Reasonable Men: Sexual Harassment and Norms of Conduct in Social Psychology

Jacy L. Young

Quest University Canada

& Peter Hegarty

University of Surrey

Accepted version of:

Young, J. L., & Hegarty, P. (2019). Reasonable men: Sexual harassment and norms of conduct in social psychology. *Feminism & Psychology*.

Contact Information:

Jacy L. Young

Quest University Canada

3200 University Blvd

Squamish, British Columbia, Canada V8B 0N8

jacy.young@questu.ca

Abstract

Sexual harassment has received unprecedented attention in recent years. Within academia, it has a particularly *reflexive* relationship with the human sciences in which sexual harassment can be both an object of research and a problematic behaviour amongst those engaged in that research. This paper offers a partial history in which these two are brought together as a common object of social psychology's *culture* of sexual harassment. Here we follow Haraway (1997) in using *culture* to capture the sense making that psychologists do through and to the side of their formal knowledge production practices. Our history is multi-sited and draws together (1) the use of sexual harassment as an experimental technique, (2) feminist activism and research which made sexual harassment an object of knowledge in social psychology, and (3) oral history accounts of sexual harassment amongst social psychologists. By reading these contexts against each other, we provide a thick description of how sexual harassment initiates women and men into cultures of control in experimental social psychology and highlight the ethical-epistemological dilemma inherent in disciplinary practices.

Keywords: sexual harassment, cognitive dissonance, social psychology, Henri Tajfel, feminist psychology.

Reasonable Men: Sexual Harassment and Norms of Conduct in Social Psychology

Conversations about sexual harassment dominated the latter half of 2017 and much of 2018, including prolific detail of victim experiences of sexual assault and harassment via the #metoo movement. In universities, as elsewhere, sexual harassment continues. Why is that? Social researchers have concluded that – irrespective of policy provisions – *norms of conduct* sanction sexual harassment (Pryor, Giedd, & Williams, 1995) and penalize both those targeted by harassment and those who speak up on their behalf (e.g., Weale & Batty, 2016). Norms are hard to change because their influence is, by definition, implicit. Few individuals resist such hard-to-detect ‘situational’ demands to the extent that academic Sara Ahmed recently did when she resigned her position rather than collude with their dynamics at Goldsmiths University in London, UK: “I am not talking about one rogue individual; or two, nor even a rogue unit, nor even a rogue institution. We are talking about how sexual harassment becomes normalized and generalized – as part of academic culture” (Ahmed, 2016). As this example suggests, norm-violators often do not remain as core opinion leaders who might re-set the norms within the institutional cultures they challenge.

Rather than decry universities, once again, for their failures, we describe how academic knowledge can partially explain the persistence of sexual harassment in its corridors. Some academic disciplines, particularly in the human sciences, take ‘sexual harassment’ as an object of knowledge. The promise of norms and normalization as explanatory constructs in Ahmed’s account leads us to social psychology. Sexual harassment remains a problem in the discipline of academic psychology like any other (Rosenthal, Smidt, & Freyd, 2016), but here sexual harassment has also been a research technique and an object of study. By drawing accounts of sexual harassment as method, object, and lived experience together, we provide a *partial* history

of social psychology's masculinist scientific *culture* (Haraway, 1997) and its attendant consequences.

Our ironic story counters the 'romantic' narratives of *unreflexive* psychology (Herman, 1996), in which experimenters monopolize storytelling to their own epistemological advantage (Scheibe, 1988). As Keller (1985) pointed out, unreflexive subject-object relations in empiricism in early modern science were originally imagined through metaphors of coercive (hetero)sexual violence committed by active male minds against nature (gendered female). A lack of reflexivity has long been a mark of the dominant, extra-feminist cultures of psychological science (Morawski, 1994), even as more reflexive visions of science have been practiced by psychologists of all genders on-and-off since the discipline's founding (Morawski, 2005). Social psychologists have long been party to this masculinist fantasy of unreflexive science, whilst a minority have used historicist attempts to cast experimental ambitions to reach truth as tragically flawed (Cherry, 1995; Gergen, 1973). Our approach is informed by White's (1973) optimism that irony might go beyond both romance and tragedy and particularly disrupt the illusionary equation of historical narrative with truth. As the field of social psychology is once again in visible crisis – occasioned by frauds, the irreproducibility of experiments, and the seductions of confusing hindsight with prediction in a discipline that values counter-intuitive findings (Pettit, 2019) – tragedy is a genre with which contemporary social psychologists are already overfamiliar. Rather than kick the (variably good) people of social psychology whilst they are epistemologically down, our desire is to reorient attention to how a feminist 'successor science' might now come into being, and what a partial history of sexual harassment might do to bring this about.

In what follows, we explore three contexts, pivotal to the development of transnational social psychology, in which sexual harassment has operated. First, the unremarkable use of sexually harassing interactions as normative stimuli in cognitive dissonance studies by the apparently reasonable men who cultivated social psychology's identity as an experimental science is described. Sexual harassment of *women* by men continued to be seen as *reasonable* experimental practices, even as concerns were raised about the ethics of exposing *men* participants to sexual stimuli. These studies and their attendant critiques reveal the gendered and heterocentrist nature of psychological knowledge production and ethics. Next, the emergence of sexual harassment as the subject of psychological research is described. From the 1970s onward, psychologists examined the prevalence of harassment, established professional guidelines prohibiting it, and put psychological expertise into practice in the courts. These events drew attention to the *norms* of conduct permitting sexual harassment in many workplaces and challenged the androcentrism of the unspoken norm that such conduct was 'reasonable' because *men* considered it so. Finally, oral histories provide a vantage point from which to view the norms of social psychology's experimental cultures through a different lens. A case study of Henri Tajfel, one of the originators of social identity theory, a core theory in social psychology, illustrates the ways in which norms of conduct that sustain sexual harassment are embedded within experimental cultures, and thus render 'reasonable' the problematic conduct of some men experimenters. The ironic resonances within and across these three instantiations of sexual harassment reveal how social norms shaped the epistemology and ethics of social psychology.

Embarrassing Experiments: Cognitive Dissonance and Experimental Initiations

From the 1950s onward, a transnationally influential form of experimental social psychology took root in the United States as never before (Collier, Minton, & Reynolds, 1991).

The exertion of power and control over others was emblematic, and problematic, in the experimental social psychology of this period (Danziger, 2000). Central to this development was Leon Festinger and his students' research on the unpleasant drive state they called *cognitive dissonance*, brought about by holding incompatible beliefs or attitudes simultaneously. In early experiments, these psychologists induced cognitive dissonance through diverse, novel, and frequently deceptive situational experiments and observed how participants resolved their dissonance. As ethical sensibilities towards deceptive methods developed, social psychologists faced a dilemma between the science and ethics of lying to others and subjecting them to experimental control. Were such experiments too realistic (and hence unethical) or not realistic enough (and hence lacking the realism to explain real world situations)? Milgram's famous experiments on obedience were subject to both forms of criticism (Baumrind, 1964; Orne & Holland, 1968). Conceived in these terms, the experimental laboratory exists as a distinct 'truth-spot' (Gieryn, 2002) for the production of knowledge, one that both exists apart from the larger reality of the world and serves as a hyper-real space from which very real and broadly generalizable behaviors may be produced. In this section we consider two experiments from Festinger's group in which experimenters deliberately staged sexual humiliation to induce distressing cognitive dissonance.

First, Elliot Aronson and Judson Mills (1959), as part of Festinger's research team, conducted their now classic study of cognitive dissonance in which they demonstrated "The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group." This study has long been upheld as the epitome of well-crafted experimental design in chapters on experimental methods in multiple editions of the discipline's esteemed reference text, the *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Aronson, Brewer, & Carlsmith, 1985; Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968). Co-authored by Aronson,

these chapters have initiated successive cohorts of graduate students into experimental social psychology's culture right up to the present day (Wilson, Aronson, & Carlsmith, 2010; see Stam, Radtke, & Lubek, 2000). In the study's experimental condition, women were instructed to read aloud to Aronson (the experimenter) "12 obscene words, e.g., fuck, cock, screw" as well as "vivid descriptions of sexual activity from contemporary novels" (Aronson & Mills, 1959, p. 178). The latter featured, as Aronson (2010) later recalled, "two particularly steamy passages from D. H. Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*" (p. 111). The experiment's key hypothesis, which was confirmed, was that women subjected to this 'embarrassment test' would demonstrate greater liking for a subsequent conversation group than women subjected to a less embarrassing initiation.

Attempts to move from the intriguing particulars of this experiment to generalizable claims about cognitive dissonance show the gendered politics of hyper-real social psychology experiments. As Mills recalled "we picked reading a list of dirty words not because we had a whole lot of ideas and it was the "cutest" one. It was the *only* one that seemed like it would do a good job in the context that we were working in" (as quoted in Patnoe, 1988, p. 248 emphasis in original). This use of 'cute,' with its multiple meanings, is instructive when read in tandem with Mills' explanation that the "procedure was cleverly designed. Not just that the manipulation was cute but that everything kind of worked in the sense of fitting together – like the woman dressing" (Mills as quoted in Patnoe, 1988, p. 247). This overtly gendered analogy for the study's construction is in direct contrast to other descriptions of the study, which adopted the then common practice of defaulting to male pronouns to describe the study and its all-female participants (see Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968, p. 4). Through such accounts, the deliberate sexual embarrassment of *women* participants by a *man* experimenter was rendered incidental to the

experimenters' hypothesis about initiation and, at least in some contexts, invisible to those encountering the study's findings. At the same time, the attribution of 'cuteness' to the sexual embarrassment of these women by these men suggests an intrinsic sexualized dynamic to the relationship between experimenters and participants that gave the experimenters some pleasure. Where and how was 'cuteness' then *real*? It existed only in the ironic difference between what really *happened* in the experiment and what was recorded as the scientific evidence of what really *happens* during severe initiation. Was this cute exercise of power, this incitement to 'embarrassing' racy discourse experienced as erotic in its time by its male experimenters? If it was, then the matter is *incidental* to the scientific contribution of the study.

Not only was the ontological status of the experiment hyper-real, so too were its ethics. By the late 1960s, critiques of harms caused by unethical deception experiments had become more common in social psychology. This later context challenged the earlier ethical norm of disregarding participants' discomfort. In the first of several handbook chapters on the conduct of social psychology experiments, Aronson described the study not as a model of real-world embarrassment but a milder version of it: "reading a list of obscene words is probably far milder than an actual initiation outside the laboratory" (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968, pp. 5–6). The experience of actual women's initiation was downplayed relative to the hypothetical initiations men might experience in situations these researchers never studied, as this embarrassment "was rather pallid in comparison with initiations used by primitive societies and even some college fraternities" (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968, p. 11). Only several decades later did Aronson and Mills' experiment strike others as odd in light of its similarity to the all-too-frequent experience of unwanted sexual attention in women's everyday lives. To our knowledge Lubek and Stam (1995) were the first to make this critical point.

Contemporaneous criticism of Aronson and Mill's research not only failed to point out the study's problematic gender dynamics but extended them. The use of sexual stimuli was characterized as problematic, not for ethical reasons, but for introducing a potential confound that undermined the study's support for cognitive dissonance. Critics questioned whether greater liking of the group following severe initiation was produced by *sexual arousal* rather than the 'severity' of that initiation (Gerard & Mathewson, 1966). Thus, a later replication prefaced a group discussion of morals with a screening test that used electrical shocks as stimuli "to weed out those girls who would tend to let their emotions run away with them" (Gerard & Mathewson, 1966, p. 282). Women were positioned as problematic subjects (see Shields, 2007), whose sexuality and emotionality made them ill-fit for generating general theories about how human social behavior functioned, and which required male experimenters to conceive of an increasing number of harmful contrivances to wrest knowledge from unwieldy sexual and emotional subjects.

The norms taking shape in social psychology around experiments in the 1960s were not only gendered but heteronormative, as a contrasting case from Festinger's group makes clear. Dana Bramel's (1963) PhD research evoked cognitive dissonance amongst *men* students, by presenting them with "photographs of handsome men in states of undress" (p. 319), and providing false feedback via bogus physiological equipment to convince these men students that their responses revealed latent homosexual arousal. Like Aronson and Mills' study, Bramel's intention was to use sexuality to induce discomfort; in this case, to evoke cognitive dissonance that might be resolved by projecting unwanted homosexuality onto others. This hypothesis seemed confirmed by Bramel's (1962; 1963) findings that under these conditions men were

quicker to attribute homosexuality to other men and to detect signs of latent homosexuality in the Thematic Apperception Test scores of other men students.

The fate of these two studies over the following decade could not have been more different. Whilst Aronson and Mills' study became a textbook classic and exemplar of experimental design, by the end of the 1960s Bramel's study was positioned as a paradigmatic case of *unethical* science, in consideration of its possible long-term harms. In an influential criticism of deceptive experiments Kelman (1967) worried about Bramel's participants because "for many persons of this age group, sexual identity is still a live and sensitive issue, and the self-doubts generated by the laboratory experience may take on a life of their own and linger for some time to come" (p. 4). In spite of his reference to '*persons* of this age group,' there is no question that it was only heterosexual men who occupy the position of universal subject in the experimental psychology of the 1960s. Bramel's participants incite empathy and concern that bound the limits of what experiments can be, but we are unaware of *any* authors in this men-dominated era of social psychology, who showed any such concern for the women in the Aronson and Mills study. Sexually harrassing women is all 'fun and games' (Lubek & Stam, 1995) but sexually harassing men, and particularly inciting impressionable young men to question their heterosexuality, is a step too far.

To the extent that embarrassment harmed research participants, these experiments are unethical romances with truth. To the extent that they fail to simulate real world situations, they tragically lack realism and explanatory power. Neither romance nor tragedy alone gets to the gendered irony of their different fates, which suggest a gendered *empathy* with the discomfort of men versus women participants. More recent reflections reiterate such gendered empathy.

Aronson (2010) emphasized subjective construal of the experimental situation by participants as validating:

In our experiments the laboratory comes alive; real things are happening to real people.... we plunked people into the middle of a situation that was so real for them that they had to respond as they would have responded outside the laboratory. (p. 113)

Yet what is made real in such situations is normatively only that which psychologists themselves narrate post hoc as truth (Scheibe, 1988). That which experimenters take to be the participants' 'subjective construal' of the situation is bounded by the limits of the psychologist's ability to empathize with the participants' subjective experiences of the experiment. In this case, empathy was limited to construals of embarrassment, including Aronson's (2010) own: "trust me, reading this material out loud was really embarrassing— for me as well as the students!" (p. 111).

Aronson's gendered empathy with men, including imagined "primitive societies" and "college fraternities," as well as reflection on his own discomfort, consistently took priority over concern for the very real women whom he intended to embarrass.

Differing criticisms of sexuality as problematic reveal the gendered irony of experimental reasonableness. The sexuality of women participants was positioned as problematic in relation to the production of generalizable psychological *knowledge*, whilst the sexuality of men participants was subject to empathetic concerns about individual *harm*. Taken together these studies and their attendant critiques, illustrate the gendered and heterocentrist tenor of psychological knowledge production and the ways in which both were policed within the discipline's masculinist culture. Yet even as participants were exposed to problematic experimental situations, only some of which were recognized as such, a distinct term for such experiences was still lacking.

Sexual Harassment and Psychology as a Discipline

It was not until the 1970s that ‘sexual harassment’ became, in intertwined developments, a distinct term, a legal construct, and a target of psychological science and intervention. Coined in the context of the civil rights and women’s movements underway in the United States, ‘sexual harassment’ was a means of delineating an all-too-familiar category of experience and rendering it publicly actionable. Positioned at the intersection of feminist concerns about equal opportunity and widespread sex discrimination and sexual violence, sexual harassment encompassed actions that ranged from sexual innuendo through sexual assault (Baker, 2008). In the ensuing decades, efforts to demarcate and restrict this category of behaviour involved both legal scholars and psychologists.

Internationally influential legal injunctions against sexual harassment began in the mid-1970s in the United States. A pivotal series of court decisions in the country in 1977 affirmed that sexual harassment was in fact illegal under the strictures of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Framing sexual harassment as sex discrimination enabled legal scholars, and the women they represented, to position unwelcome sexual interactions in the workplace as violations of Title VII, the equal employment opportunity section of the 1964 act that explicitly prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of sex (amongst other characteristics) and to seek redress through the courts (Baker, 2008). Provisions against sexual harassment in educational spaces followed a similar trajectory. Psychologist Bernice Resnick Sandler (2007) was instrumental to the passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act, which prohibited sex discrimination – including, it was soon determined, sexual harassment – in educational institutions that receive federal funds. This interpretation of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination was broadly influential in other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom and

Canada, each of which interpreted sexual harassment in similar terms in 1978 and 1980, respectively (Crouch, 2000). Thus, internationally sexual harassment, defined such that it encompassed earlier efforts to sexually embarrass men and women in social psychology experiments, was increasingly framed as a matter of sex discrimination.

As early surveys of sexual harassment revealed, women psychologists during this era had to navigate unwanted sexual attention within the profession (Pope, Levenson, & Schover, 1979). Unfortunately, and perhaps tellingly, little is known of how unwanted sexual attention was experienced by the earliest generations of women psychologists. Better documentation exists from the latter half of twentieth century onward, in part because of the efforts of projects like *Psychology's Feminist Voices* (www.feministvoices.com) and its extensive oral history initiative. Oral history interviews with Canadian and American psychologists, and their published reflections, illuminate the masculinist scientific culture of the discipline from the 1960s onward in depth, suggesting that this “was an era in which it was considered not only acceptable, but almost required that men faculty members would hit on women graduate students” (Stark, 2009, p. 8). Academic conferences replete with alcohol “bumped it up another level” (Stark, 2009, p. 8). Contesting such conduct was a fraught process, as norms and policies contra sexual harassment were nonexistent and harassers themselves often held powerful disciplinary or administrative roles (see Gallivan, 2008). Carolyn West (2010) was sexually harassed during graduate training by her clinical supervisor, who at one point informed her “You look uncomfortable. Perhaps you would be more comfortable lying on my desk” (p. 176).¹ As an undergraduate in the 1980s, social psychologist Aaronette White (2011) was raped by a professor and assistant vice-Chancellor at her university. As black women, West’s and White’s

experiences also illustrate how the exercise of power in sexual harassment is not simply gendered, but intersects with social locations like race.

Women faculty members whose research engaged issues of gender have also recalled how that research became a focus of their harassers' attention. Reflecting on her first faculty position in the United States in the mid-1970s Frances Cherry (1995) wrote of:

the days before sexual harassment policies when I would arrive at work to find sexually explicit notes under my door from a colleague in a position to judge my work and the feelings of helplessness, disillusionment and self-blame that would ensue. (p. 54)

Social psychologist Esther Greenglass (2005) noted that during her time as a new faculty member at York University in Toronto, Canada senior colleagues warned those seeking to mobilize work on the psychology of women to “stop rocking the boat...just do your job and shut up, be good girls” (p. 11). At the same time “they’d pat you on the bottom” and though “the term sexual harassment didn’t exist, you just expected it. You know, it was demeaning but you didn’t say anything because you’d lose your job” (Greenglass, 2005, p. 11). Whilst these accounts are occasioned accounts of the past (see Scott, 1991), they suggest sexual harassment was sustained by and sometimes aimed to sustain both norms of what counted as ‘reasonable’ workplace conduct and ‘reasonable’ psychological knowledge.

Despite such resistances, feminists nonetheless affected disciplinary change. In 1974, an American Psychological Association (APA) Task Force had identified sex-in-therapy as one manifestation of pervasive sexism in therapeutic practice prompting, three years later, the first statement in APA’s Ethical Standards of Psychologists that sexual contact with clients was unethical (Kim & Rutherford, 2015). Following disciplinary ethics reforms of the 1960s and 70s (Stark, 2010), the Society for the Psychology of Women, Division 35 of the APA – itself only

established in 1973 – set up a 1979 Task Force on Sexual Harassment of Students (Frisch, 1979). Ostensibly focused on students, the recommendations of the Task Force were broad in scope, calling for the development of educational resources, the initiation of an “expert witness project, which would collate material and possibly draft model testimony for psychologists asked to testify as experts in cases of sexual harassment,” and changes to “the profession and APA as an organization” (“Feminist forum,” 1981, p. 7). The latter hope was addressed, in some respects at least, by a near contemporaneous change to the APA Ethics Code. A previous revision of the association’s ethical principles in the 1970s had included language prohibiting psychologists from practicing or condoning discrimination on the basis of sex (amongst other characteristics) “in hiring, promotion, or training” (American Psychological Association, 1977, p. 22). Whilst broad enough to encompass sexual harassment as sex discrimination in theory, the 1981 Ethics Code explicitly stated that “psychologists do not condone or engage in sexual harassment,” which was defined “as deliberate or repeated comments, gestures, or physical contacts of a sexual nature that are unwanted by the recipient.” *Recipients* was a broad and heterogenous group that included “clients, supervisees, students, employees, or research participants” (“Ethical principles of psychologists,” 1981, p. 636). As with the trajectory of legal injunctions, similar disciplinary prohibitions against sexual harassment were soon adopted by the British Psychological Society (“A code of conduct for psychologists,” 1985) and the Canadian Psychological Association (see Pyke, 1996).

After the 1981 APA ethics code, psychologists had legal, moral, and ethical imperatives *as psychologists* to oppose sexual harassment. Experiments including intentional sexual harassment, such as those of Aronson and Mills and of Bramel were now – at least ostensibly – unreasonable. This limit on research practices was not without irony as feminist psychologists

not only worked to remove sexual harassment from professional conduct, but also to produce new psychological knowledge about the subject.

Like early research on rape (Gavey, 2005; Rutherford, 2017), early efforts to investigate sexual harassment focused on the prevalence and perceptions of such behaviors (Gutek, Nakamura, Gahart, Handschumacher, & Russell, 1980). In the process, sexual harassment gained ontological reality as an ongoing social problem that a psychology more inclusive of women's perspectives might address. Within the framework of social cognition – an approach to social psychological research that rested, in part, on the cognitive dissonance paradigm of the 1960s – psychologists explored gender differences in perceptions of what constitutes sexual harassment (see Fitzgerald & Shullman, 1993). Multiple studies revealed sex differences in what is taken to be reasonable conduct, as men categorize fewer workplace behaviors as 'sexual harassment' than women and this sex difference is largest in the United States (Pryor et al., 1995). Gender differences in reasonableness impacted the courts as in *Ellison v. Brady* (1991), where the extant 'reasonable man' standard regarding what behaviours did and did not constitute 'sexual harassment' was challenged by applying a 'reasonable woman' standard (see Forell & Matthews, 2000), whilst in 1993 APA lawyers submitted an amicus brief on the subject in the Supreme Court case *Harris v. Forklift Systems*. In taking social psychological concepts, such as women's and men's implicit *norms* of reasonable conduct, to court feminists challenged the unspoken, singularly androcentric understanding of workplace social norms.

This psychologization of sexually harassment has increased the stakes of the ethical-epistemological dilemma in which early cognitive dissonance experiments were mired. If the legitimate exercise of sexual harassment law now depends on the reality of what social psychologists find in their research, the imperative to see what really happens when people are

really sexually harassed becomes all the more important. In more recent years, one unique project, undertaken by two women social psychologists, crafted “realistic experimental harassment paradigms” (Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001, p. 28) and exposed young women to them under the guise of being interviewed for researcher positions in a psychology department. Doing so involves both ethical risks of psychological harm *and* the promise of using science to make real the harmful effects of sexual harassment in order to shift social norms. Feminism has not made the experimenter’s dilemma go away; quite the opposite.

Social Identities and Initiation into Experimental Cultures

The centering of experimentation as *the* means of knowledge production in psychology is longstanding. In the midst of the 1970s ‘crisis’ in social psychology (see Faye, 2012), social psychologist Henri Tajfel (1972) argued against undertaking ‘experiments in a vacuum’, instead contending that experiments both could and should be employed to address pressing social issues. Even as he was making such arguments, Tajfel was training young social psychologists in this mode of practice and directing unwanted sexual attention to the women amongst them.

The oral histories and other retrospective accounts of women psychologists cited in the previous section show that sexual harassment has been a common occurrence in academic psychology as elsewhere. As experiences that took place across a range of academic settings, they triangulate on Ahmed’s concern with how ‘sexual harassment becomes normalized and generalized – as part of academic culture.’ In a complementary manner, a unique and untapped set of oral history interviews offer a window into this culture in a particular institutional milieu. These oral histories provide a rich account of the academic culture of social psychology at the University of Bristol, UK under Tajfel’s leadership from 1967 through his retirement in 1981. Initiated by the British Psychological Society’s History of Psychology Centre and conducted by

research assistant Sandra Cameron in 1999, these interviews were undertaken as part of a never completed book project on Tajfel. All interviewees were present at Bristol for some period of Tajfel's tenure at the institution and include Tajfel's former postgraduate students, a postdoctoral researcher, and his Bristol colleague John Brown and his wife Maureen Brown. Of the ten interviewees only one reported they had neither experienced, nor heard rumors regarding Tajfel's inappropriate sexual behavior at Bristol. At the time of the interviews, participants gave their consent to be interviewed and for interview material to be held in an archive and subject to public scrutiny.² Issues of consent notwithstanding, the ethics of reviving these interviews, which document the intensely personal experiences of still-living subjects, remain ever-present and unresolved considerations even, or perhaps especially, given the feminist aims of the current project (see Potter, 2012).

Sexual harassment as a distinct category of experience was itself only instantiated in the midst of Tajfel's time at Bristol, and even then was coming into being an ocean away.

Irrespective of the term, those interviewed describe in rich detail how unwanted sexual attention was experienced as problematic. By the time these interviews were undertaken in the late 1990s, sexual harassment was a familiar and readily available descriptor for unwanted sexual attention, one interviewees employed both to help describe and situate their experiences.

Experimental social psychology established itself later in the UK than in the United States, and flourished at Bristol under Tajfel's leadership. Like Festinger's group at Stanford, the Bristol group were pioneers in their national context, but unlike in the United States the UK experienced no broader 1960s boom in experimental social psychology, as the few UK social psychologists during this period – including Hilde Himmelweit (the first Professor of Social Psychology in the UK), Marie Jahoda, and Michael Argyle – could attest (Argyle, 2001). Tajfel

and his research group changed British psychology's landscape irreversibly, establishing Bristol as the nation's premier social psychology center (Turner, 1996) and a key node in the broader transnational social psychology community (Moscovici & Markovà, 2006).

Born in Poland in 1919, Tajfel was studying at the Sorbonne in Paris when the Second World War began. He joined the French Army and spent a number of years in a prisoner of war camp. Whilst he survived the war, his family perished in the Holocaust (Turner, 1996). World War II left Tajfel resolutely politically engaged, and he endeavored to reveal the roots of prejudice and discrimination through experimental research on social categorization. His group at Bristol developed social identity theory, now a pillar of social psychological thought (see Dumont & Louw, 2009), focusing researchers' attention on how individuals' behaviors, thoughts, feelings, and self-worth are affected by membership in social identity groups. In one experiment, young boys were randomly assigned group membership and quickly showed a preference to allocate rewards to in-group over out-group members, even though they had no knowledge of or interaction with group members. This 'minimal group' experiment was, and remains, pivotal to social identity theory (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The experiment's finding – that people would forego larger ingroup advantages in order to ensure the outgroup was comparatively disadvantaged – was quickly leveraged to apply to trenchant industrial disputes of 1970s UK (Brown, 1978).

Social identity theory could apply to *any* social identity in theory, but Tajfel was resolutely uninterested in applying it to gender which he, like many other men of this time, understood to be a less fundamental, if not irrelevant, psychological question (Wetherell, 1999). This limited perspective was informed by the fact that Tajfel's first postgraduate students were largely men rendering the group's tone "a bit of a boys' club" (Billig, 1999).³ Tajfel later had

several women postgraduate students and research assistants, but had difficulty treating women as intellectual equals (Eiser, 1999) and had no serious women collaborators (Fraser, 1999).

Women entering this environment were pressured to conform to the norms of this “masculinist ethos” and “adopt that particular sort of academic style” (Wetherell, 1999).

Oral histories describe Tajfel himself as the embodiment of these masculinist norms and ethos. When academics visited Bristol, he would hold court from behind the desk in his office *cum* seminar space. In addition to offering devastating intellectual critiques, he interrupted speakers, sometimes in a language unfamiliar to those present (R. Brown, 1999; Interview A; Wetherell, 1999). If a talk bored him, he would come and go from the room (R. Brown, 1999; Interview A; Skevington, 1999). In the midst of one talk he “picked up the telephone, phoned up someone in Poland and started speaking in Polish” (Interview A).

This masculinist ethos sanctioned harassment. Men did not experience Tajfel’s sexual harassment personally, but some heard rumors of events they did not witness firsthand (Billig, 1999; Eiser, 1999; Fraser, 1999; R. Brown, 1999). At Bristol, there appeared to be a consensus that it was “all right for them [men faculty members] to have relationships with people like their postgraduate students” (Wetherell, 1999). This may not have been limited to Tajfel. One interviewee recalled in their oral history that Tajfel’s colleagues John Turner and Howard Giles took to referring to some women undergraduates as “up for grabs,” whilst undergraduate students apparently sought to exercise their own agency by aiming “for what was called the hat trick” (Interview A) of contact with Giles, Tajfel, and Turner, appropriating a very British sporting reference for scoring three goals on the soccer field.

In oral history interviews, three women who passed through the group described firsthand experience with Tajfel’s unwanted sexual attention, and all characterized this behavior as

problematic, unwanted, and unsuccessful (Interview A; Skevington, 1999; Wetherell, 1999).

Two had previous experience with unwanted sexual attention prior to coming to Bristol, yet found Tajfel's problematic behavior difficult to name (Interview A; Wetherell, 1999). Margaret Wetherell (1999), at Bristol from 1978-80, notes "we didn't have a politics around it at that time ... there wasn't a name for it and there wasn't a sense of how to position it." Wetherell also recalled that "what was more worrying was the masculinist ethos of the intellectual competition, [which] was more threatening and disturbing than the sexual harassment." One woman recalled "the word sexual harassment, if it had been coined, you had never heard it in this country." This was "in the days before sexual harassment was a notion. It was in the days before there was any recognition, really, that these things were wrong" (Interview A).

It was hard for postgraduate students who had invested in what was nicknamed "the Bristol mafia" (Interview A) to take action. One interviewee noted that not only was there no procedure in place at Bristol for complaints, but that a hierarchical culture of initiation was in place:

he was surrounded by acolytes. All of whom knew he did this and had put up with it for years. And who was I to start complaining? It wasn't as though he had raped me or anything. All he had done was stuck his hand on my knee and suggested we sat on the bed.

Wetherell (1999) recalled she was comfortable saying no to Tajfel without fear of reprisal, but recognized that others may have had different experiences. For her, Tajfel's behavior "never felt frightening. I really can't describe it better than that. I never felt that anything hung on it. If I said no, I felt that my relationship with him wouldn't be affected," yet "that's not to say that other

women, in other circumstances, would not have felt that academic favors kind of rested on their action.”

One-on-one meetings with Tajfel were especially problematic. Wetherell (1999) had “to develop strategies at some of his dinner parties where I would just make sure I was never alone with him,” whilst also at one point carefully navigating her way out of an inappropriate invitation to “go to Geneva for a weekend” with Tajfel, ostensibly to visit a colleague.

This behavior was normalized at Bristol. On one occasion complaints about Tajfel’s behavior with undergraduate students led to him being called before the Vice-Chancellor for a dressing down, but he continued in his position unimpeded (Interview A; Eiser, 1999; Skevington, 1999).⁴

Earlier we noted Aronson’s reflections, which seemed to call for sympathy with his own embarrassment whilst embarrassing the women in his experiment. Ironically, Tajfel’s behavior was also excused in part as an expression of his *social identity*, particularly by his status as an out-group member in this largely young British group. It was only later that social identity theorists explored the question of when outgroup members are judged less harshly for behavior that deviates from social norms than ingroup members (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). One interviewee (Interview A) explained Tajfel’s behavior as:

there was a tendency for them [Tajfel’s male colleagues] to think he was just a bit of an old rogue. And of course in those days, one shouldn’t be anachronistic, but it was how old rogues behaved, in those days. But also it wouldn’t have done them, to be fair it wouldn’t have done them any good to [complain].

He was seen as “an extraordinary flirt” (Skevington, 1999), with “tremendous charm,” who “was very impulsive” (M. Brown, 1999), and his tendency to direct unwanted sexual attention to the

women around him interpreted as part of a “mode of relating to women that was continental” (Wetherell, 1999). In accounting for his behavior with women Tajfel referenced “having had an exceedingly deprived experience in the concentration [*sic*] camps which had disturbed the way he thought about things and his needs and motives,” an explanation reported to have been “public knowledge” at Bristol (Skevington, 1999). In terms Wetherell (1998) would later employ, the social psychological culture at Bristol developed around Tajfel’s personal history a ‘discursive repertoire’ to explain and normalize his behavior.

In this context, Tajfel’s behavior was unwelcomed but tolerated. It was regarded “as slightly irritating but normal” (Interview A), and his actions interpreted as habitual and ritualistic (M. Brown, 1999; Interview A; Wetherell, 1999). One interviewee thought his actions were something “he didn’t worry about...it never occurred to him that he was doing anything wrong” (Interview A). On the other hand, Suzanne Skevington (1999) a postdoctoral scholar at Bristol in the mid-1970s, reported that Tajfel periodically spoke openly about his inappropriate interactions with women and accounted for these behaviors with reference to his personal history. Both the local context of the Bristol group, with its masculinist ethos and norms, and the broader context of Tajfel’s personal history rendered ‘reasonable’ his conduct with women.

The conduct at Bristol is not only ironic when set against the terms of social identity theory, but also when seen in light of the Aronson and Mills’ earlier experiment. For women, Tajfel’s unwelcome sexual attention partially constituted their ‘severe initiation’ into the boys’ club that was ‘the Bristol Mafia’ and their interpretations of this initiation resonate with the limited options available to the women in Aronson and Mills’ study. Several women noted that Tajfel’s intellectual generosity made him, in their estimation, an excellent supervisor (Interview A; Skevington, 1999; Wetherell, 1999). In words that uncannily recall the attitudes of Aronson

and Mills participants' *justification* of the severe initiation, one interviewee (Interview A) noted that she "wouldn't swap it, if I had my time again, I'd go through it again ... You didn't have to prove yourself anywhere at all. You were Bristol." This severe initiation was unwelcome and upsetting, but it was not incompatible with forming strong ingroup identification and commitment to join the conversation of academic psychology.

In more general terms, this dynamic of initiation suggest how a history of sexual harassment might inform social psychology's current crisis of confidence in its own epistemology and ethics. In Festinger's earlier cognitive dissonance group, as in Tajfel's social identity group of 'the Bristol Mafia,' the psychological impact of severe initiation was held in high regard. Aronson (2007) recalls Festinger's reputation for leaving "broken and bleeding students" (p. 13) in his wake. Tajfel too, one interviewee (Interview A) noted, "was a terrible bully....It wasn't just the sexual harassment. He was a bully. He had people he liked. And if you weren't one of the people he liked, he could make your life hell." A more recent radio program devoted to Tajfel and his work, featuring interviews with a number of his former men students, unproblematically highlighted his professional bullying as illustrative of "not suffering fools gladly" ("Henri Tajfel's Minimal Groups," 2011), whilst leaving unmentioned his sexual harassment. Sexual harassment may have been unspeakable in this context, whilst professional bullying was more easily positioned as illustrative of intellectual greatness. This masculinist ethos of psychology at Bristol, as elsewhere, revealed itself in disciplinary initiations that foregrounded interpersonal exercises of power, sexual and otherwise. Such displays of power have attendant consequences on which individuals ultimately comprise the discipline and thus whose perspectives are centred in knowledge production (Kristof, 2019). A winnowing of

perspectives continues in the oral histories at the centre of our analysis, as only the voices of those who remained within the discipline have been, quite literally, set to tape.

Gratitude for their training at Bristol notwithstanding, several of Tajfel's women students later made issues of gender central to their work, whilst also extending social identity theory to gender in ways Tajfel would have deemed inconsequential (Breakwell, 1979; Condor, 1989; Skevington & Baker, 1989; Williams, 1984). These initiatives were part of a larger effort to remake British social psychology into a more feminist enterprise (Wilkinson, 1986). Skevington (1999) noted ironically of her time with Tajfel, "what I learnt at his feet was the basis of my developing feminism." For many who experienced the masculinist ethos of experimental social psychology at Bristol, feminism was a path forward, not simply in terms of personal politics, but as a framework for remaking the field. Such ambitions were not limited to the UK, as the feminist psychology and the psychology of women took root transnationally at this time (Rutherford, Capdevila, Undurti, & Palmary, 2011). It is only in the wake of such developments that social identity theory has, perhaps ironically, been extended to explain experimental findings on the antecedents of sexual harassment (Maass, Cadinu, Guarnieri, & Grasselli, 2003).

In tandem, many of those emerging from the Bristol social psychology program have emerged as vocal critics of experimentation. The forms of discursive, qualitative, and post-structuralist social psychology that took form in psychology from the late-1980s onward, particularly in the UK, took feminism as foundational theory rather than addendum. Particularly noteworthy is Wetherell's (1998; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) championing of discourse analysis and her influential work explaining the discourse by which young British men justified their heterosexual exploits by drawing both on the immediate situational demands of conversational turn-taking *and* the larger gendered repertoires of explanation culturally available to them.

Central to Wetherell's work is a critique of how the power imbalance that underlies experimentation in social psychology silences variability in naturally occurring accounts of behaviour, much as is the case with sexual harassment. Ironically, Tajfel's best attempts to initiate these women into experimental social psychology led several to renounce this mode of practice and its attendant masculinist culture in order to supplant it with a more reflexive form of social psychology grounded in discourse and feminist ethics (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

Conclusion

Feminist psychologists from the 1970s on have actively sought to confront, document, and disrupt sexual harassment by framing such behaviour as unreasonable. Despite their best efforts, sexual harassment continues seemingly unabated in society, and within psychology itself (Rosenthal et al., 2016). Long considered an expression of masculinist ideals, the foundational moves that made experimentation a core method of social psychology show the marks of a gendered inequality in empathy, conditions which continue to sustain and normalize sexual harassment in institutional cultures, including psychology (e.g., Gluckman, 2019). Our point is not that experiments lack epistemological value, but that the ethical-epistemological dilemma involved in attributing their particulars a hyper-reality has been gendered. But experiments need not be 'value-inarticulate' exercises, as exemplified by their extension to topics such as sexual harassment from the 1970s onward. Rather than abandon experiments, it would be a more fitting continuation of feminist work to engender greater reflexivity around the similarities between research practices, research questions, and researchers' cultures. The hyper-reality of experiments all-but requires experimenters to enact concrete research practices and then to strip those particulars away in generalizing their theories (Cherry, 1995). Not only does this allow for

the doing of sexual harassment and then rendering its doing unimportant, it may provide a social structure that engenders other forms of unethical practice as well.

Developing a more reflexive social psychology would seem to require a move away from the hierarchical research cultures of the sort led by Festinger and Tajfel; cultures those who experienced them described as akin to bullying. This is a message that social psychology needs now more than ever. Experimental social psychology has been, since 2011, increasingly mired in a crisis occasioned by fraud, failures to replicate canonical experiments, the cumulative effect of post-hoc *accounts* of surprising experimental findings masquerading as predictions, and a failure to exclude evidence of the paranormal using the discipline's standard logic. In many cases, these problems appear to have resulted from research leaders' strong commitments to particular theories and an unwillingness to consider data that more junior members of their teams generated, in good faith, which might falsify those theories. The epistemological failure of some paradigms in the present may relate both to the hierarchical organization of social psychology labs, and the impossibility of replicating *any* experiment's particulars perfectly (Collins, 1985). The continuation of such hierarchical organizations renders feminist social psychologists' achievement in reifying, psychologizing, and *naming* sexual harassment all the more historic.

In this paper we have described and analyzed sexual harassment's multiple lives within social psychology: as an experimental technique, an object of psychological knowledge, and a behavior engaged in by psychologists. The ironies revealed within and across these contexts reinforce our argument that psychological knowledge and its attendant practices themselves help explain the continuing presence of sexual harassment within the discipline. As more recent experimental research on sexual harassment illustrates (Maass et al., 2003; Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001), in taking up the 'masters tools' of experimental social psychology, feminists do

not escape these ethical-epistemological dilemmas of experimentation. Engaging this dilemma requires reflexivity about the *partial* nature of all science (Haraway, 1997), rather than self-deception about the supposed social good achieved by answering ‘universal’ questions about sexual harassment’s causes and effects.

Acknowledgements

We offer our sincere thanks to Rupert Brown for multiple productive conversations about this project and the challenges of doing recent history. We are also grateful to him for sharing his unpublished research with us, including further evidence and analysis about the Bristol culture that we discuss here.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

Jacy L. Young received funding from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada Postdoctoral Fellowship, award no. 756-2014-0526.

Notes

¹ West (2010) actively challenged this sexual harassment and successfully sued the university.

² In addition to interviews with the Browns, interviews were conducted with, amongst others, Michael Billig, Rupert Brown, J. Richard Eisner, Colin Fraser, Suzanne Skevington, and Margaret Wetherell. Copies of consent forms for some interviews could not be located in the archive (and were likely misplaced during the transfer of material from the BPS to the Wellcome Library). In these cases, interviewees (i.e. Billig, R. Brown, and Wetherell) were contacted directly regarding permission for us to draw from their interviews. We thank them for granting our request. At the request of one interviewee, their interview has been anonymized throughout.

³ Billig now notes that he was present at Bristol as a post-graduate and research worker from 1969 through 1973 and that the climate there likely changed with the subsequent arrival of a number of women (M. Billig, personal communication, May 7, 2019).

⁴ This incident is described in greater detail in Rupert Brown's forthcoming biography of Tajfel (Brown, in preparation).

References

- A code of conduct for psychologists. (1985). *Bulletin of the British Psychological Society*, 38, 41–43.
- Ahmed, S. (2016, June 2). Speaking out. Retrieved April 7, 2018, from <https://feministkilljoys.com/2016/06/02/speaking-out/>
- American Psychological Association. (1977, March). Revised ethical standards of psychologists. *APA Monitor*, 8(3), 22–23.
- Argyle, M. (2001). The development of social psychology in Oxford. In G. Bunn, A. D. Lovie, & G. D. Richards (Eds.), *Psychology in Britain: Historical essays and personal Reflections* (pp. 333–343). New York, NY: Wiley.
- Aronson, E. (2007). Elliot Aronson. In G. Lindzey & W. M. Runyan (Eds.), *A history of psychology in autobiography, Vol. IX* (pp. 3–41). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Aronson, E. (2010). *Not by chance alone: My life as a social psychologist*. New York: Basic Books.
- Aronson, E., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1968). Experimentation in social psychology. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology. Vol.2, Research methods* (2nd ed., pp. 1–79). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 59(2), 177.
- Aronson, E., Brewer, M. B., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1985). Experimentation in social psychology. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology* (3rd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 441–486). New York: Random House.

- Baker, C. N. (2008). *The women's movement against sexual harassment*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Baumrind, D. (1964). Some thoughts on ethics of research: After reading Milgram's "Behavioral Study of Obedience." *American Psychologist*, 19(6), 421–423.
- Billig, M. (1999, October 1). Interview by Sandra Cameron [Audio Recording]. PSY/TAJ/8/1: Box 64, Henri Tajfel papers, Wellcome Library, London, UK.
- Bramel, D. (1962). A dissonance theory approach to defensive projection. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 64(2), 121–129.
- Bramel, D. (1963). Selection of a target for defensive projection. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 66(4), 318–324.
- Breakwell, G. (1999, November 9). Interview by Sandra Cameron [Audio Recording]. PSY/TAJ/8/1: Box 64, Henri Tajfel papers, Wellcome Library, London, UK.
- Breakwell, G. M. (1979). Woman: Group and identity? *Women's Studies International Quarterly*, 2(1), 9–17.
- Brown, M. (1999, November 18). Interview by Sandra Cameron [Audio Recording]. PSY/TAJ/8/1: Box 64, Henri Tajfel papers, Wellcome Library, London, UK.
- Brown, R. (1978). Divided we fall: An analysis of relations between sections of a factory workforce. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between social groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 395–429). London: Academic press.
- Brown, R. (1999, July 9). Interview by Sandra Cameron [Audio Recording]. PSY/TAJ/8/1: Box 64, Henri Tajfel papers, Wellcome Library, London, UK.
- Brown, R. (in preparation). *Henri Tajfel: Explorer of identity and difference*. Abingdon: Routledge.

- Cherry, F. E. (1995). *The “stubborn particulars” of social psychology: Essays on the research process*. London: Routledge.
- Collier, G., Minton, H. L., & Reynolds, G. (1991). *Currents of thought in American social psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Collins, H. M. (1985). *Changing order: Replication and induction in scientific practice*. London, UK: Sage.
- Condor, S. (1989). “Biting into the future”: Social change and the social identity of women. In S. Skevington & D. Baker (Eds.), *The social identity of women* (pp. 15–39). London, UK: Sage.
- Crouch, M. A. (2000). *Thinking about sexual harassment: A guide for the perplexed*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Danziger, K. (2000). Making social psychology experimental: A conceptual history, 1920–1970. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 36(4), 329–347.
- Dumont, K., & Louw, J. (2009). A citation analysis of Henri Tajfel’s work on intergroup relations. *International Journal of Psychology*, 44(1), 46–59.
- Eiser, J. R. (1999, n.d.). Interview by Sandra Cameron [Audio Recording]. PSY/TAJ/8/1: Box 64, Henri Tajfel papers, Wellcome Library, London, UK.
- Ethical principles of psychologists. (1981). *American Psychologist*, 36(6), 633–638.
- Faye, C. (2012). American social psychology: Examining the contours of the 1970s crisis. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, 43(2), 514–521.
- Feminist forum. (1981, January). *Division 35 Newsletter*, 8(1), 6–7, 13.

- Fitzgerald, L. F., & Shullman, S. L. (1993). Sexual Harassment: A Research Analysis and Agenda for the 1990s. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 42(1), 5–27.
- Forell, C. A., & Matthews, D. M. (2000). *A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man*. New York, NY: NYU Press.
- Fraser, C. (1999, October 14). Interview by Sandra Cameron [Audio Recording]. PSY/TAJ/8/1: Box 64, Henri Tajfel papers, Wellcome Library, London, UK.
- Frisch, S. (1979, April). In Progress: Task force on sexual harassment of students. *Division 35 Newsletter*, 6(2), 9.
- Gallivan, J. (2008, June 14). Interview by A. Rutherford [Video Recording]. Psychology's Feminist Voices Oral History and Online Archive Project. Halifax, NS. Retrieved from <http://www.feministvoices.com/joanne-gallivan>
- Gavey, N. (2005). *Just Sex?: The Cultural Scaffolding of Rape*. New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Gerard, H. B., & Mathewson, G. C. (1966). The effects of severity of initiation on liking for a group: A replication. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 2, 278–287.
- Gergen, K. J. (1973). Social psychology as history. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 26(2), 309–320.
- Gieryn, T. F. (2002). Three truth-spots. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, 38(2), 113–132.
- Gluckman, N. (2019, January 16). Responding to a Lawsuit, Dartmouth Denies Ignoring Complaints About Professors' Abusive Behavior. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. Retrieved from <https://www.chronicle.com/article/Responding-to-a-Lawsuit/245491>

- Greenglass, E. (2005, March 1). Interview by A. Rutherford [Video Recording]. Psychology's Feminist Voices Oral History and Online Archive Project. Toronto, ON. Retrieved from <http://www.feministvoices.com/esther-greenglass>
- Gutek, B. A., Nakamura, C. Y., Gahart, M., Handschumacher, I., & Russell, D. (1980). Sexuality and the Workplace. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 1(3), 255–265.
- Haraway, D. J. (1997). *Modest–Witness@Second–Millennium.FemaleMan–Meets–OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Henri Tajfel's Minimal Groups. (2011, February 27). [Audio]. *Mind Changers*. London, UK: BBC Radio 4. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00yw6km>
- Herman, E. (1996). *The romance of American psychology: Political culture in the age of experts*. Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Interview A. Interview by Sandra Cameron [Audio recording]. PSY/TAJ/8/1: Box 64, Henri Tajfel papers, Wellcome Library, London, UK.
- Keller, E. F. (1985). *Reflections on Gender and Science*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kelman, H. C. (1967). Human use of human subjects: the problem of deception in social psychological experiments. *Psychological Bulletin*, 67(1), 1–11.
- Kim, S., & Rutherford, A. (2015). From seduction to sexism: Feminists challenge the ethics of therapist–client sexual relations in 1970s America. *History of Psychology*, 18(3), 283–296.
- Kristof, N. (2019, May 27). It's taken 5 decades to get the Ph.D. her abusive professor denied her. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/opinion/sunday/gender-discrimination-abuse.html>

- Lubek, I., & Stam, H. J. (1995). Ludico-experimentation in social psychology: Somber scientific versus playful prescriptions. In I. Lubek, R. van Hezewijk, G. Pheterson, & C. W. Tolman (Eds.), *Trends and issues in theoretical psychology*. New York: Springer.
- Maass, A., Cadinu, M., Guarnieri, G., & Grasselli, A. (2003). Sexual harassment under social identity threat: The computer harassment paradigm. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85(5), 853.
- Marques, J. M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Leyens, J.-P. (1988). The “Black Sheep Effect”: Extremity of judgments towards ingroup members as a function of group identification. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 18(1), 1–16.
- Morawski, J. G. (1994). *Practicing feminisms, reconstructing psychology: Notes on a liminal science*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Morawski, J. G. (2005). Reflexivity and the psychologist. *History of the Human Sciences*, 18(4), 77–105.
- Moscovici, S., & Markovà, I. (2006). *The Making of Modern Social Psychology: The Hidden Story of How an International Social Science was Created*. New York, NY: Wiley.
- Orne, M. T., & Holland, C. H. (1968). On the ecological validity of laboratory deceptions. *International Journal of Psychiatry*, 6(4), 282–293.
- Patnoe, S. (1988). *A narrative history of experimental social psychology: The Lewin tradition*. New York: Springer Science & Business Media.
- Pettit, M. (2019). *Replication in psychology: Historical dispatches from a discipline on fire*. Manuscript in preparation.
- Pope, K. S., Levenson, H., & Schover, L. R. (1979). Sexual intimacy in psychology training: Results and implications of a national survey. *American Psychologist*, 34(8), 682–689.

- Potter, C. (2012). When radical feminism talks back: Taking an ethnographic turn in the living past. In C. B. Potter & R. C. Romano (Eds.), *Doing recent history: On privacy, copyright, video games, institutional review boards, activist scholarship, and history that talks back* (pp. 155–182). Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
- Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). *Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour*. London, UK: Sage.
- Pryor, J. B., Giedd, J. L., & Williams, K. B. (1995). A social psychological model for predicting sexual harassment. *Journal of Social Issues*, 51(1), 69–84.
- Pyke, S. W. (1996). Sexual harassment and sexual intimacy in learning environments. *Canadian Psychology; Ottawa*, 37(1), 13–22.
- Rosenthal, M. N., Smidt, A. M., & Freyd, J. J. (2016). Still second class: Sexual harassment of graduate students. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 40(3), 364–377.
- Rutherford, A. (2017). Surveying rape: Feminist social science and the ontological politics of sexual assault. *History of the Human Sciences*, 30(4), 100–123.
- Rutherford, A., Capdevila, R., Undurti, V., & Palmay, I. (Eds.). (2011). *Handbook of international feminisms: Perspectives on psychology, women, culture, and rights*. New York: Springer.
- Sandler, B. R. (2007). Title IX: How we got it and what a difference it made. *Cleveland State Law Review*, 55(4), 473–489.
- Scheibe, K. E. (1988). Metamorphoses in the psychologist's advantage. In J. G. Morawski (Ed.), *The rise of experimentation in American psychology* (pp. 53–71). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J. W. (1991). The evidence of experience. *Critical Inquiry*, 17(4), 773–797.

- Shields, S. A. (2007). Passionate men, emotional women: Psychology constructs gender difference in the late 19th century. *History of Psychology, 10*, 92–110.
- Skevington, S. (1999, November 16). Interview by Sandra Cameron [Audio Recording]. PSY/TAJ/8/1: Box 64, Henri Tajfel papers, Wellcome Library, London, UK.
- Skevington, S., & Baker, D. (Eds.). (1989). *The social identity of women*. London: Sage Publications.
- Stam, H. J., Radtke, H. L., & Lubek, I. (2000). Strains in experimental social psychology: A textual analysis of the development of experimentation in social psychology. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 36*(4), 365–382.
- Stark, C. (2009, June 6). Interview by A. Rutherford, K. Vaughn, & L. Ball [Video Recording]. Psychology's Feminist Voices Oral History and Online Archive Project. Montreal, QC. Retrieved from <http://www.feministvoices.com/cannie-stark>
- Stark, L. (2010). The science of ethics: Deception, the resilient self, and the APA code of ethics, 1966–1973. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 46*(4), 337–370.
- Tajfel, H. (1972). Experiments in a vacuum. In J. Israel & H. Tajfel (Eds.), *The context of social psychology: A critical assessment* (pp. 69–119). London: Academic Press.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 1*(2), 149–178.

- Turner, J. (1996). Henri Tajfel: An introduction. In W. P. Robinson (Ed.), *Social Groups and Identities: Developing the Legacy of Henri Tajfel* (pp. 1–23). Oxford, UK: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Weale, S., & Batty, D. (2016, August 26). Sexual harassment of students by university staff hidden by non-disclosure agreements. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/aug/26/sexual-harassment-of-students-by-university-staff-hidden-by-non-disclosure-agreements>
- West, C. M. (2010). Resistance as recovery: Winning a sexual harassment complaint. In A. M. White (Ed.), *African Americans Doing Feminism: Putting Theory into Everyday Practice* (pp. 175–188). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
- Wetherell, M. (1998). Positioning and interpretative repertoires: Conversation analysis and post-structuralism in dialogue. *Discourse & Society*, 9(3), 387–412.
- Wetherell, M. (1999, November 26). Interview by Sandra Cameron [Audio Recording].
PSY/TAJ/8/1: Box 64, Henri Tajfel papers, Wellcome Library, London, UK.
- White, A. (2011, March 4). Interview by A. Rutherford & L. Ball [Video Recording].
Psychology's Feminist Voices Oral History and Online Archive Project. Philadelphia, PA.
Retrieved from <http://www.feministvoices.com/aaronette-white>
- White, H. V. (1973). *Metahistory: The historical imagination in nineteenth-century Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wilkinson, S. (1986). *Feminist social psychology: developing theory and practice*. London, UK: Open University Press.
- Williams, J. A. (1984). Gender and intergroup behaviour: Towards an integration. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 23(4), 311–316.

- Wilson, T. D., Aronson, E., & Carlsmith, K. (2010). The art of laboratory experimentation. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume One* (pp. 51–81). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Woodzicka, J. A., & LaFrance, M. (2001). Real versus imagined gender harassment. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57(1), 15–30.