Culture, Cognition, and Social Exchange: A Classic Case Study of Social Negotiation Network
Dynamics

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ABSTRACT

How do automatic vs. controlled, hot vs. cold, and agentic vs. communal facets of cultural cognition operate together in a perspective informed by social neuroscience? This question is explored by re-imagining Malinowski's classic ethnographic case study of the Kula in light of a contemporary social exchange theory of negotiation networks. We propose: (1) sub-institutional patterns of power-dependence form a structural foundation for the rise of tacit meanings, which evolve through social negotiation into explicit, cultural meaning agreements; (2) crucial sub-cultural categories form around the pursuit of both agentic benefits and communal benefits; (3) an individual is culturally shaped through externalization, socialization, and internalization to value and be motivated to seek both kinds of benefits; (4) an individual faces the existential task of navigating both agentic and communal situations across the negotiation network; (5) the basic individual mechanism underlying such navigation entails motivated behavioral choice and motivated cultural cognition; (6) a behavioral choice rests on automatic, largely implicit and hot cognitive processing; (7) motivated cultural cognition rests mostly on the deliberate, mostly explicit, and cool selection of materials from the prevailing cultural toolkit for assembling a justification, but whose underlying trajectory is biased by an automatic, hot value-position, whether agentic or communal. Based on the analysis, some directions for future empirical research are suggested.

CULTURE AND COGNITION:

Setting the Agenda.

In sociology, Dimaggio (1997; 2002) argues that an understanding of culture, as experienced and enacted by the individual, needs to incorporate insights and findings from cognitive psychology. In his view, two facets of cognitive processing have special import: (a) automatic vs. controlled cognition, and (b) hot vs. cold cognition. Further, he argues, "Symbols, Networks, and Cognition" form a "crucial intersection" for analysis (Dimaggio, 1997:282), pointing "to a new, more complex understanding of the relationship between culture and social structure built upon careful integration of micro and macro, and of cognitive and material

perspectives" (Dimaggio, 1997: 283). Cerulo (2002:3), building on Dimaggio's work in this area, urges the incorporation of a social neuroscience perspective in the study of culture and cognition. She notes, however, that sociologists should move beyond brain scan data to "locate and analyze cognition (neurological processing) in its sociocultural context."¹ More generally, Cerulo (2014) presses for the advancement of this important sociological project, suggesting a "two-step agenda:" first, "we should mine what we can from the abundant material provided by cognitive science" and second, "we should 'continue' those stories by applying sociological knowledge." The present paper aims to contribute to the advancement of this significant sociological agenda.

Key Issues Arising from Prior Cognitive Science.

In psychology, Markus and Kityama, (1991), with a focus on cross-cultural variations, distinguish individuals in eastern (e.g., Asian) cultures who construe the self in terms of social *interdependence* from individuals in western (e.g., American or European) cultures who construe the self in terms of *independence*. Proposing a more differentiated but quite congruent perspective, Fiske (1991) makes a case for the universality of four basic culture and cognition models: communal sharing, and equality matching (that seem to parallel the interdependent self), authority ranking, and market pricing (that seem to parallel the independent self).² (Also see: Stolte, 1992; Fiske, Kityama, Markus, and Nisbett, 1998).

¹ Cerulo's position is roughly similar to that taken by behavioral and neuro-economists (Lowenstein, Scott, and Cohen, 2008; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2005). We should be measured in our embrace of "the new phrenology." While brain imaging data provide a more precise, more objective evidence base for understanding economic (and other social) behavior, such data merely intervene between objective social stimuli and objective social behavior in a larger causal sequence. The task remains to grasp the full causal sequence.

² Other contributions to cultural psychology take a similar tack. Clark and Mills (1970; 1993; Clark and Finkel, 2005) distinguish instrumental exchange (e.g., business or market) relationships and social (e.g. family and friendship) relationships. Similarly, Abele and Wojciszke, (2007), build on Bakun's (1966) classic work, to contrast self-centered *agency* and other-centered *communion* as basic dimensions of culture and cognition giving structure to interpersonal perceptions and judgments between two actors. When agency has primacy, A and B are pushed apart. When communion has primacy, A and B are pulled together. Fiske's "communal sharing and equality matching," seem embodied within Bakun's concept of communion, while Fiske's "authority ranking and market pricing" seem encompassed within Bakun's notion of agency. Finally, Stolte (1998) and Stolte and Fender, (2007) connect cultural psychology with social exchange theory, distinguishing an intrinsic social exchange

Several questions arise. How do the automatic vs. controlled, hot vs. cold, and intrinsic-communal vs. extrinsic-agentic facets of culture and cognition work together in a socio-cultural perspective informed by social neuroscience? Can the oscillations between a lower, automatic, unconscious, non-verbal level and a higher, deliberative, conscious, verbal level of cultural cognition be clarified? Can the hot vs. cold dimension of processing that connects emotion and cultural cognition be spelled out? Can the intricate balance (or imbalance) of intrinsic-communal and extrinsic-agentic concerns in cultural cognition be better understood? Can social neuroscience add explanatory power to the study of cultural cognition? The present paper explores these questions, aiming to build integrative connections among some key ideas.

As Cerelo has aptly argued, progress toward answering these sorts of questions requires consideration of individual cultural cognition explicitly within a social environmental context composed of other individuals, collectivities, and socio-cultural conditions. Three tasks must be accomplished: central features of social environmental context must be clearly demarcated; conditions shaping individual cultural cognition must be specified; the dynamic through which an individual, once shaped, effectively travels the socio-cultural landscape must be elucidated. The analysis below pursues these tasks.

The following discussion has four parts. First, Malinowski's classic study of the Kula exchange system is revisited and selectively summarized. Second, his study is thoroughly "re-imagined" in light of contemporary research on negotiation networks (Stolte, 1983; 1987; 1988). Third, the processes through which individual cultural cognition is shaped within a negotiation network setting are discussed. Fourth, the cultural cognitive dynamic through which an individual navigates the socio-cultural negotiation network is discussed.

relationship from an extrinsic social exchange relationship. In the former, A and B view one another as mutually valued ends, not instrumental means, and they mutually enjoy a close emotional bond with one another. In the latter, A and B view one another as instrumental means to other valued ends outside their relationship, and they stand at a greater emotional distance from one another.

Malinowski's ethnography is a useful starting point, because it provides a concrete, vivid glimpse of life and socio-cultural setting related to the issues investigated here. His iconic ethnographic research throws institutional culture and sub-institutional social exchange into bold relief. It offers lucid images and observations as raw material that can be theoretically re-worked to gain new insights about cultural cognition.

Nevertheless, Malinowski's meta-theoretical commitments are problematic and limiting. Falling squarely within the "functionalist" paradigm of ethnography (Sanday, 1979), his work must be criticized on the same general grounds as other social scientific work conducted exclusively within this paradigm. For example, in a classic and influential critique, Wrong (1961) notes that a strictly functionalist viewpoint over-emphasizes consensus, harmony, and integration among members of a socio-cultural setting, and it offers an "oversocialized" view of the individual. By pre-supposition, this viewpoint ignores the brute reality of social conflict. Such conflict, often entailing power and inequality, occurs pervasively, varies in intensity, and operates across the micro- to macro- span within and between human actors.

To be clear, however, the functionalist perspective, should not be judged as entirely incorrect or lacking theoretical value. There are, of course, both consensual-integrating and conflict-separating forces operating across most, if not all, social relationships. As elaborated in the discussion of mixed-motive interactions below, the negotiation network framework offers theoretical strengths for capturing both consensus and conflict in social life.

We turn next, then, to a brief sketch of the Kula ring.

OLD BUT STILL RELEVANT ETHNOGRAPHIC FINDINGS: MALINOWSKI, 1920.

The focus here is on a narrow but important slice of Bronislaw Malinowski's enduring work. Drawing from an early article (Malinowski, 1920), we outline key features of the socio-cultural life and setting of the trading peoples who inhabited the archipelagoes of New Guinea. His report describes "a special system of trade," the Kula," which, he noted, says something interesting and important about both "primitive economics" and "native mentality" (Malinowski,

1920:97). As Malinowski forcefully argues, there is a fundamental link between the ecology of human (economic and social) exchange and cultural cognition.

A few points from Malinowski's concrete description can be selected for emphasis to create a simpler, if more abstract, conceptualization. Imagine two people. Chief S leads the island people of Sinaketa. A long distance away, across rough, high, dangerous seas, Chief D heads the island people of Dobu. Suppose the two chiefs and their respective bands of followers have established a longitudinal exchange relationship. At the customary time in a given season, S and her/his fellow traders prepare a sea-worthy canoe with great care, in strict conformity with appropriate magical activities. They brave rough waters, sailing to D's island. After being welcomed, at the prescribed time, S offers an initiating Kula article, a decorative armshell, to D, who accepts with delight. After appropriate time has past, D offers a return Kula article, an ornamental necklace, to S, who likewise accepts it with pleasure. This exchange of articles is the social symbolic core of the Kula exchange system. The Kula institution, followed regularly for many generations, forms a crucial cultural boundary around a diverse set of communities, knitting together a far-flung set of disparate island peoples. Malinowski was deeply impressed by the "enormous geographical extent of the trading system" (Malinowski, 1920:97) whose intricate pattern he traced, documented, and studied in depth.

One reason the Kula exchange system fascinated Malinowski is that it stood in bold contrast to ordinary economic exchange, which regularly occurred right alongside it. The island traders continuously transmitted to one another such "highly useful utilities" as "canoes or pottery...dried fish or yams" (Malinowski, 1920: 97). An objective observer (Malinowski) could see these material articles of ordinary economic exchange were indispensable for biological survival, health, and the general quality of island life. Ironically and interestingly, however, the traders themselves were not particularly excited about the outcomes of such "subsidiary exchange" (Malinowski, 1920:97). Rather, economic outcomes and "common (economic) barter" were viewed as mundane, routine objects and events, nothing to get excited about.

Ordinary economic exchange was viewed as a pedestrian, if necessary, activity, hardly worth much attention or effort. Instead, the island traders were consumed by, and energetically devoted to, attaining better, finer, armshells and necklaces, articles “of high value but of no real use” (Malinowski, 1920:97). Obtaining an especially fine armshell or necklace stirred considerable talk among members of the surrounding community. A trader’s positive reputation, social prestige, about which a trader cared a lot, was clearly contingent on the longitudinal acquisition of Kula outcomes of higher and higher value.

A substantial corpus of mystical knowledge and practice had evolved around the Kula. Traders would often conduct magic rites and speak magic spells. If Chief S needed potency in dealing with Chief D, so that D would more likely grant her/him a highly valuable armshell, S would cast a magic spell “to shake the mountain” (Malinowski, 1920: 104). The purpose was to generate awe in D, yet keep D from getting so angry as to leave the trading relationship. A Kula transaction was delicate. It required just the right “touch.” Magical rites and incantations were used to facilitate the entire Kula enterprise, from building a safe, ocean-worthy canoe, to warding off dangers during travel, through manipulating opposing traders during Kula transactions. Also, an elaborate mythology had evolved across the generations to augment the value of Kula exchange. Legends regarding prior sailings to other islands, difficulties encountered, treasures obtained, were created and passed on through stories. “In myths, in traditional legends, in real stories and in songs, Kula expeditions were and are described and praised and there is a definite complex of Kula tradition and mythology...” (Malinowski, 1920: 103)

The Kula was a firmly institutionalized and stable form of social symbolic exchange. It was a tightly regulated system of social interaction based on long-held and widely accepted cultural norms. Presenting an initial article (an armshell), presenting a return article (a necklace), were features of exchange guided by mutually held cultural expectations, supported by most island inhabitants. To violate a Kula expectation did not bring a formally administered

coercive sanction. A deviant was not arrested, placed in shackles, and/or beaten. But a Kula violation did bring probable and serious social disapprobation, and, was thereby effectively suppressed by the community. In regard to Kula trading, most islanders did what they were suppose to do most of the time.

Cultural rules dictated the direction in which a given Kula article could “travel” through exchange. An armshell always travelled a counter-clockwise route, and a necklace always travelled a clock-wise route through the New Guinea island chain. Also, the rules commanded an article (armshell or necklace) not be “possessed” for long, but rather be put back into circulation quite soon. Ironically, a trader, skillfully maneuvering to obtain an especially valuable article (of fine size, color, artistic beauty), was strictly obliged, and rather soon (exact period of time not specified), to pass it on in a subsequent transaction. Beyond an appropriate period of time, keeping and displaying an article, in a vigorous attempt to magnify one’s own social prestige, was proscribed. A Kula article obtained was “a temporary possession... (kept) in trust for a time” (Malinowski, 1920: 100) In Malinowski’s words (1920:100), “The Kula involves the elements of trust and of a sort of commercial honour...”.

Indeed, in Malinowski’s functionalist paradigm, trust and honor were pervasive and crucial for sustaining the overall quality of social and economic life among the island traders. They required a trustworthy and honorable world in order to be willing to commence frightening, dangerous journeys by boat to distant islands for Kula exchange and material trade. They wanted considerable assurance in advance they would be met as traders, not enemies, when they arrived. They needed basic assistance and safety as they ventured to far-away territories ruled by strangers. They had to know with considerably certainty they would be housed, fed, and protected from harm when they arrived.

It is noteworthy, then, that this culturally prescribed bond of basic trust and honor upon which Malinowski dwells, existed right along side inherent competition and social friction that he himself also clearly documented between island traders. First, there was “common barter”

entailed in “subsidiary (material-economic) exchange.” Issues of mutual contention might include small or large questions: How big a canoe will Chief S give in exchange for how many pots and yams returned by Chief D? Second, there was the mutual desire to get Kula articles of higher and higher social prestige value across time, despite the obvious scarcity of such beautiful articles. What would Chief S be prepared to offer as additional (material) incentives to Chief D to persuade D to provide an especially elegant and beautiful necklace as a part of the Kula symbolic exchange itself? Such questions high-light the natural, inevitable conflicts of interest that characterized relations among the island traders, in parallel with their collective cooperative interests, and in addition to the socially binding qualities of trust and honor. As Malinowski (1920: 100) explicitly noted : “This, of course, does not completely exclude many squabbles, deep resentments and even feuds over real or imaginary grievances in the Kula exchange.”

RE-IMAGINING THE KULA AS A NEGOTIATION NETWORK

In what follows, Malinowski’s observations and interpretations are re-construed in light of ideas drawn selectively from prior work (Stolte and Emerson, 1977; Stolte, 1983; 1987;1988) centered on power-dependence (Emerson, 1962) in structures of social exchange (Emerson, 1969;1972;1981). The prior work deals with negotiated transactions and benefit-outcomes occurring across time among individuals located in exchange relations, exchange networks, and productive exchange groups. This line of work is but one tributary flowing from the widely influential theory of structural exchange originated by Richard M. Emerson (1969; 1972; 1976; 1981), whose brilliant contributions remain far under-appreciated in sociology today.

Foundations: Structural Power-Dependence and Exchange. Let us start with a simple illustration. For the moment, consider only T1 and T2 in Figure 1A. Suppose the line between these actors represents an established, longitudinal social exchange relationship between island trader T1 (perhaps Chief S described above) and island trader T2 (perhaps Chief D described above). This relationship entails a series of transactions. According to

established Kula custom, in each such transaction, T1 provides a necklace, while T2 provides an armshell. T2 values necklaces obtained from T1, and T1 values armshells obtained from T2.³ The common value obtained by both T1 and T2 through Kula transactions is island-society-wide social prestige (notoriety, positive social recognition). The finer and more beautiful an article a given trader obtains, the more prestige a trader commands from other islanders. But, following Malinowski's observations, Kula articles, whether armshells or necklaces, vary substantially in their social prestige value. Some finely crafted and beautiful articles are worth relatively high social prestige in the community. Other not so finely crafted rather plain articles are worth relatively low prestige. We assume that the finer, more artistic, more unique the article, the rarer (and scarcer) it will be. Consequently, prestige was a scarce benefit-outcome, an uncertain benefit-outcome. We think such prestige was therefore of relatively high value (though of "no real utility.")

Suppose T1 and T2 both place relatively *high and equal value* on social prestige. As strongly suggested by Malinowski's evidence, island traders such as T1 and T2 are motivated to "drive hard bargains," using whatever tactics and cultural tools they can muster, energetically

³ We follow Emerson (1969; 1972; 1981) in assuming that *anything* that enters social exchange as a resource or benefit (a Kula article---armshell or necklace) has value. Each party to an exchange relation is "motivationally invested" in obtaining what the other party can provide. For a given actor, resources/benefits lie in different value domains. An interesting question centers on the relative value of different domains. (See Stolte, 2000) In the present context, T1 might value both Kula armshells as a source of social prestige as well as regular drinks of cool, fresh water. Whether an armshell or a drink of water has relatively greater value to this island trader at a given time, will depend on which domain is currently most *uncertain*. If fresh water is readily available, easily and routinely obtained, whenever the need for water arises, the *felt need for water* is very low and the trader will place low value on a drink of water compared to an armshell worth social prestige whose acquisition may have been quite uncertain. Assuming that getting sufficient water is not problematic, Kula traders throughout the island society might well have channeled considerably more behavioral energy toward the attainment of Kula articles than water. Water (along with canoes, yams, pots, or any other material or symbolic benefit-outcomes) might be relegated down a hierarchy of value to relatively mundane, uninspiring "subsidiary exchange." Malinowski's observations described above, as well as ethnographic data collected by Sahlins (2000), at a much later time in a different societal context, are consistent with this behavioral theory that causally links uncertainty and value. Sahlins describes the "original affluent society," a band of nomadic hunters/gatherers who enjoyed considerable leisure, plenty of calories, and a relative life of ease because, evidently, what they needed biologically from their environment, could be obtained readily (with little uncertainty) through an adaptive life-style of ready and frequent nomadic travel to alternative ecological settings where needed resources were available in profusion for ready consumption.

seeking to obtain Kula articles that are as beautiful and prestigious as the circumstances permit. As Malinowski tells us, a given trader might well add an additional material resource proffer (offer to throw in a canoe plus a sack of yams) to supplement the symbolic Kula transaction. Or, an islander might employ special preparatory magic rites (attempt “to shake the mountain”), in a vigorous self-serving effort to achieve the very best possible Kula outcome. We assume that any circumstance that would stand in the way of a given islander obtaining higher rather than lower Kula prestige will be resisted. Any circumstance that puts T1’s gains in Kula prestige at odds with T2’s gains in Kula prestige (and vice versa), will create mutual resistance between them.

Whenever an exchange relationship between two parties, for example T1 and T2, is characterized by mutual resistance, social power becomes relevant. Following Emerson (1962), the power of T1 over T2 is equal to the amount of resistance in T2 that can potentially be overcome by T1 (and vice versa). Further, T1’s power is determined by T2’s dependence upon T1 for benefit-outcomes sought by T2 (and vice versa). The greater T2’s dependence, the greater T1’s power (and vice versa). From T1’s and/or T2’s perspective, dependence upon the other is, in turn, set by two variables: the more highly either actor *values* benefit-outcomes provided by the other, the greater that actor’s dependence on the other; also, the more *available* benefit-outcomes are outside the relationship from alternative sources (e.g., other island traders), the lower T1’s dependence on T2 or (vice versa).

Power-dependence in the Kula exchange relation between T1 and T2 might, theoretically, be equal or unequal. The mutual value and availability factors might be situationally arranged such that T1 and T2 are equally dependent upon one another, a circumstance granting each island trader equal power over the other in the face of mutual resistance. Or the two underlying determinants of power-dependence might be situationally arranged so that one islander is less dependent and the other more dependent. Consequently, one trader might have relatively greater power within the Kula exchange relation than the other.

Expanding these points, power-dependence theory asserts that where one actor (T2) is less dependent upon another actor (T1), T2 enjoys a power advantage in the exchange relationship. A power advantage (in the theory's inexorable logic) will tend to be used across a longitudinal series of exchange transactions. Such power use will lead to an increase in the value of benefit-outcomes enjoyed by the power-advantaged actor without an increase (indeed, often with a relative decrease) in the value of benefit-outcomes obtained by the power-disadvantaged actor across time. If T1 and T2 happen to have equal power-dependence, neither trader has an advantage, mutual power will be balanced, and no power will be used in the exchange process. Under this circumstance, Kula transactions are likely to entail armshell-for-necklace transactions entailing the mutual distribution of equal levels of social prestige across time. That is, because power-dependence is balanced between T1 and T2, the benefit-outcomes of exchange transactions will be balanced and equal. However, if either island trader has a power-advantage, that advantage will tend to be used longitudinally across transactions.⁴ T1 and/or T2 may or may not have clear knowledge about the wider circumstances bearing upon Kula transactions, but regardless of what these two island traders know (and know accurately), when "push comes to shove," when each island trader works enthusiastically to "drive a hard bargain" in an effort to achieve the very best possible armshell (or necklace) benefit-outcome possible (i.e., get the most social prestige possible), the islander with a power-dependence *advantage* will tend to benefit relatively more than the islander with a power-dependence *disadvantage* across the longitudinal series of exchange transactions. That is to say, power-dependence disparities in Kula exchange relations are likely to lead to benefit-outcome *stratification* among islanders across time. (Incidentally, and apropos of this point,

⁴ The prediction that power advantage will be used is a "structural" principle, and no explicit awareness, cognition, or shared social knowledge on the part of either Kula trader about the overall exchange situation is *presumed* (see Stolte, 1983, for an expanded discussion). On the other hand, awareness, cognition and shared social knowledge at some level is not ruled out by this principle. Indeed, a major goal of Stolte's (1987) negotiation network approach and the present paper is to explicitly incorporate and explore the significance of such awareness, cognition, and shared social knowledge.

Malinowski clearly documents the distinction between Chiefs and commoners in his ethnography.)⁵

From the exchange theory point of view, stratification among island traders in social prestige is *structurally* determined. Consider Figure 1. In this Kula structure, T2 occupies a relatively advantaged *position* in the negotiation network, by virtue of the “*availability*” determinant of dependence (and thus power), as described above (also see Stolte and Emerson, 1977). Across a series of transactions, T2 is likely to obtain increasingly favorable Kula benefit-outcomes. Conversely, T1 is unlikely to obtain such increasingly favorable Kula outcomes. Theoretically, that is to say, T2 has a position-based power-dependence advantage relative to T1 in the Kula negotiation network. Put simply, T2 enjoys a relative abundance of alternative transaction sources (other potential Kula trading partners) with whom that trader can choose to exchange Kula articles, should resistance be encountered.⁶ Theoretically, the position-based power advantage enjoyed by T2 over T1 will gradually be “used” across a series of transactions. Across time, the net Kula benefit-outcomes in social prestige value enjoyed by

⁵ Malinowski notes the general cultural expectation that one island trader provide a Kula article that is of equivalent value to the Kula article obtained from another island trader in a given transaction. However, he also notes that on certain occasions (the frequency is left unspecified) a given trader is unable to do this, and is culturally expected to attempt to rectify this imbalance in subsequent transactions if possible. Also, Malinowski discusses how traders attempt to influence the quality of articles obtained in trade, for example, by employing magic incantations and rites to “shake the mountain,” as described above. Thus, one is left with the strong impression that Kula trades might well involve variation in the quality of outcomes between traders. In other words, Kula transactions can, at least sometimes (perhaps more frequently than Malinowski’s functional approach might suggest), lead to social prestige benefit-outcomes to the advantage of one trader over another. That is, the operation of power-dependence in Kula exchange can produce a social stratification of prestige among island traders, with some enjoying higher and others settling for lower levels of island prestige.

⁶ The exchange structural disparity shown in Figure 1A operates on two levels. At a relatively more micro-social level, one can focus on the position-within-the network, noting that T2’s *position-based* power-dependence is greater than T1’s (or T3’s or T4’s). Or at a relatively more *macro-social* level one can focus on the network as a whole, looking at the contrast between Figure 1A and 1B. See Stolte (1988) for measures of both positional and network-wide power disparities as well as experimental data demonstrating the impact of such exchange structural power disparities on benefit-outcome stratification among subjects in laboratory experimental social exchange networks.

T2 will substantially exceed those enjoyed by T1. (See footnotes 5-7 regarding awareness, cognition, and shared social knowledge.)

Now consider the important contrast between Figures 1A and 1B. The first Figure is an *open* exchange network configured such that position-based power-dependence is unequal in favor of T2 relative to T1, T3, and T4 within that structure. By contrast, Figure 1B is a completely *closed* social exchange network, where every trader is directly connected in Kula exchange with every other trader, every trader has an equal number of trading partners (i.e., “availability” is equal), and position-based power-dependence is equally distributed. As experimental research has shown (Stolte and Emerson, 1977), a structure like the one drawn in Figure 1B can be identified as a “closed social circle,” which, by virtue of the “availability” determinant of relative dependence (and therefore power), allocates equal power-dependence to every actor in the network. In the present context, each island trader in Figure 1B enjoys a level of power-dependence equal to the level enjoyed by every other island trader in that structure. Therefore, across a series of exchange transactions (Kula trades), all island traders are predicted to obtain equal levels of Kula benefit-outcomes and social prestige.

Now consider the contrast between Figures 1A and 1B, on the one hand, and Figure 1C, on the other hand. This contrast is between exchange networks with varying distributions of power-dependence, unequal and equal, respectively (Figures 1A and 1B), and an “incorporated” productive exchange system, or “collective actor” (Figure 1C). Again drawing inspiration from Malinowski, suppose a given island Chief mobilizes a set of commoners/followers on a given island to prepare for and launch a major Kula trade expedition to a distant island across rough, dangerous waters. Such an expedition is a *collective enterprise*. No one trader will get a benefit-outcome, unless all get benefit-outcomes. To effectively mount such an expedition, the traders will need to divide the relevant labor somehow. Each trader will need to undertake a portion of the work to be accomplished, perhaps locating and obtaining the best wood, helping to carve the wood into an ocean-worthy craft, participating

enthusiastically in the appropriate and prescribed magic rituals surrounding such an expedition. Then, leaving together as a united, solidary “collective actor” (Emerson, 1972; Stolte, 1987), the traders must jointly venture forth across a threatening ocean and return safely with a store of Kula articles promising a relatively large level of aggregate social prestige.⁷

Note that any relationship entailing negotiated social exchange, whether embedded within an *open*, power-unequal/stratified exchange network depicted in Figure 1A, a *closed*, power-equal/non-stratified exchange network shown in Figure 1B, or a productive exchange system displayed in Figure 1C, must be seen as a *mixed-motive relationship*. Each such relationship will always entail both a cooperative/integrative and a competitive/distributive interest, lying below the surface that may or may not become explicit. However, which “side” of the relationship becomes relatively more salient in a given instance is an open empirical question. Such salience will depend on the surrounding exchange structural configuration and the dynamic longitudinal process of exchange through which benefit-outcomes are determined and distributed. Theoretically, more competition is expected to occur in a stratified structure such as Figure 1A: T1, T3, and T4 will spend relatively more time and behavioral energy competing with one another to make trades with T2. T2 will receive many offers and is in a position to choose the most valuable outcome from any trade offered. By contrast, less competition is expected in Figure 1B: T1, T2, T3, and T4 are structural equals, no power advantage is enjoyed by any trader, and trades will lead to an equal distribution of Kula social prestige outcomes for traders across a series of transactions. Finally, even less competition, as well as more explicit cooperation, is expected in a productive exchange system, as depicted in Figure 1C. Although each relationship between a trader and the collective actor continues to be mixed-motive in nature, the salience of the cooperative/integrative side will tend to exceed

⁷ See Emerson 1972; 1981; Barth, 1964; Stolte, 1987 for related discussions of “productive exchange systems” or “incorporated groups” as distinctive social exchange structures that differ fundamentally from social exchange networks.

the salience of the competitive/distributive side in a unified collective actor. Working hard together in energetic preparations for and conduct of a Kula-seeking sea voyage, the traders are expected to exhibit a relatively high level of “social solidarity” or “group cohesiveness.” Such a state is likely to remain in effect as long as members remain united in pursuit of the collective outcome. During this time, the cooperative/integrative dimension of the relationship between each trader and the group at large is likely to be relatively most salient. After the traders have returned home with a new store of valued Kula articles, however, as the current collective enterprise comes to an end and the open or closed exchange network becomes re-established, the salience of the other side of the mixed-motive relationship is expected to increase: Kula prestige must now be distributed. Who gets relatively more, and who gets relatively less social prestige? Hence, the integrative/cooperative side of the mixed motive relationship will become quiescent and the competitive/distributive side of each relationship will again gain prominence. Variation in structural exchange circumstances leads to variation in the salience of the two sides of the mixed-motive relationship within a negotiation network.

Negotiation Networks and the Emergence of Culture: From Sub-Institutional to Institutional Exchange. Stolte (1983;1987) argues that we can and should introduce theoretical ideas explicitly addressing issues of awareness, cognition, and shared social knowledge (culture) into the power-dependence/structural exchange framework. One key idea is *social negotiation*, an exchange-relevant form of interpersonal communication, through which two parties to a social exchange relationship come to agreements across the series of transactions. For example, T1 and T2 engage in such communication as they mutually settle on a longitudinal set of agreements to mutually transmit Kula articles, armshells for necklaces.⁸

⁸ The negotiation network approach (also see Stolte,1990) incorporates elements of symbolic interaction theory into Emerson’s structural social exchange theory. However, traditional symbolic interaction theory dwells too much on the “higher order verbal/logical” (deliberative) facets of cognition, failing to address crucial lower-order, non-verbal, non-logical, “automatic” facets of cognition. The present paper aims to deal more explicitly with the full range of the dual cognitive processing that occurs within social negotiation as a form of communication. Also

Based on the social negotiation process, a cultural institution, such as the Kula trading system (or any other cultural arrangement) can be understood to evolve within an underlying structure power-dependence/social exchange (Stolte, 1987).

Imagine an earlier time, perhaps generations earlier, among the Island peoples of New Guinea, prior to the time of the Kula. Suppose that getting sufficient material resources (e.g., canoes, yams, pots, fish, etc.) was far more pressing at this earlier historical time than when Malinowski studied the islanders in 1920. Presume that the island peoples began trading economic, not symbolic, goods and services in order to cope with such material scarcity. Perhaps in that earlier time, exchange/trading relationships assumed structural forms like those shown in Figure 1. But at that time, assume that only “underlying exigencies of structural exchange, mutual resource dependence, and the dynamics of power” existed (Stolte, 1987: 777). Power-dependence/structural exchange theory *per se* limits its focus exclusively to such underlying exigencies of exchange. That theory is “formulated entirely in objective, behavioral, cognition-free terms” and it “excludes perceptions, expectations, meanings, understandings” from its purview (Stolte, 1987:777). However, in order to build an adequate account of the way a cultural institution such as the Kula (or any other cultural institution) evolves within and from such sub-institutional exchange structures and dynamics, we must introduce additional theoretical concepts and principles.

These additional concepts/principles can be found in a synthesis of several ideas focused on the interplay of the symbolic/verbal and non-symbolic/non-verbal processing capacities of the human animal (Baldwin and Baldwin, 1978; Mead, 1934; Vigotsky, 1962; Paivio, 2007). Especially pertinent is a distinction between two kinds of knowledge, *tacit* vs. *explicit* (Baldwin and Baldwin, 1978). Tacit knowledge is formed through a person’s direct encounters with immediate environmental “contingencies.” Suppose in ancient pre-Kula times,

see Paivio (2007) for a systematic treatment of the intricate interrelationship of verbal and non-verbal capacities in the evolution of the human mind.

traders T1 and T2 discover they can arrive at a mutually beneficial trade of a fine canoe for needed yams, fish, and pots. The subjective knowledge each trader acquires from this underlying material exchange is tacit.⁹ Such knowledge is “private and rich in emotional meaning” (Stolte, 1987: 777). Such knowledge is concrete and situational. But, we assume, the two traders, as well as the other inhabitants of the New Guinea islands, are also able to use language for communication. Such symbolic/verbal capacity permits them to translate merely individual, concrete, tacit knowledge into more abstract, public, shared knowledge. The verbal/symbolic capacity of the traders permits them to form explicit “social and collective meaning agreements” which are essential to the formation of any cultural institution. There is an important change in the evolution from tacit to explicit knowledge: “to know the objective world explicitly is to grasp and react to it in terms of verbal and non-verbal signs, the meanings of which are established in human communication” (Stolte, 1987:777).

In sum, meaning agreements (mutual awareness, social cognition, shared social knowledge) arise interpersonally through social negotiation, as that process attends the exchange of benefit-outcomes. Across a span of time, meaning agreements are shaped and re-shaped. They become more or less widely shared. These meaning agreements come to cover many or most facets of social and material life.¹⁰

As cultural meaning agreements form and re-form through social negotiation among actors in exchange relations, exchange networks, and productive exchange systems, boundaries around “collective actors” are formed and re-formed. Two actors, T1 and T2, might

⁹ “Tacit” knowledge is very close in meaning to what contemporary dual process theorists call “intuitive” (Haidt, 2001; Evans, 2008). Baldwin and Baldwin (1978) advanced the distinction between tacit and explicit well prior to the contemporary dual-process distinction between “automatic” and “controlled/deliberative.” We will expand on the role of this distinction below.

¹⁰ Stolte (1987) limited his focus to the way “justice norms” (equality, equity, need, status) are formed through social negotiation. But the current analysis intends to expand the scope of such socially negotiated meaning agreements to virtually any aspect of the social life of a people, small or large. Thus, we aim to argue here, that the entire Kula trading system, as a cultural institution, was formed gradually through this sort of dynamic.

come to mutually form an “interpersonal meaning agreement,” a shared body of social knowledge at the social dyad-level. But such social knowledge does not itself constitute a cultural institution. At a minimum, such an institution requires a social triad, as this point was classically formulated by Simmel (Wolf, 1950). Or as Stolte (1987: 779) puts it, drawing from the classic statement by Simmel, shared social knowledge does not qualify as a cultural norm until “it is ‘super-individual’ in its objective, exterior, facticity.” Within the present example, before a cultural institution can be said to exist, T1 would need to be confronted, at a minimum, by a unified “collective actor” composed of T2 and T3 acting together under one unified normative policy, or better, by all the other actors in the trading network, including T4. A cultural institution presupposes that each individual subject to its influence is confronted by a collectivity “acting in concert,” standing above any given member of the collectivity, uniformly sanctioning obedience to its shared expectations. A “collective actor” can be construed as a powerful social coalition, upon which each member is dependent for valuable benefit-outcomes (Stolte, 1987). When culturally instituted, such a collectivity has the power (legitimate authority) to sanction any member located inside its boundaries. Significant deviation from cultural expectations will lead to significant sanctions. Each member standing within the cultural boundary of an instituted collective actor “understands” at some level¹¹ that action in conformity with the collectively agreed cultural norms will bring significant positive benefit-outcomes, while violation of the cultural norm(s) agreed to by the collective actor will fetch substantial losses of such outcomes.

Gradually, we imagine, the traders of the New Guinea islands came to conquer the practical issues of material survival, importantly through widening material exchange/trading (e.g., canoes for pots and foodstuffs) across the islands. Perhaps, as Sahlins (2000) argues, the New Guinea traders gradually established a relatively “affluent society.” If so, they

¹¹ The level of understanding might vary between two poles: a lower “automatic/unconscious” and a higher “conscious/controlled/deliberative” level.

gradually would have discovered that meeting material needs became quite certain and routine, allowing time and energy for other facets of social life. It might well have been the case that these island peoples began to view “subsidiary (material) exchange” as a relatively routine, pedestrian, uninteresting, if necessary, task to be regularly undertaken. At such a point, these island peoples might well have become increasingly excited about objects of increasing “value, but of no real use.” Perhaps the basic idea of the Kula was begun. (See footnote 4 on benefit-outcome value in exchange.) From there, the Kula symbolic social exchange system, with its promise of reputation and social prestige in the community, might have evolved further. New Kula rules, rituals, mythology, magic might have been socially negotiated. Perhaps the cultural inventions surrounding Kula were gradually but steadily embellished, as they were passed across the generations from the elders to youth through stories, legends, etc.¹²

CULTURAL COGNITION IN NEGOTIATION NETWORKS

In light of the background provided above, we now explore two sets of issues. First, we consider how an individual is culturally shaped within a negotiation network setting. Second, we examine how, once shaped, an individual navigates the practical micro-terrain of the negotiation network. Again, the re-imagined Kula inspires hypothetical concrete illustrations.

Shaping Cultural Cognition: Suppose traversing a life-course, from birth to death, through the island society described by Malinowski, gave cultural shape to the way islanders thought, felt, and acted, individually, relationally, and collectively. Assume that a member of the overall island culture is significantly shaped within varying, quite distinct *sub-cultures*. Also assume that each sub-cultural setting is a “collective actor,” having a well-defined socio-cultural boundary based on a shared meaning agreement. Thus, each islander located within

¹² Within the negotiation network approach, the two levels, sub-institutional and cultural institutional are always there. Further, we argue, in respect to the cultural cognition happening within the individual there will always be a dynamic interplay between the tacit meanings of concrete situational contingencies and the explicit meanings evidently shared and discussed by the members of the bounded, surrounding “collective actor” that enter discourse about what is taken as shared and public knowledge.

that boundary is confronted by a “super-individual,” unified coalition, mobilized and ready to sanction obedience to its shared cultural expectations. We contend two kinds of sub-cultural settings have general significance in composing the overall culture of a negotiation network. The basic features of these two crucial settings are sketched below.

Cultural Content: Two Basic Value Domains. A first category of sub-cultural setting is organized around the achievement of *intrinsic-communal* benefit-outcomes. Collective actors structured in variations of productive exchange, as depicted in Figure 1C, provide an underlying model for such settings. At the most basic level, family and friendship groups illustrate this category of setting. Members of these groups usually have intimate, emotionally significant attachments to one another. Also within this first category of sub-cultural setting are various other groups based on productive exchange. Members of these other groups form emotional bonds of mutual identification, which, while not typically as strong or significant as family or friendship bonds, can sometimes become very strong and significant. Examples might include collaborative work groups, political groups, ethnic groups, racial groups, gender groups, ideology groups, etc.). Intrinsic-communal settings are places (culturally bounded collective actors) where relatively high value is placed on self-subordination and self-sacrifice in the service of a(n) individual or collective “other(s).” As Stolte and Fender (2007) note, each party to a transaction within such a sub-cultural setting views the other party as an *end* rather than a *means*. Or, in a way, the other party *is* the benefit-outcome to be achieved. It is within such sub-cultural settings that empathy, sympathy, altruism, patriotism, camaraderie and similar social emotions are typically experienced (Hiadt, 2001; Batson, 1987).

A second category of sub-cultural setting is organized around the acquisition of *extrinsic-agentive* benefit-outcomes. Bounded collective actors with structures like Figures 1A and 1B constitute this kind of setting. Malinowski’s subsidiary (material) exchange and Kula symbolic exchange systems provide an apt illustration. Generally, individuals located within this kind of sub-cultural setting do not have strong, close emotional attachments to one another. Relatively

high value is placed on extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes. Self-service and self-promotion by each individual are strongly encouraged. In Stolte and Fender's (2007) terms, each party to a transaction in this kind of setting views the other mainly as an *instrumental means* to benefit-outcomes deriving from outside the relationship. Chief S and Chief D view one another primarily as a useful means to Kula-borne social prestige, not as a dear old friend, going way back, sharing a significant history of mutual affection. Depending on one's relative success in this sort of setting, one may feel the ecstasy of triumph or humiliation of defeat, pleasure of success or shame of failure, glow of prominence or gloom of insignificance, warmth of pride or cold of disgrace.¹³

Assume that ordinarily (typically, on average) an individual islander is shaped to place value on *both kinds of benefit-outcomes*, intrinsic-communal and extrinsic-agentic.¹⁴ Also assume, however, that individual differences in cultural shaping are probable. Consider individuals A, B, and C. Actor A might be culturally shaped to place approximately equal value on both intrinsic-communal and extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes. Actor B might be shaped to value intrinsic-communal outcomes substantially more than extrinsic-agentic outcomes. Actor C might be shaped to value extrinsic-agentic outcomes significantly more than intrinsic-communal outcomes. As noted below, studying the implications of these sorts of individual differences would be a worthwhile goal for future empirical research.

The Shaping Process. Imagine that an individual islander is formed longitudinally across the life-course in the context of varying sub-cultural settings, under the influence of

¹³ Within the negotiation network perspective, an individual's relative success in an extrinsic-agentic setting, will be determined largely by that individual's relative positional power-dependence. For a discussion of some related social psychological issues see Stolte (1983) on the "legitimation of structural inequality."

¹⁴ We follow Stolte and Fender (2007) here, contrasting the present analysis with the analysis advanced by Markus and Kityama (1991). The latter authors emphasize cross-cultural variations in selves (interdependent vs. independent). We emphasize multiple aspects of a self (intrinsic-communal vs. extrinsic-agentic) that might operate at different times in different (varying sub-cultural) situations within a single overall culture.

varying collective actors. We contend that the two value-domains and sub-cultural settings described above are especially basic in the cultural shaping of the individual.

Undoubtedly, cultural shaping is complex, probably entailing several connected processes. Based on prior theory and research, the following components of cultural shaping are likely to be most central.

“Externalization” is probably one important part of the cultural shaping process. Fiske (1991;Stolte, 1992; Fiske, Kityama, Nesbitt, 1998) captures this component well. Basically, the individual is born with a biologically given set of potentialities, propensities, present at birth, which unfold sequentially across a series of developmental stages.¹⁵ These qualities are “neurologically pre-wired.” Each quality is an inherent “readiness” for or receptivity to varying kinds of external environmental stimulation. In Fiske’s language, each quality is an inherent (perhaps universal) readiness to acquire each one of a varying set of cultural models: “communal sharing (CS),” “equality matching (EM),” “authority ranking (AR),” or “market pricing (MP).” Each cultural model can be thought of as distinct “logic of action,” in Dimaggio’s (1997) sense. The models can be collapsed into two categories corresponding quite closely to the two value domains, two sub-cultural settings, described above. An inherent neurological readiness to acquire CS and EM renders an individual sensitive to the give-an-take of members of an intrinsic-communal setting. In contrast, a pre-wired neurological propensity to externalize AR and MP predisposes an individual to be sensitive to the exchange transactions occurring among members of an extrinsic-agentic setting.

“Socialization,” is likely to be a second important component of the cultural shaping process, and it is neatly conveyed by Bandura’s (1986) social learning framework. His approach presupposes basic Skinnerian mechanisms of operant conditioning (strengthening a tendency to behave in a given way through reinforcement, weakening a tendency to behave in

¹⁵ Of course, classic contributions by Piaget (1958) and Kohlberg (1969) laid important groundwork for Fiske’s more recent cultural model externalization approach.

a given way through punishment, and establishing “cues” through associative conditioning that set the situational occasion for behaving or not behaving in a given way). But Bandura’s social learning approach develops a far richer more subtle set of learning capacities within the individual than Skinner’s simplistic, mechanistic operant conditioning paradigm. Bandura’s framework posits a complex internal ability in the learner to “code” stimuli (imaginally and/or verbally), to learn complex patterns of behavior vicariously by observing socializing agents in the surrounding sub-cultural setting, their actions, and the consequences of those actions for them. Quite relevant to the negotiation network approach, some social learning research has shown that an individual chooses which among alternative socializing models to imitate based on the relative power and status of the models.

In general, Bandura’s socialization (social learning) approach can be integrated with Fiske’s (cultural model) externalization approach. When a given propensity for a specific cultural model is inherently ready to unfold and “show itself,” socializing agents composing members of the surrounding sub-cultural setting stand ready to stimulate and reinforce that propensity. Through direct/intentional and indirect/unintentional reinforcement, an individual’s earliest tendency to enact a given behavioral propensity is strengthened and shaped into a regularized action routine relevant to achieving valued benefit-outcomes in that sub-cultural setting. Therefore, within an intrinsic-communal setting, the inherent propensity to manifest “communal sharing” or “equality matching,” will tend to be regularized as objective action routines (along with congruent ways of thinking and feeling). By contrast, within an extrinsic-agentic setting, the inherent propensity to display “authority ranking” or “market pricing” will tend to be regularized as overt action routines (plus appropriate modes of thinking and feeling). In short, socializing agents representing either kind of sub-cultural setting can and will both directly (through strategies of conditioning) and indirectly and perhaps unintentionally (through serving as unwitting observational models) reinforce specific patterns of action that lead to the

achievement of intrinsic/communal or extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes, depending upon the extant sub-cultural setting.

“Internalization” is likely to be a third significant part of the cultural shaping process. Kityama and Park (2010) provide an intriguing neuroscience approach to this aspect of cultural shaping. They argue (Kityama and Park, 2010, p. 121, Figure 1) that the macro-ecology, history, and economy of a given people shape the core values and tasks comprising the socio-cultural environment in which individuals live and act daily. Culture provides norms and expectations that stimulate the routine enactment of various behavioral tasks, and culture also provides relevant tools and problem-solving strategies. For an individual to routinely engage in such behavioral tasks, routinely using such tools and strategies, creates a distinctive pattern of neural activity, which gradually provides a distinctive structure in the brain. In other words, culturally prescribed and routine behavior feeds back to shape an individual’s neurological infrastructure, which, in turn, renders a given sort of routine action pattern more probable.

Kityama and Park focus primarily on *cross-cultural* variations in the neurological internalization of culture. They suggest that the culturally prescribed routine action of a typical member of an “eastern” society creates brain patterns characteristic of an “interdependent self.” In contrast, they argue, that the culturally dictated routine action of a typical member of a “western” society produces brain patterns characteristic of an “independent self.” Considered in negotiation network terms, an interdependent neurological self is motivationally predisposed to seek and achieve intrinsic-communal benefit-outcomes, while an independent neurological self is motivationally inclined to seek and obtain extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes. While such cross-cultural variations have been clearly identified, as we noted above (see footnote 14), the present analysis differs from that put forth by Kityama and Park. We contend that a typical individual’s culturally shaped brain is motivationally pre-disposed to seek and obtain *both* interdependence (intrinsic-communal outcomes) and independence (extrinsic-agentic

outcomes), depending upon the sub-cultural setting at hand, and depending upon individual differences in cultural shaping.

Fiske's "externalization," Bandura's "socialization," and Kityama and Park's "internalization," can be linked at a general level within the negotiation network approach. When an inherent propensity to enact a given cultural model shows itself, given appropriate external environmental stimulation by socializing agents, a culturally expected action routine will become stabilized, feeding back to shape distinctive patterns of neural pathway firing in an individual's brain. Which distinctive action routine becomes stabilized, depends upon sub-cultural setting. One kind of setting is modeled like Figure 1C: here, neurological infrastructure and action routines are shaped to motivationally predispose an individual toward actions aimed at achieving intrinsic-communal benefit-outcomes. An alternative kind of sub-cultural setting is modeled like Figure 1A and 1B: in this instance, neurological infrastructure and action routines are shaped to motivationally predispose an individual toward action aimed at obtaining extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes.

Navigating the Practical Terrain of the Negotiation Network: Basic Mechanism.

Once culturally shaped, an islander must effectively engage the varying negotiation network micro-situations encountered across the wider island culture. We consider here what we propose as the basic mechanism through which such navigation occurs. At the heart of this mechanism is a sequential two-phase process. The first phase entails motivated cultural choice behavior, and the second phase entails post-hoc motivated reasoning (cultural cognition) about such choice behavior.

Phase 1: Motivated Cultural Choice Behavior. Assume an individual enters a given socio-cultural setting. The negotiation network situation might be one that signals an opportunity to acquire either intrinsic-communal or extrinsic-agentic benefit outcomes. As the situation unfolds, the individual will make significant, situation-relevant behavioral choices across time. We argue that the longitudinal pattern of such choice behavior will be motivated. That is, in a

given instance, an individual will tend to choose X over Y action based on a tacit, implicit, unconscious (gut-level sense) that choosing X will lead to a significantly valued benefit-outcome, and that choosing Y will not lead to (or actively impede the achievement of) such an outcome. For example, in a decidedly extrinsic-agentic sub-cultural situation, islander T2 might be motivated to energetically serve the self by choosing to give T1 a relatively plain Kula article (worth relatively low prestige) saving a relatively more beautiful, more prestigious Kula artifact for a later trade, where it might yield a more valuable extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcome for the self. Or, alternatively, in a decidedly intrinsic-communal sub-cultural situation, islander T2 might choose to sacrifice the self in the service of an individual or collective other, perhaps by expending great energy making a valuable contribution to a collective division of labor aimed at preparing for a Kula expedition across the sea.

In either situation, the action choice made by T2, will be a motivated choice, a value-based choice. As such, the choice will tend have several characteristics. First, it will tend to be a relatively “hot” (rather than “cool”) choice in Zajonc’s (1980) terms, meaning that it will entail relatively more emotional energy than cognitive information. Second, and similarly, this motivated choice will tend to be a relatively impulsive, automatic “go” (rather than deliberated, reasoned, “know” choice), as described by Metcalf and Mischel (1999). Third, and, again similarly, such a value-based, motivated choice will tend to be an “X-response” (reflexive response) rather than a “C-response” (reflective response) in Lieberman, Jarcho, and Sapute’s (2004) neurological dual-processing framework.

Phase 2: Motivated Cultural Cognition. After an individual, for example, T2 in this illustration has made a motivated choice, certain conditions may stimulate that individual to justify the choice behavior, to offer an account, a verbal rationale. T1 might request/demand such an account, or other members of the sub-cultural setting may call for such an account. Or, indeed, even without prompting by other parties, T2 might be moved to create a justifying account to explain the choice to the self. We suggest that the cognitive account T2 constructs

will also be motivated. The explanation/justification assembled will be biased so as to promote T2's culturally shaped values. (Also see Haidt,2001 for a somewhat similar argument). There will be a tendency to select information and assemble it quite creatively so as to arrive at a conscious cognitive destination pre-selected by an underlying automatic/unconscious value predisposition. Our view of motivated cultural cognition is similar to the analyses contributed by Kunda,1990, Dunning,1999, and Snyder, 1999. We differ on two points. First, the cultural toolkit available to the trader is crucial. For example, the islanders in Malinowski's ethnography might well draw elements of magic, myth, and legend into the verbal-cognitive account offered to justify choice behavior. In general, non-verbal and verbal elements of explicit, socially shared knowledge (culture) will be the raw material from which an individual will draw in fashioning the justification. Second, we argue that motivated cultural cognition may be framed in either intrinsic-communal or extrinsic-agentic terms, depending upon how the negotiation network situation is framed.¹⁶ And the same actor may well develop one kind of justification in one situation and the opposite kind of justification in a different situation, even though the two rationales are completely contradictory. As Dimaggio (1997) has persuasively argued, cultural justifications need not be, and, indeed, usually are not, logically consistent!

CONCLUSIONS

Summary. The foregoing analysis aimed to clarify how the automatic vs. controlled, hot vs. cold, and intrinsic-communal vs. extrinsic-agentic facets of cultural cognition operate together within a negotiation network framework informed by social neuroscience. Core features of socio-cultural settings, dynamics of shaping, and micro-situational navigation were conceptualized. Malinowski's classic Kula exchange ethnography was reviewed and re-

¹⁶ Kunda, Dunning, and Snyder suggest that all motivated cognition is strictly self-serving. Certainly, such cognition, when it occurs in relation to an extrinsic-agentic sub-cultural setting in the service of attaining benefit-outcomes for the self, will be self-serving. However, when such cognition occurs in relation to an intrinsic-communal sub-cultural setting in the service of attaining benefit-outcomes for an individual or collective other, it will tend to be self-sacrificing and other-serving.

imagined as a negotiation network. Social symbolic Kula exchange, motivated by the pursuit of social prestige, was recast in terms of power-dependence dynamics in social exchange relations, networks, and groups. It was argued that an institutional cultural arrangement forms and re-forms through social negotiation. Such an arrangement was viewed as a bounded and unified “collective actor” arising from sub-institutional social exchange. It was argued that an overall societal culture is composed of distinct, varying sub-cultural settings. One important kind of setting is organized around the pursuit of intrinsic-communal benefit-outcomes, and a second important kind of setting is organized around the pursuit of extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes. We contended that an individual is culturally shaped, through externalization, socialization, and internalization to be motivationally predisposed to seek both intrinsic-communal and extrinsic-agentic outcomes in varying sub-cultural settings. The basic mechanism underlying the navigation of a sub-cultural negotiation network setting was discussed. Phase one, it was argued, involves enacting a relatively hot, automatic value-based choice. Phase two, it was contended, entails the use of cultural content to consciously and deliberately construct a rationale to justify the choice, the trajectory of which is governed by an underlying relatively hot, automatic, value-position. The value-position might rest on the pursuit of either intrinsic-communal or extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes.

Directions for Future Research. Based on the analysis presented above, one direction for future research is situational framing. When and under what conditions will a motivated tendency to seek and obtain an intrinsic-communal vs. extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcome gain primacy?¹⁷ The focus of this question is relatively short-term negotiation network navigation, that is, navigation that occurs across varying negotiation network situations that emerge more or less continuously across relatively short spans of time. Key to this issue is the interaction of objective socio-cultural situation and individual cultural cognition. In pursuit of this

¹⁷ Pursuing this question would extend earlier work on framing social values (Stolte and Fender, 2007).

research concern, the potential connection between the negotiation network framework and some facets of “ecological psychology” should be explored. Perhaps Gibson’s (1986) classic ecological notion of “affordance” comes into play. From an individual’s perspective, as a given situation begins to take shape, its objective features potentially become apparent and available for use. As the situational configuration reaches a meaningful threshold, its features “afford” either an intrinsic-communal or extrinsic-agentive action routine. Simultaneously, the individual’s culturally shaped predispositions affect the inclination to see (or fail to see) the opportunity afforded by the emerging situation, thus helping to bring (or fail to bring) the situation into a specific shape. One individual’s motivational bent toward achieving intrinsic-communal benefit-outcomes might trigger a response to situational “affordances” one way (perhaps by seizing and using a relevant opportunity, perhaps to sacrifice self for an individual or collective other. A second individual’s motivational inclination toward extrinsic-agentive benefit-outcomes might cue a response to the same situational “affordances” in a different way, perhaps missing the relevant opportunity, indeed, perhaps by enacting an extrinsic-agentive behavioral choice instead. Future research should pursue this line of thought.

A second direction for future research concerns relatively longer term navigation across the negotiation network. A key question is: How does an individual navigate the varying sub-cultural settings of the negotiation network with greater or lesser success? “Success,” we argue, can be reckoned in terms of the relative level of benefit-outcomes an individual achieves.

Clearly, the constitution of objective success will vary by sub-cultural setting. Also, an individual islander’s relative success in achieving benefit-outcomes will probably depend on the interaction of both the culturally shaped self the islander brings into the sub-cultural setting and the objective logic of action operating in that setting. Thus, for illustration, objective success in a socio-cultural setting like the stratified negotiation network shown in Figure 1A can be reasonably figured in terms of Kula-borne social prestige. If, through social exchange, T2

possesses relatively more prestige than T1 at the end of the day, T2 can be reasonably said to be objectively more successful than T1. However, within a different socio-cultural situation such as the negotiation network situation shown in Figure 1C, objective success might be measured not in terms of Kula social prestige, but rather in terms of the level of collective-specific social approval (more like group-relevant social esteem) an islander attains in exchange for that islander's contributions to the collective division of labor. If, compared with other islanders in Figure 1C, T12 spends relatively greater effort, making a relatively more valuable contribution to the success of a productive exchange group, T12 may be allocated relatively more social esteem by colleagues. Compared with T12's colleagues, T12 can thereby be said to be relatively more successful in that socio-cultural setting.

Consider the probable fates of three island traders across two contrasting negotiation network scenarios, again drawing images from Malinowski's Kula ethnography.

First consider island trader T1. Assume T1 has been culturally shaped to value more highly intrinsic-communal than extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes. T1's chronic tendency is to make motivated choices and adduce motivated justifications favoring self-sacrifice for individual or collective others. It is in fact difficult for T1 to make self-serving choices or give self-serving justifications.

Second, consider island trader T2. Assume T2 been culturally shaped to value more highly extrinsic-agentic than the intrinsic-communal benefit-outcomes. T2's chronic tendency is to exhibit motivated choices and motivated cultural cognition in the service of the self. It is hard for T2 to make other-serving choices and adduce other-serving justifications.

Third, consider island trader T3. Assume T3 has been culturally shaped to equally value intrinsic-communal and extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes. T3 is able flexibly to switch between the two sorts of motivated choice and motivated cultural cognition, depending on the objective requirements of the socio-cultural situation at hand. However, assume that while T3 can evince

behavioral choice and cultural justification fitting either value position, each value position softens somewhat the effect of the opposite value position.

Scenario 1: Cultural Cognition and Relative Success in A Stratified Negotiation

Network. Suppose the current socio-cultural situation takes on the character depicted in Figure 1A, the stratified and open negotiation network. Success in this context is the magnitude of social prestige an individual trader can amass relative to other traders via the Kula trading process. The objective, matter-of-fact, operative “logic of action” is “competition.” To successfully obtain relatively valuable Kula articles worth relatively high levels of social prestige will depend upon vigorous self-serving agency as an adept Kula negotiator/competitor in such a situation. It is reasonable to suppose that a culturally instituted social exchange situation like that represented by Figure 1A will lead to different levels of objective success for traders, T1, T2, and T3. We predict that Kula social prestige will be ordered among these three individuals as follows: $T2 > T3 > T1$.

This prediction follows from the ways in which the three culturally shaped traders connect with the objective socio-cultural negotiation network situation at hand. Trader T2, an independent/individualistic individual, whose strong chronic internal bent is to make motivated behavioral choices and motivated justifications evincing extrinsic-agency, is likely to best fit the competitive stratified negotiation network situation. T2 is likely to gain the most beautiful Kula articles, to achieve the most social prestige. Trader T3 is predicted to come next in the order. While T3 is flexible, and while T3 can make motivated choices and give motivated reasons in the direction of both value complexes, his chronic orientation toward taking an extrinsic-agentic value position is likely to be softened to some degree by a simultaneous chronic orientation toward taking an intrinsic-communal value position. Thus, T3 will not be as successful in accumulating highly artistic Kula articles and social prestige as T2. However, T3 will tend to be objectively more successful than T1, whose culturally shaped psyche oriented most strongly toward an intrinsic-communal value position and weakly toward extrinsic-agency value position.

Scenario 2: Cultural Cognition and Relative Success in a Productive Exchange

System. By contrast, suppose the current socio-cultural situation takes on the character pictured in Figure 1C, the unified productive exchange system, based on a division of labor. Success in this alternative context is the magnitude of social approval (sense of acceptance by and group-relevant esteem) allocated by colleagues committed to a shared effort (a dangerous Kula journey across rough seas). The objective, matter-of-fact operative “logic of action” here is cooperation. To successfully acquire gestures communicating a relatively high level of esteem will depend upon vigorous self-subordination/sacrifice in support of the collective benefit of one’s fellow traders. One would reasonably expect that a culturally instituted social exchange situation like that shown in Figure 1C will lead to different levels of objective success for traders T1, T2, and T3. We predict that signs/gestures of group member approval/esteem will be ordered as follows: $T1 > T3 > T2$.

We make these predictions based on how the three culturally shaped island traders mesh with this alternative socio-cultural negotiation network situation. Trader T1 is culturally shaped to have a strong chronic internal bent to make motivated choices and adduce motivated reasons displaying intrinsic-communal values. Therefore, T1 is likely to best fit the cooperative productive exchange situation. T1 is likely to earn the highest level of group approval/esteem for personal self-sacrifice on behalf of the group’s collective goal. Again, trader T3 is likely to end up next in the order, for essentially the same reason as stated above. While T3 is flexible and while T3 can make motivated choices and give motivated reasons in the direction of both intrinsic-communal and extrinsic-agentic values, the latter value position offsets the former value position somewhat. Thus, T3 will not be as successful in earning group approval/esteem for his contributions to the collective task. However, T3 will be more objectively successful in garnering group approval/esteem in this setting than trader T2, whose culturally shaped and chronic bent is most strongly toward extrinsic-agentic benefit-outcomes and only weakly toward intrinsic-

communal benefit-outcomes. The predictions following from this line of reasoning ought to be probed and tested in follow-up empirical research.

Figure 1: Three Kinds of Negotiation Network

Fig. 1A Stratified Negotiation Network

Fig. 1B Non-Stratified Negotiation Network

Fig. 1C Productive Exchange System

(Group Based on a Division of Labor)

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