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Politicians' Ideology Matters More than Their Race in Determining the Association between White
Identity and Evaluation of the Politicians

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Abstract

White Americans' racial identity can predict their sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors, demonstrating an emergent trend of White identity politics. However, when it comes to predicting support for political candidates, it remains an unclarified question whether the effects of White identity politics are determined more by candidates' ideology or race. This paper disentangles and compares the role of candidates' ideology and race. Four studies using White American samples consistently support the ideology hypothesis, which suggests that White identity predicts support for conservative politicians and opposition to liberal politicians because of their ideology. The evidence is limited for the racial hypothesis, which suggests that White identity predicts support for White politicians but opposition to Black politicians because of their race. Thus, this paper complements theories of White identity politics and clarifies implications for who might benefit from its growing influence.

Keywords: White identity, identity politics, race, ideology

Social identity theory suggests the social groups that we identify can shape our attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and individuals who identify strongly with their in-group are more likely to favor in-group members (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). Whites' racial identity was once thought of as invisible due to Whites' majority status (Flagg, 1993; Frankenberg, 2001), but as racial minority population grows and White population declines, many Whites are experiencing various inter-group threats (Abrajano & Hajnal 2017; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Danbold & Huo, 2015; Bai & Federico, 2020). These threats can ultimately help Whites to develop a sense of solidarity (Knowles & Peng, 2005; Knowles & Tropp, 2018) and racial identity (Jardina, 2019).

Like other identities, Whites' increasingly salient racial identity predicts various types of sociopolitical attitudes, such as conservative policy positions, desire to strengthen their racial in-group (Knowles et al., 2014; Lowery et al., 2006), and prejudice against racial out-groups (Morrison & Chung, 2011; Castillo et al., 2006; contra Jardina, 2019, which suggests that many White identifiers do not hold very much prejudice against racial out-groups). As such, intuitively, White identity predicts positive evaluation of Donald Trump, a White conservative politician (Knowles & Tropp, 2018), and negative evaluation of Barack Obama, a Black liberal politician (Jardina, 2020).

Candidate's ideology vs candidate's race

However, how is White identity related to evaluation of White liberal politicians and minority conservative politicians? Past observations do not point to a very clear direction, as White identity is usually used to predict support for politicians that are either White conservative or Black liberal (e.g., Knowles & Tropp, 2018; Jardina, 2020; Petrow et al., 2018¹). Theories on White identity do not rule out either possibilities. On one hand, White identity's effect may be decided by

¹ The study of Petrow and colleagues is the only one that potentially includes evaluation of Black candidates who may be not liberal, as the 41 Black candidates for House of Representative were described as "all but two voting members were Democrats."). Nonetheless, this study still cannot effectively disentangle the effect of candidate's race and ideology because their analyses focused on predicting evaluation of Democratic candidates in general, and they did not model candidates' race as well as ideology separately.

candidates' ideology, as its relationship with support for Trump has been theorized as something grounded on his political agenda that protects Whites' interest (Knowles & Tropp, 2018; Jardina, 2020; Yadon & Ostfeld, 2020). On the other hand, White identity's effect may be decided by candidates' race, as White identifiers have more positive evaluation of Whites (Wong & Cho, 2005), and are more likely to explicitly state that it is important for them that a political candidate they support is White² (Schildkraut, 2017).

To be sure, both ideological and racial explanations may be true, and traditionally, it has not been necessary to identify whether White identity's effect is driven by candidates' ideology or race, because White candidates are also often perceived to be more conservative (e.g., Sigelman et al., 1995; Chambers et al., 2013; Jacobsmeiser, 2014; Lerman & Sadin, 2016; Fulton & Gershon, 2018) and supporting minority candidates and candidate who disrupt the existing racial hierarchy is usually the same thing. Perhaps for these reasons, some researchers have incorporated both ideological and racial explanations in their theorizations of White identity, and they considered that the effect of White identity on evaluation of White conservative candidates and minority liberal candidates are due to their ideology as well as race (e.g., Jardina 2019, 2020). Consequently, it is not explicit from past literature whether White identity is related to support or opposition to White liberals and minority conservatives.

For instance, Jardina's theory argues that White identity is about maintenance of Whites' position atop the racial hierarchy (2020), but does it matter who is doing the maintenance? Furthermore, is a minority political leadership regarded as a disruption to the hierarchy in and of itself? The consideration that "as the nation's first black president, Obama challenged the nation's racial hierarchy by disrupting the succession of white presidents" (Jardina, 2020) still allows for these possibilities. Yet, these questions have not been explicitly addressed from prior work. Extending

² In their response to the question "[...], how important is it for you that a candidate is white?"

past theories on White identity, the current paper specifically tests and compares the role of candidates' ideology and race that are not explicitly addressed in the past by testing three hypotheses.

Current studies

Hypothesis 1 states that the predictive effect of White identity on the evaluation of politicians is moderated (i.e., determined) by the politicians' ideology, and Hypothesis 2 states that it is moderated by the politicians' race. Though politicians' race and ideology may jointly moderate the effect of White identity, by comparing their *relative* moderating effects, one can derive an inference about whether White identity benefits or undermines White liberals and minority conservatives.

An assumption about the mechanism of Hypothesis 1 is that the interaction between White citizens' level of racial identity and politicians' ideology would be explained by the interaction between citizens' ideology and the politician's ideology. Therefore, this paper also tests Hypothesis 3, i.e., the moderating effects of politicians' ideology on White identity described in Hypothesis 1 is further mediated by the moderation of politicians' ideology on respondent ideology, a moderated mediation. Conceptually, the interaction between citizens' ideology and politicians' ideology can also be thought of as respondents' ideological similarity with the target politician. This hypothesis contrasts and extends prior theoretical models that consider citizens' White identity and ideology as independent dimensions of predictors for vote choice (see Weller & Junn 2018). It is conceptually illustrated in Figure 1a, and its statistical meaning is illustrated in Figure 1b based on Hayes' (2013) Model 15 template. The notation, tests, and interpretation related to this hypothesis are all drawn directly from Hayes (2013).

Correspondingly, Hypothesis 3 will be supported if the parameter estimates are negative for $a \times b_1$ and positive for $a \times (b_1 + b_2)$, meaning White identity's indirect effect is negative for liberal and positive for conservative politicians via participants' ideology. Theoretically, a corresponding "Hypothesis 4" may be tested: the moderating effects of politicians' race on White identity described

in Hypothesis 2 is further mediated by the moderating effect of politicians' race on citizens' racial attitudes, such as prejudice against Black people. However, this hypothesis will not be tested because, as will be shown below, the data's support for Hypothesis 2 is very limited. These ultimately rendered this "Hypothesis 4" superfluous. The corresponding Figures 1c and 1d are provided for illustration and placed in Appendix A, as this is an untested model.

Figure 1a Conceptual diagram for the moderated mediation (Hypothesis 3)

Figure 1b Statistical diagram for the moderated mediation (Hypothesis 3)

Four studies were conducted, and all three hypotheses were tested in Studies 1-2 but only Hypotheses 1 and 3 were tested in Study 3. The studies operationally focus on two aspects of White identity that are relevant to evaluation of politicians: White identity centrality and preferences for White identity politics. The former reflects the degree to which a White individual's race is important to their self-concept. The latter focuses on their support for Whites to engage in White identity based political coalition.

All studies use pre-existing data from larger collaborative projects that were not specifically designed to test the hypotheses described in this paper. Therefore, the sample size was pre-determined independent of the current project. Only data from White American were included in

the analyses. All measures were rescaled to range from 0 to 1, with higher scores on a variable indicating a higher level of that construct. This coding allows us to interpret the model estimates as effect size. In all tables, “0” and “0.00” denote values that are between -0.01 and 0.01, and “0.000” denote values less than 0.001. In all tables for indirect effects, rows for variances and covariances are omitted for conciseness, but the full tables that contain these rows can be found in the online table in <https://osf.io/pzctx>, which also has the data, analytic code, and online supplemental appendices for all studies. All measures and experimental materials throughout the studies can be found in Appendix A. No study was pre-registered. The least sensitive test throughout the studies is Model 2 from Study 2b. A sensitivity analysis (see the analysis in the osf folder) shows that it can detect an effect the size of $f^2=.018$, a small effect, according to Cohen (1988).

Study 1

Study 1 tests the hypotheses by comparing White identity politics’ effect on evaluation of real politicians whose ideology and race vary orthogonally.

Method

This study uses data from 782 (including partial completions) White Americans from Prolific. White identity politics was measured using a scale from De Zavala and colleagues (2009; $\alpha=.86$) which has five items such as “If my racial/ethnic group had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place” (1=‘Totally disagree’, 7=‘Totally agree’). Participants’ evaluation of politicians was measured with feeling thermometers for four politicians whose race and ideology differed, and indicator-coded variables for race (“Target race”) and ideology (“Target ideology”) of the politicians were generated accordingly. The politicians were Barack Obama (a Black liberal; Target race=0, Target ideology=0), Ben Carson (a Black conservative; Target race=0, Target ideology =1), Joe Biden (a White liberal; Target race=1, Target ideology =0), and Donald Trump (a White conservative; Target race=1, Target ideology =1). Participants’ own ideology was measured

with one item “How would you describe your ideological preference in general?” (1=Very liberal; 7=Very conservative)³. Again, all variables that were not already in 0-1 coding were recoded so that they run from 0 to 1 whereas 1 is the higher level of that variable.

Results

Table 1 describes the descriptives and bivariate relationship between all variables. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, politician evaluation was predicted by variables for White identity politics, White identity politics, Target race, and Target ideology in a linear regression. Additionally, two interaction terms, White identity politics $\times$ Target ideology and White identity politics $\times$ Target race, were entered, and their significance would support Hypothesis 1 and 2 respectively. This model can be found in Table 2 (Model 2), and a baseline model without the interactions was also estimated (Model 1).

³ Though a detailed discussion of ideology is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that scholars continue to debate the utility of ideology and its measures, particularly vis-à-vis party identification (e.g., Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; Mason, 2018; Ellis & Stimson, 2012). Nonetheless, emerging evidence suggests that, after correcting for potential omitted variable bias, ideology, measured on a seven-point scale like in the current studies, performs very well in predicting candidate evaluation (Bai, under review).

Table 1 Study 1 Descriptives and Correlations

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1. Gender	2. Age	3. Education	4. Income	5. Ideology	6. Party identity	7. White identity politics	8. Obama	9. Carson	10. Biden
1. Female	0.52	0.50										
2. Age	34.99	12.47	0.07									
3. Education	0.50	0.24	-0.02	.14***								
4. Income	0.53	0.30	-0.11	0	.34***							
5. Ideology	0.49	0.32	-.21***	.25***	0.04	.08*						
6. Party identity	0.50	0.31	-.18***	.25***	0	.08*	.86***					
7. White identity politics	0.33	0.22	-.19***	.13***	.10**	.12***	.46***	.45***				
8. Obama	0.52	0.35	.12**	-.24***	.09*	0.03	-.61***	-.65***	-.37***			
9. Carson	0.46	0.31	-.10**	.21***	.08*	.17***	.59***	.57***	.32***	-.41***		
10. Biden	0.38	0.32	.10**	-.09*	.13***	0.05	-.54***	-.60***	-.27***	.80***	-.32***	
11. Trump	0.38	0.38	-.15***	.30***	0.02	0.05	.74***	.77***	.48***	-.68***	.62***	-.57***

Note. **** $p < 0.001$, *** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$. Mean and standard deviation of age are described in the original metric whereas all other variables are in the 0-1 coding.

Table 2. Study 1 Regression models

	Model 1					Model 2				
	b		S.E.	<i>p</i>	95% CI	b		S.E.	<i>p</i>	95% CI
(Intercept)	0.48	***	0.01	0.000	[0.46 0.51]	0.72	***	0.02	0.000	[0.68 0.76]
White identity politics	0.07	*	0.03	0.016	[0.01 0.13]	-0.65	***	0.05	0.000	[-0.74 -0.56]
Target ideology	-0.03	*	0.01	0.017	[-0.05 -0.01]	-0.41	***	0.02	0.000	[-0.45 -0.37]
Target race	-0.11	***	0.01	0.000	[-0.13 -0.09]	-0.21	***	0.02	0.000	[-0.25 -0.17]
White identity politics × Target ideology						1.14	***	0.05	0.000	[1.03 1.24]
White identity politics × Target race						0.30	***	0.05	0.000	[0.20 0.40]

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$.

Both interaction terms are significant: White identity politics predicts support for the politicians based on their ideology as well as race, as it predicts support for conservative and White politicians, but opposition to the liberal and Black politicians on average (see Figure 2), supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2. An additional model investigated the three-way interaction of White identity politics $\times$ Target ideology $\times$ Target race, and this term is marginally significant, $b=.20$, $S.E.=.11$, $p=.065$.

To test Hypothesis 3, a model similar to what is in Figure 1b was estimated and summarized in Table 3. This model controls for gender, age, education, income, and party identity (1=strongest identification with the party that the target politician identifies with). The model was estimated using the Lavaan package (Rosseel et al., 2017), and the bias-corrected confidence intervals for the indirect effects were based on 1000 bootstrap samples. Accordingly, White identity politics has a significant indirect effect on politician evaluation via respondent ideology. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the effects are positive for the conservative politicians, but negative for the liberal politicians. White identity politics also has a residual direct effect on politician evaluation, and their effects are in the same direction as indirect effects.

Table 3. Study 1 parameter estimates with bias corrected confidence interval

	Predicted variable	Predictor	Path	b		s.e.	<i>p</i>	95% CI	
Regressions	Ideology	White identity politics	a	0.67	***	0.03	0.000	[	0.62 0.72]
	Feeling thermometer	Ideology	b1	-0.20	***	0.04	0.000	[	-0.27 -0.12]
	Feeling thermometer	Ideology × Target ideology	b2	0.48	***	0.07	0.000	[	0.34 0.60]
	Feeling thermometer	White identity politics	c1	-0.10	*	0.04	0.015	[	-0.18 -0.02]
	Feeling thermometer	Target ideology	c2	-0.35	***	0.04	0.000	[	-0.42 -0.28]
	Feeling thermometer	White identity politics × Target ideology	c3	0.24	***	0.05	0.000	[	0.14 0.35]
	Feeling thermometer	Gender		0.00	<i>ns</i>	0.01	0.810	[	-0.02 0.02]
	Feeling thermometer	Age		0.05	†	0.02	0.052	[	0.00 0.09]
	Feeling thermometer	Education		0.08	***	0.02	0.000	[	0.04 0.12]
	Feeling thermometer	Income		0.05	***	0.02	0.001	[	0.02 0.08]
	Feeling thermometer	Party identity		0.46	***	0.03	0.000	[	0.40 0.53]
	Feeling thermometer	Target race		-0.11	***	0.01	0.000	[	-0.13 -0.09]
Defined Parameters for the effects of White identity	Indirect effects on liberal politicians		a × b1	-0.13	***	0.03	0.000	[	-0.18 -0.08]
	Indirect effects on conservative politicians		a × (b1+b2)	0.19	***	0.03	0.000	[	0.13 0.23]
	Direct effects on liberal politicians		c1	-0.10	*	0.04	0.015	[	-0.18 -0.02]
	Direct effects on conservative politicians		c1+c3	0.14	***	0.04	0.000	[	0.08 0.22]
	Total effects on liberal politicians		a × b1+c1	-0.23	***	0.04	0.000	[	-0.32 -0.14]
	Total effects on conservative politicians		a × (b1+b2)+c1+c3	0.33	***	0.04	0.000	[	0.25 0.40]

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$.

Figure 2. Moderating effect of politicians' ideology and race in Study 2

Discussions

All three hypotheses are supported: politicians' ideology (Hypothesis 1) and race (Hypothesis 2) both moderate the effect of White identity politics, and the moderating effect is mediated by participants' ideology (Hypothesis 3). When comparing the moderation of politicians' race and ideology, however, politicians' ideology is a stronger moderator than politicians' race, as the coefficient for the interaction term with ideology far exceeds that of race in Table 2. Consistent with

this, Table 1 shows that the variable for White identity politics is negatively related to feelings for Joe Biden, whereas it is positively related to feelings for Ben Carson. Therefore, White Americans who support identity politics are willing to follow someone who is perceived to maintain Whites' privileged racial status even if the person is a racial out-group, and they are unwilling to support someone who may change the racial hierarchy, even if the person is a racial in-group.

Study 2a and Study 2b

Though Study 1 has good external validity because it uses real politicians, participants' preconceived attitudes toward them may confound the internal validity of the inferences. Therefore, Studies 2a and 2b experimentally manipulate the race and ideology of a hypothetical politician independently.

Method

Study 2a uses a sample of 725 non-contaminated (Bai, 2018) White respondents from Mturk, filtered using the tool from Prims and colleagues (2018; see <https://itaysisso.shinyapps.io/Bots/>). Study 2b uses a sample of 549 White respondents from Lucid. In both studies, White centrality, the theoretical independent variable, was measured using a four-item scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) that includes statements such as "My race is an important reflection of who I am" (1=Strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree; $\alpha=.88$ in Study 2a, $\alpha=.69$ in Study 2b).

Study 2a is a 2 (Target's race: Black vs White) $\times$ 2 (Target's ideology: conservative vs liberal) design. Participants reviewed a male politician whose race was manipulated by an ostensible profile picture and his ideology was manipulated by attributing a statement containing either liberal or conservative issue stances. Target race (Black=0, White=1) and Target ideology (liberal=0, conservative=1) variables were created like in Study 1.

Study 2b is similar to Study 2a except that the politician's gender and party affiliation were also manipulated, fully crossing with other factors. Therefore, this study has a 2 (Target's race:

Black=0 vs White=1) $\times$ 2 (Target gender: female=0 vs male=1) $\times$ 2 (Target ideology: liberal=0 vs conservative=1) $\times$ 2 (Target party: Democrat=0 vs Republican=1) between-subject design. The gender and party factors are unrelated to the hypotheses, so their effects are theoretically treated as random effects (see below). This procedure was demonstrated by Bai (2020, Appendix B) as effective.

Both studies asked participants to rate the politician using a feeling thermometer and a voting likelihood question. These two items were averaged as the politician evaluation scale ($\alpha=.96$ in Study 2a, and $\alpha=.95$ in Study 2b). The participants' own ideology is measured on a seven-point scale as in Study 1. Again, all variables are recoded to run from 0 to 1 before analyses, and all measures and stimuli can be found in Appendix A.

Results

Tables 4 and 5 describe the descriptives and bivariate relationships. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, two linear regressions using data from Studies 2a and 2b were estimated like in Study 1. In these models, politician evaluation was predicted by White identity centrality, Target race, and Target ideology. Importantly, White identity centrality $\times$ Target ideology and White identity centrality $\times$ Target race were entered, and like in Study 1, the significance of these two interactions would support Hypotheses 1 and 2 respectively. For Study 2b, Target party and Target gender were also added to account for the theoretical random effects of politicians' partisanship and gender (see above). These models are in Tables 6 and 7 (Model 2), along with baseline models without the interactions (Model 1).

Table 4. Study 2a Descriptives and Correlations

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1. Gender	2. Age	3. Income	4. Ideology	5. Party identity	6. White identity centrality
1. Female	0.61	0.49						
2. Age	40.37	13.10	0.02					
3. Income	0.48	0.30	-0.05	0.01				
4. Ideology	0.45	0.31	-.11**	0.05	0			
5. Party identity	0.45	0.26	-.09*	0	-0.02	.81***		
6. White identity centrality	0.42	0.25	0.01	.12***	.12**	.24***	.22***	
7. Black liberal	0.65	0.30	0.11	0.02	-0.04	-.67***	-.66***	-0.1
8. White liberal	0.60	0.33	.20*	-0.07	-0.04	-.67***	-.70***	-.23***
9. Black conservative	0.53	0.33	-0.09	0.05	-0.1	.76***	.74***	.22**
10. White conservative	0.40	0.34	0.07	-0.02	0.01	.66***	.68***	.33***

Note. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$. Mean and standard deviation of age are described in the original metric whereas all other variables are in the 0-1 coding. Note that these tables do not include the correlations between variables 7 through 10 because participants only evaluated one of the politicians corresponding to variables 7 to 10.

Table 5. Study 2b Descriptives and Correlations

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1. Gender	2. Age	3. Income	4. Education	5. Ideology	6. Party identity	7. White identity centrality
1. Female	0.51	0.50							
2. Age	48.17	16.54	-.17***						
3. Income	0.36	0.29	-.18***	-0.04					
4. Education	0.56	0.21	-.19***	.07*	.43***				
5. Ideology	0.53	0.29	-.09**	.15***	-0.01	-0.06†			
6. Party identity	0.55	0.38	-.13***	0.01	.09**	0	.63***		
7. White identity centrality	0.43	0.21	-.08*	0.04	0.01	0.03	.12***	.14***	
8. Black liberal	0.54	0.32	-0.04	-.24**	0.06	0.04	-.57***	-.45***	-0.12
9. White liberal	0.51	0.33	0.13	-0.15†	0.10	0.11	-.45***	-.43***	-0.13
10. Black conservative	0.60	0.32	-.25**	-0.02	0.14	0.05	.30***	.52***	.17*
11. White conservative	0.52	0.34	-0.05	0.02	0.15	-0.03	.34***	.39***	.22*

Note. **** $p < 0.001$, *** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$. Mean and standard deviation of age are described in the original metric whereas all other variables are in the 0-1 coding. The candidate evaluation variables are collapsed across gender and party conditions. Note that these tables do not include the correlations between variables 8 through 11 because participants only evaluated one of the politicians corresponding to variables 8 to 11.

Table 6. Study 2a Regression models

	Model 1							Model 2						
	b		S.E.	<i>p</i>	95% CI			b		S.E.	<i>p</i>	95% CI		
(Intercept)	0.64	***	0.03	0.000	[	0.58	0.7]	0.74	***	0.04	0.000	[	0.66	0.82]
White identity centrality	0.08	<i>ns</i>	0.05	0.131	[	-0.02	0.18]	-0.20	*	0.09	0.023	[	-0.36	-0.03]
Target ideology	-0.16	***	0.03	0.000	[	-0.21	-0.11]	-0.41	***	0.05	0.000	[	-0.50	-0.31]
Target race	-0.09	***	0.03	0.000	[	-0.14	-0.04]	-0.07	<i>ns</i>	0.05	0.155	[	-0.16	0.03]
White identity centrality × Target ideology								0.60	***	0.10	0.000	[	0.41	0.80]
White identity centrality × Target race								-0.04	<i>ns</i>	0.10	0.683	[	-0.24	0.16]

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$.

Table 7. Study 2b Regression models

	Model 1							Model 2						
	b		S.E.	<i>p</i>	95% CI			b		S.E.	<i>p</i>	95% CI		
(Intercept)	0.50	***	0.04	0.000	[	0.41	0.59]	0.62	***	0.06	0.000	[	0.50	0.74]
White identity centrality	0.06	<i>ns</i>	0.07	0.434	[	-0.08	0.19]	-0.22	†	0.12	0.071	[	-0.45	0.02]
Target ideology	0.03	<i>ns</i>	0.03	0.259	[	-0.02	0.09]	-0.19	**	0.07	0.004	[	-0.33	-0.06]
Target race	-0.06	*	0.03	0.026	[	-0.12	-0.01]	-0.08	<i>ns</i>	0.07	0.220	[	-0.22	0.05]
Target party	0.01	<i>ns</i>	0.03	0.844	[	-0.05	0.06]	0.01	<i>ns</i>	0.03	0.730	[	-0.05	0.07]
Target gender	0.05	†	0.03	0.069	[	0.00	0.11]	0.05	†	0.03	0.064	[	0.00	0.11]
White identity centrality × Target ideology								0.52	***	0.14	0.000	[	0.24	0.79]
White identity centrality × Target race								0.04	<i>ns</i>	0.14	0.762	[	-0.23	0.31]

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$.

Results from both studies show that the White identity centrality $\times$ Target ideology term is significant. According to Figure 3, White identity predicts support for the conservative politicians and opposition to the liberal politicians. Thus, like Studies 1 and 2, these results support Hypothesis 1. Unlike Study 2, the White identity centrality $\times$ Target race term is not significant. Therefore, the effect of White identity centrality on politician evaluation is not significantly different for the White politicians and the Black politicians, inconsistent with Hypothesis 2. Like in Study 1, additional models tested the three way interaction of White identity $\times$ Target ideology $\times$ Target race, and this term is marginally significant in Study 2a, $b=.34$, $S.E.=.20$, $p=.090$, and not significant in Study 2b, $b=.09$, $S.E.=.28$, $p=.739$.

To test Hypothesis 3, two models similar to what is described in Figure 1b were estimated, and its specification is similar to Study 1 except that the predictors for Study 2b also included terms for Target party and Target gender. These models control for gender, age, income, as well as party identity, though education was only controlled for in Study 2b because it was not measured in Study 2a. The results are in Tables 8 and 9. The patterns for the indirect effects are similar to that of Study 1, and therefore can be interpreted in the same way, supporting Hypothesis 3.

Discussion

The results of Studies 2a and 2b are consistent with each other, and they support Hypotheses 1 and 3, but not 2. Therefore, these studies present additional evidence for the moderating role of politicians' ideology and mediating effect of participants' ideology. In contrast with Study 2, there is no evidence for the moderating role of politicians' race, which will be discussed more in the general discussion.

Figure 3. Moderating effect of politicians' ideology in Study 2a and Study 2b

Table 8. Study 2a parameter estimates with bias corrected confidence interval

Predicted variable		Predictor	Path	b	s.e.	<i>p</i>	95% CI		
Regressions	Ideology	White identity	a	0.30 ***	0.05	0.000	[	0.20	0.39]
	Target politician evaluation	Ideology	b1	-0.69 ***	0.06	0.000	[	-0.82	-0.57]
	Target politician evaluation	Ideology × Target ideology	b2	1.44 ***	0.06	0.000	[	1.34	1.56]
	Target politician evaluation	White identity	c1	-0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.06	0.778	[	-0.14	0.09]
	Target politician evaluation	Target ideology	c2	-0.89 ***	0.04	0.000	[	-0.96	-0.81]
	Target politician evaluation	White identity × Target ideology	c3	0.19 *	0.09	0.026	[	0.03	0.37]
	Target politician evaluation	Gender		0.05 *	0.02	0.013	[	0.01	0.08]
	Target politician evaluation	Age		-0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.04	0.615	[	-0.11	0.06]
	Target politician evaluation	Income		-0.01 <i>ns</i>	0.03	0.833	[	-0.06	0.05]
	Target politician evaluation	Party identity		0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.07	0.727	[	-0.12	0.17]
	Target politician evaluation	Target race		-0.05 *	0.02	0.014	[	-0.08	-0.01]
Defined Parameters for the effects of White identity	Indirect effects on liberal politicians		a × b1	-0.21 ***	0.04	0.000	[	-0.29	-0.14]
	Indirect effects on conservative politicians		a × (b1+b2)	0.23 ***	0.04	0.000	[	0.15	0.31]
	Direct effects on liberal politicians		c1	-0.02 <i>ns</i>	0.06	0.778	[	-0.14	0.09]
	Direct effects on conservative politicians		c1+c3	0.17 **	0.06	0.005	[	0.05	0.29]
	Total effects on liberal politicians		a × b1+c1	-0.22 ***	0.07	0.001	[	-0.36	-0.10]
	Total effects on conservative politicians		a × (b1+b2)+c1+c3	0.40 ***	0.07	0.000	[	0.27	0.54]

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$.

Table 9. Study 2b parameter estimates with bias corrected confidence interval

	Predicted variable	Predictor	Path	b		s.e.	<i>p</i>	95% CI	
Regressions	Ideology	White identity centrality	a	0.20	**	0.07	0.007	[	0.04 0.33]
	Target politician evaluation	Ideology	b1	-0.55	***	0.06	0.000	[	-0.65 -0.43]
	Target politician evaluation	Ideology × Target ideology	b2	0.91	***	0.09	0.000	[	0.74 1.08]
	Target politician evaluation	White identity centrality	c1	-0.06	<i>ns</i>	0.09	0.501	[	-0.24 0.11]
	Target politician evaluation	Target ideology	c2	-0.58	***	0.07	0.000	[	-0.71 -0.43]
	Target politician evaluation	White identity centrality × Target ideology	c3	0.31	*	0.13	0.017	[	0.06 0.57]
	Target politician evaluation	Gender		0.00	<i>ns</i>	0.03	0.860	[	-0.06 0.05]
	Target politician evaluation	Age		-0.14	*	0.06	0.024	[	-0.27 -0.03]
	Target politician evaluation	Income		0.06	<i>ns</i>	0.04	0.197	[	-0.03 0.15]
	Target politician evaluation	Education		0.10	<i>ns</i>	0.07	0.108	[	-0.03 0.23]
	Target politician evaluation	Party identity		0.12	***	0.03	0.000	[	0.06 0.19]
	Target politician evaluation	Target race		-0.06	*	0.03	0.020	[	-0.11 -0.01]
	Target politician evaluation	Target party		-0.01	<i>ns</i>	0.03	0.607	[	-0.07 0.04]
	Target politician evaluation	Target gender		0.04	<i>ns</i>	0.03	0.155	[	-0.01 0.09]
Defined Parameters for the effects of	Indirect effects on liberal politicians		a × b1	-0.11	**	0.04	0.010	[	-0.19 -0.03]
	Indirect effects on conservative politicians		a × (b1+b2)	0.07	*	0.03	0.020	[	0.02 0.14]
	Direct effects on liberal politicians		c1	-0.06	<i>ns</i>	0.09	0.501	[	-0.24 0.11]
	Direct effects on conservative politicians		c1+c3	0.25	**	0.09	0.007	[	0.05 0.42]
	Total effects on liberal politicians		a × b1+c1	-0.17	†	0.09	0.075	[	-0.35 0.01]
	Total effects on conservative politicians		a × (b1+b2)+c1+c3	0.33	***	0.10	0.001	[	0.12 0.51]

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$.

Study 3

Studies 1 through 2 demonstrate that politicians' ideology can moderate the effect of White identity because of the similarity between citizens and the target politician in their ideologies. If so, the *perceived* ideology of the politician may moderate the effect of White identity regardless of the actual ideology of the politicians. As such, this study tests Hypotheses 1 and 3 by investigating how White Americans' feelings toward various real politicians are predicted by their racial identity centrality and preferences for identity politics.

Method

Study 3 uses data from 875 White respondents in the American National Election Studies' 2016 Pilot Study. White identity centrality and White identity politics were measured with two questions: "How important is being White to your identity?" and "How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?" (1=not important at all, 5= Extremely important).

Participants' evaluation of politicians was measured with feeling thermometers for Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, and Donald Trump (0=Very cold or unfavorable feeling, 100=Very warm or favorable feeling). The perceived ideology of the politicians was measured using the instruction "When it comes to politics, would you describe yourself, and these groups, as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal nor conservative?" (1=Very liberal to 7=Very conservative). The item for "yourself" is a measure of participants' own ideology (like in Studies 1 and 2). Each participant was asked to evaluate each of the politicians and rate each of their ideological orientations. Again, all variables are recoded to run from 0 to 1 as mentioned above before analyses.

Results

The sample characteristics, descriptives, and bivariate relationship between all variables are described in Table 10. In order to test Hypothesis 1, in a linear regression, politician evaluation was predicted by White identity centrality, White identity politics, perceived ideology of the politicians, indicator-coded politicians' identity (with Obama designated as baseline), and critically, interaction between perceived ideology and the two White identity variables (see Model 2 in Table 11). A baseline model without the interaction was also estimated (Model 1). According to Model 2, both interactions are significant, supporting Hypothesis 1. According to Figure 4, higher levels of White identity centrality and White identity politics are related to support for politicians who are perceived to be conservative but opposition to politicians who are perceived to be liberal.

Table 10. Study 3 Descriptives and Correlations

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1. WIC	2. WIP	3. Gender	4. Age	5. Edu.	6. Income	7. Party identity	8. Ideology	9. Obama	10. Clinton	11. Cruz	12. Rubio	13. Trump	14. Obam a ideo.	15. Clinton ideo.	16. Cruz ideo.	17. Rubio ideo.
1. White identity centrality	0.48	0.36																	
2. White identity politics	0.47	0.36	.37***																
3. Female	0.51	0.50	.12***	0.06†															
4. Age	49.78	17.17	.09**	.13***	0.04														
5. Education	0.45	0.31	-.16***	-.10**	-0.04	-.11***													
6. Income	0.32	0.22	-.15***	-0.04	-.11***	-0.05	.42***												
7. Party identity	0.50	0.37	.11**	.10**	-0.05	0.04	-.07*	0.02											
8. Ideology	0.52	0.32	.17***	.14***	-0.04	.20***	-.10**	-0.02	.69***										
9. Obama	0.42	0.37	-.12***	-.16***	0.06†	-.14***	.09**	0.03	-.69***	-.72***									
10. Clinton	0.36	0.35	-0.01	-.10**	.09**	-0.04	0.04	-0.04	-.65***	-.64***	.79***								
11. Cruz	0.40	0.31	.10**	.11**	-0.06	.08*	-0.02	0.03	.57***	.63***	-.57***	-.46***							
12. Rubio	0.43	0.28	0.06	0.07†	-0.01	.08*	0.02	.10**	.49***	.48***	-.45***	-.35***	.68***						
13. Trump	0.43	0.37	.20***	.22***	-0.05	.20***	-.13***	-0.04	.53***	.54***	-.61***	-.47***	.52***	.41***					
14. Perceived Obama ideology	0.22	0.25	.11***	0.04	0.06†	-.14***	-.11**	-.17***	-.28***	-.28***	.36***	.36***	-.31***	-.28***	-.22***				
15. Perceived Clinton ideology	0.25	0.26	0.04	0.01	0.06†	-.20***	-.08*	-.17***	-.33***	-.37***	.40***	.36***	-.33***	-.32***	-.28***	.69***			
16. Perceived Cruz ideology	0.77	0.25	-.22***	-.25***	-.10**	0.02	.24***	.27***	-.14***	-.12***	.18***	.09***	-0.06†	-0.05	-.25***	-.24***	-.15***		
17. Perceived Rubio ideology	0.71	0.24	-.20***	-.19***	-0.05	-0.01	.23***	.22***	-.20***	-.24***	.26***	.16***	-.22***	-.08*	-.27***	-.11**	-0.04	.65***	
18. Perceived Trump ideology	0.66	0.27	-.09*	-0.05	0.04	-0.02	.08*	.09*	-.14***	-.19***	.17***	.12***	-.21***	-.16***	-.09**	-.12***	-0.05	.34***	.35***

Note. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.10$. Mean and standard deviation of age are described in the original metric whereas all other variables are in the 0-1 coding.

Table 11. Study 3 Regression models

	Model 1						Model 2					
	b		S.E.	p	95% CI		b		S.E.	p	95% CI	
(Intercept)	0.35	***	0.01	0.00	[	0.33 0.38]	0.47	***	0.02	0.00	[	0.43 0.50]
White identity centrality	0.04	**	0.02	0.01	[	0.01 0.07]	-0.07	**	0.03	0.01	[	-0.12 -0.02]
White identity politics	0.15	***	0.02	0.00	[	0.11 0.19]	-0.11	***	0.03	0.00	[	-0.17 -0.06]
Perceived politician ideology	0.02	<i>ns</i>	0.02	0.29	[	-0.01 0.05]	-0.08	*	0.03	0.01	[	-0.14 -0.02]
Clinton	-0.05	***	0.02	0.00	[	-0.09 -0.02]	-0.05	**	0.02	0.00	[	-0.08 -0.02]
Cruz	-0.10	***	0.02	0.00	[	-0.14 -0.06]	-0.08	***	0.02	0.00	[	-0.12 -0.05]
Rubio	-0.06	***	0.02	0.00	[	-0.10 -0.03]	-0.05	**	0.02	0.01	[	-0.09 -0.01]
Trump	-0.06	**	0.02	0.00	[	-0.09 -0.02]	-0.05	**	0.02	0.01	[	-0.09 -0.01]
White identity Centrality × Perceived politician ideology							0.23	***	0.04	0.00	[	0.15 0.32]
White identity politics × Perceived politician ideology							0.24	***	0.04	0.00	[	0.16 0.33]

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$.

Figure 4. Moderating effect of politicians' perceived ideology at the level of conservative (1), moderate (.5), and liberal (0) in Study 3

To test Hypothesis 3, a model similar to what is described in Figure 1b (and similar to that of Studies 1 and 2) was estimated. The only difference is that the variables for White identity centrality *and* White identity politics, together with their associated interaction, were entered in the model. The model also controls for gender, age, education, income, and party identity. This model is

described in Table 12. Since there are two White identity variables, the model from Study 3 includes two sets of parameters about White identity (unlike Studies 1 and 2): parameters related White identity centrality are denoted with the subscript *i* (e.g., a_{1i}), and parameters related White identity politics are denoted with the subscript *ii* (e.g., a_{1ii}) in the table (also see the first two rows of the table). Their statistical meanings still reflect that of Figure 1b, and their interpretations are still the same to that of Studies 1 and 2.

The results for the indirect effects are again similar to that of Studies 1 and 2, and they can be interpreted in a similar way. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the effects are positive for the politicians who are perceived to be conservative but negative for the politicians perceived to be liberal. Furthermore, this analysis shows that whereas White identity centrality has no residual direct effects on politician evaluation, White identity politics do have significant residual direct effects. These indirect effects are in the same direction as its indirect effects. Put differently, whereas the former appears to be partially mediated, the latter is completely mediated, statistically speaking.

Table 12. Study 3 parameter estimates with bias corrected confidence interval

Predicted variable	Predictor	Path	b		s.e.	p	95% CI		
Ideology	White identity centrality	a1i	0.11	***	0.02	0.000	[0.08 0.15]		
Ideology	White identity politics	a1ii	0.10	***	0.02	0.000	[0.07 0.13]		
Feeling thermometer	Ideology	b1	-0.73	***	0.02	0.000	[-0.77 -0.69]		
Feeling thermometer	Ideology $\times$ (per.) Politician ideology	b2	1.31	***	0.04	0.000	[1.23 1.39]		
Feeling thermometer	White identity centrality	c1i	0.02	ns	0.02	0.225	[-0.01 0.06]		
Feeling thermometer	White identity politics	c1ii	-0.06	***	0.02	0.000	[-0.10 -0.03]		
Feeling thermometer	(per.) Politician ideology	c2	-0.66	***	0.03	0.000	[-0.72 -0.60]		
Feeling thermometer	White identity centrality $\times$ (per.) Politician ideology	c3i	-0.03	ns	0.03	0.305	[-0.09 0.03]		
Feeling thermometer	White identity politics $\times$ (per.) Politician ideology	c3ii	0.14	***	0.03	0.000	[0.08 0.20]		
Feeling thermometer	Gender		-0.01	ns	0.01	0.108	[-0.03 0.00]		
Feeling thermometer	Age		0.07	***	0.02	0.000	[0.04 0.11]		
Feeling thermometer	Education		0.01	ns	0.01	0.567	[-0.02 0.03]		
Feeling thermometer	Income		0.00	ns	0.02	0.991	[-0.04 0.04]		
Feeling thermometer	Party identity		0.28	***	0.01	0.000	[0.25 0.31]		
Feeling thermometer	Trump		-0.03	†	0.02	0.057	[-0.07 0.00]		
Feeling thermometer	Clinton		-0.04	***	0.01	0.001	[-0.07 -0.02]		
Feeling thermometer	Cruz		-0.07	***	0.02	0.000	[-0.10 -0.04]		
Feeling thermometer	Rubio		-0.03	*	0.02	0.049	[-0.06 0.00]		
White identity centrality	White identity politics		0.05	***	0.00	0.000	[0.04 0.05]		
Defined Parameters for the effects of White identity	Indirect effects of White identity centrality on (perceived) liberals	a1i $\times$ b1	-0.08	***	0.01	0.000	[-0.11 -0.06]		
	Indirect effects of White identity centrality on (perceived) conservatives	a1i $\times$ (b1+b2)	0.07	***	0.01	0.000	[0.05 0.09]		
	Direct effects of White identity centrality on (perceived) liberals	c1i	0.02	ns	0.02	0.225	[-0.01 0.06]		
	Direct effects of White identity centrality on (perceived) conservatives	c1i+c3i	-0.01	ns	0.02	0.649	[-0.05 0.03]		
	Indirect effects of White identity politics on (perceived) liberals	a1ii $\times$ b1	-0.07	***	0.01	0.000	[-0.09 -0.05]		
	Indirect effects of White identity politics on (perceived) conservatives	a1ii $\times$ (b1+b2)	0.06	***	0.01	0.000	[0.04 0.08]		
	Direct effects of White identity politics on (perceived) liberals	c1ii	-0.06	***	0.02	0.000	[-0.10 -0.03]		
	Direct effects of White identity politics on (perceived) conservatives	c1ii+c3ii	0.07	***	0.02	0.000	[0.04 0.11]		
	Total effects of White identity centrality on (perceived) liberals	a1i $\times$ b1+c1i	-0.06	**	0.02	0.004	[-0.10 -0.02]		
	Total effects of White identity centrality on (perceived) conservatives	a1i $\times$ (b1+b2)+c1i+c3i	0.06	*	0.02	0.011	[0.01 0.10]		
Defined Parameters for the effects of White identity	Total effects of White identity politics on (perceived) liberals	a1ii $\times$ b1+c1ii	-0.14	***	0.02	0.000	[-0.18 -0.09]		
	Total effects of White identity politics on (perceived) conservatives	a1ii $\times$ (b1+b2)+c1ii+c3ii	0.13	***	0.02	0.000	[0.09 0.17]		

Note. S.E. represents standard error. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < .10$.

Discussion

Study 3 provides additional support for Hypotheses 1 and 3. Using data from a national sample about attitudes toward real politicians, it demonstrates that perceived politicians' ideology moderates the effect of White identity centrality and White identity politics in a similar way to that of Studies 1 and 2.

General Discussion

The results consistently support Hypotheses 1 and 3, though the support for Hypothesis 2 is limited and inconsistent. Overall, White Americans who have a strong racial identity or support White identity politics tend to support conservative politicians (Hypothesis 1) regardless of their racial background (contra Hypothesis 2), and this relationship is explained by White Americans' own political ideology (Hypothesis 3).

Whereas Studies 1 and 3 demonstrate the external validity by using real politicians, Study 2 provides internal validity by experimentally manipulating attributes of hypothetical politicians. The robust effect of politicians' ideology is observed similarly across the studies, which rely on different methods, targets, and operationalization of White identity. The White identity measures include the facets of identity centrality as well as preferences for identity politics, and the operationalization of White identity politics also differs across studies: Study 1 focuses on preferences for White identity politics fueled by a sense of Whites' innate superiority whereas Study 3 focuses on preferences for identity politics that is undergirded by a sense of receiving unfair treatment or discrimination to Whites. As the results show, Hypotheses 1 and 3 are supported regardless of these differences in the measure.

Theoretical contributions

Theoretically, these studies contribute to our understanding of the emergent White identity politics in the U.S. by clarifying its nuanced effects on political candidates. In the past, it remained

unclear whether a target politician's ideology or race is more important to Whites who have a strong sense of racial identity. Complementing and clarifying recent theories on White identity (e.g., Jardina, 2019), this paper answers this question by suggesting that White identifiers and supporters of White identity politics are willing to follow a leader of a different racial background as long as the leader's ideology benefits Whites. Thus, when White Americans' racial identity is negotiating between favoritism for individual in-group members who run for a political office and collective in-group interest, they choose the latter over the former. Together, these results suggest that the growing salience of White identity politics under the epochal demographic shift, though unlikely to benefit racial in-group White politicians individually, may ultimately benefit White citizens collectively. As recent years witness a growing number of conservative minority social groups (e.g., Cai & Fessenden, 2020) and high profile conservative minority candidates running for the presidential seat (conservative presidential candidates in 2016 includes three racial minorities: Ben Carson, Ted Cruz, and Marco Rubio), this paper timely clarifies the theories about White identity by identifying exactly whether the rise of White identity politics benefit or undermine White liberals and minority conservatives respectively.

The inconsistent effect of politicians' race

One inconsistent finding is that the moderating effect of race is present in Study 1, but not in Studies 2a and 2b. There are three possibilities. First, it may be an artifact: the race interaction term can be significant in the observed direction if the average perceived ideology for Carson and Obama is more liberal than that of Biden and Trump under the ideology explanation. After all, Black Americans are often perceived to be more liberal than White Americans (e.g., Sigelman et al., 1995; Chambers et al., 2013; Jacobsmeiser, 2014; Lerman & Sadin, 2016; Fulton & Gershon, 2018). This explanation can also reconcile the current results with the prior finding that White identifiers

explicitly state that it is important for them that a political candidate they support is White (Schildkraut, 2017), as they may assume that a White politician will promote Whites' interests.

Second, it is also possible that politicians' race actually moderates the effects, but the analyses of Studies 2a and 2b could not detect it. As such, Bayes factors were used to compare M2 models in Studies 2a and 2b against corresponding models that do not have the White identity centrality $\times$ Target race term. The Bayes factors are .042 in Study 2a and .046 in Study 2b, presenting substantial evidence (i.e., for Bayes factor $< .10$) against any effect from the White identity centrality $\times$ Target race term, so the second possibility is unlikely. Finally, it is possible that the inconsistency is due to different measures between Studies 1 and 2. Unfortunately, this could not be addressed by the current data, but future studies could consider exploring this. Regardless, the moderating effect of politicians' race is still substantially smaller than politicians' ideology in Study 1, suggesting that citizens' preferences for identity politics of Whites would overall benefit conservative politicians, even if the politicians are not White themselves, as discussed above.

Qualifications of the claims and limitations

Finally, it should be noted that the claims about "ideology over race" in this paper are specifically and narrowly about politicians' ideology and politicians' race. As suggested in the introduction, the ideology hypothesis assumes that politicians' ideology matters more because it has a greater implication for the racial hierarchy than the politicians' race. Therefore, ultimately, White identifiers pay attention to what politicians will (perceived to) do to a society's racial hierarchy more than how politicians look. Taken together, although the effect of White identity politics is more about ideology than the race of an individual candidate, the candidate's ideology itself is ultimately about racial hierarchy (also see Bai, 2020 and Feldman & Huddy, 2005 for related discussions on racism).

The studies have some limitations. First, the causal effect of the theoretical independent variable, White identity, remains unclear because it was not manipulated. This paper relies on robust model specification and control variables to rule out alternative explanations, but future studies should address this limitation by experimentally manipulating White identity. Second, this paper by topic focuses on White Americans. It is unclear if the results generalize to other racial groups or Whites in other countries. Future studies should consider addressing these limitations.

Conclusion

In summary, White identifiers and Whites who endorse White identity politics support conservative politicians and oppose liberal politicians, regardless of the politicians' racial background. As such, the growing salience of White identity politics under the epochal demographic shift, though unlikely to benefit White politicians who are racial in-group individually, may ultimately benefit White citizens collectively.

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Online Supplemental Appendix A

Figure 1c Conceptual diagram for the moderated mediation (Hypothesis 4; untested)

Figure 1d Statistical diagram for the moderated mediation (Hypothesis 4; untested)

Measures and stimuli

White identity politics (Study 1)

Please indicate your level of agreement with the statement below. (1=Totally disagree, 7=Totally agree)

1. If my racial/ethnic group had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place
2. My racial/ethnic group deserves special treatment
3. It really makes me angry when others criticize my racial/ethnic group
4. Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my racial/ethnic group
5. I will never be satisfied until my racial/ethnic group gets the recognition it deserves

We would like to know how you think of yourself. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. We would like you to consider your race or ethnicity (e.g., Black/African-American, Latino/Latina/Hispanic American, Asian/Asian American, White/European-American) in responding to the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree." (1=Strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree)

White identity centrality (Studies 2a and 2b)

1. Overall, my race has very little to do with how I feel about myself. (reverse coded)
2. My race is an important reflection of who I am.
3. My race is unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am. (reverse coded)
4. In general, my race is an important part of my self-image.

Evaluation of politician (Study 1)

We would like to get your feelings toward the following individuals or entities. Please rate these entities using something we call the "feeling thermometer." Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the entity. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the entity and that you don't care too much for that entity. You would rate the entity at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the entity. There is no right or wrong answer.

Donald Trump
Joe Biden
Ben Carson
Barack Obama

Evaluation of politician (Studies 2a and 2b)

For the dependent variable, participants read a hypothetical profile of a political candidate. The profile includes several pieces of information that are manipulated. The party affiliation is manipulated by including one of the two following texts in the beginning of the profile.

[Only in Study 2b, the follow instruction about party affiliation is included]
Democrat condition

Next, we would like to get your opinion on the following politician who was nominated as the **Democratic Party** candidate. Please read the following statement from this politician and respond to the following questions.

Republican condition

Next, we would like to get your opinion on the following politician who was nominated as the **Republican Party** candidate. Please read the following statement from this politician and respond to the following questions.

Race and gender were manipulated by using one of the following four pictures as the profile picture: Black male (<https://bit.ly/3dGt2OR>), a White male (<https://bit.ly/2Bf04Zh>), a Black female (<https://osf.io/tbmsf/>), and a White female (<https://osf.io/j87ft/>). [the images for Black female and White female were only used in Study 2b]

The ideology of the candidate is manipulated including one of the following two statements as part of the profile

Liberal condition

Statement

"All of us have the right to high-quality health care, regardless of our station in life. The Affordable Care Act guarantees this right, and it has greatly improved the well-being of the American people. Therefore, I will work to protect and strengthen the Affordable Care Act. I also believe that immigration is both good for our economy and for American culture. I believe we should continue to welcome new immigrants, and help undocumented immigrants living among us become citizens. Finally, our current tax laws favor big corporations and the rich, while the average American feels the worst of the taxman's bite. I support a fairer tax system that benefits everyday people, rather than billionaires and corporate fat cats."

Conservative condition

Statement

"All of us have the right to freedom from government interference in our health-care decisions. The Affordable Care Act strips away this right, and it has greatly damaged the well-being of the American people. Therefore, I will work to repeal and replace the Affordable Care Act. I also believe that excessive immigration is bad for our economy and weakens the unity of American culture. I believe we should reduce current immigration levels, and deport undocumented immigrants currently living among us. Finally, our current tax laws take way too much out of the average American's paycheck and hands it to government bureaucrats. I support a fairer tax system that cuts taxes for everyone, rather than giving more of our hard-earned money to big government."

The evaluation is measured with the following two items:

[Study 2a]

We would like to get your feelings toward this politician. Please rate him using the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward him. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward him and that you don't care too much for him. You would rate him at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward him. There is no right or wrong answer.

We would like to get the likelihood that you will vote for him. Rating of 0 means that there is a 0% of chance you will vote for him. Rating of 100 mean that you there is a 100% of chance you will vote for him. Rating of 50% means that you there is a half chance you will vote for him. There is no right or wrong answer.

[Study 2b]

We would like to get your feelings toward this politician. Please rate this politician using the feeling thermometer that you used earlier.

How likely do you think you will vote for this politician? Rating of 0 means that there is a 0% of chance you will do so. Rating of 100 mean that you there is a 100% of chance, and rating of 50% means that you there is a half chance you will vote for this politician.