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Integrating Philosophical and Psychological Accounts of Happiness and Well-Being

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Abstract

Philosophers have been interested in happiness and well-being since the Hellenic period. More recently, psychologists have begun to study how happy people are and what makes people's lives go well. Today, these fields begin to converge, as philosophers and psychologists are interested in integrating the two disciplines. A central challenge for any interdisciplinary research is that disciplines often differ in their terminology. In this paper, we offer a novel approach to integrating philosophical and psychological accounts of happiness and well-being by describing these accounts on two independent continuous dimensions: degree of stability (from transient to stable) and psychological process (from affective to cognitive). This dimensional taxonomy highlights similarities and differences among the accounts and allows researchers to assess where philosophical and psychological accounts overlap and where they diverge. We first describe the methodological approach we used to develop our two-dimensional taxonomy, and then demonstrate how this taxonomy can be applied to a large number of existing theoretical accounts of happiness and well-being. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the dimensional approach and implications for future theoretical and empirical research.

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Integrating Philosophical and Psychological Accounts of Happiness and Well-Being

Philosophers have been interested in happiness and well-being since the Hellenic period. More recently, psychologists have begun to study how happy people are and what makes people's lives go well. Today, these fields begin to converge, as philosophers (Alexandrova, 2017; Bishop, 2015; Haybron, 2008; Kristjánsson, 2013; Tiberius, 2006, 2013a) and psychologists (Fowers, 2005, 2016; Kesebir & Diener, 2008; Ryan & Martela, 2016; Vittersø, 2016) are interested in integrating the two disciplines. However, interdisciplinary collaborations remain an exception and are often difficult to implement in practice. A central challenge for any interdisciplinary research is that disciplines often differ in their terminology. This is certainly true for the field of happiness and well-being. For example, the terms 'happiness' and 'well-being' refer to highly distinct philosophical traditions but are used interchangeably by some researchers of both disciplines who might be unaware of their distinction.

Furthermore, interdisciplinary research is impeded when researchers of one discipline are unaware of important theoretical or empirical developments occurring in the other discipline. Although some interdisciplinary journals exist (e.g., the *Journal of Happiness Studies*), most happiness and well-being researchers publish in outlets that are specific to their own field and are rarely read by researchers from other fields. This is problematic because certain theoretical notions might develop independently within different fields. Combined with a lack of terminological consistency, it is then often difficult for researchers to identify similarities and differences among theoretical accounts from different disciplines. Again, this is certainly true for the field of happiness and well-being where theoretical models, constructs, and measurements in the empirical science and theories in the philosophical traditions have been developed independently.

To enable truly productive interdisciplinary research, a necessary first step is therefore to characterize and integrate approaches to happiness and well-being discussed in different disciplines.

The present paper contributes to this process. We propose a novel comprehensive and integrative way of describing accounts of happiness and well-being.

Note that the attempt to classify theoretical accounts of happiness and well-being is not novel per se. Indeed, the philosophical and psychological literature is full of classifications of definitions and theories of happiness and well-being (Haybron, 2008; Huta & Waterman, 2013; Parfit, 1984; Woodard, 2013) and several reviews exist that summarize these definitions and theories (Haybron, 2007; Kesebir & Diener, 2008; Tiberius, 2006; Tov, 2018; Vittersø, 2016). However, most of these classifications are shaped by different schools of thinking that exist within one of these disciplines (e.g., the distinction between normative theories of well-being and descriptive theories of happiness in philosophy or the distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic accounts in psychology). Such classifications work well to organize accounts within one discipline, and for the present paper, we built on these classifications. However, classifications developed in one discipline are not necessarily suitable to organize theoretical accounts discussed in other disciplines, and thereby may hinder rather than advance a true integration of accounts from different disciplines.

In addition, previous classifications have adopted categorical frameworks to describe similarities and differences among different theoretical accounts of happiness and well-being. In categorical frameworks, units are assigned to distinct categories (also referred to as types or classes). For example, the best-known philosophical taxonomy of theories of well-being distinguishes three groups of accounts: hedonistic theories, desire theories, and list theories (Parfit, 1984). Categorical frameworks have intuitive appeal because they present a clear organization, but they are often difficult to implement in practice. One challenge associated with categorical frameworks that is particularly relevant for accounts of happiness and well-being is that most taxonomies require that the categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Categories are mutually exclusive if units can be assigned to only one single category, and they are exhaustive if every unit can be assigned to at least one category. If assignments to multiple categories were

allowed or if some units could not be classified at all, the categorical taxonomy would become messy and defy its purpose of providing a clear and easy-to-understand framework.

In practice, assigning units to mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories is often difficult to achieve. For example, philosophers have recently developed accounts of happiness and well-being that are not included in Parfit's taxonomy mentioned above, such as Sumner's authentic happiness (Sumner, 1996) and Haybron's emotional well-being (Haybron, 2008). As a result, other taxonomies have been developed (Fletcher, 2013; Haybron, 2008; Heathwood, 2010; Tiberius, 2013b; Woodard, 2013). Moreover, psychological research contributes with accounts that are often, but not always, based on philosophical theories of happiness and well-being. Psychological accounts are sometimes classified into hedonic versus eudaimonic approaches (Huta & Waterman, 2013; Tov, 2018), but they are rarely included in the philosophical taxonomies (Haybron, 2007).

In sum, integrating both psychological and philosophical accounts of happiness and well-being into existing categorical taxonomies is highly challenging, if not impossible. In the present paper, we therefore do not create a new categorical taxonomy, but instead describe similarities and differences among philosophical and psychological accounts on two independent continuous characteristics. Such dimensional taxonomies have several advantages over categorical taxonomies. First, by using continuous dimensions instead of discrete classes, it is possible to describe units in terms of the degree to which a certain characteristic applies to them rather than making a forced binary choice about whether a characteristic applies or not. Second, using multiple independent dimensions implies that multiple characteristics can be considered simultaneously to distinguish units. Together, these features of dimensional taxonomies permit describing similarities and differences among units in a parsimonious yet nuanced way.

Because of these advantages, dimensional taxonomies are predominant in psychological science. For example, similarities and differences among persons are typically described in terms of continuous personality traits such as the Big Five (John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008) instead of in terms of typological approaches (e.g., Jung, 1923). Similarly, dimensional approaches to describe

similarities and differences among situations (Rauthmann et al., 2014) and events (Luhmann & Alcock, 2018) have recently been introduced. In the present paper, we argue and demonstrate that dimensional taxonomies are also useful to describe similarities and differences among theoretical accounts of happiness and well-being.

In the remainder of this paper, we first describe the methodological approach we used to develop our two-dimensional taxonomy, and then demonstrate how this taxonomy can be applied to a large number of existing theoretical accounts of happiness and well-being. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the dimensional approach and implications for future theoretical and empirical research.

Methodological Approach

A dimensional framework is only useful if it fulfills the following criteria. First, the number of dimensions should be sufficiently high to describe both similarities and differences among accounts in a meaningful way. Second, however, the number of dimensions should only be as high as necessary, meaning that a parsimonious taxonomy is preferred over a complex taxonomy. This means that dimensions are only added if they provide unique additional information. Third, the dimensions must be applicable to most or even all units that are to be described. Fourth, the dimensions should be defined in such a manner that they fulfill the psychometric criterion of objectivity, meaning that independent scholars should come to similar conclusions on where a specific theoretical account is located on the dimensions. Finally, the dimensions should be continuous in order to reflect not just extreme opposites, but also more nuanced differences among units.

With these criteria in mind, we developed the dimensional taxonomy described below in a multi-step procedure. First, we compiled a comprehensive list of theoretical accounts of happiness and well-being discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature (see Table 1). In an interdisciplinary team consisting of philosophers and psychologists, we then described similarities

and differences among these theoretical accounts in an increasingly abstract fashion. This process resulted in six broad characteristics, which served as the initial base for our dimensional taxonomy.

The initial six characteristics were temporal dimension (short vs. long), degree of stability (state vs. trait), psychological process (affective vs. cognitive), constituent element (internal vs. external), perspective (subjective vs. objective), and theoretical approach (descriptive vs. normative). The temporal dimension referred to whether an account focused on the present moment of the individuals' lives (short) or on a longer period in their lives (long). The degree of stability referred to whether happiness was defined as a general trait of the person (e.g., genetic or character traits) or as a temporary state of the person (e.g., mental states or temporary judgments). The psychological process referred to whether happiness was defined as a cognitive process (judgments, reflections, or beliefs) or as an affective process (feelings, emotions). The constituent element clarified whether happiness was defined only in terms of individuals' experiences (internal) or in terms of the things individuals have or do in their lives (external). The perspective referred to whether the components of well-being were described as independent from individuals' attitudes toward them (objective) or whether they depended on individuals' psychological states (subjective). Finally, the theoretical approach distinguished between accounts that refer to happiness and well-being as a value concept (normative) and accounts that focus only on describing individuals' happiness (descriptive).

In the next step, two of the authors independently rated all accounts on these six dimensions on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. For example, with respect to the degree of stability, accounts were rated as 1 and 2 if the account strongly (1) or moderately (2) emphasized instability, as 3 if the account emphasized instability and stability about equally, and as 4 and 5 if the account moderately (4) or strongly (5) emphasized stability. The interrater agreement ranged between $ICC = .41$ and $ICC = .77$ ($M = .68$). Divergent ratings were discussed among the two raters until a consensus was reached (Table 1). Even though all of the initial characteristics are useful to identify certain common features among happiness and well-being accounts and some of them are commonly used

to classify accounts (e.g. internal vs. external (Sumner, 1996) or descriptive vs. normative (Haybron, 2007)), this process provided empirical evidence that our initial taxonomy did not yet fulfill our criteria outlined above in a satisfactory way. First, not all characteristics could be applied to all accounts in a straightforward manner. For example, many accounts included both features of some of the characteristics (e.g., internal/external, subjective/objective), rendering ratings of these accounts somewhat arbitrary. Second, some of the characteristics overemphasized extreme ratings (1 or 5), indicating that these were binary rather than continuous dimensions. Note that the fact that a characteristic is binary does not make it generally irrelevant. It might be an important information if theories could be described and distinguished by assigning each account to one of two possible groups. For example, characterizing accounts as subjective or objective is commonly and successfully used in the literature, showing that this binary characteristic is a helpful and crucial feature (Hall & Tiberius, 2016; MacLeod, 2015). However, since this paper focused on demonstrating the benefits of continuous characteristics, we decided to not include the binary characteristics in the present paper. Third, we detected high overlap between some characteristics (e.g., temporal dimension and degree of stability). Fourth, the ratings of some characteristics were not sufficiently independent of the raters, as indicated by a low interrater agreement for some dimensions (e.g. constituent element; ICC = .41). Finally, and most importantly, a six-dimensional taxonomy is extremely complex. We therefore dropped characteristics that were redundant, binary or not applicable to many accounts from our taxonomy. Through this process, we reduced the taxonomy to two dimensions, described in detail in the following section: degree of stability and psychological process. However, note that dimensions not included in this taxonomy are not considered as completely irrelevant. On the contrary, we believe that our taxonomy could be improved, and some dimensions could be added. The present taxonomy should be seen as a first attempt to describe similarities and differences among theories of well-being and happiness using continuous rather than binary dimensions.

Description of the Two-Dimensional Taxonomy

The *degree of stability* (Veenhoven, 1994) refers to whether happiness is defined as a more stable, trait-like concept (e.g., genetic or character traits, activities, goals, views of life, etc.) or as a less stable, temporary, state-like concept (e.g., affective states, attitudinal pleasures, or temporary judgments). For instance, eudaimonic accounts define well-being as a certain character development, virtuous activity, view of life, or goal pursuits, and for this reason they are described as more stable accounts (Annas, 1993; Fowers, 2012; Kraut, 2007; Vittersø, 2016). In contrast, accounts which define happiness and well-being as pleasant mental states or momentary positive states are better described as less stable accounts (Bentham, 1789; Kahneman, 1999).

The *psychological process* (Andrews & McKennell, 1980; Andrews & Withey, 1976) refers to whether happiness is defined as an affective process (feelings, emotions, etc.) or as a cognitive process (judgments, reflections, beliefs, views of life, etc.). For example, hedonist accounts are described as more affective accounts in our taxonomy because happiness is understood as a pure feeling (pleasure) (Bentham, 1789; Kahneman, 1999). In contrast, some life satisfaction accounts are classified as more cognitive because they define happiness as a cognitive state or a belief that represents how well one's actual life matches one's ideal life plan (Kekes, 1982).

Application of the Two-Dimensional Taxonomy

To demonstrate that the two dimensions can be applied to describe similarities and differences among accounts of happiness and well-being, two independent raters rated all accounts on these two characteristics using a scale from 1 to 5. For degree of stability, lower scores were given to more state-like accounts and higher scores were given to more trait-like accounts. For psychological process, lower scores were given to more affective accounts and higher scores were given to more cognitive accounts. Because some accounts describe happiness and well-being as multidimensional concepts, we rated the various facets of these accounts separately. For example, in the case of psychological accounts that define well-being as both hedonic and eudaimonic, we rated

hedonic and eudaimonic facets separately (for examples of these accounts see Huta & Waterman, 2014). Doing so not only acknowledged the multidimensional nature of these accounts, it also allowed us to examine whether the separate facets could be distinguished in our taxonomy (see below).

The bivariate distribution of the scores is visualized in Figure 1 (see Table 1 for details). Figure 1 can be thought of as a map that presents the position of each theoretical account in a two-dimensional space where the two dimensions are degree of stability (x axis) and psychological process (y axis). Using this map, one can visually detect similarities and differences among the theoretical accounts, with accounts that are closer to each other on the map being closer to each other on the two dimensions. Before describing these ratings in detail, we would like to caution that these ratings were done by the authors of this paper, not by the proponents of the theoretical accounts. It is very likely that despite an intensive reading of the relevant literature, the original proponents might have rated their accounts differently from us. In addition, other scholars might disagree with some of our ratings, for justifiable reasons. This map should therefore not be taken as an absolute truth, and the position of each account is not fixed but open to debate. Instead, this map serves as a demonstration of how dimensional taxonomies can illustrate similarities and differences among theoretical accounts of happiness and well-being in graphic displays.

Distinguishing Accounts in Terms of Degree of Stability

We begin this review with accounts that define happiness and well-being as a more transient (state-like) concept and gradually move toward accounts that define happiness as a more stable (trait-like) concept. Note that in the text, we focus on accounts that are particularly exemplary for a particular location on the stability dimension. A complete list of all accounts is provided in Table 1. Furthermore, we need to treat all accounts very superficially, focusing only on those aspects of these accounts that are relevant to describe them on the stability dimensions. Readers who seek more in-depth descriptions of these accounts are referred to the original publications and to existing

overviews of the psychological and philosophical literature on happiness and well-being (Haybron, 2008; Huta & Waterman, 2013; McMahon, 2018; Tov, 2018).

At the transient pole of the stability dimension are accounts that define happiness and well-being as the sum of highly transient, momentary, pleasant states. These accounts emphasize the instability of happiness and well-being. For example, according to some philosophers of the hedonist tradition, happiness can be described as a sensory pleasure and as the balance of pleasant and unpleasant states (Bentham, 1789; Mendola, 2006; Sprigge, 1991; Tännsjö, 2007). Similarly, according to some psychologists, happiness can be described as momentary pleasant states and as the average of momentary good and bad affective states over a period of time (Kahneman, 1999), or as a pure state located at the positive extreme of the bipolar pleasure-displeasure dimension (Russell, 1980).

Other accounts define happiness and well-being as a more lasting and profound experience, and thus emphasize stability slightly more than the previous accounts. For instance, some of the philosophers inspired by the hedonists traditions describe happiness and well-being as deep and pleasant sensations produced by certain valuable intellectual experiences (e.g., reading Shakespeare or listening to your favorite songs) and refer to a well-lived life as a life full of these kinds of pleasant experiences (Crisp, 2006; Mill, 1867). Similarly, in psychology, certain accounts define happiness as a surplus of energy (Gailliot, 2012) or as so-called peak experiences which consist of states of enjoyment (Maslow, 1964). While these accounts still focus on momentary and transient states, they imply that people experience recurrent patterns of these states. These accounts are therefore rated as moderately but not completely transient.

A number of accounts emphasize stable and transient aspects about equally. Philosophical accounts that fell into this group included those that describe happiness and well-being as experiences of enjoyment of certain goods (Adams, 1999; Kagan, 1992), as attitudinal pleasures (Feldman, 2010; Sidgwick, 1874), as the satisfaction of preferences (e.g. Brandt, 1979; Hare, 1981; Harsanyi, 1977), or as feelings of satisfaction (Telfer, 1980). What these accounts have in common

is that they define happiness and well-being both as (transient) mental states (e.g., enjoyments and emotions) and in terms of (stable) evaluations, attitudes, and dispositions. Similarly, some psychologists emphasize the stability and instability of happiness about equally, defining it as a stable disposition for experiencing transient positive affective states characterized by either high activation (e.g., enthusiasm and exhilaration) or low activation (e.g., calmness, tranquility, and contentment) (Gilbert et al., 2008; Larsen & Diener, 1987).

Accounts that describe happiness and well-being as more stable concepts frequently refer to well-being as living a good life by developing certain character traits and engaging in certain well-being activities. Thus, they define happiness and well-being as a more trait-like concept rather than as a transient feeling or emotion. In philosophy, these accounts are often based on Aristotle's concept of *eudaimonia*, according to which we flourish as human beings by exercising our capacities or excellences (Aristotle, 1999). Some philosophers argue that living well requires flourishing as a human being and being virtuous (Annas, 1993; Hursthouse, 1999; LeBar, 2013; Russel, 2012), perfecting human nature (Hurka, 2015), developing certain capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000), or developing and exercising certain characteristic human capacities at the appropriate level of individual development (Kraut, 1979). Eudaimonic accounts have also been proposed in psychology. For example, self-determination theory describes well-being as fulfillment of inherent growth and psychological needs such as autonomy, integrity, competence, effectiveness, and connectedness (Ryan & Martela, 2016). Fower's Aristotelian model focuses on goal pursuit and activities that are constitutive of well-being (purposeful and meaningful in themselves) (Fowers, 2012). Other psychologists define happiness and well-being in terms of psychological growth, sense of purpose, meaning, and autonomy, along with positive attitudes toward oneself and the ability to love and to create interpersonal relations (e.g., psychological well-being), which is particularly influenced by life experiences (Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 2008), or as evaluations of one's social status and functioning (e.g., social well-being), which is proposed to be achieved through education and age (Keyes, 1998). Finally, psychologists have described well-being in terms

of self-developments, maturity, and excellence of personal character (e.g., growth motivation model) (Bauer & McAdams, 2004), or as fulfillment of one's individual nature — acting in a way that is consistent with personal potentials and development of one's best potentials (Waterman, 1993). These philosophical and psychological accounts do not only share their emphasis of eudaimonic aspects, they are also highly similar in terms of defining happiness and well-being as a moderately stable concept.

However, accounts that emphasize stable over transient aspects are not limited to the eudaimonic accounts discussed in the previous paragraph. For example, certain desire satisfaction accounts endorse a rather stable concept, defining a well-lived life as the life one would desire if one were fully informed (Griffin, 1986; Railton, 2008; Rawls, 1971; Sobel, 1994). Finally, we also counted philosophical life-satisfaction accounts as part of this group because they focus on individuals' judgments of their lives as a whole rather than on transient experiences (Suikkanen, 2011; Tatarkiewicz, 1966; Tiberius, 2006).

Finally, we located Asian and Eastern accounts at the extreme stable pole of the stability dimension. These accounts usually define happiness as a very stable concept referring to a sense of fulfilment, spirituality, abundance, and tranquillity pervading individuals' whole lives. They also emphasize happiness as individuals' views of themselves as part of the collective community and include negative emotions as a constituent part of individuals' happiness. These accounts describe happiness as a worldview which is determined early in life or achieved through spiritual practice and thus independent of people's current subjective state (Hitokoto & Uchida, 2014; Joshanloo, 2013; Uchida & Oishi, 2016).

Distinguishing Accounts in Terms of Psychological Process

Theoretical accounts can also be described in terms of their psychological process. In this section, we start with accounts that define the concept as involving only or mainly affective

processes and proceed gradually towards accounts in which the concept of happiness and well-being is described as involving mainly or only cognitive processes.

Purely affective accounts include some philosophical hedonic accounts which describe happiness as an affective pleasant state or as the balance of pleasant and unpleasant states (Bentham, 1789; Mendola, 2006; Sprigge, 1991; Tännsjö, 2007). This notion can also be found in some psychological accounts that refer to happiness as the average sum of good and bad momentary affective states (Kahneman, 1999; Russell, 1980).

Overall, however, such purely affective accounts are rare. In psychology, many multidimensional accounts involve at least one facet that can be rated as more affective than cognitive (see Figure 1 and Table 1), although being also influenced by cognitive elements. For example, the emotional elements in Vittersø's concept of functional well-being (Vittersø, 2016) or the affective components in Diener's concept of subjective well-being (Diener, 1984) are facets within multidimensional accounts that can be rated as moderately affective. We discuss these multidimensional accounts in more detail below. An interesting and relatively new account in philosophy that defines happiness as more affective than cognitive is Haybron's emotional state theory, where happiness is defined as having a positive emotional stance towards life and positive mood propensities (Haybron, 2008).

Accounts that describe their concepts as involving equally affective and cognitive processes include those who define happiness and well-being as attitudinal pleasures (Feldman, 2010; Sidgwick, 1874), as positive moods (Brülde, 2007), and as the self-fulfilment of one's emotional nature (e.g., Haybron's emotional well-being account; Haybron, 2008). These accounts describe happiness and well-being as affective states that involve cognitive processes such as having certain attitudes or making evaluations (e.g., pleasant attitudes, dispositions, and emotions). Some other philosophers also describe happiness and well-being as a lasting and profound pleasant state which sometimes involves intellectual cognitive activities rather than only bodily or sensory pleasant feelings (Crisp, 2006; Mill, 1867). For them, a life full of pleasure involving cognitive ability (e.g.,

the life of a musician) must be preferred over a life full of purely affective sensations (e.g., a life of indulging in sensory pleasant experiences). In psychology, Gailliot (2012) describes happiness as a surplus of energy which is affected by both, moods and cognitive demands. Again, multidimensional psychological accounts often involve at least one facet that can be rated as equally affective and cognitive, as we discuss in detail below.

Philosophical accounts that emphasize cognitive processes often come from two traditions. First, most philosophical accounts in the Aristotelian tradition (Annas, 1993; Hurka, 2015; Hursthouse, 1999; Kraut, 2007; LeBar, 2013; Nussbaum, 2000; Russel, 2012) can be rated as highly cognitive accounts. To a different degree, all of these accounts understand happiness and well-being as involving cognitive processes such as developing and exercising certain characteristic human capacities. Affective processes are still part of well-being in some accounts but are seen more as a by-product of certain rational activities (e.g., virtuous activities) rather than as a process that directly defines happiness and well-being. Second, philosophical accounts that define happiness and well-being in terms of satisfaction tend to focus on the cognitive aspect by describing happiness and well-being as individuals' judgments of their lives as a whole (Suikkanen, 2011; Tatarkiewicz, 1966; Tiberius, 2006), as satisfaction of preferences (e.g. Brandt, 1979; Hare, 1981; Harsanyi, 1977) as satisfaction of informed desire (e.g., Griffin, 1986; Railton, 1986; Rosati, 1995), or as beliefs of satisfaction (Davis, 1981).

Corresponding accounts in psychology include eudaimonic well-being models. Similar to their philosophical counterparts, these accounts emphasize cognitive processes but still include affective processes as having a secondary role in humans' well-being. An account entirely inspired by Aristotle's virtue ethics is Fowers' model (Fowers, 2016). This model focuses on eudaimonic activities, that is, activities that are associated with a sense of purpose and meaningfulness. However, it also acknowledges that these well-being activities can produce a sense of fun and enjoyment in individuals (Fowers, 2012). Another example for a psychological account that emphasizes cognitive processes over affective processes is self-determination theory (Ryan &

Martela, 2016). This account describes cognitive processes such as autonomy, integrity, competence, effectiveness, and connectedness, as necessary conditions for well-being, psychological growth, and health. Well-being is mainly seen as a by-product of a rather eudaimonic lifestyle (Ryan & Martela, 2016). Well-being is also described as a more cognitive concept in Bauer's growth motivation model (Bauer & McAdams, 2004), which focuses on self-development, maturity, and excellence of personal character, and in Waterman's eudaimonic identity theory (Waterman, 1993), which defines well-being as fulfillment of human nature and assessment of individuals' actions, which could be accompanied by certain positive feelings. Finally, Asian and Eastern accounts also tend to define happiness as a more cognitive than affective concept, as they focus on individuals' world views and individuals' view of themselves as part of the collective community (Hitokoto & Uchida, 2014; Joshanloo, 2013; Uchida & Oishi, 2016).

Implications

Once the two-dimensional taxonomy is applied to a set of theoretical accounts, it can be used to answer specific research questions about similarities and differences among accounts in a systematic way. As illustrative examples, we now discuss how the two-dimensional taxonomy can be used (a) to describe and understand multidimensional accounts, (b) to identify focal points and gaps in the theoretical accounts, and (c) to integrate philosophical and psychological accounts.

Identifying Focal Points and Gaps in Theoretical Accounts

Describing theoretical accounts on independent continuous dimensions permits identifying focal points and gaps in the theoretical literature in a straightforward way. A closer inspection of Figure 1 reveals several interesting points.

First, not all areas in the two-dimensional maps are equally occupied. Rather, most theoretical accounts are concentrated in the bottom-left quadrant (transient, affective) and in the top-right quadrant (stable, cognitive). This pattern leads to two important conclusions. First, there is no universally accepted definition of happiness and well-being. Second, although the two

dimensions are conceived as independent, there is a significant association ($r = .67$) such that accounts that received higher scores on the stability dimension also tended to receive higher scores on the process dimensions. Put differently, accounts that emphasized cognitive processes were rated as viewing happiness and well-being as a rather stable concept (top-right quadrant in Figure 1), whereas accounts that emphasized affective processes were rated as viewing happiness and well-being as a rather transient concept (bottom-left quadrant in Figure 1).

It is important to point out that this is the empirical result of a systematic literature review, indicating a certain level of agreement among scholars that cognitive processes tend to be stable and that affective processes tend to be transient. However, this is not a natural law. In fact, several psychological authors have argued (e.g., Eid, 2008) and shown empirically that presumably cognitive concepts such as life satisfaction can vary substantially within short periods of time such as days or weeks (Eid & Diener, 2004; Jayawickreme, Tsukayama, & Kashdan, 2017), and that presumably affective concepts such as positive and negative affect have a stable core that changes little within people (Anusic, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2012; Eid & Diener, 2004). Our analysis shows that a theoretical elaboration and integration of these concepts may be of interest for both philosophers and psychologists.

Second, the plot also reveals that very few accounts were rated as extremely unstable or extremely stable, with most accounts being rated as somewhere in the middle between the two extremes. This is also true for psychological process, although to a lesser degree. Here, the number of accounts being rated as purely affective or purely cognitive was somewhat higher. Interestingly, this even applies to the multidimensional accounts, which could more easily allow some of their facets to tap into the extremes, without conceding that happiness and well-being is overall extremely stable or transient, affective or cognitive. Overall, most accounts are moderate, and this is true for both philosophical and psychological accounts. This observation highlights one of the advantages of dimensional taxonomies over categorical taxonomies: Only dimensional taxonomies can represent such nuances.

In sum, describing and visualizing theoretical accounts on the two-dimensional taxonomy highlights focal points and gaps in previous theoretical accounts and may point scholars to opportunities for future theory development. In particular, the empty spots in the map should not be seen as no-go areas, but rather as uncharted terrain that merit exploration.

Understanding Multidimensional Accounts

As noted above, a number of theoretical accounts in both philosophy and psychology consist of multiple facets. These accounts are traditionally referred to as multidimensional accounts. Rating the facets of these accounts separately allowed us to examine whether the different facets tap into different concepts of happiness and well-being as defined by our two-dimensional taxonomy. Due to space constraints, we do not discuss all multidimensional accounts here (but see Table 1 for ratings for all facets of the multidimensional accounts). Instead, we focus on a few selected multidimensional accounts that are particularly illustrative and/or widely recognized in the literature.

As a first example, there are accounts in both psychology and philosophy that define well-being as a dual concept, consisting of a less stable, affective facet and a more stable, cognitive facet. For example, Diener's concept of subjective well-being (SWB) has an affective component (positive and negative affect) and a cognitive component (personal judgments about satisfaction with life as a whole as well as satisfaction with specific life domains) (Diener, 1984). A corresponding philosophical account is Sumner's authentic happiness theory which describes happiness as constituted of positive affect (affective facet) and informed and autonomous individuals' judgments of satisfaction with their lives (more cognitive) (Sumner, 1996). For both accounts, the cognitive facets (white symbols) and affective facets (black symbols) occupy different areas in the two-dimensional map, indicating that they do tap into rather distinct phenomena (Figure 2).

As a second example, we discuss accounts that distinguish well-being into two equally important facets: hedonic well-being and eudaimonic well-being (Delle Fave, Brdar, Freire, Vella-Brodick, & Wissing, 2011; Huta & Waterman, 2013; King & Napa, 1998; McMahan & Estes, 2011a). Hedonic well-being is frequently associated with positive affective states and life satisfaction and is therefore described as less stable and more affective. Eudaimonic well-being is associated with meaning, purpose, self-development, flow, etc. and is therefore often described as more stable and more cognitive. An interesting exception to this general description is Vittersø's functional well-being (Vittersø, 2016). This account describes well-being as including a dispositional (more stable and cognitive) element and an emotional (less stable and more affective) element for *both* hedonia and eudaimonia. This account shows that not all accounts equate hedonic well-being with transient, affective processes and eudaimonic well-being with stable, cognitive processes.

Finally, we consider pluralist accounts discussed in philosophy that differentiate among multiple components of well-being (Finnis, 1980; Fletcher, 2013; Parfit, 1984). These accounts usually claim that certain goods included in a list benefit people and can tell us how well people's lives are going. A graphical display of the different components of enumerative pluralist theory (Fletcher, 2013) in our two-dimensional taxonomy illustrates that these accounts are truly multidimensional in the sense that the components occupy different areas of the two-dimensional model (Figure 3).

In sum, these examples show that describing multidimensional accounts on independent dimensions rather than trying to classify them into different categories allows for a more nuanced characterization of these accounts. Similarities and differences both within accounts (i.e., among facets of a specific account) and between accounts can be illustrated graphically and thereby allow conclusions about whether the different facets cover a narrow or a wide area in terms of degree of stability and psychological process, and how they compare to other multidimensional accounts, including those from other disciplines.

Integrating Philosophical and Psychological Accounts

Describing theoretical accounts on two dimensions facilitates integration of accounts both within and across disciplines. With respect to integrating philosophical and psychological accounts, we can use the two-dimensional taxonomy to detect similarities and differences between the two disciplines overall (macro perspective) as well as between specific theoretical accounts (micro perspective).

With respect to the macro perspective, one can use the two-dimensional map to examine whether the distribution of the theoretical accounts across this map differs between the two disciplines. For example, it might have been possible that psychological accounts tended to be more affective than philosophical accounts (or vice versa), which would have resulted in a starker concentration of psychological accounts in the two left-hand side quadrants of the map, whereas philosophical accounts might have scattered more frequently in the two right-hand side quadrants of the map. However, such a pattern was not apparent for accounts of happiness and well-being displayed in Figure 1. A multivariate analysis of variance with discipline as the independent variable and degree of stability and psychological process as dependent variables confirmed that the distributions did not differ significantly across the two disciplines, Pillai = 0.01, $F(2, 89) = 0.43$, $p = .655$. This finding is encouraging for attempts to integrate the two fields because it suggests that theoretical accounts in both disciplines describe similar phenomena.

As an example for the micro perspective, we focus on two accounts that we already mentioned above as being similar to each other: the psychological account of subjective well-being (Diener, 1984) and the philosophical account of authentic happiness (Sumner, 1996). Sumner's account differs from Diener's account mainly in terms of the additional authenticity and autonomy constraint. In the case of Sumner's account, it is assumed that, hypothetically, individuals' judgments must be informed and free from manipulation and oppressive social conditioning. These differences lead to somewhat different ratings of the facets on our two dimensions (Figure 2). For both accounts, their facets occupy different areas in the two-dimensional map, but the two affective

facets and the two cognitive facets were rated as being similar but not identical to each other, as illustrated by their respective proximity to each other in the figure. This observation implies that while these accounts are not identical, it may nevertheless be possible to integrate them. Arguably, both psychologists and philosophers subscribing to these accounts could benefit from such an integration. In general, psychological accounts tend to be less well elaborated and less well grounded in philosophical schools of thinking than philosophical accounts, and linking them to corresponding philosophical accounts might enhance their theoretical foundation. Philosophical accounts, in contrast, tend to be less concerned with measurement than psychological accounts, and linking them to corresponding psychological accounts would open a pathway towards empirical examination of their assumptions. Describing accounts from both disciplines on a dimensional taxonomy such as the one proposed in this paper helps identify accounts that are similar enough to each other to make attempts to integrate them promising. However, any truly interdisciplinary collaboration is only possible if philosophers and psychologists work together bringing in their own specific competences and expertise. Collaboration should, therefore, be based on philosophers working with psychologists as measurement experts and psychologists working with philosophers as conceptual analysis specialists.

Discussion

Although happiness and well-being are studied by scholars from many different disciplines, interdisciplinary collaborations among these disciplines are relatively rare and often complicated by differences in terminology and theoretical traditions. Theoretical accounts are often developed within one discipline without much cross-reference to other disciplines. Such a focus on one specific discipline may lead to the development of theories that are highly distinct from theories from other disciplines, but it may also lead to the independent development of theories that are highly similar to each other. To foster interdisciplinary collaborations, a necessary first step is

therefore to identify and describe similarities and differences among theoretical accounts in a simple and straightforward way.

In the present paper, we proposed that this goal can be attained by moving away from categorical taxonomies towards dimensional taxonomies of theoretical accounts. A systematic review of philosophical and psychological accounts of happiness and well-being showed that there is an enormous number of distinct definitions. To describe similarities and differences among these different accounts in a systematic way, we developed a two-dimensional framework that allowed characterizing accounts in terms of degree of stability (from transient to stable) and in terms of type of psychological process (from affective to cognitive). An application of this framework to theoretical accounts demonstrated several advantages of using a dimensional taxonomy such as the one proposed here. First, if the dimensions of the taxonomy are general enough, they can be applied to almost all theoretical accounts in a field, as it was the case for the philosophical and psychological accounts of happiness and well-being in the present paper. This feature of dimensional accounts resolves the problem of exhaustiveness and exclusiveness inherent in most categorical taxonomies. Put simply, because most accounts can easily be integrated into an existing dimensional taxonomy, developing and refining novel taxonomies to be able to integrate novel theories becomes obsolete. Second, dimensional taxonomies can be displayed graphically. Graphical displays make focal points and gaps visible and facilitate integrating different theoretical accounts because their similarities and differences are reflected in their relative distance to each other in this graphical display. Applying this advantage to philosophical and psychological accounts of happiness and well-being allowed us to describe and evaluate multidimensional accounts and to identify theoretical twins, that is, accounts from different disciplines that tap into the same phenomena (e.g., Sumner's authentic happiness and Diener's subjective well-being).

However, the two-dimensional taxonomy proposed here has some limitations. First, we based our ratings of the theoretical accounts on detailed written descriptions of the concepts. While these ratings were straightforward for some accounts, they were more challenging for others. We

therefore acknowledge that others might disagree with our ratings as well as with our selection of these particular two dimensions. Thus, our taxonomy is open to changes and improvements. Moreover, we considered as many different accounts as feasible, including lay people's definitions (Delle Fave et al., 2016; Furnham & Cheng, 2000; McMahan & Estes, 2011b) and Eastern and Asian conceptualizations (Hitokoto & Uchida, 2014). However, we should make clear that our research is mostly based on accounts and studies from Western countries and does not include accounts developed in other disciplines (e.g., sociology, economics, theology) and cultures (e.g., Eastern or African accounts, Asian and Arabic philosophy). One task for future research is therefore to examine whether the framework proposed here can be applied to these accounts as well.

A related open question is how happiness and well-being should be defined. We deliberately do not endorse a specific definition here. However, our framework may inspire a new way of defining them as it encourages researchers to identify some basic features of their definitions in order to come up with a common shared definition across disciplines. Having a clear definition is also mandatory to be able to measure a construct. Empirical research to date focuses on those concepts of happiness and well-being for which well-validated measures have been developed. These measures usually focus on one particular definition of happiness and well-being and has led to an immense number of empirical studies in the past decades. However, such a focus may also hinder a complete understanding of what makes people happy and what contributes to a well-lived life. We therefore would like to encourage philosophers and psychologists to work together toward a common theoretical account of happiness and well-being. Our systematic review of existing accounts suggests that well-being and happiness can be defined in very different ways, depending on which aspects of individuals' lives are in focus. However, this diversity in definitions does not mean that we should give up in trying to find a shared definition, but rather that a good way to find a common definition for well-being is to understand it as a pluralist and multidimensional concept that is better described by analyzing different connected aspects of individuals' lives. Using the

two-dimensional taxonomy as a roadmap, we propose that such a multidimensional concept should attempt to occupy all areas in this taxonomy.

Conclusion

In this paper, we offer a new framework to describe and classify definitions of happiness and well-being that may foster interdisciplinary exchange between empirical researchers and philosophers and advance attempts to find a shared definition of the concept of well-being. This would be an essential step for a beneficial collaboration between the two disciplines, which we believe to be fundamental for future advancements on happiness and well-being research.

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Tables

Table 1. Overview of philosophical and psychological accounts of happiness and well-being.

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts			Dimensions	
		Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
1	Affect intensity		(Gilbert et al., 2008; Larsen & Diener, 1987)	Experiencing different types of happiness as a result of dispositions for affect intensity.		
1a		Activated positive affect		Experiencing high arousal positive affect like enthusiasm and exhilaration.	3	1
1b		Relaxed positive affect		Experiencing low arousal positive affect like calmness, tranquility, and contentment.	3	2
2	Affective pleasant state		(Russell, 1980; Russell & Carroll, 1999)	Having an affective state located at the positive end of the bipolar pleasure-displeasure dimension and in the middle of the arousal-sleep dimension.	1	1
3	Affective well-being		(Brülde, 2007)	Experiencing a certain positive mood state that is not about anything in particular - a rosy view of life in general.	4	3
4	Beliefs about well-being		(McMahan & Estes, 2011a, 2011b)	Lay definitions of happiness.		
4a		Experience of pleasure		Pleasant experiences are desired.	2	1
4b		Avoidance of negative experience		Painful experiences are not desired.	2	1
4c		Contribution to others		Emphasizing ones' important role in society and in their own community.	4	3
4d		Self-Development		Achieving one's true potential by continuous learning and development.	4	5

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts			Dimensions	
		Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
5	Capabilities approach		(Nussbaum, 2000)	Developing central human capabilities (e.g. practical reasoning or affiliation) for having a life that is good for us.	4	3
6	Contentment		(Hitokoto & Uchida, 2014; Joshanloo, 2014; Uchida & Ogihara, 2012)	Having a sense of fulfilment and abundance, and being at peace with oneself, others, and the whole cosmos. Experiencing peacefulness and calmness independent of external circumstances.	4	4
7	Cross-Cultural well-being		(Delle Fave et al., 2016, 2011)	Referring to contextual-social sphere and psychological sphere of lay people's definitions of happiness across cultures. Inner harmony as key concept.		
7a		Hedonia		Experiencing positive emotions and life satisfaction.	2	3
7b		Eudaimonia		Long-term process of growth and self-actualization related to meaning, experience of flow and inner harmony.	3	4
8	Developmentalism		(Kraut, 2007)	Developing and exercising certain human capacities, such as rationality. Having an appropriate level of cognitive and emotional development at the stage of individuals' development.	5	4
9	Dialectical model of happiness		(Joshanloo, 2013; Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2002; Uchida & Ogihara, 2012; Uchida & Oishi, 2016)	Viewing suffering, negative emotions, and unhappiness as an important part of life contributing to spiritual development. Preserving balance of joy and sorrow.	5	5
10	Emotional state theory of happiness		(Haybron, 2008)	Having a favorable emotional condition towards life (endorsement, engagement, and attunement) and positive mood propensities.	4	2

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts			Dimensions	
		Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
11	Emotional well-being		(Haybron, 2008)	Involving self-fulfillment of one's emotional nature.	4	3
12	Enjoying the excellence		(Adams, 1999)	Being morally excellent and having other individual quality, but also having a variety of non-moral excellence as well (e.g. beauty).	3	3
13	Enjoying the good		(Kagan, 2009)	Possessing certain objective goods and taking pleasure in them - people enjoy having them.	3	2
14	Eudaimonia (Aristotelian view)		(Aristotle, 1999)	Fulfilling the human nature - developing and exercising the various intellectual and moral virtues.	4	5
15	Eudaimonic goal pursuit model		(Fowers, 2012, 2015; Fowers, Molica, & Procacci, 2010)	Pursuing certain life goals. Aristotelian model of eudaimonic well-being. Hedonic well-being as a secondary element.		
15a		Instrumental mode of goal pursuit: hedonic enjoyment		How much the individual experienced a sense of enjoyment by doing an activity.	2	1
15b		Instrumental mode of goal pursuit: efficacy		How efficacious/successful individuals perceive their goals.	3	3
15c		Instrumental mode of goal pursuit: fun		How much fun the goal is.	2	2
15d		Constitutive mode of goal pursuit: integrity		How integral the goal is to the individual's life - to what extent a goal is consistent with the values that guide one's life.	4	5

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts			Dimensions	
		Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
15e		Constitutive mode of goal pursuit: personal expression		How much the individual identifies with his or her activities.	3	4
16	Eudaimonic identity theory		(Waterman, 1990, 1993; Waterman, Schwartz, & Conti, 2008)	Fulfilling individual nature: assessing individuals' actions rather than experiences.		
16a		Hedonic enjoyment		Experiencing pleasant affect along with satisfaction of need (physical, intellectual, social). Could also be a byproduct of attaining success regarding self-realization.	3	2
16b		Personal expressiveness / Eudaimonia		Self-realization (acting in ways consistent with personal potentials) leading to feelings of personal expressiveness - acting in consistency with one's intrinsic nature.	3	4
17	Eudaimonism		(Annas, 2011; Foot, 2003; Hursthouse, 1999; LeBar, 2013)	Living a life of virtuous activities or excellence (rationality).	4	5
18	Flow or optimal experience		(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990)	Experiencing a harmonious ordered state of mind and wanting to pursue something for its own sake while taking part in certain activities involving engaging and challenging tasks.	2	4

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts		Description	Dimensions	
		Facets	References		Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
19	Functional well-being		(Vittersø, Søholt, Hetland, & Alekseeva, 2010)	Having hedonic and eudaimonic well-being but distinguishing between a dispositional element and an emotional element for both.		
19a		Hedonic well-being: dispositional element		Orientation on evaluation of outcomes, like life satisfaction - judgments of things on basis of their goodness or badness.	4	4
19b		Hedonic well-being: emotional element		Evaluations in terms of goodness and badness; like affect. Related activities experienced as pleasant.	2	2
19c		Eudaimonic well-being: dispositional element		Orientation on seeking out challenge and complexity, striving after demanding goals, openness to experience, self-actualization, and curiosity.	4	5
19d		Eudaimonic well-being: emotional element		States that are perceived as favorable, even if the balance of goodness-badness is slightly disrupted. Related activities experienced as engaging, interesting, associated with flow.	2	3
20	Good life		(King & Napa, 1998)	Experiencing happiness and having meaning in life - the good life seen as a desirable life.		
20a		Happiness		Experiencing enjoyment and absence of trouble - probably as a by-product of meaning.	2	2
20b		Meaning		Having a sense of purpose in life.	3	4
21	Growth motivation		(Bauer & McAdams, 2004; Bauer, McAdams, & Pals, 2008; Bauer, Park, Montoya, & Wayment, 2015)	Following different paths of self-development and growth motivation.		

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts			Dimensions	
		Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
21a		Reflective growth motivation		Having maturity and wisdom. Complexly and integratively thinking about oneself and others.	4	5
21b		Experiential growth motivation		Experiencing well-being and meaningfulness. How good one feels about the self in a world of others as a result of fulfilled values.	3	2
22	Hedonism (attitudinal)		(Feldman, 2010; Sidgwick, 1874)	Being pleased towards certain things and state of affairs we have in our lives, which we like, enjoy, and desire.	3	3
23	Hedonism (qualitative)		(Crisp, 2006; Mill, 1867)	Having positive balance of pleasant over unpleasant experiences - some intellectual pleasures are more valuable than certain bodily pleasures.	2	3
24	Hedonism (quantitative)		(Bentham, 1789; Mendola, 2006; Sprigge, 1991; Tännsjö, 2007)	Having a positive balance of pleasure over pain. Any kind of sensory pleasure matters.	1	1
25	Interdependent happiness		(Hitokoto & Uchida, 2014; Joshanloo, 2014; Uchida & Ogihara, 2012)	Viewing ourselves as small ordinary part of the collective and the cosmos. Happiness in terms of connectedness and harmony with one's surrounding.	4	4
26	Objective happiness		(Kahneman, 1999)	Having an average of subjective momentary good/bad evaluations over a period of time.	1	1
27	Orientations to a good life		(Huta, 2015; Huta & Ryan, 2010; Huta & Waterman, 2013)	Having orientations for activities (attitudes, values, motives, goals) along with the desired outcomes.		
27a		Hedonic orientations		Experiencing pleasure, enjoyment, reduced negative affect, life satisfaction, comfort, and carefreeness.	3	3

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts			Dimensions	
		Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
27b		Eudaimonic orientations		Developing the best in oneself in congruence with one's values and true self - authenticity, meaning, excellence, personal growth, and optimal experience - indirect influence on positive affect.	4	4
28	Perfectionism		(Hurka, 2015)	Possessing things perfecting human nature, such as rationality.	4	5
29	PERMA & Authentic happiness		(Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 2005; Seligman, 2002, 2011)	Having positive human functioning defined as flourishing which contains different facets.		
29a		Positive emotions / Pleasure		Maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain.	2	1
29b		Engagement		Experiencing happiness through the engagement in satisfying activities.	3	3
29c		Accomplishment		Applying skills and efforts to progress towards goals.	3	5
29d		Relationships		Social integration, care and support, satisfaction with social life and connections.	4	3
29e		Meaning		Achieving worthwhile pursuits while serving what is larger and more worthwhile than the self's pleasures.	4	5
30	PERMA + Balance		(Sirgy & Wu, 2009)	Experiencing balance in life and satisfaction in several life domains. PERMA (Seligman, 2011) enriched by the importance of balance.	3	3
31	Pluralist (enumerative) theory		(Fletcher, 2013) Other list theories: (Finnis, 1980; Murphy, 2001)	Listing certain objective prudential goods - things good for the agent, even if the agent does not desire them.		
31a		Achievement of goals			3	4
31b		Friendship			3	3
31c		Happiness and pleasure			2	2

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts			Dimensions	
		Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
31d		Self-respect			3	3
31e		Exercising virtue			4	5
32	Psychological well-being		(Ryff, 1989, 2014; Ryff & Singer, 2008)	Experiencing self-actualization, optimal functioning, mental health, maturity.		
32a		Self-acceptance		Having positive attitudes toward oneself and one's past life.	3	3
32b		Purpose in life		Beliefs that give one the feeling that there is purpose and meaning in life - a clear comprehension of life's purpose, a sense of directedness, and intentionality.	3	4
32c		Personal growth		Developing one's potential for growing as a person, taking new challenges at different stages of life, and being open to new experiences.	3	5
32d		Positive relations with others		Having the ability to love, create interpersonal relations, see others as an important part of the personal identification, and feel empathy and affection for humans.	4	3
32e		Environmental mastery		Having a sense of control over the external world and being able to take advantages of environmental opportunities.	4	3
32f		Autonomy		Having an internal locus of evaluation and being committed to personal standards and free from collective norms, fears, and beliefs. Having self-determination, independence, and internal regulation of behavior.	4	5

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts			Dimensions	
		Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
33	Quality of life & Health related well-being		(WHOQOL Group, 1995)	Focusing on physical health and functional ability but also including subjective perception of position in life in context of a specific culture and value systems and in relation to individuals' goals, expectation, standards and concerns.		
33a		Physical health		Pain, discomfort, energy, and fatigue.	3	3
33b		Psychological state			3	3
33c		Social relationships			4	3
33d		Relationship to environment			4	3
33e		Level of independence			4	4
33f		Personal beliefs		How personal beliefs affect the quality of life - both positive and negative influences.	4	4
34	Satisfaction of desires for the good		(Darwall, 1999; Raz, 1986)	Being successful in pursuing worthwhile goals such as projects, plans, relationships, ambitions, commitments, long-term desires, and objectives.	4	4
35	Satisfaction of informed-desire theory		(Griffin, 1986; Railton, 1986; Rawls, 1971; Rosati, 1995; Sobel, 1994)	Living the best life as seen the one people would desire if they were fully informed - the life people find compelling and attractive.	4	5
36	Satisfaction of perceived desire		(Davis, 1981)	Believing that enough of one's important desires are satisfied.	2	4
37	Satisfaction of preferences theory		(Barry, 1965; Brandt, 1979; Hare, 1981; Harsanyi, 1977; Singer, 1979; Von Wright, 1963)	Satisfying individual preferences.	3	4
38	Satisfaction of present-desire theory		(Murphy, 1999)	Fulfilling current desires and getting what one wants.	1	3

Philosophical and Psychological Accounts					Dimensions	
No.	Concept	Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
39	Satisfaction with life (affective) theory		Telfer (1980)	Having a positive affective state based on one's view of life overall - whether one feels pleased with how one is living.	3	3
40	Satisfaction with life (cognitive) theories		(Almeder, 2000; Kekes, 1982; McFall, 1989; Meynell, 1969; Scruton, 1975; Suikkanen, 2011; Tatarkiewicz, 1966; Thomas, 1968; Tiberius & Plakias, 2009)	Being in a cognitive state of a belief that represents how well your actual life matches up to your ideal life-plan.	4	5
41	Satisfaction with life as a whole		(Benditt, 1974; Montague, 1966; Nozick, 1990; Von Wright, 1963)	Having a favorable attitude toward one's life as a whole - involving some form of affect.	4	3
42	Self-Actualization theory		(Maslow, 1964, 1965, 1968)	Self-actualization as the highest human need, accompanied by certain positive states.		
42a		Self-actualization		Fulfilling highest human needs through the fulfilment of inner potentials and ultimate values of goodness, truth, beauty, and perfection.	4	4
42b		Peak experiences		Brief, intense, and involuntary state of illumination, vividness and completeness, while having no self-consciousness.	2	2
42c		Plateau experiences		Less intense state of enjoyment, wondering, appreciating, and contemplative experience - cognitive element achieved by hard work through maturing, living, and learning.	3	4

No.	Concept	Philosophical and Psychological Accounts			Dimensions	
		Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
43	Self-Determination theory		(Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryan & Martela, 2016)	Fulfilling inherent tendencies and psychological needs as necessary conditions for growth, integrity, well-being, and psychological health. Well-being as a by-product of a rather eudaimonic lifestyle, which does not differ in quality from the happiness one might experience from other positive events (e.g. rather hedonic events).		
43a		Autonomy and integrity			4	5
43b		Competence and effectiveness			4	4
43c		Connectedness			4	3
44	Social well-being		(Keyes, 1998)	Evaluating one's social status and functioning.		
44a		Social integration		Quality of one's relationship to society and community: feelings of belongingness.	3	3
44b		Social contribution		One's social value: belief of being an important member of society, having something to give to the world, and feelings of contribution to the commonweal.	3	4
44c		Social acceptance		Positive view of human nature: trust, expectations to be treated kindly, and feeling comfortable with others.	4	3
44d		Social coherence		Perception of the quality, organization, and operation of the social world. Includes concern for the knowledge about the world.	4	4

Philosophical and Psychological Accounts					Dimensions	
No.	Concept	Facets	References	Description	Degree of stability (1 = transient; 5 = stable)	Psychological process (1 = affective; 5 = cognitive)
44e		Social actualization		Positive evaluations of the potential and trajectory of the society. Hope regarding future societies and control over one's own destiny.	4	5
45	Subjective authentic happiness		(Sumner, 1996)	Being authentically happy: being informed about the conditions of one's life and free from manipulation or oppression - global judgments about one's life as a whole.		
45a		Positive affect		Finding one's life rewarding as a consequence of being satisfied.	3	3
45b		Life-satisfaction		Being satisfied with life as a whole - all things considered one's life measures up to one's standards.	5	5
46	Subjective well-being (SWB)		(Diener, 1984)	Having a positive balance of pleasant over unpleasant experiences and a positive global evaluation of one's life.		
46a		Positive affect (AWB)		Experiencing pleasure.	2	1
46b		Negative affect (AWB)		Lacking unpleasant experiences.	2	1
46c		Life-satisfaction (CWB)		Global judgment about one's life according to one's individual chosen criteria.	4	5
47	Surplus of energy		(Gailliot, 2012)	Having a surplus of energy - this includes biological energy, but also secondary sources that provide or conserve energy (e.g. social support or monetary wealth).	2	3

Figures

Fig. 1 Position of all theoretical accounts included in the review on the two-dimensional map. Red triangles denote psychological accounts, black circles denote philosophical accounts. The so-called rug (short lines at the inner edges of the axes) display the frequency of accounts that were given the respective rating for stability and psychological process, respectively. The frequencies for philosophical accounts are displayed on the bottom and left axis; the frequencies for psychological accounts are displayed on the top and right axis. Random jitter was applied to all data points to enhance the graphical display.

Fig. 2 Position of the facets of Diener's and Sumner's multidimensional accounts on the two-dimensional map

Fig. 3 Position of the components of Fletcher's enumerative pluralist theory on the two-dimensional map