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**Emotional Processes in Intractable Conflicts:
Integrating Descriptive and Interventionist Approaches**

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1. Introduction

Intractable intergroup conflicts are extreme, prolonged, and violent forms of intergroup conflict, which involve unique socio-psychological dynamics (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013). As such, they offer challenges in using widely established and successful approaches to intergroup relations and harmony. One approach which has gained growing attention in this context addresses the role of emotions as an avenue to changing attitudes, behaviors and even support for policies in intergroup intractable conflicts. The role of emotional processes in conflicts can be studied from two very different perspectives. The first is a more descriptive one, in which scholars examine the role played by individuals' and groups' emotional experience in conflict situations. The second perspective, which has gained increasing attention in the recent decades, is a more interventionist one, focusing on the way emotional change (or regulation) can promote conciliatory attitudes and behaviors among the conflict's involved parties. The following chapter offers for the first time an integrative model, bringing together both the descriptive and the interventionist approaches. Put differently, this model encapsulates both the role of emotional experiences in preserving and perpetuating conflicts, and the potential role of emotion regulation in contributing to conflict resolution.

We begin by defining and discussing intractable conflicts, their unique characteristics and dynamics. We then introduce the role of emotions in conflict, portraying first the descriptive approach, which elucidates how conflicts elicit emotions, and how emotions shape behaviors and policies in conflict in two ways. First, how emotions shape different stages of the conflict cycle, and second, the way emotions are experienced vs. the types of intergroup outcomes they induce. Next, we add the interventionist approach, providing an overview of approaches to conflict resolution, and their limitations in addressing intractable

conflicts specifically. We then incorporate the emotion-based interventionist approach into our model and demonstrate how two different approaches to emotion regulation (direct and indirect) come into play during the emotion generative process. Finally, we discuss the main challenges and opportunities in studying emotional processes in intractable conflicts and offer some avenues for developing the field further.

2. Intractable Intergroup Conflicts

Intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007) are characterized by extreme, prolonged violence and involve unique socio-psychological dynamics that influence their nature and longevity. Coleman (2011) estimated that about 5 per cent of conflicts in the world become intractable. The conflicts in the Middle East, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Northern Ireland, and Cyprus constitute prototypical examples of intractable conflicts. While intractable conflicts evolve around very tangible and real issues (such as territory, security, and natural resources), which must be addressed in the resolution process, they are not merely severe forms of intergroup conflict. These conflicts are situations so extreme that although those involved understand that peace is in their best interest, they seem unwilling, and perhaps unable to take the necessary steps towards conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, 2011; Fitzduff & Stout, 2006; Tropp, 2012).

2.1 Defining and Conceptualizing Intractable Conflict

In what ways are intractable conflicts unique? First, intractable conflicts are *protracted* and last at least one generation, creating a situation in which large parts of society have been born into a state of conflict, and are not acquainted with peaceful life conditions (Kriesberg, 1998). In addition to affecting the collective memory of the conflict, being unfamiliar with peace may make it hard for people in conflict to desire, and therefore act in order to promote, conflict resolution. Second, intractable conflicts cause wide-spread destruction and

devastation. Although many intergroup conflicts may involve various forms of violent actions between the groups, intractable conflicts involve an ongoing cycle of wide-scale and extreme *violence* (such as war, occupation, terrorism, and limited military engagement), which escalates and de-escalates over time (Kriesberg, 1993, 1998). This leads to another unique characteristic of intractable conflicts. The scope and sheer intensity of intractable conflict leads to *extensive investment* made by the parties involved. These investments are both physical (financial and military) and psychological (Kriesberg, 1993, 1998), which enable the group to withhold the difficult conflict situation (Bar-Tal, 2007).

Two further phenomena characterizing intractable conflicts involve the conflict's *centrality* and *totality* in the eyes of society members. While all intergroup conflicts exist in people's awareness and may be present in the collective narrative, intractable conflicts are highly predominant and play a central role in individuals' lives and decisions, as well as those of society as a whole. The conflict becomes so prevalent that it penetrates into almost all spheres in societal, cultural, educational and political life and institutions, all of which become involved in the conflict and highly politicized. In essence, it is impossible for those involved in the conflict to ignore the situation or to stay neutral, since the conflict is forced upon them throughout their lives and in multiple domains (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007).

Lastly, and perhaps most pertinent to this chapter, in addition to material factors, societies involved in intractable conflicts are characterized by a number of unique perceptions and attitudes. Parties in intractable conflicts hold an inherently *zero-sum perception* of the conflict. The fact that the conflict is highly multifaceted and complex, together with the continuous threats to security, lead to a perception of the issues in question not only as important but as existential to the group's very survival. And because both groups understand that winning is not a possibility, but equally will not compromise, intractable conflicts involve a perception that the *conflict is irresolvable*. Since both sides cannot win and are

locked in a stalemate, both sides expect the conflict to continue forever, and adjust accordingly both materially and psychologically to withstand the conflict far into the future (Kriesberg, 1993; Bar-Tal, 2007).

2.2 The Psychological Infrastructure of Intractable Conflicts

Contemporary literature on intractable conflicts describes a self-perpetuating cycle that when complete leads to conflict intractability (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). As a result of the exposure to the extreme conditions of a long-lasting violent conflict, societies in such conflicts develop specific needs in their struggle for survival. Two of the most basic needs in this regard are maintaining a sense of normality in light of the abnormal situation that conflicts bring about, and the need to mobilize society for the collective conflict effort. Once these needs arise, psychological mechanisms develop in order to address them. For example, perceptions of in-group righteousness or out-group delegitimization can provide a sense of purpose and reason in the face of the doubt and helplessness that intractable conflicts often evoke. In other words, such psychological mechanisms are what people use in the attempt to try to live a normal life in abnormal conflict circumstances. Similarly, psychological mechanisms enable mobilization of group members without doubt or delay, which is crucial in an intractable conflict scenario.

These mechanisms are sustained and passed along between group members and taught across generations until they become a collective norm or standard. Over time, they establish into a complex sociopsychological infrastructure that encompasses both these elements and provides continuous psychological support and social mobilization. This infrastructure has been termed the culture of conflict or the psychological infrastructure of the conflict, and it consists of three main aspects: the *collective memory*, *ethos of conflict*, and *collective emotions* (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013; Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012). The developed infrastructure underlies the evolved culture of conflict and lays the

groundwork for the reconstruction of a collective identity with characteristics reflecting the conflict context.

Collective memory is defined, according to Kansteiner (2002), as representations of the group's past, remembered by society members as their history and providing the epistemic foundation for the group's existence and continuity. Collective memory constructs the narratives, the symbols, and the myths related to the past that mold the culture of the group. Beliefs underlying collective memory, as a narrative, in the case of intractable conflict, evolve over time and become the history of the conflict to society members. Because collective memory is constructed to provide the epistemic basis and justification for the current goals and beliefs regarding the conflict, it provides an over-simplified, one-sided historic narrative, which is inherently biased and distortive (Bar-Tal et al., 2012; Baumeister & Hastings, 1997). It revolves around four major themes: (1) The justification of the conflict, its' eruption and ensuing developments. Relatedly, (2) the presentation of the ingroup as positive and (3) delegitimization of the outgroup. Lastly, (4) the victimization of the ingroup by the rival group. Past events that are unrelated to the conflict are often adapted and reinvented to serve the needs and goals associated with the conflict (Hammack, 2011; Volkan, 1997). Importantly, the collective memory becomes, during times of escalation in which external parties become involved, an additional battleground over which the sides of the conflict fight to justify their actions (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013).

Ethos of conflict is defined as "the configuration of central societal beliefs that provide dominant characterization to the society and [give] it a particular orientation" (Bar-Tal, 2000, p. xiv). It is a relatively stable worldview, described as a conflict-specific ideology (Bar-Tal et al., 2012; Cohrs, 2012; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009) which creates a conceptual framework that allows human beings to organize and comprehend the prolonged context of conflict in which they live and act toward its preservation or alteration in accordance with

this standpoint. It provides the shared basis for societal membership, binds the members of society together, gives meaning to societal life, and imparts legitimacy to social order. The ethos of conflict is comprised of eight interrelated themes of societal beliefs (Bar-Tal, 2000; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998):

Societal beliefs about the justness of the ingroup's goals outline, justify and rationalize the ingroup's goals, presenting them as existential and delegitimizing the justness of the outgroup's goals. *Societal beliefs about security* delineate the threats and dangers posed by the outgroup and conflict, functioning as a strong societal mobilizer to address said dangers when required. *Societal beliefs of positive collective self-image* refer to the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive characteristics (e.g., courage, morality), to the ingroup as a way to differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup and establishing a sense of superiority and moral endurance (Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, & Worth, 1989). *Societal beliefs of the ingroup's victimization* refer to the presentation of the ingroup as the ultimate (and often only) victim, both generally but with a specific focus on the harm perpetrated by the outgroup (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori-Eyal, & Gundar, 2009; Schori-Eyal, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2014). These provide moral incentive to seek justice and oppose the outgroup, as well as to seek support from the international community. *Societal beliefs delegitimizing the opponent* place the outgroup and its' members outside the boundaries of commonly accepted norms and groups, therefore justifying aggressive and inhumane treatment of the rival (Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Haslam, 2006). *Societal beliefs of patriotism* create attachment and loyalty to the country and society, subsequently propagating sacrifice (including of members' own life) and encouraging endurance of hardships for the group (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). *Societal beliefs of unity* emphasize the importance of unity and social cohesion in the face of threat. These beliefs forge a sense of belonging and solidarity (Moscovici & Doise, 1994). Lastly, *societal beliefs of peace* shape peace as the group's ultimate wish and present the

ingroup and peace-loving and pacifist. These beliefs bolster positive self perceptions and external presentation of the group (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013). Together, these themes enable an understanding of society's present and past concerns as well as its future aspirations in the context of the conflict.

2.3 Intergroup Emotions

The unique psychological infrastructure involved in intractable conflicts, coupled with the one-sided perceptions and beliefs, turn intractable conflicts into fertile ground for the evolvment and perpetuation of intense group-based and collective emotions (Halperin, 2015). Emotions occur when an individual or a group appraises a situation as offering either important challenges or opportunities deemed to be relevant (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984). This relevance can be based on individual goals and priorities, but also pertains to important social identities as well as symbolic and group-based goals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Therefore conflicts, which arise when two or more parties perceive their goals as directly contradictory and decide to act upon this basis (Kriesberg, 1993), are a quintessential breeding ground for a range of emotions. Collective or group-based emotions form the third and final layer of intractable conflicts' psychological infrastructure, because the emotions themselves are derived and created based on the ethos of the conflict and collective memory. Collective memory forms the historical and epistemic basis for the conflict-based ideology, and this in turn influences how events related to the conflict are interpreted (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015). Such appraisals underlie the generation and regulation of emotions (Frijda, 1986), which subsequently lead to action tendencies and attitudes supporting or rejecting efforts for conflict resolution.

Consequently, emotions have been described as arguably the psychological fuel driving and escalating intractable conflicts (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015), since they guide attention to

events, shape how events are then interpreted (Dukes et al., 2021), and determine attitudinal and behavioral responses. Research on emotions in the context of conflicts has indicated that they pervade both the antecedents and outcomes associated with conflicts (Lindner, 2006). Specifically, for intergroup conflict, group identification adds a layer of complexity to the role of emotions in conflicts and their resolution. Thus, the most relevant types of emotions to such contexts are group-based emotions and collective emotions.

In recent years, a combination of growing research regarding affective processes in psychology in general (Dukes et al., 2021; Ekman, 1999; Fredrickson, 1998; Frijda, 1986; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999, 2001; Keltner & Gross, 1999), and the acknowledgment of the importance in understanding emotions in political processes (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Mackie & Smith, 2015; Marcus, Neuman, & Mackuen, 2000), has led to a substantial increase in the study of emotions in intergroup, political conflicts (Halperin, 2014, 2016; Halperin et al., 2011; Cohen-Chen, Pliskin, & Goldenberg, 2020).

2.3.1 Group-Based Emotional Phenomena

Group-based emotions result from an individual's self-categorization as a member of a social group and occur in response to situations that have perceived relevance for that group (Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 2016; Smith & Mackie, 2016). These emotions differ from the more classic individual emotions in that they are experienced by individuals merely as a result of their group membership. As such, people can experience group-based emotions "in the name" of their group, without even experiencing the emotion inducing event directly or personally. Importantly, group-based emotions are emotions that are experienced at the individual level. For example, an individual sitting on the couch may experience pride at the sight of a representative of their country winning a medal in the Olympic Games, although they do not know the athlete personally, and have played no part

in their success. The only thing they have in common is that they belong and identify with the same group (national, gender, or religious).

On the other hand, collective emotions (see Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007) are defined as macrolevel phenomena that emerge from emotional dynamics among individuals who are responding to the same situation (Goldenberg, Garcia, Halperin, & Gross, 2020). As such, they represent emotional phenomena on the collective or group level, rather than on the individual one. Another example, again the context of the Olympics, is a widescale celebration in light of a substantial victory such as winning a gold medal. Here, a large number of people are experiencing pride or joy in light of the national achievement, and the emotion can therefore be considered a collective emotional experience.

1. Research Approaches to Emotions in Conflict

Scrutinizing the recent developments in the study of emotions in conflicts in recent years, one can categorize that work into two very different, yet closely related categories. These two perspectives feed and inform one another mutually. The first perspective is descriptive, and is characterized by scholars examining the role played by group-based and collective **emotional experience** in conflict situations. More specifically, most of the work in this area focuses on the way that discrete emotions, as well as other affective processes (e.g., emotional sentiments, clusters of emotions; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994), shape policy preferences and other individual or group-based motivations in the context of intractable conflicts.

The second perspective is inspired by the Lewinian tradition (Lewin, 1943), according to which in order to really understand a phenomenon, one should attempt to change it. This approach, when applied to the study of emotions in conflict, can be described as interventionist due to its' focus on ways **emotional change (or regulation)** can promote

conciliatory attitudes and behaviors among parties involved in conflict. By deliberately inducing emotional change processes in conflicts, mostly using lab and field-based experimental designs, scholars contribute to the understanding of conflict resolution processes on the one hand, and to the more basic understanding regarding the nature, role and implications of emotions in intractable conflicts on the other hand. Our chapter presents, for the first time, an integrative model bringing together both the descriptive and the interventionist approaches. This integrative model encapsulates both the role of emotional experiences in preserving and perpetuating conflicts, and the role of emotion regulation in potentially contributing to conflict resolution efforts and processes.

3.1 The Descriptive Approach – Emotional Experiences in Conflicts

The descriptive approach aims to understand and observe the role of emotions in conflicts, without seeking to intervene or change the emotional experiences themselves. Early work on emotions in politics utilized a broad perspective based mainly on valence (the extent to which an emotion is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant) and its' role in political behavior, or on the role of two distinct systems of clusters of emotions in these processes (Marcus, 2003). Over the years, scholars of emotions in conflict have found it more functional to refer to discrete emotions, which enables a more precise and specific examination of emotions and their corresponding behavioral tendencies. This approach draws upon appraisal theory of emotions (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986), which delineates emotional processes as rooted in appraisals of meaningful events, leading to emotional goals and subsequently action tendencies. One major reason for this shift were consistent findings showing that emotions of the same valence and even the same intensity or arousal can lead to two very different, and sometimes even opposite political implications (e.g., Halperin, 2011; Lerner, Gonzales, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003), which raised the need to develop a more precise scope of examination.

Accordingly, a conflict-related event relevant to an individual and associated group leads to an appraisal regarding the self or the ingroup, which elicits an emotional response, and subsequently a relevant attitude or behavioral tendency (Halperin, 2015). As Lindner (2006) outlines, emotions can (and should) be viewed simultaneously as both antecedents and outcomes of conflict, exacerbating the downward spiral so often described as the cycle of violence associated with intractable conflict (Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007). In the current chapter, we refer to emotions in conflict using this integrative, cyclical approach, which sees emotional phenomena as both meaningful outcomes and powerful antecedents of political processes in conflict (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The Descriptive Approach

3.2.1 *Emotions as Outcomes*

Using this model to examine the role of emotional experiences in conflicts, two relationships have dominated the field (Lindner, 2006). The first examines ways in which conflict situations and events affect and influence emotions and emotional experiences (See Figure 1). The assumption is that conflict-related situations are meaningful enough to group members to draw their attention, influencing their appraisals of events or new information, and subsequently eliciting adaptive or maladaptive emotional reactions (Mackie & Smith,

2015) relevant to the conflict situation itself. The lion's share of research within the context of intractable conflicts has focused, understandably, on negative emotions.

As stated, the psychological infrastructure and culture of conflict shape how events are interpreted and therefore the emotional response to such events. Thus, the conflict ideology effectively constructs group based emotional reactions to the conflict. For instance, the perpetual threat posed by conflict situations, and the prevalence of these threats in the collective experience manifested in societal beliefs about security and victimhood within the ethos of conflict can lead to long term fear (Bar-Tal, 2001; Halperin, 2011; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). Relatedly, threat content has been found to induce either fear or anger in low power groups (Kamans, Otten, & Gordijn, 2010). The unique existential characteristics of intractable conflicts have been found to elicit a feeling that the future of the group is in question, an appraisal underlying collective angst (Wohl et al., 2012). Similarly, intergroup anxiety stems from deep-rooted psychological and physical segregation between groups involved in such conflicts (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Husnu & Crisp, 2010). However, threat has been found to elicit additional emotions, also related to the ingroup and its' responses to events within the context of intractable conflict. Experiencing the inability to respond to an aggressive and unfair event or behavior perpetrated by the outgroup induces the emotion of humiliation (Fernandez, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015; Lindner, 2006, 2002; McCauley, 2017). On the other hand, guilt derives from feeling regret over the ingroup's harmful actions, coupled with appraised responsibility for the unfair or immoral misconduct toward an outgroup (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998).

Although not as prevalent, conflict-related events or new information may also elicit emotions that are experienced as positive for the individual. Events advancing the (imagined or real) possibility for peace in the future, as well as information increasing expectations of conflict resolution have been found to elicit the emotion of hope (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-

Zehngut, & Drori, 2008; Leshem & Halperin, 2020; for a review see Cohen-Chen, Crisp, & Halperin, 2017). Another example is pride, experienced when an individual holds a positive group image, either in general or in a specific domain (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Schori-Eyal, Reifen-Tagar, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015). These perceptions are also exhibited within the ethos of conflict, specifically societal beliefs about the ingroup's positive self-image as well as beliefs about peace (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013).

3.2.2 Emotions as Antecedents

The second relationship within the descriptive approach corresponds to the latter stage of the model (refer to Figure 1). Subsequent to the way in which conflict and conflict-related events induce emotional responses, a myriad of work examines the role that emotions play in eliciting conflict-related attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 2007; de Rivera & Paez, 2007). Each intergroup emotion has a unique story, stemming from its' distinctive appraisal, emotional goals and action tendencies. Previous research has examined the effect of similarly-valenced or related emotions that may differ on a specific appraisal aspect. This difference may lead to differential attitudinal or behavioral tendencies in conflict. A notable example is anger and hatred, which are both negatively-valenced emotions associated with aggression. However, while anger stems from an appraisal that the situation or group can be changed and efforts should be made to promote such change (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), hatred is based in a perception of the outgroup as inherently evil and unchanging (Halperin, 2008). Importantly, although these two emotions often go hand in hand, this key difference between them has important implications and results in very different outcomes. For instance, anger in the absence of hatred was found to induce concessions in conflict (Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011), and while anger motivated engagement in normative action, hatred induced violent action intentions (Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Halperin, 2016).

Moreover, each emotion has a discrete influence on attitudes and behavioral tendencies. This can be on individual level behaviors, such as engagement in collective action (*Hope*: Hasan-Aslih, Shuman, Goldenberg, Pliskin, van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2020; *Anger*: Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2000, *Anger / Hatred*: Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Halperin, 2011; *Contempt*: Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, Singh, & Siddiqui, 2011), as well as support for policies or collective-level decision-making related to resolving intergroup conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2007; Halperin et al., 2011, 2012). These unique effects of discrete group level emotions on conflict related outcomes take place in different phases of intractable conflicts, as will be elaborated in the following pages.

3.3 Different Emotions are Dominant during Different Phases

Group level emotions play a significant role in all phases of intractable conflicts, yet, research in recent decades suggest that different emotions play different roles in different phases, although some emotions are dominant in more than one phase. For the sake of simplicity, we now focus on the most dominant emotional processes, characterizing each phase.

Conflict Eruption, as the starting phase of any intractable conflict, a process in which the parties' conflicting goals rise above the surface and spark the potential for violent intergroup confrontation. Intractable conflicts erupt over goals that are perceived to be of existential importance and often are related to core beliefs associated with group identity. They are based on severe grievances and contentions that are accompanied by strong emotional feelings (Kriesberg, 2007; Coutant, & Worchel, & Hanza, 2011). Azar (1990) suggested that the basic conditions for eruption of protracted conflicts are deprivation of basic needs related to collective identity (see also Brewer, 2011; Kelman, 1997; Korostelina, 2006; Reicher, 2004; Staub, 2011). The eruption process is driven by intra as well as inter-group processes that stimulate and motivate the destructive transformation of the

disagreements into overt and active conflict. The challenge of mobilizing society members to actively participate in the intractable conflict is of crucial importance. Many of the ideas related to the psychological processes that underlie collective action (see: van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) can be applied to mobilization for conflict.

The emotion that has been most frequently studied with respect to this stage of the conflict is anger. *Anger* is evoked by events in which the individual perceives the actions of others as unjust, unfair or as deviating from acceptable societal norms (Averill, 1983). In addition, it involves appraisals of relative strength and high coping potential (Mackie et al., 2000). The integration of these two characteristics often creates a tendency to confront (Berkowitz, 1993; Mackie et al., 2000), strike, kill, or attack the anger-eliciting target.

In line with its characteristics, previous studies conducted in the context of real-world conflicts have consistently found a clear and direct association between anger and the attribution of blame to the outgroup (Halperin, 2008; Small, Lerner, & Fischhoff, 2006). Other studies have found that individuals who feel angry appraise future military attacks as less risky (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) and anticipate more positive consequences for such attacks (Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007). Accordingly, studies conducted in the U.S. following the 9/11 attacks found that angry individuals were highly supportive of an American military response in Iraq and elsewhere (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner et al., 2003; Skitka., Bauman., Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006). Finally, the central role of group-based anger in motivating conflict eruption and aggression yielded further support in a recent study conducted in Serbia and Republika Srpska (Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010).

Humiliation is another important emotion that appears in the early phase of conflict eruption. It is a particularly strong aversive self-conscious emotion that arises when a person or a group see themselves as unfairly demeaned, degraded, or put down (Elshout, Nelissen, &

van Beest, 2017; Fernández et al., 2015; Lindner, 2006; McCauley, 2017). The experience of humiliation has been associated with particularly negative outcomes for the psychological well-being of the victims, such as major depression, severe anxiety, or suicidal tendencies (Hartling & Lindner, 2016; Klein, 1991; Torres & Bergner, 2012). Not in vain, humiliation has been labeled the “nuclear bomb of emotions” (Lindner, 2006, p. xiii) to emphasize its extreme destructive outcomes. It creates rifts between groups and breaks relationships (Lindner, 2001). This feeling arises in many of the conflict situations in which societies experience deprivation as a result of discrimination, oppression, and/or exploitation. Humiliation often creates a motivation to retaliate, as the humiliated group sees it as the only way to regain positive group identity and image.

Conflict escalation and management entail strategies to contend with conflict while it is expected to continue, including choices about how to respond to violence, as well as how to treat civilians and civilian causes among the adversary. Escalation indicates that the grievances, objections and contentions raised are not met with understanding and compliance, but rather with dismay, rejection, and even stronger counter-actions. Consequently, the party that raised the grievances or objections resorts to harsher steps, in order to make the conflict more salient and more costly to the rival. These steps are met with severe reactions, and both sides thus raise the level of confrontation, entering into cycles of reactions and counter reactions (Horowitz, 1985; Kriesberg, 2007). From a psychological perspective, our assumption is that conflict escalate due to a destructive feedback loop between the actual context and events on the one hand, and the psychological repertoire, held by society members, on the other hand. The psychological repertoire leads to actions that escalate the conflict, in turn the escalation reinforces the repertoire that perpetuates the conflict, due to the dominance of the culture of conflict and its bearing on collective identity.

Two dominant emotions that have received much attention in the current literature as impacting policy preferences in this context are fear and anger. Fear is associated with the appraisal that one is under threat and lacks sufficient strength or control to overcome the threat; and is characterized by the motivation to defend and protect oneself (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). These lead to action tendencies focused on minimizing risk, which may take the form of either ‘fight’ or ‘flight’ depending on what seems most effective for threat reduction. Indeed, while in some violent conflicts fear has been found to decrease support for military action (e.g. Huddy et al., 2007; Skitka et al., 2006), in more intractable conflict, where “flight” seems less possible, fear leads to defensive aggression increasing support for aggression toward the outgroup (e.g. Spanovic et al., 2010).

Anger, as mentioned above, is associated with appraising the outgroup's behavior as unjust and the ingroup as strong and able to successfully contend with risk and confrontation with the other (Smith et al., 2007). Anger is further associated with the motivational goal of taking action and setting right the outgroup's perceived wrongdoing (e.g., Roseman et al., 1994). Correspondingly, in the context of conflict management and escalation, anger most often leads to justification of and support for confrontation and use of violence against the outgroup (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Pliskin et al., 2014; Halperin, Porat, Tamir & Gross, 2013; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006).

De-Escalation and Peacemaking: Although de-escalation of intractable conflicts is a highly difficult challenge, almost every society engaged in such conflict contains societal forces (even that they are a small minority) that propagate and press for embarking on a different road—the road of peacemaking. Once these forces grow and become influential, it is possible to say that the process of peace-building has gained momentum. In some societies, this process even ends with a peaceful settlement following negotiations that may extend over many years (see: Fisher, Kelman & Nan, 2014). People living under long term conflict often

acknowledge that dramatic compromises are necessary for the promotion of peace yet often do not endorse them. Emotions modulate such support, with some emotions presenting a barrier and others facilitating it.

One of the most powerful emotional barriers to de-escalation and peacemaking is that of hate. Hatred is driven by the appraisal that the outgroup is inherently and unchangeably evil, thus people who are dominated by hate unequivocally reject any compromise toward changing relations between the groups because it is deemed futile (Halperin, 2008, 2011). The impact of anger and fear for conflict resolution is more complex in that they may drive either opposition or support for political compromise depending on how such compromise is construed. The appraisals of anger, namely, seeing the outgroup as unjust and the ingroup as strong and able to successfully contend with risk (Smith et al., 2007), often leads to opposition to compromise (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006; Spanovic et al., 2010; Tam et al., 2007). However, when correction of outgroup wrongdoing is deemed possible through conciliatory action (for example if education and mass media campaigns are perceived effective in inducing change in outgroup behavior), anger can increase support for compromise (Halperin et al., 2011; Reifen Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011; Shuman, Halperin, & Reifen Tagar, 2017).

Fear (and by extension, anxiety or angst), on the other hand - given that it is shaped by the appraisal that the magnitude of threat is greater than one's ability to overcome it, and characterized by the motivation to avoid risk and restore security - often presents a meaningful barrier to support for conciliatory policies (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Sabucedo, Duran, Alzate, & Rodriguez, 2011), as they are perceived as potentially risky, or at the very least as uncertainty inducers. However, to the extent that compromise can be construed as the path to establish security, fear is likely to increase willingness to compromise (Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013; Spanovic et al., 2010).

Finally, hope, an emotion characterized by positive affect coupled with an expectation for further positive outcomes, is a meaningful facilitator of conflict resolution. Hope increases openness to and active search for new information (Bar-Tal, 2013; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal, 2014), and increases creative thinking about solutions, and support for compromises (Cohen-Chen, Crisp, & Halperin, 2015; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014; Leshem, Klar, & Flores, 2016).

A further important force relevant for de-escalation and peacemaking is engagement in collective action, such as participation in demonstrations or signing petitions, to advocate for or oppose conciliation or compromise. Anger has been identified as the most relevant emotion motivating collective action (Tausch et al., 2012; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). To a lesser degree, guilt also motivates participation in collective action in support specifically of reparations to the outgroup for harm caused by the ingroup (Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008; Solak et al., 2016). Hope has also been proposed as a meaningful predictor of collective action, stemming from its goal-driven action-orientation and the belief in the possibility of a brighter reality (Cohen-Chen, van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2015; Greenaway, Cichocka, van Veelen, Likki & Branscombe, 2016).

Reconciliation goes beyond the formal resolution of the conflict by focusing on steps to address the psychological needs of the sides and to transform their relationship; such as acknowledgement of and support for compensation of past outgroup suffering, willingness to extend apologies, and to accept them and forgive. A dominant emotion shaping people's willingness to acknowledge and compensate outgroup suffering is guilt. Group-based guilt stems from appraisals of ingroup responsibility for illegitimate harm to the outgroup (Doosje et al., 1998; Ferguson & Branscombe, 2014), and is associated with the motivation to correct the wrongdoing, and to be forgiven by the outgroup. Group-based guilt has been found to increase support for compensation across different conflicts (e.g., Allpress, Barlow, Brown,

& Louis, 2010; Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Lickel, Steele, & Schmader, 2011), and is also associated with support for the extension of official apologies to the outgroup for past moral transgressions (Leonard et al., 2015; McGarty et al., 2005).

Another relevant self-targeted emotion stemming from the appraisal of responsibility for harm inflicted on others is shame. However, unlike guilt, it is coupled with the appraisal that the wrongdoing is indicative of the perpetrator's defective nature (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004; Tangney, 1991). Correspondingly, shame is characterized by the motivational goal of validating the ingroup's image (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Brown et al., 2008). Hence, in the context of reconciliation, shame has been found to increase both support for reparations and defensive avoidance (Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005), likely depending on the extent to which the damaged group-image is deemed reparable (Leach & Cidam, 2015).

Finally, empathy – the experience of a congruent emotion to that of another – plays an important role in reconciliation, especially in how recipients of intergroup apologies respond to it. Consistent with empathy's motivational goal of alleviating the discomfort or suffering of the other (Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011), several studies have found that empathy is associated with willingness to forgive the opponent for past transgressions, (e.g. Čehajić, Brown, & Castano, 2008; Tam et al., 2008).

3.4 “Feel good” / “Do good”: An alternative perspective to the role of emotions in conflicts

One way to look at the role played by group level emotions in conflict, as presented above, is to examine emotional impact in each and every phase of the conflict. A more nuanced way to look at the very same phenomenon was recently offered by Cohen-Chen and colleagues (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020), who introduced a framework categorizing emotions according to two separate dimensions: valence (the extent to which emotions are experienced

as pleasant or unpleasant) and function (the extent to which emotions lead to outcomes supporting or hindering conflict resolution). This differentiation is particularly important in intractable conflicts, in which clashes between how good an emotion feels and the good that it does in terms of the conflict more broadly are very prevalent. Importantly, the position of each emotion in a specific quadrant is dynamic and subject to change, dependent on contextual factors such as power or (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020). For example, anger may be experienced as pleasant when feelings of empowerment are emphasized (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), while hope for intergroup harmony may diminish motivation to change power asymmetries when induced in a low-power group (Hasan-Aslih et al., 2020). However, that is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Feel bad / do bad emotions are emotions that involve negative affect for the individual, and simultaneously induce conflict-escalating attitudes and behaviors. This definition encompasses within it the largest number of emotions, due to the very nature of conflict as harmful and destructive. For example, hatred (Fischer, Halperin, Canetti, & Jasini, 2018; Opatow & McClelland, 2007; Sternberg, 2005) is a negatively-valenced emotion stemming from an appraisal of the outgroup as holding a stable and evil nature (Halperin, 2008). Subsequently, hatred has been found to lead to aspirations of annihilation of the outgroup as a whole, triggering extreme intergroup aggression (Halperin, 2008). Similarly, humiliation, an emotion based on an internalization of aggressive external message that is perceived to be hostile but unjust (Fernandez et al., 2015; Lindner, 2006; McCauley, 2017), has been suggested to predict reactive violence and aggression (Lindner, 2006; Motyl, Rothschild, & Pyszczynski, 2009), as well as diminishing support for opportunities to achieve peace (Ginges & Atran, 2008). Lastly, emotions elicited by a sense of threat to the ingroup, such as intergroup anxiety (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Halperin et al., 2012) and fear (Halperin et al., 2008; Pliskin, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2015) have been found to increase

avoidant behaviors, diminishing willingness to engage with the outgroup to promote conflict resolution. Fear in conflict has been found to induce cognitive freezing (Kruglanski, 2004), leading to a focus on threatening information (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014) and preventing openness to new ideas (Clore et al., 1994; LeDoux, 1995).

Feel bad / do good emotions are those which are experienced as negative or unpleasant, but induce peace-supporting attitudes or behaviors. An example which has gained much interest and evidence is guilt, which is experienced as negative based on an appraisal of being personally accountable or seeing the ingroup as responsible for negative and unjust acts aimed at the outgroup (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004). Despite the negative experience associated with the emotion, guilt has been shown to encourage support for reparations or apologies for past wrong-doing (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; McGarty, Pederson, Leach, Mansell, Waller, & Bliuc, 2005), promoting intergroup conciliation. Another emotion which may feel unpleasant but has been found to promote positive intergroup attitudes is sadness, associated with an appraisal of significant loss (Camras & Allison, 1989). Gur, Ayal, and Halperin (2020) recently showed that experiencing sadness can reduce political polarization and promote peace-supporting attitudes. Lastly, collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008) is a negative emotion experienced when group members appraise their group as under existential threat. However, collective angst has been found to induce attempts to prevent the negative outcome, which can at times manifest in promoting conciliatory attitudes (Wohl, Porat, & Halperin, 2016; Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013).

Although not considered a discrete emotion, empathy (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Zaki, 2019) is characterized by feelings of sympathy and compassion towards a suffering or misfortunate (member of the) outgroup (Hasson, Tamir, Brahms, Cohrs, & Halperin, 2018) and therefore, is categorized as

negatively-valenced. Empathy is linked to cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup attitudes (Batson & Moran, 1999; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), and in the context of intractable conflicts has been found to induce support for humanitarian policies to help the outgroup (Balmas, & Halperin, 2021; Pliskin, Bar-Tal, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2014; Rosler, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, 2017). Due to both its' valence and its' behavioral outcomes, members of group are motivated not to experience empathy, which makes it uncommon in the context of intractable and violent conflicts.

As previously mentioned, positively-valenced emotions are significantly less prevalent in the context of violent and extreme conflicts. However, they too can have opposite effects on conflict-related attitudes (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020). Emotions that are experienced as pleasant, or the contextual conditions that may change the emotional valence (such as sadness enhancing a feeling of togetherness; Porat, Halperin, Manheim, & Tamir, 2016; Porat, Halperin, & Tamir, 2016) emphasize the importance of emotional preferences and the motivation individuals have to experience certain emotions (Tamir, 2016).

Feel good / do bad emotions are emotions experienced as positive or pleasant, but induce conflict-exacerbating attitudes. A notable example is pride. Despite being experienced as elevated and positive due to the achievements or nature of the ingroup (Sullivan, 2007), pride has been found to be associated with increased aggression (Baumeister, 2001), prejudice against outgroup members (Pettigrew, 1997), and hostility toward outgroup members via increased nationalism (de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003).

Lastly, *feel good / do good* emotions are those which both feel pleasant and promote intergroup harmony. The most notable example is the emotion of hope, which, as previously mentioned, is a positively-valenced emotion elicited in light of imagining a positive and desired goal in the future (Lazarus, 1999; Cohen-Chen et al., 2017; Leshem & Halperin,

2020). Long-term hope has been found to have positive associations with a myriad of peace-supporting attitudes, such as favorable information processing (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014), support for humanitarian aid to the outgroup (Halperin & Gross, 2011), support for conciliatory attitudes (Halperin et al., 2008; Cohen-Chen, van Kleef, Crisp, & Halperin, 2019), and openness to engaging with the outgroup (Saguy & Halperin, 2014). Notably, and as has previously stated, hope can, under some conditions, elicit outcomes detrimental to conflict facilitation (Hasan-Aslih et al., 2020). However, this is beyond the purview of this chapter.

As aforementioned, we refer to the interplay between the conflict and the emotional experiences in the conflict as a cyclical process (See Figure 1). One example of such a process might begin with an initial conflict related event (Lindner, 2006), which violates the ingroup's sense of justice, the underlying appraisal associated with the emotion of anger (Averill, 1983). As stated, anger has been found to increase aggressive attitudes (Skitka et al., 2006), which in intractable conflict contexts is translated into support for aggressive policies against the outgroup. As this process progresses and repeats itself, this continuous cycle may expand and become ingrained in collective memory and narrative (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). As parties involved continue to act and react, leading perceptions of the outgroup as inherently evil (underlying the emotion of hatred and further inducing extreme violence and aspirations to annihilate the outgroup; Halperin, 2008), and the conflict as fundamentally irresolvable, feeding into the hopelessness (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006) that perpetuates the conflict. As the cycle intensifies, different perceptions come into play, triggering new appraisals and therefore a variety of emotions.

3.5 The Interventionist Approach – Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict

For many years, social scientists have endeavored to understand the creation, preservation, escalation, and resolution of intergroup conflicts with the aim to develop interventions for promoting peace and intergroup harmony (Lewin, 1943). This includes a myriad of approaches from many fields and schools of thought, which have proven efficacious, as presented below. Nonetheless, these approaches' success has been found to be limited in extreme, protracted conflict situations. Recently, and as mentioned above, emotions have captured the attention of social psychologists as a key mechanism underlying political attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in contexts characterized by extreme animosity. Subsequently, this approach has become a central avenue in creating and developing interventions aimed at engendering reconciliation.

3.5.1 Classic Interventions Promoting Intergroup Harmony

Arguably the most famous and well-researched contribution to reducing intergroup conflict has been *Contact Theory* (Allport, 1954; Barlow et al., 2012; Dhont & Van Hiel, 2009; Graf et al., 2014; Hayward et al., 2017; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Tropp, 2021; Pettigrew, 2008). Contact theory posits that, under certain conditions, contact between members of different social groups can reduce intergroup bias (Allport, 1954). Members of opposing or different groups should be of equal status to one another and should cooperate to achieve common goals. Moreover, integration and contact should be supported by authorities and group norms, or attitude change will be difficult to achieve (for a meta-analysis see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

These conditions are often impossible to achieve in highly charged, extremely segregated contexts such as intractable conflicts. Counter-productive consequences have been said to be caused by defensive reactions to meeting and 'fraternizing' with the enemy (Amir, 1976; Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009; Bekerman & Maoz, 2005), leading to deterioration of intergroup relations. Within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, contact theory, in certain forms,

has been shown to be ineffectual. At times contact theory has even been described as immoral by preserving the status quo (Maoz, 2011; Maoz, Bar-On & Yikya, 2007). In the case of asymmetrical relations between groups, contact-based interventions that do produce positive perceptions of the outgroup lessen perceptions of existing power differences (Saguy & Chernyak-Hai, 2012; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009).

Over time, contact-based interventions were developed in order to overcome physical, language-based, and cultural segregation (Crisp & Turner, 2009; Pettigrew, 2008), as well as low motivation to engage in actual contact due to anxiety, discomfort, or bias (Crisp & Turner, 2009; Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Based on this, interventions began to move away from direct interactions between outgroup members, while maintaining a focus upon the specific outgroup in question. *Extended Contact* (Wright et al., 1997; Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008), demonstrating that knowledge of a close relationship between an ingroup member and an outgroup member can improve intergroup attitudes. Later on, *Imagined Contact* (Crisp, Stathi, Turner, & Husnu, 2008; Crisp & Turner, 2009) used mental simulations to change attitudes towards an outgroup, by providing a “safe” way for people to engage in contact with the outgroup, and reducing intergroup anxiety (Birtel & Crisp, 2012; Stathi et al., 2012; Turner et al., 2007).

Another approach, based on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), is the *Common Ingroup Identity Model* (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This approach focuses on creating a common identity, shared by members of different groups, to reduce bias and stereotyping. *Decategorization* highlights individual identity over group identity (Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1992), *recategorization* highlights a superordinate or shared identity of outgroup members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Relatedly, *crossed*

categorization (Crisp & Hewstone, 2000) blurs intergroup boundaries by highlighting shared social categories.

Although traditional interventions for promoting intergroup relations have proven successful in a large number of contexts, the understanding has gradually emerged that in intractable conflicts, one of the major fuels of the conflict, emotions, has been overlooked by classic approaches in working to instill peace and intergroup harmony. Zero sum perceptions make common goals nearly impossible (Brewer, 1999; Hornsey & Hogg, 1999). A collective narrative and socio-psychological infrastructure endorses and sustains the conflict, rather than supporting prejudice-reducing activities and interventions (Bar-Tal, 2000; Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). Consequently, attempts to change these mutually and deeply engrained norms come up against reactance, as they are interpreted as a threat to the group's identity and existence (Bar-Tal, 2007). Emotions, as flexible mechanisms associated with cognitions, identity, and motivations, are a key psychological mechanism in reconciliation processes, playing a pivotal role for intergroup relations characterized by rigid attitudes and perceptions. Thus, without addressing the emotional aspect underlying political attitudes and motivations, change, and particularly consistent and long-term change, is extremely difficult to achieve (Cehajic-Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, & Halperin, 2016).

3.5.2 Emotional Interventions – The Age of Affectivism

In recent decades, following similar trends in other domains within psychological sciences, political psychologists have shown an increasing shift from a descriptive to a more interventionist approach. This shift is manifested in work focusing on offering evidence-based interventions to reduce intergroup prejudice and promote intergroup reconciliation (see: Hameiri et al., 2014; Paluck et al., 2020). Specifically, regarding the study of emotions in conflict, while the descriptive approach serves the initial purpose of furthering knowledge

regarding the role of emotions in conflict, it stops short of expounding how this information can be used to change this harmful spiral of conflict.

Accordingly, emerging research has aimed to understand how this knowledge can be used to *change* emotions in order to promote attitudes for conflict resolution (Halperin, 2015; Halperin, Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014; Halperin & Pliskin, 2015). This line of work utilizes knowledge regarding the role of emotions in conflict, as well as extant research on emotion regulation (Gross, 1998, 2007) which refers to the process of influencing emotional responses by the self or others. In the context of intractable conflict, work on emotion regulation investigates ways in which emotions elicited by conflict-related events can be changed, leading to subsequent attitudinal and behavioral changes (for recent reviews see: Gross, Halperin, & Porat, 2013; Halperin & Riefen-Tagar, 2017).

3.5.2.1 Emotion Regulation

The idea that even powerful emotions can be modified is the cornerstone of a rapidly developing field of research in affective science that is concerned with emotion regulation, defined as the processes that influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and express them (Gross, 2014). Because emotions are multi-componential processes that unfold over time, emotion regulation may involve changes in various components of the emotional process, including the latency, rise time, magnitude, duration, or offset of responses in behavioral, experiential, or physiological domains (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Emotion regulation may increase or decrease the intensity and/or duration of either negative or positive emotions, and the defining feature of emotion regulation is the activation of a goal to modify emotion generation (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). Most of the research on emotion regulation has thus far focused on individuals or dyads.

However, many of the insights from such research are applicable to intergroup conflicts (Goldenberg et al., 2016, 2020).

Emotion regulation pertains both to situations in which people regulate their own emotions as well as to processes through which individuals or groups regulate others' emotions. In terms of the change strategy itself, one way to categorize emotion regulation processes is to examine not the target (the individual whose emotion is changing) but the process of the regulation. This results in two different approaches to emotion regulation – a direct approach (people are directly asked or trained to regulate their emotions) and an indirect approach (messages are conveyed to indirectly regulate other's emotions). These two approaches and the differentiation between them are particularly relevant in the context of intractable conflicts, in which emotions should be regulated in masses, people are not always motivated to down-regulate their negative emotions, and the source of the individual or group that aspire to stimulate the emotion regulation process is critical in determining its' effectiveness.

Direct Emotion Regulation

Emotion regulation in its' direct meaning refers to self-driven, intentional efforts to change the intensity, valence or type of experienced emotion (Gross, 1998, 2007). People can regulate their own emotions, and attempt to regulate the emotions of others. This may be targeted towards positive, as well as negative emotions, assuming the form of upward (increasing levels of arousal) or downwards (decreasing levels of arousal) regulation. In what now is already considered as the classic model of emotion regulation, James Gross (1998) offered five main strategies of direct emotion regulation that follow the process and sequence of the way emotions evolve – situation selection, situation modification, attention deployment, cognitive change and response modulation.

All these direct emotion regulation strategies can be applied, with some necessary adjustments, to the realm of intergroup conflicts and to the regulation of group level emotions (Goldenberg, Halperin, Van-Zomeren, Gross, 2016). The required adjustments are mostly impacted by the collectivistic nature of the emotional experience, by the central role played by social identities in these contexts, as well as from the fact that the actual experience of the emotion often takes place in a crowded or at least subjectively "groupy" environment. Also, the question of what is actually needed to regulate the emotions of a group, and in what way is it different from simultaneous regulation of many individual emotions, is still unresolved.

In terms of empirical support for the effectiveness of direct emotion regulation strategies within the context of intractable conflict, one strategy that has received substantial attention is cognitive reappraisal — the modification of meaning-giving to different situations aimed at shifting one's emotional reactions to them. In one example (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013) researchers trained participants in the skills of cognitive reappraisal (unrelated to the context of conflict), and compared those participants' emotional and political reactions to those of a control group. Equipped with the skills of cognitive reappraisal, participants reacted with less anger to a real political anger-inducing event, leading them to demonstrate greater support for conciliatory policies, both one week and five months after training. Same pattern of results was received in another study in which the ultimate political outcome of the emotion regulation intervention has been reduced political intolerance towards conflict related outgroups (Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2013). A similar pattern of results was obtained recently in a less intense intergroup conflict, when two direct emotion regulation strategies, cognitive reappraisal and suppression, led to increased intergroup openness among a sample of Finish participants (Westerlund et al., 2020). Finally, in a recent study, results regarding the constructive implications of reappraisal, were observed also using reappraisal training through smartphone application, rather than through in-lab,

face to face training (Porat, Erel, Pnueli, & Halperin., 2020). Clearly, training in emotion regulation skills can enhance peace-oriented reaction to political events. The challenge with training in direct emotion regulation, however, is that it hinges on people's motivation to regulate their emotions in a direction conducive to peace promotion, which, especially in the context of intractable conflict, is often not the case.

Therefore, another configuration of direct emotion regulation in the context of intergroup conflicts focuses on deliberative attempts to change people's motivation to experience or not to experience certain emotions, rather than on the emotion regulation skills required in order to do that (Porat, Tamir & Halperin, 2020). Change in motivation to experience certain emotions can be done by highlighting either hedonic or instrumental considerations or benefits, or some integration of both. Recent attempts to regulate conflict-related emotion through altering motivation were successful, when across four studies, Porat and colleagues (Porat et al., 2016) were able to alter group-based emotional experiences, and even political reactions, simply by changing what people wanted to feel. Specifically, Jewish-Israelis actively downregulated anger or fear when they were led to believe that the experience of these emotions toward Palestinians might impair their political decision making (Porat et al., 2016).

Indirect Emotion Regulation

Despite the success garnered by the direct approach to emotion regulation, the context of intractable conflict poses a unique challenge in the application and wide-spread utilization of direct emotion regulation. The notion that people involved in deeply entrenched conflicts are motivated to down-regulate negative emotions or up-regulate positive emotions has been described as widely misplaced (Tamir, 2009). On the contrary, many of the beliefs which form the underlying appraisals of such emotions are exacerbated by the collective narrative

(Bar-Tal, 2001; Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009), which serves as a survival mechanism for groups involved in intractable conflicts. Relatedly, recent work has pointed to a misalignment between the valence and functionality of emotions in conflicts (Cohen-Chen, Pliskin, & Goldenberg, 2020). As aforementioned, this work suggests that in conflicts, and particularly intractable conflicts, emotions that are experienced as positive for the individual (such as ingroup pride; Averill, 1983; Baumeister, 2001; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003) are often detrimental to the resolution of conflict, while emotions experienced as negatively-valenced (such as guilt or empathy; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006) can be functional to resolution efforts.

This disaccord further upholds the need for indirect interventions in promoting peace-making attitudes through emotions, manifested as indirect emotion regulation (for a review see Halperin, Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014). One notable advantage of the indirect approach is the fact that it bypasses the necessity for individuals to be motivated to regulate their emotions (Halperin et al., 2014). The process begins with associating between a target conflict-related action tendency and the connected discrete emotion. Next, core appraisal themes underlying the emotions (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984) are identified, and various strategies and interventions are employed to change those appraisals without necessarily mentioning the outgroup or the context of the conflict. While we present a number of examples, this by no means is an exhaustive review, as more examples of indirect emotion regulation can be found in the literature.

One such strategy addresses general beliefs or perceptions, which individuals then apply deductively to the specific context subconsciously. A substantial amount of work employing this approach has utilized the well-established implicit theories (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995) according to which people hold beliefs regarding the malleability of various constructs, such as individuals

(Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2001), and groups (Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, & Mackie, 2007). Research within the interventionist approach has utilized strategies based on implicit theories for two reasons. First, malleability beliefs are relatively simple to change (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Heslin, Latham, & VandeWalle, 2005). Second, malleability is associated with a number of emotions' core appraisal themes. One example is hatred, which is based on the appraisal of the outgroup as inherently and unchangeably evil (Halperin, 2008). Interventionist research which sought to regulate hatred indirectly imparted the belief that groups in general are malleable, without referring to the outgroup in question. This relatively simple, applicable, and indirect intervention successfully reduced intergroup hatred and increased support for concessions within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Halperin et al., 2011). A related design addressed hopelessness, which is rooted in the appraisal of the conflict as irresolvable (Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). Applying a similar approach further led to interventions which instilled general malleability of groups (Goldenberg et al., 2018), conflicts (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014) and the world (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015). Although the specific conflict and outgroup were never mentioned directly, these interventions successfully induced hope for peace and subsequently support for conciliatory policies in intractable conflict.

A further indirect strategy does not depend on deductive reasoning (all groups are malleable therefore the outgroup is malleable), but addresses an unrelated psychological need which would enable acceptance of an idea or message underlying an emotion functional for conflict resolution (Cohen-Chen et al., 2020). One such example is group-based guilt (Branscombe et al., 2004), which induces support for reparations or apologies (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003; McGarty et al., 2005). Guilt is elicited by an appraisal of an unjust or immoral act perpetrated by an individual's ingroup towards an outgroup. The acceptance of ingroup responsibility is however in stark contrast to the ethos

of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001) which asserts ingroup righteousness, and poses a threat to the need for a positive ingroup image (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). One line of work (Čehajić, Efron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011) addressed this need by administering a self-affirmation intervention, which enables group members to tolerate a threat to a specific aspect of their identity, in the form of responsibility acceptance, if they are able to affirm other aspects of their ingroup image. Results showed that without referring to the conflict, the self-affirmation intervention successfully led to increased guilt, subsequently leading to support for reparations to the outgroup in conflict. Across these examples, by addressing a seemingly unrelated belief or psychological need, the context-specific appraisal was influenced when the event or new information is introduced, which subsequently up-regulated or down-regulated the relevant emotion.

3.6 The Integrative Model: Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Conflict

Integrating the descriptive and the interventionist approaches, we contend that each type of intervention corresponds to a different stage in the emotion-elicitation process, creating a comprehensive model of emotions and emotion regulation in conflict (Figure 2).

Figure 2: An Integrative Model of Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Conflict

The *indirect approach* corresponds to the stage in which conflict-related events elicit emotions in conflict. This is because such interventions transform the way events, behaviours, and relationships are appraised, changing the way emotions are experienced. Indeed, this approach essentially targets the appraisal tendencies (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001) rather than an already formed appraisal) which lead to the formulation of the appraisal itself (Halperin et al., 2014). The fact that the indirect approach does not tackle specific conflict-related content or attitudes means that changes in general or unrelated perceptions could potentially be applied to other contexts entirely (or not at all) and is therefore not content-specific to the conflict.

Advantageously, the fact that the indirect approach focuses on the relationship between a conflict-related event and the emotional experience means that the regulation process comes into play before the appraisal and destructive emotion are even formed. Gross (2008) refers to this stage as taking place when the event in the emotion generative process cannot be modified by the individual, but before the event is imbued with a specific meaning. At this point, the individual (or an external party) may take specific actions (attentional deployment; Gross, 2008) to affect how this event is interpreted and becomes the appraisal in question. Applied to the context of conflict, rather than the individual choosing to change appraisal tendencies affecting how an appraisal is formed, the intervention itself (externally administered) changes how conflict-related events are interpreted and therefore how appraisals are formed.

This is meaningful because previous work has established that over time recurring (negative) experiences become entrenched in psychological schema and grow more

automatic, persistent, and stable (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Frijda et al., 1991). Such long-term sentiments in conflict then exacerbate corresponding emotional responses by biasing the cognitive appraisals of an event (Halperin & Gross, 2010). Based on this logic, changing the process by which an event is appraised negatively before it is actually formed would alleviate and weaken this inevitable and destructive association. Previous research has shown that the frequent application of such interventions creates the effect's endurance over time (Yeager & Walton, 2011). It therefore stands to reason that this approach could change *the way* in which events or new information are interpreted and processed in the first place, leading to long term change in intergroup attitudes through intergroup emotions.

On the other hand, the direct approach corresponds to the second stage, in which emotions are antecedents of political outcomes. This is because direct emotion regulation, and particularly the most common form of it, cognitive reappraisal (Gross, 2007), operates mostly after the emotion has already appeared. Here, the assumption is that the appraisal has already been formed (based on previous experience and long-term emotions) and the emotion is already being experienced by the individual. In that case, the reappraisal process intervenes at the point in which the action tendencies associated with the discrete group level emotion are just about to transform into a concrete conflict related motivation, behavioural tendencies, or policy preferences. Naturally, changing emotions after they have already been formed is a challenging task, but research have demonstrated that emotion regulation strategies can be effective, even at that point of the emotional process. Moreover, regulating emotions after they have emerged can be even more important when it comes to group level emotions and to intractable conflicts. This is especially true in these cases because emotional reactions in groups might have a diffused and amplifying nature (see Goldenberg et al., 2016, 2020), so downregulation negative emotions among some members of the group can be effective in preventing escalation of the emotional experience among the group in general.

2. Conclusions and Future Directions

A recent consensus paper, written by dozens of leading scholars of emotions and affective sciences, has recently raised the question of whether social sciences are now moving into the era of what they defined as "Affectivism" (See: Dukes et al., 2021). In the final paragraph of that paper, the authors state that "the conceptual, methodological and technical advances made within the last few decades have demonstrated that affective processes are unquestionably enlightening when it comes to understanding both behavior and cognition. While it will ultimately be the responsibility of historians of science to determine whether or not a new era has begun, given the undeniable impact of affective sciences on our models of brain, mind, and behavior, it seems relevant to ask today whether we are now in the era of "affectivism" (Dukes et al., 2021, p. 5).

We argue that although the scientific work on the role of emotions and emotion regulation processes in intergroup conflicts has developed rapidly in the last two decades, it is still in its' early stages. The dominance of affective processes in this area of research is not yet close to the description in the previous paragraph regarding social and behavioral sciences more broadly. On the one hand, most political psychologists agree today that emotions play a key role in driving individuals and groups towards violent conflict, but also towards de-escalation processes. At the same time, both from a conceptual and a methodological perspective, there is still a long way to go before we can achieve at least part of the potential embedded in studying emotional processes in conflict situations.

We have suggested in the current chapter that to address that gap, an integrative approach should be adopted, one that brings together a descriptive view on the role of emotions in conflicts, with a more interventionist approach on the ways through which emotional change can promote support for peaceful resolution of such conflicts. The current

chapter reviewed several steps made in recent years to promote such an integrative approach. For example, as we reviewed in the current chapter, scholars in the field have managed to develop a much more nuanced view of the nature and implications of discrete group level emotions on conflict related policies and behaviors. After more than two decades on intensive research, empirical work from various contexts on prolonged conflicts have allowed us to more deeply understand which situations would give rise to which group-level emotions and among which individuals. These studies also enabled us to pinpoint the discrete emotions that constitute catalysts or barriers to various conflict related processes (e.g., support for compromises for peace, humanitarian aid, intergroup interaction and negotiation etc'). We illustrate that what seem to be considered positive emotions might be at times destructive to conflict resolution, and vice versa regarding negative emotions that at times may be constructive. Finally, in the last decade, there is some work showing quite promising indications regarding the impact of effective emotion regulation processes as tools for conflict transformation.

However, as we suggested, more work is needed and, as we see it, political psychologists should utilize progress made in other domains of research and society to deepen our understanding of emotional processes in conflicts. For example, social media provides a fertile ground to the study of emotional processes in groups in general and in conflicts more specifically (Goldenberg & Gross, 2020). Also, big data science coupled with social media targeting, enables a more personalized approach to the way individuals are driven by emotions in conflict situations, as well as to the way different emotion regulation efforts can differently influence different individuals according to their backgrounds, personality characteristics or ideologies (Halperin & Schori-Eyal, 2020).

Future work should also go beyond the emotional 'immediate suspects', taking into account other group-based emotions, such as (but not limited to) *schadenfreude*, admiration

and contempt. It should also study other emotion regulation strategies besides cognitive reappraisal, while taking into account more seriously the aspects unique to intergroup conflicts such as power relations, traumatic experiences and identity complexity. Finally, from a methodological point of view, the integration of neurophysiological studies, on the one hand with large scale field experiments, on the other hand, seem like the next step in the study of emotions in conflict

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