**CHILDREN ENDORSE DETERRENCE MOTIVATIONS FOR
THIRD-PARTY PUNISHMENT BUT DERIVE HIGHER
ENJOYMENT FROM COMPENSATING VICTIMS**

Rhea L. Arini^{1,2}, Marukh Mahmood², Juliana Bocarejo Aljure³, Gordon Ingram³, Luci Wiggs², &
Ben Kenward²

¹ School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, University of Oxford, UK

² Centre for Psychological Research, Oxford Brookes University, UK

³ Department of Psychology, Los Andes University, Bogotá, Colombia

Correspondence should be addressed to: Rhea L. Arini (rhea88bg@gmail.com)

Data, script, stimuli, analysis pipelines are available at Open Science Framework:
<https://osf.io/4ygw5/>

Abstract

Children's punishment behaviour may be driven by both retribution and deterrence, but the potential primacy of either motive is unknown. Moreover, children's punishment enjoyment and compensation enjoyment have never been directly contrasted. Here, British, Colombian and Italian 7- to 11-year-old children (N = 123) operated a Justice System in which they viewed different moral transgressions in Minecraft, a globally popular videogame, either face-to-face with an experimenter or over the internet. Children could respond to transgressions by punishing transgressors and compensating victims. The purpose of the system was framed in terms of retribution, deterrence, or compensation, between subjects. Children's performance, endorsement and enjoyment of punishment and compensation were measured, along with their endorsement of retribution vs. deterrence as punishment justifications, during and/or after justice administration. Children overwhelmingly endorsed deterrence over retribution as their punishment justification, irrespective of age. When asked to reproduce the presented frame in their own words, children more reliably reproduced the deterrence than retribution frame. Punishment enjoyment decreased while compensation enjoyment increased over time. Despite enjoying compensation more, children preferentially endorsed punishment over compensation, especially with increasing age and transgression severity. Reported deterrent justifications, superior reproduction of deterrence framing, lower enjoyment of punishment than compensation, and higher endorsement of punishment over compensation together suggest that children felt they *ought* to mete out punishment as a means to deter future transgressions. Face-to-face and internet-mediated responses were not distinguishable, supporting a route to social psychology research with primary school-aged children unable to physically visit labs.

Keywords: third-party punishment; compensation of victims; enjoyment and endorsement of third-party interventions; punishment motives

General Introduction

When violations of moral norms occur, there is a tension between different possible courses of action that can satisfy the psychological need to see justice restored. Witnessing norm transgressions can trigger at least two different – although non-mutually exclusive – types of third-party interventions: punishment of transgressors (i.e., third-party punishment) and/or compensation of victims. Whereas punitive justice has received a great deal of academic attention, compensatory justice still lags behind (but see Gummerum et al., 2016; Petersen et al., 2012). Although some large-scale societies have moved towards increased use of reparative justice within penal systems in recent decades (including compensation, Johnstone & Van Ness, 2013), the focus remains on punitive sanctions. This is striking in light of anthropological evidence documenting that small-scale societies do not commonly adopt punishment to solve disputes (Marlowe et al., 2007), but they more frequently involve third-parties in processes of mediation and arbitration. These forms of triadic settlements are aimed at promoting reconciliation between the antagonists, or at rendering decisions about compensation of the wronged party (Fry, 2000; Singh & Garfield, 2022). Moreover, whereas third-party punishment seems to be a uniquely human behaviour (Riedl et al., 2012), ethologists have observed triadic post-conflict affiliations directed towards victims of aggressions in non-human primates (Fraser et al., 2009), some of which might be considered the evolutionary bases of human compensation.

The number of empirical papers on children's third-party punishment has reached double digits in the last years (see Marshall & McAuliffe, 2022 for a review). However, very few developmental studies have simultaneously tested different types of third-party interventions in response to moral transgressions (reviewed below). Thus, we investigate here a range of factors that could potentially modulate children's choices between punishment and compensation, the

affective states following the enactment of these two types of third-party interventions, as well as the motivational basis of punishment. Given that most of the literature on children's third-party interventions has been conducted in Northern European and Northern American countries (but see Yang et al., 2021 and Liu et al., 2021), we included children from three different countries (UK, Italy and Colombia) to increase diversity in the sample. Our analysis focuses on commonalities rather than differences across countries.

Third-Party Interventions: Compensation and Punishment

One line of research has put the two types of third-party interventions in direct comparison to establish if people tend to be compensation- or punishment-oriented. In the adult literature, some studies have provided evidence for preference for punishment (Adams & Mullen, 2015; van Prooijen, 2010), others for compensation (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013; Lotz et al., 2011; Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2018; Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans et al., 2018). These mixed results might be due to whether the third-party intervention options at participants' disposal were personally costly or not. In studies showing higher willingness to compensate instead of punishing, both punishment and compensation were economically costly to the participants. In contrast, in studies showing preference for punishment over compensation there were no costs associated with either type of third-party intervention. This could be due to participants acting upon intuition rather than deliberation when they can carry out third-party interventions at no cost to themselves (Van Doorn & Brouwers, 2017).

There are now a handful of studies that have investigated children's compensatory and punitive tendencies simultaneously. In one such study, 9- to 22-year-old Dutch participants witnessed instances of social exclusion, and then played economic games with the victims and transgressors. Older participants paid greater costs to compensate victims and punish

transgressors, but it was not possible to establish whether participants preferred compensation or punishment, because the two were not contrasted directly (Will et al., 2013). Other developmental studies were explicitly designed to assess if children tend to be compensation- or punishment-oriented. However, in contrast to the adult literature, it is challenging to identify systematic patterns, in part because compensation was differently operationalised across studies.

In one line of research, compensation entails any prosocial actions towards the victim to make up for the transgression they suffered, while the transgressor's payoff is left untouched. For example, in hypothetical scenarios involving physical harm, 7- to 12-year-old Canadian children were more willing to see the transgressor being punished than the victim being compensated, irrespective of age, with this tendency becoming more pronounced for more severe transgressions (Miller & McCann, 1979). Conversely, after witnessing third-party interventions in response to inequity (i.e., selfish resource distributions), 5- to 9-year-old US children evaluated compensation more positively than punishment, regardless of their age (Lee & Warneken, 2020). However, when given the choice to intervene themselves in response to inequity, 6- to 9-year-old US children were more likely to pay a cost to enact punishment than compensation (McAuliffe & Dunham, 2021).

In another line of research employing ownership transgressions such as theft, punishment was pitted against restitution. Restitution confounds compensation and punishment since the action of returning the resources to the victim also affects the transgressor's payoff. These studies all used non-incentivised paradigms, where children did not have to pay a cost to enact their preferred intervention. For example, in response to theft, 3-year-old German children preferred to return stolen resources to the victim (i.e., restitution) rather than just making them inaccessible to both the thief and the victim (i.e., punishment) or doing nothing (Riedl et al.,

2015). In another experiment, 3- to 6-year-old Chinese children also preferred to enact restitution over punishment but in this case punishment entailed taking away even the resources that the transgressors had prior to the theft (Yang et al., 2021). Finally, when witnessing victims' reactions to ownership transgressions, 4- to 6-year-old Chinese children evaluated restitution more positively than punishment, especially in case of harsh punishment (Liu et al., 2021).

We did not operationalise compensation as restitution. Rather, compensation entailed providing the victim with resources to make up for the damage endured, while the transgressor's payoff remained unchanged. Our research intended to expand knowledge about whether children's orientation for punishment or compensation is modulated by factors such as judgement of transgression severity, transgression type and children's age. In order to assess orientation, we measured punishment vs. compensation endorsement via forced-choice self-report tasks, after children had the opportunity to enact both compensation and punishment behaviours. However, we did not assess children's orientation by comparing levels of compensation and punishment because our paradigm used different currencies for each (material resources for compensation; time-outs for punishment).

Specifically, we investigated whether endorsement of compensation vs. punishment would change as a function of how seriously children judged transgressions (Q1, Table 1). Since Miller and McCann (1979) showed that children's preference for punishment over compensation was higher in response to severe transgressions compared to mild transgressions, we expected to observe children increasingly endorsing punishment over compensation the more severely they judged the transgressions.

We were also interested in whether punishment vs. compensation endorsement would be affected by the type of moral transgression (Q2, Table 1). We predicted children would attribute

more importance to punishment in case of physical harm (Miller & McCann, 1979), and to compensation in case of ownership transgressions such as theft (Riedl et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2021). We were less confident in making predictions about the effect of inequity transgressions, given the lack of relevant literature at the time of developing our experiment (contrasting findings were published later, see Lee & Warneken, 2020 and McAuliffe & Dunham, 2021). However, it seemed plausible that children would preferentially endorse compensation in response to inequity, as there is evidence that children are motivated to intervene as third parties by the desire to even out the resource imbalances experienced by victims (Arini et al., 2021). Importantly, in our paradigm resource imbalances could be corrected only via compensation, not punishment. Because of our interest in both transgression type and transgression severity judgement, which are likely to be associated, we examine their independent effects using models controlling for both.

Finally, we tested whether children's endorsement of punishment vs. compensation was dependent on age (Q3, Table 1). Since Riedl et al. (2015) demonstrated that third-party interventions in early childhood are compensation-oriented, whereas Miller & McCann (1979) showed that third-party interventions in middle- to late childhood are punishment-oriented, we hypothesised there might be a shift towards endorsement of punishment over compensation with increasing age. We note that this is also consistent with some more recent studies that were not available when we designed our experiment (Yang et al., 2021; McAuliffe & Dunham, 2021; Liu et al., 2021).

Affective States Induced by Third-Party Interventions

It is unclear whether individuals' endorsement of punishment vs. compensation is aligned to enjoyment of punishment vs. compensation. A misalignment (i.e., preferential endorsement of

punishment accompanied by higher enjoyment of compensation) would suggest that individuals see punishment as a moral duty, something that ought to be done (Arini et al., 2021).

Neuroscientific studies have begun to clarify the affective components involved in punishment and compensation in adults. The activation of the striatum, a key area in the brain's reward circuitry, seems to reflect anticipatory satisfaction. This kind of striatal response has been observed both in people meting out punishment (Strobel et al., 2011) and compensation (Hu et al., 2015). Activation of the striatum predicts charitable donations to victims of misfortune (Genevsky et al., 2013; Harbaugh et al., 2007).

Research focused on adults' subjective reports of punishment-related emotions has instead produced somewhat mixed results. People confronted with a cooperative norm violation predicted that taking revenge would make them feel better. However, once they enacted punishment, they ended up reporting lower mood (due to rumination) than those who had not punished (Carlsmith et al., 2008). It has been shown that, for people to derive satisfaction from punishment, it is important to know how the transgressor reacts to the punishment. Indeed, punishers reported to be satisfied if they saw the transgressor suffer because of punishment, and/or if they received proof that the transgressor learnt a lesson through punishment (Aharoni et al., 2022). Avengers experienced higher levels of satisfaction than non-avengers upon receiving a message from the transgressor that acknowledged that they had understood why they had been punished (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2011) or that indicated a change in moral attitude (Funk et al., 2014). Nevertheless, people showed no increased willingness to punish at the prospect of receiving information on the effects of punishment on the transgressor (Funk & Mischkowski, 2022). This may suggest that people fail to predict what would bring them satisfaction following a moral transgression.

Given the gap in knowledge about children's affective states related to third-party interventions, scientific efforts have now begun focussing on the study of the emotional antecedents and consequences of children's punishment behaviour. Regarding the emotional antecedents of punishment, self-reported anger after witnessing inequity has been shown to mediate the link between transgression severity and costly punishment in British adults but not in children and adolescents (Gummerum et al., 2020). Moreover, by experimentally manipulating anger (via an autobiographical recall procedure), it was possible to demonstrate that anger has a causal role on punishment severity of inequity in British adults and adolescents but not in children (Gummerum et al., 2022). Regarding the emotional consequences of punishment, 5- to 7-year-old US children who meted out punishment reported higher levels of sadness, and lower levels of happiness and excitement than their peers who did not punish (see Supplemental Material in Marshall et al., 2021). Moreover, 5- to 11-year-old British children were more likely to report no enjoyment when they enacted real rather than pretend punishment (Arini et al., 2021).

In the current study we investigated whether enjoyment would vary according to the type of third-party intervention children were enacting (Q4, Table 1), and to the time passed since the intervention (Q5, Table 1). We measured enjoyment immediately after children decided how to respond to transgressions, and then again, once they had the time to reflect upon their past choices at the end of the experiment. Notably, children were told that their punishment and compensation decisions would be implemented. However, children were neither shown how the transgressors and victims reacted to their decisions, nor were they made think that they would receive such information. Since children could not ascertain whether the transgressors suffered or learnt a moral lesson through punishment, we expected children not to derive satisfaction from

punishment. Therefore, we predicted that compensation would generally elicit more enjoyment than punishment. Furthermore, based on Carlsmith et al.'s (2008) findings about the negative effect of punishment-induced rumination on adults' affective states, we expected that children's punishment enjoyment would decrease across time. Since it has been previously demonstrated that British children's emotional experience of punishing was on average neither positive nor negative when measured at the end of the experiment (Arini et al., 2021), we predicted we would find comparable results also in the current study at the same time point. However, we did not formulate any specific prediction for the temporal pattern compensation enjoyment would follow.

Punishment Motives and Justifications: Deterrence and Retribution

Clarifying *what* people feel when they engage in punishment could help explain *why* people punish (but see discussion in Funk & Mischkowski, 2022). The philosophical literature about the motivational basis of punishment can be organised around two main theories of justice: retribution and deterrence. Retributive punishment is rooted in balancing out a past injustice by giving the transgressor their “just deserts” (Kant, 1790/1952). In contrast, deterrence conceptualises punishment as a means to prevent future misbehaviours by transgressors and/or bystanders (Bentham, 1789/1948). Thus, retribution theory is in accord with the idea that punishment is motivated by the desire to see the transgressors suffer in proportion to the wrongdoing committed (suffering hypothesis). Instead, deterrence theory is in accord with the idea that punishment is aimed at communicating to the transgressors that they should make amends for their misbehaviour (understanding hypothesis) (Berman, 2010).

Psychological research has demonstrated that adults are motivated by both retribution and deterrence, but with retribution probably more important. For example, manipulating punishment

severity (as retribution-relevant information) increased participants' punitive tendencies, yet manipulating punishment observability (as deterrence-relevant information) did not (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Mohlo et al., 2022). Relatedly, before making punishment recommendations people were most likely to first seek retribution-relevant information as it increased their confidence in the appropriateness of their decisions more than deterrence-relevant information (Carlsmith, 2006; Keller et al., 2010). Moreover, it has been shown that adults were more willing to invest resources into punishing transgressors when punishment satisfied only retributive motives, compared to when it satisfied a combination of deterrent and retributive motives (Nockur et al., 2022; but see Crockett et al., 2014).

In the adult literature, a remarkable discrepancy has been noticed between people's actual punitive choices (which tend to be retribution-oriented) and their explicit justifications (which tend to be deterrence-oriented). People have been shown to support deterrence policies in the abstract but reject them once they saw them contradicting retributive principles (Carlsmith, 2008). People were also shown to persist in justifying their punishment recommendations in deterrent terms, even if they were pointed out that none of their justifications were applicable to the specific scenario (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012). People invested resources into retribution of transgressions more often than they reported endorsing retributive justifications (Crockett et al., 2014). This mismatch between implicit punishment motivations and explicit justifications may be driven by people's lack of insight into, or inability to express, the motivations of their own behaviour (Carlsmith, 2008). An implication of this argument is that deterrent justifications are primarily post-hoc rationalisations of retributive impulses (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012; Keller et al., 2010; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; but see Rehren & Zisman, 2022). This mismatch could also indicate the existence of a social desirability bias, since adults may be aware that being perceived

as aggressive can have a detrimental effect on their reputation (Eriksson et al., 2016; Raihani & Bshary, 2015a; Gordon et al., 2014).

Regarding the developmental literature, both interview and experimental studies have shown that children are capable of deterrence reasoning from a young age, at least in US contexts. Stern & Peterson (1999) analysed how 4- to 11-year-old children justify their punishment choices in response to a variety of transgressions. Children of all ages were equally likely to use eye-for-an-eye justifications. However, starting from 7-8 years of age, children began to also show awareness of the preventive function of punishment. Bregant et al. (2016) presented 5- to 8-year-old children with a scenario depicting a character stealing a resource from another character. The theft either remained unpunished or was followed by a punishment (not decided by the children themselves). Children predicted that the punished thief would be less likely to misbehave again than the unpunished thief. Dunlea & Heiphetz (2021) found that 6- to 8-year-old children – but not adults – report that “mean” people become “nicer” after both severe and mild forms of punishment (incarceration and time-out, respectively). In Yudkin et al.’s (2019) study, 3- to 6-year-old children could decide whether to engage in punishment by preventing a harmful peer from accessing a playing opportunity. Once questioned about the reasons for their punitive decisions, they mentioned the desire to see the transgressor change their behaviour and learn a lesson. Importantly, these expressions of desire for reform correlated with children’s actual punishment rates.

Regarding the motivational basis of punishment, there is evidence that, already from early childhood, children prefer to see bad things happen to those who behave badly towards others (Hamlin et al., 2011; Kenward & Östh, 2012, 2015), suggesting incipient retributive desires or expectations. However, a couple of recent studies conducted on older participants (4-

to 7-year-old US children and 9- to 12-year-old German children) suggests that children can be motivated by both deterrence and retribution. There is indeed evidence that children punished transgressors at higher rates and invested more resources into punishment when doing so satisfied both retributive and deterrent motives, compared to when it satisfied purely retributive motives (Marshall et al., 2021; Twardawski & Hilbig, 2020). In the face of a large body of evidence suggesting that adults are often motivated by retribution despite the deterrent justifications they provide, but more limited evidence in children, it is still unclear whether this mismatch between implicit punishment motivations and explicit justifications is also present when children punish.

Regarding the implicit motivations of punishment, we explored whether children's punishment severity would change depending on the type of punishment frame they had been experimentally assigned to (Q6, Table 1), i.e., whether children's role as third-party punishers was framed as serving a deterrent or retributive purpose. We argue that the punishment frame most in line with children's pre-existing punishment motivation would also be the most effective at increasing their punishment severity (for a similar paradigm, see van Prooijen, 2010). Since there were few grounds for a specific prediction as to whether children are primarily motivated by deterrence or retribution, we did not make one.

Regarding the explicit justifications of punishment, we analysed how children justified the punishment behaviours they had meted out. More specifically, we assessed endorsement of deterrence or retribution in a forced-choice task, expecting to observe increasing rates of deterrence endorsement with age (Q7, Table 1), consistently with Stern & Peterson's (1999) findings. Since it has been argued that retribution is driven by intuition and deterrence by deliberation (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012; Keller et al., 2010; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; but see

Rehren & Zisman, 2022), we predicted that younger children would endorse retribution more often than older children due to their relative lack of inhibitory control and forward-looking reasoning skills.

Method Validation: Setting Method and Believability

This study piloted a new method of conducting experimental research on children; an online virtual environment in the form of a Justice System based on the world of *Minecraft*, a globally popular commercial videogame. To test the validity of this method, child participants using this Minecraft Justice System were met either face-to-face or over the internet, and we compare results obtained in each way. We additionally checked that the Minecraft Justice System would appear credible to the children, expecting that the majority of them would believe they had judged misbehaviours that had actually happened on the server, as player misbehaviour and justice administration by other players are now normal in children's online playgrounds (Beale et al., 2016; Kou et al., 2017).

Table 1. Research questions, related predictions, and whether data supported predictions

Topic	Research question	Prediction	Supported?
Third-Party Interventions: Compensation and Punishment	Q1 (a priori): Does participants' judgement of transgression severity affect compensation vs. punishment endorsement (during justice administration)?	More severe judgements lead to higher endorsement of punishment over compensation.	Yes
	Q2 (a priori): Does transgression type affect compensation vs. punishment endorsement (during justice administration)?	Physical harm elicits higher endorsement of punishment over compensation.	No
		Theft and inequity elicit higher endorsement of compensation over punishment.	No
	Q3 (a priori): Does children's age affect compensation vs. punishment endorsement (during and after justice administration)?	Endorsement of punishment over compensation increases with increasing age.	Yes (but only after justice administration)

Affective States Induced by Third-Party Interventions	Q4 (a priori): Does type of third-party intervention affect enjoyment?	Compensation elicits higher enjoyment than punishment.	Yes
	Q5 (a priori): Does time affect enjoyment of punishment and compensation?	Punishment enjoyment decreases over time (no enjoyment by the end of the experiment).	Partly
		No prediction on the temporal pattern of compensation enjoyment.	NA
Punishment Motives and Justifications: Deterrence and Retribution	Q6 (a priori): Does framing condition affect punishment severity (during justice administration)?	The punishment frame most in line with children's pre-existing punishment motivation increases punishment severity.	No
	Q7 (a priori): Does children's age affect retribution vs. deterrence endorsement?	Endorsement of deterrence over retribution increases with increasing age.	No
	Q8 (post-hoc): Does framing condition affect frame reproduction?	Exploratory analyses, no predictions.	NA

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Method

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The study was approved by the XX University Ethical Review Committee under the project name “Children’s social judgement in a computer game” (Study Number X). All raw data, experimental scripts, and analysis pipelines are available at the Open Science Framework (<https://osf.io/4ygw5/>).

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Participants

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Exclusions from the dataset amounted to 3 children: 1 child was excluded because of an experimenter’s technical mistake; 2 children had difficulties in comprehending experimenter’s questions due to lack of experience with playing Minecraft (see script in Supplemental Material – S1). After exclusions participants were 123 children (*mean age*: 9.83 years; *SD* = 1.41 years; *age range*: from 7.05 years to 11.97 years; *age distribution*: 16 7-year-olds, 16 8-year-olds, 34 9-

year-olds, 23 10-year-olds, 34 11-year-olds; *gender*: 32 girls and 91 boys) residing in the UK (n = 67), Colombia (n = 23) or Italy (n = 33). Of these 123 children, 43 were assigned to the retribution frame, 40 to the deterrence frame and 40 to the compensation frame (see Supplemental Material – Table S3 for sample breakdown according to age, country and framing condition). Our choice of countries was opportunistic to maximise diversity in the sample. Sample size was determined by logistic constraints: we collected as much data as practically possible within time-periods.

Participants were tested in one of two alternative settings: either face-to-face (at science fairs or a technology-themed summer camp) or remotely over the internet (via Skype or WhatsApp video or voice calls, depending on the reliability of the internet connection participants had access to from their homes). Data collection lasted from late June 2018 to the beginning of March 2019.

The Italian sample, consisting of 33 children mainly from middle-income backgrounds, was tested entirely over the internet (nationwide recruitment). The Colombian sample, formed by 23 children mainly from middle-to-high-income backgrounds, all recruited at the same summer camp of a large city, was tested entirely in a face-to-face setting. The British sample, coming from a mixed socio-demographic background, was the only one to be tested in both settings: 35 children over the internet (nationwide recruitment) and 32 face-to-face (recruitment at two different science fairs in the same medium-sized English city). The categorisation of the children in terms of their socio-economic status was made through informal communications with gatekeepers or knowledge of general characteristics of the catchment areas.

Stimuli

Eight short videos depicting players' behaviours in *Minecraft* were recorded and embedded into a *Qualtrics* platform questionnaire to create an online Justice System, called Squidcraft (link to the Justice System Qualtrics: <http://bit.ly/obust33> where video streaming has now been disabled; videos now available at the Open Science Framework: <https://osf.io/4ygw5/>). An offline version that was identical except for minor formatting aspects was also developed for the purpose of testing at science fairs where the internet connection was not reliable. The system was formatted to resemble an administrative control-panel interface rather than a questionnaire (Figure 1).

The videos, varying in length from 25 to 54 seconds, represented various moral transgressions during *Minecraft* play (see Table 2 for brief transgression descriptions and Supplemental Material – S1.6 for full descriptions).

Figure 1. Screenshot from the Squidcraft Justice System interface operated by participants. Above: a still image from the Physical Harm condition video in which Samicle has just attacked and killed Dieg0123, and showing the first question to be answered.

Design

We adopted a mixed design in which the within-subject variables were *time* (during and after justice administration) and *transgression type* (see Table 2 and Supplemental Material – S1.6). The between-subject variables were *country of residence* (UK; Colombia; Italy); *setting method* (over the internet; face-to-face); *framing condition* (retribution; deterrence;

compensation); *gender* (male; female); and *age* (between 7 and 11 years of age). These between-subject variables were counterbalanced against two between-subject nuisance variables: *transgression order* (see Supplemental Material – Table S2) and *question order* (see Supplemental Material – S1.8, S1.9, S1.10).

Table 2. Brief description of transgressions

Transgression type	Description
Physical harm	Player C was farming some wheat when he was unexpectedly killed by player A with a sword.
Property destruction	Player A and player C worked together to build a house, but then player A destroyed it by setting it on fire.
Sanctity/authority transgression	Player A killed a holy squid in a temple while player C was making an offer of gold to it.
Theft	While player C and another player were trading an enchanted pick for an emerald, player A appeared and stole both resources.
Inequity/disloyalty	Two players mining together (player A and player C) had promised each other to equally divide any emeralds or diamonds they discovered. When they found two emeralds, player A seized them both, refusing to share with player C.
Deception/liberty violation	Player A persuaded player C to follow him into a place, where player A trapped player C inside an obsidian pit.
Harm-related false accusation (control)	Player C complained that she was set on fire by player A, but the video reveals that this was not the case.
Property-related trivial accusation (control)	Player C, who claimed to need a lot of wood, complained that player A had harvested a tree in the village common forest.

Note: player A stands for “accused”, while player C stands for “complainer”. Children were asked to decide whether to punish the former and compensate the latter in the Squidcraft Justice System.

The dependent variables were *punishment severity*; *compensation level*; *punishment enjoyment*; *compensation enjoyment*; *punishment vs. compensation endorsement*; *retribution vs. deterrence endorsement*; *frame reproduction* and *believability of the Justice System*. Dependent variables were measured during justice administration (i.e., repeatedly after each moral transgression), after justice administration (i.e., after all moral transgression scenarios were complete), or at both time points (see Table 3 for details). After each moral transgression we also

measured for use as a covariate the participant's *judgement of transgression severity* (on a 6-point ordinal scale ranging from -5, "very bad", to 0, "not bad not good").

Table 3. Description of all dependent variables.

Dependent variable	Time of measurement	Measurement scale
Frame reproduction (manipulation check)	Before Trial 1; between Trials 4-5	Categorical choices: "punishment with undetermined motivation"; "retribution"; "deterrence"; "compensation"
Punishment severity	During justice administration	11-point ordinal scale, ranging from 0 = "no ban from the server" to 10 = "4 week-ban"
Compensation level	During justice administration	11-point ordinal scale, ranging from 0 = "0 Minecraft diamonds" to 10 = "10 Minecraft diamonds"
Punishment enjoyment	During and after justice administration	11-point ordinal scale: -5 was "very bad"; 0 was "not bad not good"; +5 was "very good"
Compensation enjoyment	During and after justice administration	11-point ordinal scale: -5 was "very bad"; 0 was "not bad not good"; +5 was "very good"
Punishment vs. compensation endorsement	During and after justice administration	Binary choice between 0 = "compensation" and 1 = "punishment"
Retribution vs. deterrence endorsement	After justice administration	Binary choice between 0 = "deterrence" and 1 = "retribution"
Believability of the Justice System (manipulation check)	After justice administration	Binary choice between 0 = "not believable" and 1 = "believable"

Procedure

Parents gave consent for their children to participate after having received information about the experiment; an opt-in consent system was applied in Italy and the UK, opt-out consent in Colombia (as usage of Minecraft was already part of the standard activities of the summer camp we recruited from). In addition to a specific age range (7-11 years), the other requirement for participation was to have already played Minecraft prior to the experiment in order to understand the dynamics between the players (experience with Minecraft was certified by the children's parents).

After establishing the connection (for internet data collection) or seating the child at the computer (for face-to-face data collection), the procedure began with the researcher explaining that during the experiment they would not be Minecraft players themselves but rather judges helping to test a newly set up Justice System for a Minecraft server called Squidcraft (a Minecraft server is an online multiplayer arena where players can interact in numerous ways, with some servers allowing both prosocial and antisocial interactions – the latter is known informally as “griefing”; Beale et al., 2016). Participants were told that players on the server experiencing misbehaviours from other players could log their complaints into the Justice System. These complaints along with the chat logs between the players and video renditions of the behaviour in question (see Supplemental Material – S1.6 for details of the complaints and chat logs) would then be shown to a Justice System judge for action to be taken (very similar player-operated justice systems feature in real computer games, e.g., Kou et al., 2017). In reality the complaints and chat logs had been previously written, as well as the videos pre-recorded. This element of deception was revealed to the children once the experiment was completed.

According to the framing condition children were assigned to, the purpose of the Justice System was described by either emphasising its retributive or deterrent or compensatory functions. This frame was repeated twice, paraphrased in different ways (see Supplemental Material – S1.2 and S1.4). The experimenter checked twice whether children could reproduce (with their own words) the frame: before Trial 1 (immediately after framing), and then again between Trials 4 and 5. In both frame manipulation checks, children were asked if they remembered the purpose of the Justice System. The experimenter immediately coded whether their explanations contained mentions of compensation, deterrence, retribution or of a general punitive motivation with no specific links to retribution or deterrence. When children’s answers

424 did not match the assigned frame, the experimenter repeated the frame to them. Recordings were
425 blind double-coded (see Supplemental Material – S4.1 for coding criteria).

426 After children had responded to the first frame manipulation check, the experimenter
427 assisted them to navigate to the first complaint of the Justice System (for example, for internet
428 data collection, by pasting the link into the text-chat channel of the connection), thus starting the
429 justice administration phase of the experiment. Following the reading of the relevant chat log and
430 the viewing of the video, children were asked if they believed the accused player had done what
431 the complaining player said they did. In case of an affirmative answer, children were required to
432 judge the accused player's transgression by rating its severity on a scale ranging from "very bad"
433 to "not bad not good" (first 6 points of the Likert scale in Figure 2). At this point, children could
434 decide both the amount of compensation (number of diamonds) to allocate to the
435 complainer/victim and the amount of punishment (length of ban from the server) for the
436 accused/transgressor. Children did not have to pay any economic cost to enact their third-party
437 decisions; however, the consequences of these decisions for transgressors and victims were
438 presented as real, and the children used the Justice System interface to make the decisions. In
439 order to avoid ceiling effects with compensation choices, the experimenter initially specified that
440 diamonds were limited and discouraged the children from always giving the maximum number
441 of diamonds. The order of punishment and compensation-related questions was counterbalanced
442 across participants.

443 Immediately after children decided to enact punishment and/or compensation (i.e., during
444 justice administration), they were asked to indicate how they felt in punishing and/or
445 compensating on a scale ranging from "very bad" to "very good" (all 11 points of the Likert
446 scale in Figure 2). The enjoyment question during justice administration was asked multiple

times (i.e., every time children had punished a moral transgression). If children had decided to assign both punishment and compensation, they answered a forced-choice question about whether they considered the former or the latter (with order of mentioning counterbalanced) more important in this specific case.

All participants were presented with the same 8 complaints with order of appearance counterbalanced across participants. When all the 8 complaints had been judged (i.e., after justice administration), participants had to answer the final block of questions. Children had to rate on the 11-point Likert scale how performing acts of punishment and compensation had made them feel; whether they attributed more importance to punishing transgressors or compensating victims; and whether their main reason for punishing transgressors was for deterrence or retribution. The internal order of these questions was counterbalanced across participants. Finally, the experimenter checked whether children truly believed they had judged misbehaviours that had actually happened on the Minecraft server (see Supplemental Material – S1.10 for details of the questions). Of note, self-reported measures (particularly endorsement of punishment vs. compensation, and of retribution vs. deterrence) were asked after the behavioural measures (punishment severity and compensation level). We consider this arrangement best suited to minimise the risk that individual differences in endorsements influence children’s behavioural choices downstream.

Figure 2. Likert scale used to measure both judgements of transgression severity and the affective states related to punishment and compensation.

Analysis Strategy and Statistics

To test our research hypotheses, we adopted linear models implemented using the lme4 package (Version 1.1-26) in the R programming environment (Version 4.0.2, R Core Team, 2020). We used *lmer* to analyse linear mixed-effects models of continuous dependent variables (punishment severity, punishment enjoyment, compensation level, compensation enjoyment); *glmer* to analyse logistic mixed-effects models of binary dependent variables (punishment vs. compensation endorsement during justice administration); and *glm* to analyse linear fixed-effects models of binary dependent variables (retribution vs. deterrence endorsement, punishment vs. compensation endorsement after justice administration).

To test predictions and to explain variance in dependent variables (and thus increase statistical power to test predictions) models included a range of factors (fixed unless stated otherwise). All models included age, framing condition, setting method, gender, country of residence, question order, and believability (to test predictions and explain variance). All within-subject models include participant ID as a random factor. When dependent variables were modelled trial-by-trial during justice administration, models included transgression severity judgement and transgression type (to test predictions and explain variance), with transgression type as a random factor to improve generalisability of findings. When dependent variables were modelled to compare their values during and after justice administration, the model compares the mean dependent-variable value during justice administration trials with the value from afterwards, and models included time-point (during vs. after, to test predictions) and mean transgression severity judgement during trials (to explain variance). Regarding the nuisance variables, only question order and not transgression order was included because of stronger theoretical reasons to expect an effect (Condon & DeSteno, 2011). Because of the large number

of relations between variables included in these models, we discuss in main text only relations for which we made predictions, to minimise the false discovery rate. In all our models we included only main effects, not interaction effects. For intuitive interpretation, some effect sizes for pair-wise category comparisons are stated as Cohen's d with associated confidence interval (CI); these are calculated by dividing the relevant dummy regression coefficient and associated CI by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. See tables S4 to S11 for full model specifications.

Preliminary analysis of the control scenarios revealed that for the false accusation, none of the participants identified the accused as having done something wrong, and in the trivial accusation, children barely expressed any negative judgement (see Supplemental Material – S3.1). Analyses presented below therefore exclude the two control scenarios, which served their purpose by demonstrating that participants could distinguish substantive accusations from false or trivial accusations.

Results

Method Validation: Setting Method and Believability

The setting method did not have any effect on any of the key dependent variables: all $ps > .100$ (see Supplementary Materials, Tables S4-S11), suggesting no important differences between conducting the experiment remotely over the internet and face-to-face. In total 88% (95% CI [82%, 94%]) of children believed the events shown had actually happened on the SquidCraft server.

Third-Party Interventions: Compensation and Punishment

Overall, during justice administration children expressed preferences for punishment: in 57% (95% CI [53%, 61%]) of the test trials children endorsed punishment over compensation

when asked to choose. Moreover, punishment vs. compensation endorsement during justice administration was not affected by children's age $\chi^2(1) = 2.68, p = .102, \Delta R^2 = .006, OR = 1.16, 95\% CI [0.97, 1.35]$ (Q3, Table 1; see Table S6 for the full model for this variable). In contrast, judgement of transgression severity was a significant predictor, $\chi^2(1) = 4.50, p = .034, \Delta R^2 = .008$ (Q1, Table 1). Specifically, the more severely children judged the transgressions, the more likely they were to endorse punishment over compensation, $OR = 0.85, 95\% CI [0.73, 0.98]$. Transgression type was also a significant predictor, $\chi^2(1) = 10.73, p = .001, \Delta R^2 = .032$ (Q2, Table 1).

Most transgression types did not elicit preferential endorsement either of punishment or of compensation – the two exceptions for which punishment was clearly the favourite option were for transgressions related to sanctity/authority and liberty/deception (Figure 3). There were no transgression types eliciting a preference for compensation. The significant effect of transgression type is explicable with reference to the observation that theft elicited lower endorsement of punishment over compensation than what would be expected from the judgement of the severity of this transgression (Figure 3).

After justice administration children's preferences for punishment were confirmed: 60% (95% CI [51%, 68%]) of children endorsed punishment over compensation in the forced-choice task. This was affected by age, $\chi^2(1) = 7.59, p = .006, \Delta R^2 = .072$ (Q3, Table 1; see Table S7 for the full model for this variable): the older the children, the more likely they were to endorse punishment over compensation, $OR = 1.58, 95\% CI [1.14, 2.25]$.

Figure 3. Proportion of endorsement of punishment over compensation in relation to judgement of transgression severity across transgression types. 3PP: punishment; 3PC: compensation. In judgement of transgression severity, more negative numbers indicate more severe judgements. 95% CIs are shown for each transgression type; the regression line is based on the proportions for each transgression type.

Affective States Induced by Third-Party Interventions

Children's enjoyment was predicted by type of third-party intervention, $\chi^2(1) = 76.38, p < .001, \Delta R^2 = .093$ (Q4, Table 1; see Table S8 for the full model), with compensation eliciting more enjoyment ($M = 3.31, SD = 1.34$) than punishment ($M = 2.27, SD = 1.96$), $d = 0.61$, 95% CI [0.48, 0.74] (Figure 4). Punishment enjoyment was predicted by time, $\chi^2(1) = 7.19, p = .007, \Delta R^2 = .015$ (Q5, Table 1; see Table S9 for the full model): punishment enjoyment was lower when measured after justice administration ($M = 2.04, SD = 2.31$) than when measured during justice administration ($M = 2.50, SD = 1.53$), $d = -0.24$, 95% CI [-0.42, -0.07].

Compensation enjoyment was also predicted by time, $\chi^2(1) = 19.81, p < .001, \Delta R^2 = .035$ (Q5, Table 1; see Table S10 for the full model), but the temporal pattern was different from punishment enjoyment: compensation enjoyment was higher after justice administration ($M = 3.59, SD = 1.44$) than during justice administration ($M = 3.05, SD = 1.17$), $d = 0.37, 95\% CI [0.21, 0.53]$.

Figure 4. Enjoyment level reported at different time points for the two types of third-party intervention. Error bars represent 95% CIs of means. Note that enjoyment after justice administration (one data point per individual) was compared with enjoyment during justice administration (data points averaged over each individual's six test trials).

Punishment Motives and Justifications: Deterrence and Retribution

During justice administration, punishment severity did not change across framing conditions, $\chi^2(1) = 2.26, p = .324, \Delta R^2 = .008$ (Q6, Table 1; see Table S4 for the full model for this variable). For the important retribution vs. deterrence comparison, $d = 0.16, 95\% CI [-0.12, 0.43]$ (a positive value means higher punishment severity in the deterrence frame), indicating the possibility of a small undetected effect. After justice administration, 88% (95% CI [80%, 93%]) of children endorsed deterrence over retribution in the forced-choice task. This overwhelming

endorsement of deterrence did not vary as a function of age, $\chi^2(1) = 0.18, p = .668, \Delta R^2 = .002$, OR = 0.91, 95% CI [0.57, 1.43] (Q7, Table 1; see Table S11 for the full model for this variable).

Given the lack of framing effects on punishment severity (as well as on all other key variables), we examined if there were framing effects on children's answers to the framing manipulation checks (Q8, Table 1), which assessed children's understanding of the Justice System's presented purpose (a post-hoc investigation). Children's mentions of retribution, deterrence and compensation significantly varied across framing conditions (all $ps \leq .001$ at Checks 1-2, Fisher's exact tests; Figure 5), indicating that the framing manipulation did affect children's understanding of the Justice System's purpose. Specifically, mentions of retribution were more common in the retribution condition than in the compensation condition (Checks 1-2, $ps < .010$) and deterrence condition (Checks 1-2, $ps < .050$). Mentions of deterrence were more common in the deterrence condition than in the compensation condition (Checks 1-2, $ps < .001$) and retribution condition (Checks 1-2, $ps < .050$). Mentions of compensation were more common in the compensation condition than in the deterrence condition (Checks 1-2, $ps < .001$) and retribution condition (Checks 1-2, $ps < .010$).

A salient observation is that deterrence was more commonly mentioned than retribution (in line with the results for deterrence vs. retribution endorsement after justice administration). For example, retribution was almost never mentioned by participants in the deterrence frame condition, whereas deterrence was mentioned as often as retribution by participants in the retribution frame condition (Figure 5). Inter-coder reliability was good with regards to the proportion of children mentioning each motivation (Supplemental Material – S4.4).

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Figure 5. Proportion of children who mention compensation, deterrence and retribution across framing conditions at the first framing manipulation check (responses at the second manipulation check were very similar, see Supplemental Material – Figure S2). Error bars represent 95% CIs of proportions.

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Discussion

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Our research advanced knowledge about important but relatively un-investigated topics in developmental psychology: the modulating factors of children’s orientation for punishment or compensation; the emotional consequences of enacting punishment and compensation; and the justifications and motives (deterrence vs. retribution) behind children’s decisions to inflict punishment.

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Interestingly, high levels of endorsement of deterrence over retribution were found, irrespective of children’s age, confirming that it is normal for children (as well as adults) to conceive of punishment as being for deterrence (Yudkin et al., 2019; Stern & Peterson, 1999; Bregant et al., 2016; Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2021; Marshall et al., 2022). However, since children,

relative to adults, have less developed inhibitory control and forward-looking reasoning skills, it seems less likely that their high levels of deterrence endorsement result from sophisticated deliberative processes (as discussed by Bregant et al., 2016). The observed tendency of children to default to deterrence-based explanations of punishment raises the possibility that deterrence reasoning is more intuitive, which would contravene some assumptions in the adult literature (Aharoni & Fridlund, 2012; Keller et al., 2010; Carlsmith & Darley, 2008; but see Rehren & Zisman, 2022). However, this should be tested with younger children than those in our sample.

Moreover, contrary to our predictions, whether the punishment frame was deterrence or retribution had no effect on children's punishment severity. This suggests that, in this context, children tend to act according to their preconceived notions of what is right, not merely what they are told should be done. Importantly, we can rule out that these null effects are due to the total ineffectiveness of our framing manipulation: we did observe framing effects in the manipulation check. The frequency of children's mentions of retribution, deterrence, and compensation depended on the framing condition, indicating that children tended to remember the experimenter's framing explanations; they did not purely report their pre-existing justice beliefs. However, a further salient result from the manipulation checks was that children assigned to punishment frames were biased towards explaining the Justice System in terms of deterrence, showing that the preference for deterrence over retribution evident in the forced-choice endorsement task generalised to this open-ended measure. These results are also in line with previous work showing that children are sensitive to deterrence cues (Marshall et al., 2021; Twardawski & Hilbig, 2020). We note further that our between-subjects statistical power was lower than ideal, and the confidence interval for the size of the effect on punishment severity of

deterrence vs. retribution frames allows for a small undetected effect: children might punish slightly more given a deterrence frame in this context.

It is possible that explaining the experiment to children as a Justice System where they would take the role of judges affected our results (Gonzalez-Gadea et al., 2022): this may have geared children toward remembering and endorsing more deterrence-based explanations for punishment. However, it has also been demonstrated that children explain punishment in terms of deterrence irrespective of social roles, as they overwhelmingly attribute deterrent motives to institutional and peer punishers alike (Marshall et al., 2022). It remains to be clarified whether children's endorsement of deterrence in our experiment was due to the high frequency at which children in everyday life are familiarised with pedagogical uses of punishment (Marshall et al., 2022), an experience that would promote internalisation of deterrent messages.

With respect to children's affective states related to third-party interventions, it was found that compensation elicited more enjoyment than punishment, as predicted. This could be due to a "warm glow" effect deriving from the experience of giving to people in need (Andreoni, 1990). From an early age children show sympathetic behaviour towards victims of transgressions (Vaish, et al., 2009) and are motivated to see others get the help they need (Hepach et al., 2016). Moreover, both compensation and punishment enjoyment were time-dependent but followed different temporal patterns: compensation enjoyment increased, while punishment enjoyment declined over time. The decrease in punishment enjoyment is unlikely to be due to emotional memory extinction (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006) because the same process would probably have governed compensation enjoyment too, which instead showed an increase over time. Whereas the temporal pattern of compensation enjoyment might be indicative of children's positive reappraisal of the impact of their action on the victims, the temporal pattern of punishment

651 enjoyment is in accordance with Carlsmith et al.'s (2008) finding that enacting punishment
652 causes rumination and thus lowering of mood. It is also possible that the decrease of punishment
653 enjoyment over time might also indicate that children experienced a social desirability bias to
654 show regret.

655 Children enjoyed compensating victims more than punishing transgressors, yet they
656 preferentially endorsed punishment over compensation (after justice administration, and with
657 increasing judgement severity during justice administration). This misalignment between
658 affective states and endorsements suggests that children see punishment as a duty to fulfil even if
659 unpleasant. This sense of duty might arise in part because of demand characteristics of the
660 situation (being repeatedly asked to contemplate allocated punishment and compensation), but
661 this does not explain the mismatch between affective states and endorsement. Whether this duty
662 is about meeting retributive (i.e., transgressors' suffering) or deterrent goals (i.e., transgressors
663 learning their lesson) is difficult to establish from our affective results, since previous literature
664 demonstrated that both are linked to higher punishers' satisfaction (Aharoni et al., 2022).
665 However, a retributive explanation for children's punishment seems unlikely given our findings
666 that children overwhelmingly endorsed deterrence irrespective of age and had a recollection of
667 the purpose of the Justice System biased towards deterrence.

668 Children's punishment-related affective states were positive, albeit not as positive as
669 compensation-related affective states. This finding is thus in contrast with a previous study that
670 found children usually did not enjoy enacting their punishment decisions (Arini et al., 2021). The
671 specificities of the different experiments might account for these contrasting results. In the
672 paradigm used by Arini et al. (2021) the allocation of punishment to the transgressor was more
673 visually and auditorily salient for the participant than in the Minecraft paradigm, which might

have elicited a sense of compassion for the punished transgressor. Moreover, in Arini et al.'s (2021) experiments children did not have previous experience with the game, whereas participants in the Minecraft experiment were familiar with Minecraft and generally enjoy playing and thinking about it. Most importantly, in Arini et al.'s (2021) paradigm children could only assign punishment, while in the Minecraft paradigm they could both punish transgressors and compensate victims, thus contributing to a greater overall sense of justice being restored.

As expected, the seriousness of a transgression influenced children's third-party interventions. Analyses showed that children preferred to endorse punishment over compensation during justice administration when they judged transgressions more severely. Furthermore, children's endorsement of punishment vs. compensation during justice administration was affected by transgression type. Contrary to our predictions, children did not preferentially endorse punishment in cases of harm violation (Miller & McCann, 1979), and compensation in cases of theft (Riedl et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2021; Liu et al, 2021) and inequity (Lee & Warneken, 2020). Transgressions in sanctity/authority and liberty/deception were in fact the only contexts eliciting clear preferential endorsement of punishment: for the majority of transgression types children did not express preferential endorsement either of punishment or of compensation during justice administration.

To note, the sanctity/authority transgression (i.e., killing a squid, usually allowed but not on this particular Minecraft server because of their status of holy animal) was the scenario prompting the highest rates of punishment endorsement. Whereas all the other moral norms such as killing players and stealing were independent of this Minecraft server, this norm was novel and unique. This may relate to the particular importance of sacred ingroup values (Tetlock, 2003), and is telling of the malleable nature of children's norm learning (Rakoczy et al., 2008)

and of the volatility of moral norms on the internet. This may also speak to the strong potential for information associated with religious contexts to be quickly accepted by children (Vaden & Woolley, 2011).

Interestingly, theft elicited higher endorsement of compensation over punishment than expected on the basis of judgement of transgression severity. To explain this result, we refer to the evidence that children use punishment as an opportunity to directly right the wrong when it concerns resources (Arini et al., 2021). In the current experimental setting, punishment (i.e., banning the transgressor from the game) was not suitable for equalising the resource unbalance between victim and transgressor after a theft, so children reacted to this scenario by instead using compensation (i.e., giving diamonds to the victim) to fulfil their equalisation purposes.

Whereas several transgression types did not cause preferential endorsement of punishment over compensation during justice administration, a clear preference for endorsement of punishment was observed after justice administration. This result could be because a generic and abstract sense that moral transgressions have occurred in the past might elicit children's intuitive reaction to endorse punishment. On the other hand, requiring children to attend in real time to the details of the different transgression types might induce them to engage in careful deliberation about whether it is more appropriate to endorse punishment or compensation (Van Doorn & Brouwers, 2017). The preferential endorsement of punishment after justice administration is also indicative of children's transgressor-centred approach to justice restoration. This is in accordance with the other behavioural studies in the developmental literature in which punishment was preferred over compensation, when the latter was operationalised as any prosocial actions towards the victim (McAuliffe & Dunham, 2021), other than restitution of previously subtracted resources (Riedl et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2021). This is

also in accordance with the studies in the adult literature in which third-party interventions were not costly to the participants (Adams & Mullen, 2015; van Prooijen, 2010), as in our experiment. In contrast, studies with adult participants providing evidence for preference for compensation commonly employed paradigms where third-parties' economic resources were at stake (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013; Lotz et al., 2011; Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2018; Van Doorn, Zeelenberg, Breugelmans, et al., 2018).

Finally, regarding the investigation of developmental patterns, as hypothesised on the basis of the studies conducted by Riedl et al. (2015) and Miller & McCann (1979), we observed a developmental increase in the proportion of children endorsing punishment over compensation after justice administration (a finding consistent with later studies by Yang et al., 2021 and McAuliffe & Dunham, 2021). This points to the possibility that, although children are willing to punish transgressors from an early age (e.g., Kenward & Öst, 2012, 2015), attitudes towards this type of third-party intervention are further subject to learning processes. Because third-party punishment is administered in schools and households, children may learn that punishment is a socially approved choice (Marshall et al., 2022), and indeed there is evidence that young children attribute reputational benefits to punishing (Vaish et al., 2016, although see Eriksson et al., 2016; Raihani & Bshary, 2015b; Dhaliwal et al., 2021 for opposite examples in adults).

Regarding the limitations of our study, as noted above, some effect-size confidence-intervals reflect the possibility of undetected effects due to lower than ideal power, and further, the samples of recruited children were not necessarily representative of the respective national populations. Children tested face-to-face while attending science-themed fairs and summer camps came from households characterised by higher education and socio-economic conditions than the national average. In comparison, online testing was more able to reach children of

diverse backgrounds. The internal cultural diversity of our sample is in some ways a strength, but the relatively small sample from each country (in part due to greater difficulties with internet recruiting than expected) also represents a weakness. We were unable to fully counterbalance the setting method across different countries. Only British children were tested in both settings, whereas Colombian children were tested exclusively face-to-face and Italian children exclusively over the internet. Having said that, the statistical analyses we conducted always controlled for children's country of residence and setting method, and our aim to test a broad range of children in terms of nationalities was mainly motivated by the desire to maximise the chances of detecting common patterns of moral behaviour rather than cross-cultural differences.

Future avenues for investigating children's third-party interventions should take advantage of multiple methodologies. Qualitative and possibly longitudinal studies could provide a more detailed insight into the development of children's concepts about punishment justifications. From interviews with children and their parents and teachers, it would be also possible to discern to what extent children's beliefs about punishment are affected by their familiarity with deterrent justifications in the family and school setting (Sorbring et al., 2006). Questionnaire studies could shed light on personality differences in children endorsing punishment vs. compensation, and retribution vs. deterrence. Finally, experimental studies could complement the picture by measuring children's affective states in three different conditions: when they are given only the opportunity to enact punishment of transgressors; when they are given only the opportunity to compensate victims; and when they can choose to either punish or compensate.

Before concluding, we briefly address methodological implications. To our knowledge this has been the first study in which developmental psychologists have tested children in a

virtual environment (i.e., a Justice System) relating to an online game of their choice, by making use of video chat and voice call applications. The lack of any differences in the key variables depending on whether children were tested over the internet or face-to-face, and the high rates at which children believed they were enacting interventions with real consequences for victims and transgressors, together provide evidence that our innovative computer-mediated paradigm has the potential to fundamentally change the practicalities of collecting some types of behavioural data. However, care must be taken not to overgeneralise this result to different studies. Further, whilst online testing is arguably more scalable than in-person testing, online recruitment of children is not without its own specific set of challenges (e.g., parents might have lower trust in researchers they have not met). Future studies should therefore systematically investigate different online recruitment methods in order to identify the most effective ones.

Conclusion

We demonstrated that children overwhelmingly reported deterrence as their punishment justification, across a wide age range. Additionally, the more severely children judged the transgressions, the more they endorsed punishment over compensation during justice administration, revealing a transgressor-centred approach to justice restoration. Moreover, even though children explicitly endorsed punishment over compensation after justice administration, they derived higher enjoyment from compensating victims than from punishing transgressors. Finally, whereas compensation enjoyment increased, punishment enjoyment decreased over time. Results from enjoyment, endorsement, and justification measures together suggest that children enacting punishment behaviour are motivated by a sense they *ought* to punish to fulfil social obligations and achieve deterrence. How children's punitive sentiment becomes more motivated by retribution, as it is in adults, is a question that awaits future investigation.

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