mental states or beliefs of others (Liddle & Nettle, 2006). Theory of mind has a recursive nature; that is, mental states can be nested at several levels of recursivity (Liddle & Nettle, 2006; Livingstone, Fernández Rodríguez, & Rothers, 2020). The ability to view others as also possessing a theory of mind is called second-order theory of mind. To put it differently, it is the capacity to make inferences about others' perspectives, including our own. Thus, felt understanding represents a meta-meta perspective³: a set of beliefs about (their) beliefs about (our) beliefs (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010; Livingstone et al., 2020). Livingstone et al. (2020) contended that the perspective differentiates felt understanding from variables that concern outgroup views in general, as well as variables that include metabeliefs. The notion of feeling understood frequently appears in theories, such as self-verification theory and theory of mind (for details, see Reis et al., 2017). When people feel understood by another person, they tend to feel connected (Morelli, Torre, & Eisenberger, 2014; Swann & Read, 1981). However, when feeling misunderstood, people are inclined to feel isolated. Though the role of felt understanding spans diverse social relations, few studies investigate the potential of felt understanding in intergroup relations.

A recent study by Livingstone et al. (2020) is an exception. These researchers defined felt understanding in intergroup contexts as the belief that members of an outgroup understand and accept the perspectives of ingroup members, including their beliefs, values, experiences, and identity. They conducted a series of studies and examined the role of felt understanding in various intergroup relations such as U.K.-EU relations. Intergroup outcomes were action intentions (e.g., positive and negative approach, avoidance) and intergroup orientations (e.g., intergroup orientation, outgroup trust, and institutional trust). They expected that felt understanding would predict intergroup outcomes such as more positive action intentions, greater trust toward outgroups, and greater trust in superordinate political institutions (involving the ingroup and outgroup). This was expected to be true over and above the impact of beliefs about the outgroup, metabeliefs, and beliefs about appearing prejudiced. Supporting these expectations, the results indicated that, controlling for outgroup beliefs and metabeliefs, felt understanding predicted intergroup relation outcomes. However, the studies were conducted in Europe, which is categorized as Western culture. It is unknown whether the findings in Western culture are valid in East Asian countries.

Do the findings of felt understanding in intergroups generalize to people in East Asia and, if so, what cultural features may be relevant? Felt understanding entails components such as theory of mind, which is known to be relatively culturally universal (Avis & Harris, 1991; Callaghan et al., 2005). Similar developmental changes in false-belief reasoning have been observed in various cultural groups (Barrett et al., 2013; Callaghan et al., 2005). If this universal feature resides in felt understanding, the benefits of felt understanding in intergroup relations throughout East Asia may be ubiquitous. However, certain aspects of felt understanding are considered culturally distinctive, such as naïve dialecticism and causal attribution, which may be reflected in the variances in

the role of felt understanding. For instance, according to the theory of naïve dialecticism (Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Peng, & Wang, 2009), East Asian global self-concept can be broadly defined by three primary characteristics: change, contradiction, and holism. East Asians' global self-concepts are more changeable (change), and contradictions are tolerated (contradiction), making them more willing to adapt their self-concepts in response to contradictory information (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). As such, if East Asians have a flexible self-concept and openness to contradictions, they may not respond adversely to others (e.g., confrontation) even when they perceive that they are not understood. This is because East Asians tend to think that others have a different perspective of themselves than they do. Although we did not develop any specific hypotheses before conducting the replication study, such discrepancies may be relevant to the psychological mechanisms of feeling (mis) understood.

Differences between Livingstone et al. (2020) and the Present Study

This study conducted a conceptually replicative study by Livingstone et al. (2020) in the following ways. First, unlike their study with samples from Western cultures, we used a sample from East Asia and tested for measurement invariance. It is crucial to conduct replication in cross-cultural research to check whether measurements obtained in different cultural groups can be interpreted in the same way (Milfont & Klein, 2018). This is because differences in how instruments and instructions are understood could cause observable cross-cultural differences in psychological phenomena (Campbell, 1964), leading to misinterpretations of results. Thus, we checked for measurement equivalence of the scales across the samples in this study and in the previous study.

Second, in contrast to the previous study, which focused on a kind of minority group in intergroup relations (e.g., the U.K. against EU nations), we selected a sample of

Japanese people who are the majority in Japanese and Chinese relations in Japan. It is critical for the minority group to be understood by the majority group in the superordinate political structure/system because the majority group has power. Furthermore, such outgroups represent the structure. Thus, feeling understood by the outgroup can be linked to trust in the structure. However, the Japanese are the majority group with more political power than the Chinese in Japan, and they have less need to be understood by the Chinese people. Even in this context, though, felt understanding and trust in the political structure may be related. Self-verification theory assumes that people confirm and reinforce their self-views or identities (including personal and social identities) through the perspectives of others (Gómez, Seyle, Huici, & Swann, 2013; Swann & Read, 1981). Given self-verification theory, when an ingroup member believes that outgroup members understand their culture, values, and identity, these perspectives are confirmed and reinforced. Of the perspectives, ingroup identity may be related to trust in the political structure because national identity is linked to trust in the political structure (Berg & Hjerm, 2010; McLaren, 2017). For example, following the Great East Japan Earthquake, foreign countries, including China, praised the orderly behavior of Japanese people (James & Goldman, 2011). Knowing foreigners understand orderly nature of Japanese people may strengthen their Japanese identity and increases institutional trust. Although the argument here is only speculative, by focusing on a Japanese sample of Japanese and Chinese relations in Japan, we investigated whether status dynamics may induce differences in the role of felt understanding in intergroup relations.

Third, we measured intergroup contact. As with felt understanding, intergroup contact has been shown to possess many positive benefits in ingroup-outgroup relations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). However, intergroup contact may also be associated with anxiety (Plant & Devine, 2003; Shelton & Richeson, 2006). Oishi et al. (2010) argued

that contact quality and intergroup outcomes might benefit from felt understanding. Thus, we tested the interactive effect of felt understanding and contact on intergroup outcomes.

In summary, we conceptually replicated the role of felt understanding in intergroup relations by adding the three modifications mentioned above. Based on the previous section, we expected that felt understanding would predict more positive action intentions, greater trust in the superordinate institution and the outgroup, and more positive intergroup orientation. This was expected to be the case over and above the effects of outgroup beliefs, metabeliefs, and beliefs about appearing prejudiced. Furthermore, we expected that felt understanding would be more positively related to intergroup outcomes among high contact scorers than among low contact scorers.

Method

Participants and procedures. We collected data from 256 Japanese (154 females). The mean age of the Japanese was 29.99 years ($SD = 12.28$, range = 18-71). More descriptions of our sample such as sample size determination can be found in supplementary materials on the Open Science Framework (OSF) site. Following Livingstone et al. (2020), we used a snowball-sampling technique and advertised the online survey via social networks. The survey was available from November 3 to December 17, 2020. We did not preregister this study.

Measures. Materials⁴ are almost the same as the materials used in Livingstone et al. (2020). The independent variable was felt understanding (to what extent the Chinese in Japan might have accurate knowledge about Japanese views on them). Control variables include outgroup beliefs (to what extent the Japanese agreed with each trait characterization of the Chinese in Japan), metabeliefs (to what extent the Chinese in Japan

would (or might) agree with each trait characterization of the Japanese), beliefs about appearing prejudiced (to what extent the Japanese believed that the Chinese in Japan saw the Japanese as being prejudiced against them). Intergroup contact was a moderating variable (how often the Japanese encounter the Chinese in Japan). Outcome variables were intergroup outcomes. These include action intentions (i.e., negative approach, avoidance, and positive approach intentions; to what extent the Chinese in Japan in general make participants want each action), institutional trust (to what extent the Japanese trust the Japanese government), outgroup trust (to what extent the Japanese trust the Chinese in Japan), and intergroup orientation⁵ (to what extent the relationship between the Japanese and the Chinese in Japan is positive). We used trust in the Japanese government as institutional trust because it was a superordinate institution including the ingroup and outgroup as Livingstone et al. (2020) similarly operationalized it. Participants responded to each item on 7-point bipolar scales ranging from -3 (completely disagree) through 0 (neither) to 3 (completely agree): we used unipolar scales to assess action intentions and intergroup contact from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). We carried out item parceling following Livingstone et al. (2020).

Results

Measurement invariance. To check measurement invariance of the scales across samples of this study and previous study, we conducted a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis across groups using the collected data in this study and data of Study 2 in Livingstone et al. (2020). Because outgroup beliefs, metabeliefs, felt understanding, and beliefs about appearing prejudiced all represent a kind of beliefs, measurement invariance of those beliefs was evaluated simultaneously as a belief system. Then, we tested

measurement invariance for action intentions and institutional trust respectively. Following Vandenberg and Lance (2000), we tested three models: configural invariance (i.e., assuming equivalent factor structure), metric invariance (i.e., assuming equivalent factor loadings), and scalar invariance (i.e., assuming equivalent item intercepts)⁶. Summaries of tests for measurement invariance are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

For beliefs system, there was evidence of configural invariance (BS1, Table 1). Beliefs system also displayed metric invariance and even scalar invariance. For action intentions, there was evidence for configural invariance (including negative approach, avoidance, and positive approach). However, the test for metric invariance was rejected (AI2). Modification indices indicated that 2 of the 10 item factor loadings should be freely estimated (“oppose them?” and “avoid them?”). Releasing the equality constraint for the 2 item factor loadings, this partial metric invariance model fit the data well (AI3). We then tested for scalar invariance (relative to the partial metric invariance model) by constraining item intercepts to be equal across group, which resulted in a decrement in model fit (AI4). Based on modification indices, releasing the equality constraint for 3 of the 10 item intercepts (“oppose them?”, “confront them?”, and “argue with them?”), this partial scalar invariance model fit the data well (AI5). Finally, the institutional trust also demonstrated configural invariance. However, the test for metric invariance was rejected (IT2). Based on modification indices, releasing the equality constraint for 1 of the 3 item factor loadings, this partial metric invariance model did not meet the prescribed criteria (IT3). Tests for scalar invariance (IT4) and partial scalar invariance (IT5) were rejected.

Predicting intergroup outcomes. To test the predictive roles of the factors in the beliefs system, we modified the specification to include the intergroup outcomes—action intentions, outgroup trust, intergroup orientation, and institutional trust—as endogenous

factors. These models included participant age and gender as control predictors of the endogenous outcome variables. To avoid overcomplicating the model, each outcome was tested in a separate model (Livingstone et al., 2020). No covariances between errors were considered between items. Standardized path coefficients and R^2 values for each outcome variable are reported in Table 2 (Also see Figure S1 in Supporting information). Descriptive statistics and correlations between all scales are reported in Table 3.

Table 2, 3

Consistent with Livingstone et al. (2020), felt understanding emerged as a unique predictor of action intentions (except negative approach) with more felt understanding associated with lower avoidance ($\beta = -.35$) and higher positive approach intentions ($\beta = .32$). Outgroup beliefs also significantly predicted each type of action intention, with more negative beliefs about the outgroup associated with stronger negative approach ($\beta = .28$), avoidance ($\beta = .40$), and weaker positive approach intentions ($\beta = -.37$). In contrast, metabeliefs did not predict any action intentions, and beliefs about appearing prejudiced predicted only negative approach intentions. Consistent with Livingstone et al. (2020), felt understanding emerged as a strong predictor of outgroup trust ($\beta = .33$). Outgroup beliefs predicted outgroup trust ($\beta = -.34$). However, neither metabeliefs nor beliefs about appearing prejudiced predicted it. As with outgroup trust, felt understanding positively predicted intergroup orientation ($\beta = .20$). Outgroup beliefs ($\beta = -.24$), metabeliefs ($\beta = -.15$), and beliefs about appearing prejudiced negatively predicted intergroup orientation ($\beta = -.35$). However, felt understanding and other variables did not predict institutional trust, which is inconsistent with Livingstone et al. (2020). The significant effect of felt understanding remained after adjusting for multiplicity with the outcomes.

Interplay with contact. A series of regression analyses examined whether the effect of felt understanding on intergroup outcomes was moderated by contact (as detailed

in supplementary materials on the OSF site). The result showed that significant interactions qualified the main effects of felt understanding on only two outcomes: institutional trust and intergroup orientation. Simple slope analyses revealed that felt understanding was positively related to institutional trust among high contact scorers, $\beta = .21, p < .05$, but not among low contact scorers. Additionally, the analyses showed felt understanding was positively related to intergroup orientation among high contact scorers, $\beta = .50, p < .01$, and among low contact scorers, $\beta = .29, p < .01$. However, when applying post hoc corrections for multiple testing, those interactions were no longer significant.

Discussion

Our study cross-culturally replicated Livingstone et al.'s (2020) findings, providing further evidence for the unique role of felt understanding in intergroup relations. In Japanese and Chinese relations in Japan, beliefs system (including felt understanding) and intergroup outcomes displayed either metric or partial metric invariance. Felt understanding negatively predicted avoidance intentions and positively predicted positive approach intentions, outgroup trust, and intergroup orientation. These effects were apparent even when controlling for outgroup beliefs, metabeliefs, and beliefs about appearing prejudiced. Additionally, the effects remained significant after adjusting for multiplicity with multiple outcomes.

The theoretical implications are afforded by Japanese and Chinese relations in Japan. Although the findings on felt understanding in intergroup relations have been limited to the Western context, felt understanding involves theory of mind and other components considered to be culturally universal. The results of our study generally replicated those of the original study, which was conducted with Europeans. The findings

offer additional support for the idea in East Asian contexts that felt understanding includes second-order theory of mind (Liddle & Nettle, 2006; Livingstone et al., 2020).

Although the majority of the findings were consistent with the original study, there were notable differences in the role of felt understanding. First, felt understanding did not predict one of the action intentions: negative approach (e.g., “confront outgroup members?”), which is inconsistent with the findings of Livingstone et al. (2020). This may be due to naïve dialecticism or causal attributions to external situations. East Asians with a fluid self-concept and openness to contradictions are less likely to react negatively to others when they feel not understood. Moreover, because people in collectivistic cultures do not prefer confrontation (Ohbuchi & Takahashi, 1994; Ozaki, 1987), the association between felt understanding and negative approach intentions may be weaker.

Second, felt understanding did not predict institutional trust. The discrepancy between this study and the previous one can be attributed to differences in the participants’ status. As described in the Introduction, unlike the previous study, the participants in this study were the majority group (the Japanese vs. the Chinese in Japan). Such status differences in intergroup relations might have affected how our sample interpreted the institutional trust items. The measurement invariance test for institutional trust supported neither metric nor scalar invariance. This indicates that sample’s understanding of institutional trust scale items in this study may have been different from that in the previous study. To test this possibility, research focusing on the majority of intergroup relations that share a political structure/system is required.

This study also measured intergroup contact and examined the moderating role of contact on the links between felt understanding and intergroup outcomes. The results of the simple slope test on institutional trust revealed a positive link between felt understanding and institutional trust only among high contact scorers. Furthermore, there

was a positive correlation between felt understanding and intergroup orientation among both high and low contact scorers; however, this correlation was higher among the former. This finding support Oishi et al.'s (2010) claim that felt understanding may contribute to contact quality and intergroup outcomes. However, these interactive effects were no longer significant after controlling multiplicity, suggesting that more study is required.

The cross-cultural replication of Livingstone et al.'s (2020) study has practical implications for people who hope for reconciliation between Japanese and Chinese people. For instance, imagine that you have Chinese friends and that your parent or friend has a negative orientation toward Chinese. Even if you attempt to persuade your parent or friend to contact Chinese people, they may hesitate or even resist making efforts to contact them. An intervention with felt understanding can help change their minds because it does not require any active participation on their part or direct contact with Chinese residents, which, in some cases, may produce fear.

However, some other limitations of this study should be noted. First, the sample size in this study was roughly 30% of the Study 2 by Livingstone et al. (2020), when testing measurement invariance across samples. As Chen's (2007) simulation study demonstrated, this unbalanced sample size ratio might have affected the estimation in the test. Second, measurement invariance models for beliefs system and action intentions met acceptable cutoffs for at least two indices, but may not have met acceptable cutoffs for others such as RMSEA and SRMR. There is considerable debate about which fit indices and cutoffs should be used in measurement invariance testing (e.g., Putnick & Bornstein, 2016). Therefore, the model fit results of our models with different samples are likely to be valuable in future studies. Third, we adopted a cross-sectional research design, limiting the extent to which the causal effect of felt understanding could be evaluated. To obtain more confidence in the causal effect, direct manipulation of felt understanding or a

longitudinal research design may be effective in future research.

Conflict of Interest

The authors have no conflicts of interest associated with this manuscript.

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Table 1: Model fit of measurement invariance testing with multigroup confirmatory factor analysis.

Model	χ^2 (df)	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	Δ CFI	Δ RMSEA	Δ SRMR	AIC	Decision
Beliefs system									
BS1 Configural	315.587 (100)	.970	.062	.049				34983.522	Accept
BS2 Metric	398.857 (112)	.960	.068	.100	.010	-.006	-.051	35042.792	Accept
BS3 Scalar	550.932 (124)	.941	.079	.111	.019	-.011	-.011	35170.867	Accept
Action tendencies									
AT1 Configural	351.148 (67)	.965	.087	.098				33348.319	Accept
AT2 Metric	564.580 (77)	.940	.106	.174	.025	-.019	-.076	33541.751	Reject
AT3 Partial metric	378.368 (75)	.963	.085	.099	.002	.002	-.001	33359.540	Accept
AT4 Scalar	582.330 (85)	.939	.102	.128	.024	-.017	-.029	33543.502	Reject
AT5 Partial scalar	441.917 (82)	.956	.089	.115	.007	-.004	-.016	33409.089	Accept
Institutional trust									
IT1 Configural	2.378 (1)	.999	.050	.034				9674.516	Accept
IT2 Metric	181.542 (4)	.930	.282	.310	.069	-.232	-.276	9847.680	Reject
IT3 Partial metric	51.447 (3)	.981	.170	.127	.018	-.120	-.093	9719.585	Reject
IT4 Scalar	257.157 (7)	.902	.253	.272	.079	-.083	-.145	9917.295	Reject
IT5 Partial scalar	108.690 (5)	.959	.193	.119	.022	-.023	.008	9772.828	Reject

Note . Decision "Accept" = accepting the assumption of invariance, "Reject" = rejecting the assumption of invariance. Δ CFI = the difference in CFI between the model and the one step back model (the same goes for Δ RMSEA and Δ SRMR).

Table 2 Summary of predictive paths for outcome measure

Dependent variable	OGB	MB	FU	BAP	R^2
Negative approach	.278 (.094) **	.161 (.088)	-.034 (.093)	-.198 (.088) *	.154
Avoidance	.403 (.074) **	.105 (.070)	-.352 (.072) **	-.008 (.071)	.506
Positive approach	-.369 (.079) **	.085 (.076)	.323 (.078) **	-.049 (.075)	.381
Inst.trust	-.146 (.094)	-.020 (.089)	.019 (.090)	-.007 (.090)	.047
Outgroup trust	-.341 (.075) **	-.125 (.071)	.328 (.072) **	.002 (.071)	.457
Intergroup orientation	-.236 (.067) **	-.152 (.068) *	.201 (.067) **	-.345 (.065) **	.482

Note. Each analysis controls for age and gender. Values are standardized path coefficients with standard error in parentheses. We report 95% confidence intervals in Table 1 of supplementary materials in the OSF site. OGB = outgroup beliefs; MB = metabeliefs; FU = felt understanding; BAP = beliefs about appearing prejudiced. Effects that remained significant after correcting for multiple testing are depicted in bold (Benjamini–Hochberg adjusted p -value < .05).

** p < .01, * p < .05

Table 3 Zero-order correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables analyzed in this study

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1 OGB	3.73	1.02										
2 MB	3.66	0.86	.215 **									
3 FU	3.97	0.97	-.468 **	-.179 **								
4 BAP	4.44	0.89	.247 **	.267 **	-.324 **							
5 IC	3.38	1.46	-.186 **	-.004	.101	-.126 *						
6 NA	1.75	1.04	.257 **	.118	-.101	-.056	-.047					
7 A	3.02	1.58	.564 **	.212 **	-.543 **	.248 **	-.229 **	.336 **				
8 PA	4.31	1.41	-.507 **	-.060	.498 **	-.220 **	.230 **	-.130 *	-.746 **			
9 IT	2.91	1.20	-.138 *	-.039	.076	-.049	-.044	.124	.048	.029		
10 OT	4.04	1.03	-.532 **	-.231 **	.535 **	-.283 **	.135 *	-.254 **	-.604 **	.592 **	.157 *	
11 IO	3.68	1.17	-.371 **	-.363 **	.421 **	-.489 **	.205 **	-.072	-.350 **	.260 **	.102	.420 **

Note . OGB = outgroup beliefs; MB = metabeliefs; FU = felt understanding; BAP = beliefs about appearing prejudiced; IC = intergroup contact; NA = negative approach; A = avoidance; PA = positive approach; IT = institutional trust; OT = outgroup trust; IO = intergroup orientation. ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$

Footnotes

1. Data and materials (including details of our sample) can be found on the project OSF site (https://osf.io/n65tb/?view_only=fe664af2dee34e5484bbc01f09bb9bc0).

2. We are grateful to Asako Miura and Philip Streich for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. We would like to extend our thanks to Kengo Nawata for their comments on the research proposal.

3. Readers can obtain an image file that depicts the hierarchical relationship in beliefs system via the URL provided by Andrew Livingstone under creative commons license: <https://osf.io/numk7> (file: felt understanding as meta-meta perspective.pdf).

4. We followed the translation procedure in accordance with Brislin (1980) and Muryama, Zhou, and Nesbit (2009).

5. These multiple variables represent intergroup relations, which enable us to draw more robust inferences about the role of felt understanding in intergroup orientations. That is, relative to a single outcome variable, it is less dependent on the idiosyncrasies of particular outcome variables' scales.

6. The presence of metric invariance for constructs means that understanding of the constructs is similar across the samples (Hammer, Wade, & Cragun, 2020). When comparing the differential associations among constructs, each construct is expected to display metric invariance at least. We evaluated the invariance based on whether at least two of the reported fit indices met an acceptable cutoff (Rice, Loscalzo, Giannini, & Rice, 2020); the difference in CFI is greater than .01; the difference in RMSEA exceeds .015; a change in SRMR exceeds .030 for metric invariance or 0.15 for scalar invariance (Chen, 2007; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). If we detected systematic bias, parameters that vary across groups were freely estimated across groups, and we tested for partial measurement invariance (Lopez-Vergara et al., 2020).