Does Daily Dishonesty Foster Corruption? The Impact Group Identity, Amount of Money, and Type of Action

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Abstract

In this research, we investigate the effect of group identity, amount of money, and type of action on engagement in corrupt behavior. We conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 experiment in which participants responded to scenarios where they stated how likely they were to engage in corruption. In these scenarios, group identity (ingroup or outgroup), the amount of money at stake (high or low), and type of action (passive or active) were manipulated to evaluate their influence on this ethical decision-making process. We also tested past dishonest behavior and social norms (injunctive and descriptive ones) as predictors of corruption intentions. Our main results are: (i) participants who admitted to having engaged in past dishonesty more often reported stronger intentions of corrupt behavior; (ii) descriptive norms were significant predictors of corruption intentions; (iii) individuals tended to engage in corruption more often when dealing with ingroup members and lower amounts of money. These results indicate that individuals who engage in petty dishonesty may be more corruptible. Our findings also suggest the relevance of investing in public policies to make norms of honesty salient in order to prevent corruption and that negotiations be held among ingroup members should be impeded.

Keywords: social identity theory; ingroup favoritism; moral decision-making; social norms; dishonest behavior.

Corruption consists of a global issue that places a heavy toll on countries' development efforts, for it diverts funding away from the intended parties (Runde & Metzger, 2020). In fact, the estimated amount of money lost due to corruption globally comprises \$2 trillion a year (Thomson, 2017). Consequently, countries may fail to address basic needs, such as health (Bellow, 2020; Dyer, 2006), education (Ferraz et al., 2009; Poisson, 2010), and safety (Runde & Metzger, 2020). Developing countries bear the most disproportionate share of the costs of corruption since corrupt practices constrain economic growth and prevent these nations from becoming self-reliant (Runde & Metzger, 2020). Besides, low-income countries with weak governing institutions and poor rule of law are the ones that are the most prone to corruption (Runde & Metzger, 2020).

According to a purely economic standpoint, dishonesty consists of lying as the result of trading-off the potential benefits of it against the potential costs, each weighted by their probability of occurrence (Thielmann & Hilbig, 2019). From a psychological point of view, however, individuals not only consider potential material costs of lying but also psychological costs in terms of a threat to one's moral self-image (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Mazar et al., 2008; Pascual-Ezama et al., 2015). Dishonesty is considered a broader term, comprising actions that incur in cheating and lack of integrity and may cause damage to third parties. Unlike dishonesty, corruption necessarily involves the misuse of public resources for pursuing power and/or political gains (Lindgreen, 2004), being generally defined as the "abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International, 2020). Any regular citizen may be dishonest, but only someone who holds a public position can be corrupt.

The presence of others is essential to ethical decision-making, and it is not only relevant in situations in which individuals share the social utility of their behavior but also when others help to establish a pattern for ethical behavior. What is considered to be a proper or expected behavior is negotiated and understood through social interaction (Rimal &

Lapinski, 2015). People learn about and negotiate norms of conduct through interpersonal discussions, direct observations, and interactions through information conveyed by the means of communication (Chung & Rimal, 2016). Through observation, one can determine how often this behavior is in a particular environment, and it becomes possible to draw the dividing line between ethical and unethical acts (Gino et al., 2009).

This study aims at testing whether manipulations of the amount of money at stake (high or low), group identity (ingroup or outgroup), and type of action (active or passive) may influence engagement in corruption. It also aims at investigating whether past acts of dishonesty as well as social norms can predict intentions of engaging in corrupt behavior.

Social Norms

When engaging in any sort of behavior, individuals look for situational clues, which indicate whether this behavior is acceptable or not in that specific circumstance. These clues may consist of rules that constrain the behavior by eliciting conformity, which are known as social norms (Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014). According to the social norm theory (Cialdini et al., 1990), the social context determines which type of norms people follow in a certain time and how these norms interfere in the immediate behavior of an individual. There is usually an interactive effect between injunctive and descriptive norms such that the effect on behavior is strongest when injunctive and descriptive norms align (Oliver et al., 2019; Rimal, 2008). Usually, when injunctive norms are strong and accessible, there is little effect of descriptive norms on behavior (Oliver et al., 2019; Rhodes, Potocki, & Thomas, 2019).

Individuals tend to incorrectly perceive the attitudes and/or behaviors of peers and other community members to be different from their own when in fact they are not (Berkowitz, 2005) — a phenomenon that has been termed pluralistic ignorance (Miller & McFarland, 1991). Other's risk behaviors are usually overestimated while healthy or protective behaviors are usually underestimated (Berkowitz, 2005). Pluralistic ignorance

consists of a problem because it may cause individuals to change their behavior to approximate the misperceived norm.

As for socially undesirable behaviors, when social context highlights descriptive norms that support them, it helps people to justify the behavior, which reduces dissonance. Conversely, when the social context highlights injunctive norms that contradict these behaviors, the dissonance is increased. For instance, Baumgartner et al. (2011) reported that, to avoid cognitive dissonance when engaging in risky sexual online behavior, individuals justified it by claiming that others did the same thing. Furthermore, adolescents may cognitively normalize their behavior by judging their peers' behavior and approval by exaggerating the number of friends who engage in it (Baumgartner et al., 2011). This seems to ultimately downplay possible negative consequences of such behavior.

Is a dishonest society more likely to have more widespread corruption?

The extent to which individuals follow the rules depends on how prevalent rule violation is in a particular place (Keizer et al., 2008). If cheating is profoundly embedded in a certain society and goes legally or socially unpunished, individuals may start to see daily dishonesty as justifiable and acceptable. In a similar vein, experiencing unfair situations increases dishonesty (Houser et al., 2012) since weak institutions and cultural legacies that generate rule violation not only cause direct adverse economic consequences but also impair individual intrinsic honesty (Gächter & Schulz, 2016).

When an individual encounters a corrupt behavior frequently, this person may progressively become desensitized to the behavior so that as time passes by, it causes little moral discomfort (Bandura, 2016; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 2019). As a result, acting dishonestly may not compromise one's self-concept of honesty any longer (Gino et al., 2009). It is also expected that through routinization — a process by which individuals justify present behavior using past behaviors as reference —, individuals that commit daily acts of

dishonesty lean toward performing more and more of them in the future (Bicchieri & Ganegonda, 2016). According to Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004), “If the past practices were ethical and acceptable, then practices that are similar and not too different are also acceptable. If each step away from ethical and acceptable practices is sufficiently small, small enough not to appear qualitatively different, then a series of these small steps can lead to a journey of unethical and illegal activities” (p. 228).

Past behavior guides future responses. It happens when the processing that controls well-practiced behaviors in constant contexts becomes automatic (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). On the other hand, when behaviors are not well learned or when they are performed in unstable contexts, conscious decision-making is usually necessary to carry them out. Under these conditions, past behavior may contribute to intentions, and the current behavior is guided by these intentions (Ouellette & Wood, 1998). In a similar vein, feedback about past behavior has a direct effect on individuals’ attitudes and ultimate behavioral decisions that were independent of the outcome-specific cognitions (Albarracín & Wyer, 2000). This effect was observed even when individuals had not performed an action in the past but were induced to believe so (Albarracín & Wyer, 2000). Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to expect that past engagement in dishonesty be a significant predictor of engagement in corruption.

Group identity, amount of money, and type of action

Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982) suggests another critical factor that may influence the way people interpret others’ behavior: the extent to which they identify with others. This theory considers the role of self-concept and associated cognitive processes as well as social beliefs in group processes and intergroup relations (Hogg, 2016). Whether large demographic categories or small task-oriented teams, social groups provide their members with a shared identity that prescribes and evaluates who they are, what they should believe and how they

should behave (Hogg, 2016). They also highlight how the ingroup is distinct from relevant outgroups in a particular social context (Hogg, 2016).

Individuals tend to cooperate more when interacting with others sharing the same group identity (ingroup) (McLeish & Oxoby, 2011; Weng & Carlsson, 2015). When people share identity characteristics, unfair distributive decisions do not trigger a dishonest reaction; however, when different group identities coexist, dishonest behavior is observed as a reaction to unfairness (Della Valle & Ploner, 2017). In contrast, when interacting with members of other groups, individuals display less cooperation (Charness & Jackson, 2007; McLeish & Oxoby, 2007) and coordination (Chen & Chen, 2011; Chen et al., 2014). Indeed, individuals are more likely to practice an immoral behavior if this behavior is accepted or promoted by relevant others, such as parents and friends (Kam et al., 2018). Therefore, when individuals observe unethical mistakes of ingroup members, they tend to feel more comfortable with losing their ethics code.

When identification is high, others' behavior tends to have a more significant influence on observers than when identification is low. An extensive study obtained evidence for this theory (Wenzel, 2004). In fact, perceived high risk of exclusion from one's group predicted engagement in pro-group unethical behaviors when the group member had a high need for inclusion (Thau et al., 2015). Besides, there is a higher probability that individuals will engage in dishonest behavior after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity (Della Valle & Ploner, 2017).

There is a relationship between social identification and conformity to salient ingroup norms (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2009). However, this trend is only found when there is strong identification with the group (Masson & Fritzsche, 2019). This relation holds even more robust for peripheral members, who are hoping to stay in the group and become more similar to other ingroup members (Masson & Fritzsche, 2019). Therefore, when there is either weak

identification or when high-identifiers are prototypical, group members may be open to deviant intentions of behavior. Based on this evidence, we expect that corruption be more frequent when dealing with ingroup members in comparison with outgroup members. Being dishonest may affect one's self-concept. Indeed, individuals tend to behave more dishonestly when faced with the opportunity but not to the maximum extent (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Mazar et al., 2008; Pascual-Ezama et al., 2015). As dishonesty is psychologically costly, individuals tend not to want to lie to obtain very small profits (Shalvi et al., 2011), but at the same time, very large incentives can result in less cheating, for higher incentives increase the perception of the severity of dishonesty, generating higher psychological costs (Hilbig & Thielmann, 2017). Thus, profits must be worthwhile but not to the point of being disproportionate, exceeding the corresponding psychological costs (Thielmann & Hilbig, 2019). By considering this rationale, we expect that corruption will be more frequent when dealing with low amounts of money in comparison with high ones.

Acts of omission that result in negative outcomes are generally considered more acceptable than acts of commission which incur the same type of result — a tendency that is called omission bias (Ritov & Baron, 1990). This tendency of judging inactions as less severe than actions that cause negative outcomes is a consistent phenomenon reported across several domains (Bar-Eli et al., 2007; Pittarello et al., 2016). In fact, individuals are more likely to refrain from telling the truth than actively lying when they face the temptation to benefit from dishonesty (Pittarello et al., 2016). This happens because there is reluctance in individuals to assign responsibility when dishonesty takes the form of omission if compared to commission. For this reason, dishonest behaviors that take more passive forms are considered more acceptable compared to the ones that take more active forms (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Therefore, it is reasonable to conceive that corruption will be more frequent when committing active actions in comparison with passive actions.

This research aims at testing the effect of the manipulation of three factors (group identity, amount of money, and type of action) on corruption intentions in hypothetical scenarios. It also intends to assess the role of past dishonest behavior and social norms as predictors of corrupt behavior.

Method

Participants

Participants were obtained through convenience sampling. There were three group manipulations (amount of money at stake, group identity, and type of action). Our sample size was determined by a power analysis which suggested that we would need at least 183 participants to detect an effect size of .10, relying on an alpha of .05, power of .8, and three groups. We aimed to recruit 300 participants to account for possible exclusions.

A total of 301 people answered the survey. This sample was composed of 170 women and 131 men, with a mean age of 28.8 years. As for education, 32.2% reported to have finished high school, 27.6% have completed an undergraduate course, and 39.9% are post-graduate students. Almost the entire sample was composed of Brazilian people (99.1%). Their average monthly income ranged from R\$ 3,816.01 to R\$ 4,470.00 (from approximately US\$ 624.74 to US\$ 876.52).

Measures and materials

Social Norms. Information on injunctive and descriptive norms about three types of dishonest behaviors was gathered: jumping a waiting line, not giving wrong additional change back, and not offering a seat to an elderly person on a bus. An example of an injunctive norms item is “My friends think jumping a waiting line is acceptable” and one of descriptive norms is “My friends jump waiting lines. This measure was answered at a 5-point Likert scale (1= Strongly agree, 5= Strongly disagree) (see Appendix A for all items). A factorial analysis

pointed out that the scale contains two dimensions instead of four, as it was supposed beforehand. Cronbach's alpha for the measure is .91.

Past Dishonest Behavior. This measure was created in the scope of this research to assess dishonest behavior that was performed in the past. It is comprised of three items, such as "I have already jumped a waiting line" and "I did not give additional change back when I received it by mistake". Participants answered them on a 5-point Likert scale (1= Never, 5= Always) (see Appendix B for all items). By analyzing eigenvalues as well as parallel analysis results, we decided to extract one factor. We found a KMO coefficient of .54, and a reliability analysis pointed to a Cronbach's alpha of .32. This low index was found probably because participants admitted less to not having given additional change back ($M= 1.59$, $SD=0.85$) and not having given a seat to an elderly person ($M=1.58$, $SD=.85$) in contrast with jumping a waiting line ($M=1.91$, $SD=.87$).

Corruption Scenarios. Scenarios were presented to the participants to measure their intentions of engaging in corrupt behavior (Appendix C). They comprised 16 items which were developed in the scope of this research. All of them required that participants pictured themselves either as public officers or as regular citizens who had to decide on whether engaging or not in corrupt behavior. When creating the scenarios, factors that may play a part in engaging in such type of behavior were considered, such as situations in which high/low sums of money were at stake, ingroup/outgroup identity, and passive/active action. An extraction analysis pointed to a KMO of .75 and the existence of only one factor. Reliability analysis showed a Cronbach's alpha of .90. See Appendix B for all items.

Sociodemographic measure. The following information was collected: gender, educational level, age and income. Gender was measured in a binary way (1= Male, 2= Female). The educational level was measured at four points (1 = Finished elementary school, 2 = Finished high school, 3 = Finished undergraduate degree, 4 = Post graduation). Age was

informed by the participants through an answer to the open question “what is your age?”.

Income was reported by using a 9-point scale, ranging from "up to a minimum wage" to "over 15 minimum wages" (1= up to R\$ 954 to 9 = over R\$ 14,310.01).

Procedure

The study has a 2 (group identity: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (amount of money: high vs. low) x 2 (type of action: active vs. passive) within-subjects design. The research was carried out individually on the Internet, and the manipulations occurred through the situations presented in the Corruption scenarios. A set of questionnaires was implemented on Google Forms and was propagated on social media. First, participants answered the Social Norms measure and then the Past Dishonest Behavior measure. After that, they responded to the Corruption Scenarios and the Sociodemographic measure.

Independent variables in this research are the three variables manipulated in the scenarios (group identity, amount of money, and type of action). Dependent variables consist of the answers to the scenarios. The obtained values were analyzed through univariate regression analyses and a repeated-measures ANOVA performed on SPSS 22.0.

The study reported in the manuscript strictly followed the Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Research with Human Participants proposed by the American Psychological Association. Participants were informed about the research purposes, the risks involved in taking part of the research, the confidentiality and anonymity of the participation. Participants explicitly informed their consent in taking part in the research by checking a box and were free to quit the participation at any moment. No personal information was collected to preserve participants' anonymity. The research protocol was not submitted to an approving institutional review board because the committee's rules and regulations in Brazil only evaluate projects in the realm of medical and pharmacological research. Considering the

situation in the current national regulations, it is not required to obtain approval from an institutional review board to conduct studies with human subjects in social sciences.

Results

A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed to assess the effect of group identity, amount of money, and type of action. As the sphericity assumption has not been met, we used Greenhouse-Geisser correction to report the results. There was a significant effect of the group identity manipulation on corruption intentions, $F(1, 298) = 87.84, p < .001, \eta^2p = .228$, with people reporting to be more corrupt when dealing with ingroup members in comparison with outgroup members. There was also a significant effect of the amount of money at stake, $F(1, 298) = 5.26, p = .02, \eta^2p = .017$, with people reporting stronger intentions of engaging in corruption when dealing with low amounts of money in comparison with higher ones. Regarding the type of action, there was not a significant effect on engagement in corruption $F(1, 298) = .39, p = .53, \eta^2p = .001$. See Table 1 for means and standard deviations of corruption intentions among the different groups.

(Insert Table 1 here)

Furthermore, some significant interactions that cannot be removed by monotonic transformation were found. There was a marginal interaction between group identity and the amount of money at stake, $F(1, 298) = 3.38, p = .07, \eta^2p = .011$ and a significant effect of the interaction between group identity and type of action, $F(1, 298) = 6.09, p = .01, \eta^2p = .020$. Conversely, a significant effect of the interaction of amount of money and type of action on corruption was not found, $F(1, 298) = 2.75, p = .10, \eta^2p = .009$. The interaction effect of the three dependent variables on corruption was not significant as well, $F(1, 298) = 2.50, p = .12, \eta^2p = .008$. See Figures 1 and 2 to visualize the interaction effect between the three variables more accurately.

(Insert Figures 1 and 2 here)

Injunctive norms, descriptive norms, and past dishonest behavior were tested as predictors of corruption intentions through the performance of regression analyses. As results, participants who admitted to having engaged more in dishonesty in the past reported stronger intentions of corrupt behavior, $t(301) = 5.82$, $\beta = .61$, $p < 0.001$, 95% CI [.38, .81], $R^2 = .10$. There was not a significant effect of injunctive norms on corruption, $t(301) = 1.17$, $\beta = .11$, $p > .05$, 95% CI [-.50, .15], $R^2 = .005$. There was a significant effect of descriptive norms on corruption intentions, $t(301) = 2.00$, $\beta = .20$, $p = .05$, 95% CI [.004, .39], $R^2 = .013$. By performing correlation analyses, we could notice that past dishonest behavior as well as injunctive and descriptive norms were positively correlated to each other, and the strongest correlation occurred between the two types of norms. The correlation coefficient of past behavior and injunctive norms was $R = .25$, $p < .001$, $n = 301$. The one of the correlation between descriptive norms and past behavior was $R = .30$, $p < .001$, $n = 301$, and the one between the two types of norms was $R = .85$, $p < .001$, $n = 301$.

Discussion

In this research, we found a significant difference concerning corruption intentions when participants negotiated with ingroup members in hypothetical scenarios in comparison with outgroup members. This difference is in line with the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982), which states that individuals tend to favor members of their own groups to the detriment of others. Indeed, when dealing with a friend, who is presumably an ingroup member, participants admitted to being more likely to accept or offer a bribe, which would bring financial gains to both the participant and the ingroup member. This is in agreement with the proposition that individuals tend to feel comfortable with losing their ethic code that when they observe unethical mistakes of ingroup members (Wenzel, 2004) and with the reported that there is a higher probability that individuals will engage in dishonest behavior

after having experienced unfairness perpetrated by an individual with a salient group identity (Della Valle & Ploner, 2017).

Individuals were more corrupt when a lower payout was involved. This might have happened because handling lower amounts may be more excusable and causes less damage to one's self-concept of honesty. This result supports the findings of Hilbig and Thielmann (2017), suggesting that higher incentives increase the perception of the severity of dishonesty, incurring higher psychological costs. It is also in line with Thielmann and Hilbig (2019)' statement that profits must be worthwhile but not to the point of being disproportionate, for this disproportion would incur high psychological costs.

We did not find a significant tendency for participants to engage more in corruption when it involved passive actions in comparison with active ones. This result does not support reports that omissions which result in negative outcomes are considered more acceptable than acts of commission that cause the same outcomes (Bar-Eli et al., 2007; Pittarello et al., 2016). It also contradicts the claim of Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004) — which suggests that dishonest behaviors that take more passive forms are considered more acceptable compared to the ones that take more active forms — and the works of Bar-Eli et al. (2007) and Pittarello et al. (2016) — which reported that there is a tendency of judging omission as less severe than commission upon causing negative outcomes. However, the significant interaction with group identity could suggest that the omission bias is only present when considering the effect of ingroup favoritism. Future research is encouraged to explore this relationship.

We found that past dishonest actions predicted corruption. This is in consonance with the research of Ouellette and Wood (1998), which pointed out that the frequency of past behaviors reflects habit strength and has a direct effect on future performance. It also suggests that even small acts of dishonesty must be confronted to prevent corruption. In fact, Keizer et al. (2008) reported that the extent to which individuals follow the rules depends on how

prevalent rule violation is in a particular place. As lack of legal or social punishment may lead individuals to start to see daily dishonesty as justifiable and acceptable (Keizer et al., 2008), cheating must, therefore, be confronted, even if it is petty and does not cause major detrimental consequences.

Descriptive norms was a significant predictor of corruption intentions while injunctive norms was not. These results are in line with the report of Baumgartner et al. (2011), which stated that individuals tend to justify a socially undesirable behavior by claiming that others did the same thing, helping to avoid cognitive dissonance. This also supports the finding of Tools et al. (2012), claiming that individuals tend to seek the environment for information about what people typically do in situations which lack an accessible injunctive norm. Since Rhodes et al. (2019) and Tools et al. (2012) reported that when injunctive norms are strong and accessible there are little effects of descriptive norms on behavior, making injunctive norms of honesty salient and chronically accessible may be effective in reducing engagement in socially undesirable behaviors. Therefore, social norms intervention strategy could consist of an efficient way to prevent this type of practices (Berkowitz, 2005; Mattern & Neighbors, 2004).

One limitation of this study is that data about group identification were not collected. Since there is a consistent relationship between social identification and conformity to salient ingroup norms (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2009), especially when there is a strong identification with the group (Masson & Fritsche, 2019), it is relevant to gather information about the strength of group identification. Besides, the relation holds even more robust for peripheral members, who are hoping to stay in the group and tend to make stronger efforts to become more similar to other ingroup members (Masson & Fritsche, 2019). In this research, it is not possible to know to which degree participants identified with the group as well as whether they consider themselves as peripheral or prototypical group members. It is

encouraged that further research be conducted on the role of group identification in moral judgement and compliance with norms.

This study has some limitations. First, The sample was not randomly drawn. It is likely that there is some sort of bias, seeing that the nature of the recruitment was such that a relatively young and highly educated group of participants was included. Besides, the questions and measures in this research were not presented in a randomized order. Future studies are encouraged to carry out a similar type of analysis but applying the measures in a random order to avoid a possible order bias in the responses collected. Furthermore, we must recognize that, when dealing with ethical and moral issues, participants tend to give more socially desirable answers, which consists of an inherent trait in research in social psychology. In an attempt to circumvent this issue in future research, other types of research designs could be employed, such as laboratory, field and natural experiments. One possibility consists of an incentive-compatible experiment that exogenously varies conditions and allows participants to make actual decisions with consequences. By doing so, manipulations could be implemented in such a way that researchers could observe behaviors directly and not rely only on participants' answers, which are prone to socially desirable response bias. It is also encouraged that replications be performed to assess whether the results found in this study will be consistent when applied to a different sample.

This study has also brought some contributions to the advancement of the literature on moral judgment and dishonest behavior. Firstly, we provided further evidence to the impact of ingroup identity, amount of money, and type of action on corruption intentions. Secondly, the study sheds light on other relevant predictors of engagement in corruption (past dishonest behavior and descriptive norms), also strengthening the reports present in the literature on dishonest behavior. Thirdly, our findings suggest that social norms intervention strategies may provide an efficient way to fight and reduce corruption practices. Finally, testing the

applicability of well-established theories to non-WEIRD populations such as Brazil is crucial since these theories are usually based on samples drawn entirely from WEIRD societies, and the findings based on the latter sample may not be generalizable to the former one (Henrich et al., 2013). Considering the effect of these predictors is of relevance and should be considered by policy-makers in the elaboration of policies aimed at preventing corrupt and dishonest acts in the future.

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Tables

Table 1. Interaction of group identity with amount of money and type of action

Type of Group	Amount of Money	Type of Action	Mean	Standard Error	Confidence Interval 95%	
					Inferior Limit	Superior Limit
Ingroup	High	Passive	3.46	0.18	3.11	3.80
	High	Active	3.81	0.19	3.44	4.19
	Low	Passive	4.03	0.23	3.57	4.49
	Low	Active	4.04	0.23	3.58	4.49
Outgroup	High	Passive	2.61	0.13	2.35	2.87
	High	Active	2.52	0.11	2.31	2.76
	Low	Passive	2.72	0.11	2.49	2.95
	Low	Active	2.63	0.14	2.36	2.90

Figures

Figure 1. Estimated Marginal Means for the interaction between Group and Amount of Money at Active Action Level.

Figure 2. Estimated Marginal Means for the interaction between Group and Amount of Money at Passive Action Level.