Misogyny, Violent Extremism and Interpersonal Violence: Examining the Mediating and Contingent Effects of Revenge Motivation, Hypermasculinity, Collective Narcissism and Group Threats

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Abstract

The growing evidence base of risk factors for violent extremism demonstrates overlaps with parallel problem areas like domestic violence, mass murder, and stalking. Yet, empirical research examining the overlap among these domains is limited. The present analysis aims to address the lack of empirical research on the relationship between misogyny, violent extremism, and interpersonal violence by conducting survey-based analyses employing a newly developed and validated psychometric scale to measure misogyny. Based on a UK nationally representative survey ($n = 1500$), we examine the underlying mechanisms and contingent effects linking misogyny to violent extremism and interpersonal violence. We investigate how misogyny, frustrated narcissistic entitlement, and group threats among men translate into revenge motivation and hypermasculinity and thus, may increase violent extremist intentions and attitudes, as well as justification of and willingness to engage in interpersonal violence. The results show that misogyny predicts violent extremist attitudes and intentions as well as increased support for and willingness to engage in interpersonal violence via revenge planning and hypermasculinity, particularly among men who experience frustrated narcissistic entitlement and greater threats to the ingroup. Among women, misogyny is not associated with violent extremist attitudes or intentions but is associated with increased support for and readiness to use violence. Our findings have important practical implications as we provide evidence which articulates *when* and *for whom* misogyny may be a risk factor for violent extremism and interpersonal violence. Establishing the *relevance* of misogyny as a risk factor for (extremist) violence may provide evidence for more targeted prevention and intervention programs.

Keywords: misogyny, violent extremism, terrorism, interpersonal violence, hypermasculinity, collective narcissism, revenge motivation, group threats

Introduction

Empirical research demonstrates male misogynistic beliefs and attitudes underpin many criminal offences including stalking, intimate partner violence, and sexual assault (Munsch & Willer, 2012; Casey et al., 2017; Peralta, Tuttle, & Steele, 2010). Misogynistic attitudes and behaviours are also increasingly under the microscope of research on violent extremism. Misogynistic attitudes are outwardly expressed in diverse forms of extremism including recent far-right terrorist manifestos (Wilson, 2020) and the jihadi cause (Lia, 2017; Pearson, 2020). Misogynistic attitudes also help bind the ‘involuntary celibate’ (more popularly known as ‘incels’) movement. Incels are a loosely organised online community of sexually frustrated men who express hatred and vengeance toward women for not acknowledging their male entitlement to women and sex (Ging, 2019). Incels and the far-right alike perceive status threats to their ethnic and gender hierarchies. Particularly, perceived masculine identity threats motivate engagement in violent hypermasculine behaviours (Kalish & Kimmel, 2010) and induce feelings of injustice and victimhood (Center on Extremism, 2019; DiBranco, 2020), as well as a strong desire for women’s (sexual) subjugation (Díaz & Valji, 2019; O’Malley, Holt, & Holt, 2020). A sense of frustrated entitlement and superiority transform shame, anger, and perceived injustices into a desire for revenge against women, ethnic minorities, and wider society (Baele, Brace, & Coan, 2019; Kimmel, 2017). Resultingly, perceived victimhood and violated entitlement expectations are argued to be fundamental drivers for the current wave of mass violence committed by white males (Hoffman, Ware, & Shapiro, 2020; Kimmel, 2017), where retributive violence is seen as a legitimate and righteous response to male suffering to restore status and dominance (Marganski, 2019).

These misogynistic attitudes have mobilised to real-world harmful behaviour with several incels and far-right terrorists crossing the Rubicon into ideological violence. Many had already conducted misogynistic-inspired violence prior to their terrorism, this includes crimes

such as domestic abuse and/or intimate partner violence (Smith, 2019), sexual assault (Vives, Hamilton, & Sondheimer, 2018), stalking (Topping, 2018), and online harassment of women (Duncan & Bogel-Burroughs, 2018). Sometimes these crimes are intertwined in the same offence (Gill, 2015, p. 38-39).

Despite growing anecdotal and descriptive findings linking misogyny to extremist violence, quantitative evidence analysing the intersection of attitudes and motivations fuelling gender-based and extremist violence remains lacking. This in part may be due to difficulties in measuring and operationalising misogyny for quantitative research. Hence, the present study employs a newly developed and validated psychometric scale to examine the relationship between misogyny and (1) violent extremist attitudes (2) violent extremist intentions (3) acceptance of interpersonal violence and, (4) willingness to engage in interpersonal violence. We test several moderated mediation models and examine whether misogyny is indirectly associated with all four violence measures via (1) revenge motivation and (2) hypermasculinity among men. We further test whether the revenge mediation is contingent upon men's levels of collective narcissism and whether the hypermasculinity mediation is dependent on men's group threat perceptions. In the following sections, we explain the theoretical rationale.

Collective Narcissism, Revenge Motivations, Hypermasculinity, Group Threats and Support for Violence

Research on collective narcissism offers ways to understand how frustrated group entitlement beliefs and perceived group injustice can induce outgroup hostility and revenge thoughts, which in turn, may lead to acts of aggression and violence. Collective narcissism is conceptualised as frustrated group-based entitlement and has been defined as “a belief that one's own group (the ingroup) is exceptional and entitled to special recognition and privileged treatment, but it is not sufficiently recognized by others” (Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, &

Lantos, 2019, p. 37). Collective narcissists are emotionally invested in a grandiose image of the ingroup, which requires constant validation. This idealised image is unstable and thus vulnerable to internal and external threats (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). As a result, collective narcissists tend to view the actions of others as threatening, undermining the group's inflated view, which in turn renders them prone to act aggressively and to engage in intergroup hostility as a way of protecting and defending their ingroup's status and image (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). Importantly, male collective narcissism is associated with viewing women as a threatening out-group resulting in both, less empathy and greater hostile sexism towards women (Górska et al., 2019; Golec de Zavala & Bierwiaczzonek, 2020). Several studies examined collective narcissism in the context of ethnic conflict. Collective narcissism was a robust predictor for support of terrorist violence (Jaśko, Webber, & Kruglanski, 2017; Jaśko et al., 2020).

'Revengefulness' has been defined as the tendency to uphold and to engage in revenge thoughts, which may translate to actual revenge behaviour as well as the inability to forgive prior offences (Żemojtel-Piotrowski et al., 2017). The desire to take revenge has been described as a fundamental motive across various violent behaviours, such as terrorism (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008), homicide (Counts, 1987), and rape (Scully & Marolla, 1985). Experimental and correlational studies demonstrate revengefulness is linked to high levels of entitlement and collective narcissism (Gabay, Hameiri, Rubel-Lifschitz, & Nadler, 2020; Dyduch-Hazar & Mrozinski, 2021). Several studies further found evidence that entitled frustration as well as externalising blame are related to fantasies of vengeful murder (Fox, Levin, & Fridel, 2018), and that individuals who hold stronger revenge thoughts are more likely to harm others (Murray, 2017). Revenge offers individuals who feel they have been wronged a sense of empowerment in which justice and the moral balance is restored (Kalish & Kimmel, 2010), and whereby dominance and masculinity can be reinforced (Marganski, 2019).

Indiscriminately targeting any member of the out-group may provide a means to restore threatened in-group and self-image amongst collective narcissists, also (Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006).

This aligns with research on masculinity, group status, and threats, which provides valuable explanations to understand how threats to one's masculine identity may transform into hypermasculine behaviours and extreme outgroup derogation, and thus, may contribute to mass and gender-based violence (Eisler, Franchina, Moore, Honeycutt, & Rhatigan, 2000; Munsch & Willer, 2012). Hypermasculinity refers to an extreme adherence to masculine gender roles. Hypermasculinity has been operationalised with three main characteristics: a belief that violence is manly, callous sex attitudes, and the view that danger is exciting (Mosher & Sirkin, 1984). Hypermasculinity often results in endorsing positions that subjugate and devalue women, engaging in violent fantasies about women, and conducting aggressive behaviours toward women (Reidy, Berke, Gentile, & Zeichner, 2014; Willer, Rogalin, Conlon, & Wojnowicz, 2013). These effects are particularly strong when men perceive their gender status as being under threat (Vandello, Bosson, Cohen, Burnaford, & Weaver, 2008). This is for a variety of reasons. Acts of aggression help to down-regulate negative emotions which arise when their manhood is challenged (Bosson, Vandello, Burnaford, Weaver, & Arzu Wasti, 2009). Additionally, by engaging in hypermasculine behaviours and by derogating and subjugating women, men reinforce their status within the dominant ingroup and against outgroups (Maass, Cadinu, Guarnieri, & Grasselli, 2003).

The above accounts suggest that (1) misogyny is associated with violent extremist attitudes and intentions, and (2) misogyny is associated with support for and intentions to engage in violence among men. It is further expected that both associations are mediated by revenge motivations particularly among men who hold high levels of collective narcissism and as such feel that men as a group are not sufficiently recognised despite the group's perceived

exceptionality, resulting in a sense of frustrated narcissistic entitlement, which needs to be avenged (Figure 1).

Therefore, it is hypothesised that:

H1: Men who report misogynistic beliefs are more likely to hold stronger *violent extremist attitudes* via revenge motivation, especially when they hold high levels of collective narcissism

H2: Men who report misogynistic beliefs are more likely to hold stronger *violent extremist intentions* via revenge motivation, especially when they hold high levels of collective narcissism

H3: Men who report misogynistic beliefs are more likely to express increased *support for interpersonal violence* via revenge motivation, especially when they hold high levels of collective narcissism

H4: Men who report misogynistic beliefs are more likely to express an increased *willingness to engage in interpersonal violence* via revenge motivation, especially when they hold high levels of collective narcissism

It is further expected that the relationships between misogyny and the violent extremism as well as interpersonal violence measures are mediated via hypermasculinity, particularly among men who perceive that their ingroup is threatened. As mentioned above, threats to the ingroup may lead to motivations to hyper-conform to masculine ingroup traits to demonstrate masculinity and dominance (Figure 1)¹.

Therefore, it is hypothesised that:

H5: Men who report misogynistic beliefs are more likely to hold stronger *violent extremist attitudes* via hypermasculinity, especially when they experience threats to their ingroup

¹ It is important to note that our data is cross-sectional and therefore we cannot draw causal inferences. The ordering of the determinants in our proposed models is guided by previous research. Therefore, neither the direction of the individual hypotheses nor the exact ordering of the constructs can be determined with our data, instead they are theoretically informed to test the proposed models.

H6: Men who report misogynistic beliefs are more likely to hold stronger *violent extremist intentions* via hypermasculinity, especially when they experience threats to their ingroup

H7: Men who report misogynistic beliefs are more likely to express increased *support for interpersonal violence* via hypermasculinity, especially when they experience threats to their ingroup

H8: Men who report misogynistic beliefs are more likely to express increased *willingness to engage in interpersonal violence* via hypermasculinity, especially when they experience threats to their ingroup

Figure 1. Path diagram to present the hypothesised moderated mediations among men with (1) Misogyny as predictor, revenge motivation as mediator, the a-path moderated by collective narcissism and violent extremist attitudes, violent extremist intentions, justification of and willingness to use violence as outcome criteria. (2) Misogyny as predictor, hypermasculinity as mediator, the a-path moderated by group threat and violent extremist attitudes, violent extremist intentions, justification of and willingness to engage in violence as outcome criteria.

Method

Participants

Data collection took place in July 2020. Participants were recruited via the online platform, Prolific. Participants were based on a UK nationally representative sample (by age, gender, and ethnicity) $n = 1500$. Overall, 51.3% ($n = 769$) identified as female, 48.7% ($n = 730$) identified as male, and one individual indicated non-binary as their gender status ($M_{\text{ageM}} = 44.52$; $SD_{\text{ageM}} = 16.21$; $M_{\text{ageW}} = 45.31$; $SD_{\text{ageW}} = 15.62$). See Table 1 for a breakdown of ethnicity and education among female and male participants.

Table 1. Sociodemographic characteristics of participants

Characteristics		Men	Women
		n (%)	n (%)
Ethnicity	Asian	57 (7.8%)	58 (7.5%)
	Black	25 (3.4%)	30 (3.9%)
	Mixed	15 (2.1%)	16 (2.1%)
	Other	13 (1.8%)	11 (1.4%)
	White	618 (84.9%)	654 (85%)
	Total	730	769
Education	No formal qualifications	(1.9%)	(2.1%)
	GCSEs	(18.6)	(17%)
	A-levels/BTEC	(27.4%)	(23.7%)
	Undergraduate Degree	(35.8%)	(40.1%)
	Masters	(13%)	(14.6%)
	Completed PhD	(3.2%)	(2.6%)
	Total	730	769

Procedure

Participants were invited to participate in a study on risk and protective factors for violent extremism. After completing the consent form, participants were asked to fill out the questionnaire. After the data collection finished, the data were examined to ensure data quality. There was no missing data. Whether respondents had missed attention checks and the completion time for each participant was further assessed. Participants were excluded from the data analysis if they missed more than two attention checks and completed the survey more than two standard deviations quicker than the average completion time.

Statistical analyses

To test the hypotheses, we performed structural equation modeling with moderated mediations in Lavaan (Rosseel, 2021). Age and education were entered as covariates (the analyses without this covariate yielded almost the same results). The models were run with 5000 bootstrap samples and 95% bias corrected bootstrap confidence intervals as this method is robust to non-parametric data and statistical outliers. Further, this method effectively handles deviations from the normal distribution of study variables as no assumptions about the shape of the sampling distribution are made (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). Bootstrapping is a non-parametric technique and there is growing consensus that bootstrapping is the preferred resampling strategy for estimation and hypothesis testing, particularly when testing for indirect and conditional indirect effects (Hayes, 2017).

To examine the hypotheses that the effects of the relationship between misogyny and the violent (extremist) outcome variables are mediated by (1) revenge planning and are conditional upon levels of collective narcissism and are in addition mediated by (2) hypermasculinity and are contingent on perceived group threats among men, two separate sets of moderated mediation path analyses were conducted. One moderated mediation analysis from each set was run for each outcome criterion. For all models, the path (a-path) linking misogyny

to (1) revenge planning is expected to be moderated by collective narcissism, and the path (a-path) linking misogyny to (2) hypermasculinity is expected to be moderated by group threats, indicating that the effects are strongest for those highest in self-reported collective narcissism and group threats, respectively, which subsequently renders the overall indirect effects dependent on levels of the moderators. Similar to analyses conducted with PROCESS (Hayes, 2017), inferential tests for the moderation of the indirect effects were estimated (index of moderated mediation). The moderated mediation index estimates how differences in misogyny result in differences in the outcome variables indirectly through revenge planning and hypermasculinity and depending on the values of collective narcissism and group threats. If the indirect effect differs systematically as a function of the moderator, i.e., the confidence interval of the index does not contain zero, then the mediation is said to be moderated (Hayes, 2017).

Measures

Unless stated otherwise, throughout all studies, all items were measured on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). For all scales, the individual items were averaged to calculate a score for each individual, whereby higher values denoted e.g., stronger misogynistic attitudes, higher levels of collective narcissism, and stronger intentions to engage in violent extremism etc.

Misogyny. In the present research, a conceptualisation of misogyny is used, which is defined as the hatred or devaluation of, hostility towards, or prejudice against women or girls. To measure misogyny, a newly developed 10-item psychometric scale was employed (e.g., *‘Women exploit men for their own agendas’*, *‘When it comes down to it a lot of women are deceitful’* $\omega_{Men} = .95$, $\omega_{Women} = .93$, see preprint here: <https://psyarxiv.com/6f829>). The 3-factor misogyny scale (i.e., *‘Manipulative and exploitative nature of women’*, *‘Distrust towards women’*, *‘Devaluation of women’*) was developed and validated across three studies based on a UK nationally representative survey. Construct and measurement validity were established

across several studies. An exploratory factor analysis established the factor structure of the 10-item misogyny scale. Subsequently, the 10-item structure was replicated via confirmatory factor analysis. The misogyny scale displayed good convergent (i.e., significant and strong relationship with male sexual entitlement, masculinity related violent beliefs and willingness to use violence), discriminant validity (i.e., no relationship with analytical thinking), and high internal consistency (composite reliability). Additionally, measurement invariance across gender and age groups was established, allowing researchers to deploy the scale among male and female individuals, across different age groups as well as to assess latent mean differences.

Revenge motivation. Revenge motivation was operationalised with the validated ‘Revenge Planning’ subscale of the ‘Displaced Aggression Questionnaire’, which measures the tendency to hold a grudge for a prior provocation and a plan for retaliation and thoughts and ideas of retribution (e.g., ‘*When someone makes me angry, I can’t stop thinking about how to get back at this person*’, $\omega_{\text{Men}} = .95$, $\omega_{\text{Women}} = .95$, Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006). The scale showed excellent internal consistency and test–retest reliability and demonstrated convergent as well as discriminant construct validity. Denson et al.’s (2006) analysis showed a strong correlation between the revenge planning scale and physical aggression as well as angry rumination and the scale was moderately correlated with verbal aggression. The scale also significantly predicted real-world aggression (i.e., self-reported domestic abuse) (Denson et al., 2006).

Hypermasculinity. Hypermasculinity was measured with four items from the ‘Machismo’ subscale of the ‘Maudsley Violence Questionnaire’, which is a validated measure that has demonstrated construct validity across several studies (e.g., ‘*Sometimes you have to be violent to show that you are a man*’, $\omega_{\text{Men}} = .82$, Walker, 2005). ‘Machismo’ items describe violence as manly, similar to Mosher and Sirkin’s Hypermasculinity Inventory (1984). The items refer to stereotypical expectations of men pertaining to toughness and manliness. Such

attitudes indicate that aggression and violence are not only expected but are desirable as they are means to express strength and assertiveness among men. The ‘Machismo’ scale was strongly correlated with self-reported violence among men (Walker, 2005).

Collective Narcissism. We operationalised the 5-item Collective Narcissism Scale (e.g., ‘Men deserve special treatment’, $\omega_{Men} = .84$, Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). The collective narcissism scale has demonstrated strong internal reliability across several studies (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019) as well as convergent, divergent, and predictive validity (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009).

Group Threats. Perceived group threats among men was measured with a single item ‘I have the feeling that the group I belong to is under threat in the UK’, which was developed for this study.

To test the robustness of our hypothesised models, we employed four different outcome variables, two measures tapped into individuals' *attitudes* regarding (1) support for extremist violence and (2) acceptance of interpersonal violence, and two measure assessed participants *intentions* to engage in (3) extremist violence, and (4) interpersonal violence.

Violent extremist attitudes. The violent extremist attitudes scale is a four-item measure of generic support for violent extremism, which has been developed for the Zurich Project on the Social Development of Children and Youths (z-Proso), an ongoing prospective longitudinal study on the development of aggressive and other problem behaviour (e.g., ‘It’s OK to support groups that use violence to fight injustices’, ‘It’s sometimes necessary to use violence, commit attacks, or kidnap people to fight for a better world’, $\omega_{Men} = .88$, Nivette et al., 2017).

Violent extremist intentions. Violent extremist intentions was assessed with the four-item Radical Intention Scale (RIS), which is a validated and widely used scale to measure individuals’ willingness to engage in illegal and violent actions on behalf of a group (e.g., ‘I would continue to support an organization that fights for my group’s political and legal rights

even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence', *'I would participate in a public protest against oppression of my group even if I thought the protest might turn violent'*, $\omega_{Men} = .84$, Moskaleiko & McCauley, 2009).

Participants completed two general measures of interpersonal violence. Items were part of a larger violence scale development and were inspired by the 'Acceptance of Violence' subscale of the 'Maudsley Violence Questionnaire' (Walker, 2005).

Justification of violence. The justification of violence measure consisted of four items and assessed justification and support for interpersonal violence (e.g., *'Sometimes you have to use violence to show your dominance'*, *'Some issues can only be resolved with violence'*, $\omega_{Men} = .82$, $\omega_{Women} = .81$).

Willingness to use violence. The second *interpersonal* violence measure captured participants willingness and intentions to use or engage in violence and was assessed with three items (e.g., *'If someone provokes me, I'll respond with my fists'*, *'In certain situations, I'm willing to use violence'*, $\omega_{Men} = .76$; $\omega_{Women} = .76$).

We ran confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) on all scale measures. All CFAs showed good fit indices and all indicators showed satisfactory factor loadings with standardised coefficients ranging from $\beta = .58$ to $\beta = .95$.

Results

Table 2 shows the separate correlations among all variables for men and women. As expected, the correlations for men were all stronger than those for women. Among men, misogyny demonstrates a positive and significant association of small to moderate strength with all variables. All other operationalised variables are positively and significantly correlated with each other, indicating medium to strong effect sizes. We further examined whether misogyny is correlated with the violent extremism and interpersonal violence measures

amongst our female sample. The correlations show that misogyny is not significantly correlated with violent extremist attitudes ($r = .06, p > .05$) nor with violent extremist intentions ($r = .00, p > .05$), among women. Yet, misogyny among women demonstrates a significant positive relationship with support for and intentions to engage in interpersonal violence. The remaining variables for the female sample were all significant and showed small to medium effect sizes with one another. Mean difference tests among genders revealed that men demonstrate significantly higher means than women for all variables operationalised, ranging from small to large effect sizes (also see Table 2).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations among men and women.

Variables	Men	Women	Mean differences			Correlations								
	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>M (SD)</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>d</i>	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1. Misogyny	2.63 (1.17)	2.23 (1.06)	6.45	< .001	.33	-	.37***	.36***	.15***	.16***	.06	.00	.27***	.26***
2. Revenge motivation	2.69 (1.34)	2.37 (1.30)	4.79	< .001	.25	.48***	-	.42***	.36***	.18***	.21***	.23***	.37***	.46***
3. Hypermasculinity	1.97 (1.00)	1.50 (.68)	10.71	< .001	.55	.45***	.49***	-	.26***	.17***	.38***	.27***	.63***	.67***
4. Collective narcissism	3.31 (1.23)	3.20 (1.20)	2.12	< .05	.11	.34***	.45***	.31***	-	.38***	.18***	.23***	.26***	.24***
5. Group threat	2.94 (1.78)	2.75 (1.63)	2.12	< .05	.10	.43***	.34***	.34***	.42***	-	.17***	.25***	.21***	.20***
6. Violent extremist attitudes	2.78 (1.49)	1.98 (1.19)	11.67	< .001	.60	.20***	.34***	.44***	.20***	.23***	-	.59***	.62***	.42***
7. Violent extremist intentions	2.82 (1.36)	2.54 (1.21)	4.23	< .001	.22	.17***	.34***	.38***	.25***	.22***	.63***	-	.42***	.37***
8. Justification violence	2.26 (1.28)	1.50 (.80)	13.99	< .001	.72	.42***	.47***	.69***	.30***	.36***	.64***	.44***	-	.62***
9. Willingness violence	2.19 (1.13)	1.53 (.82)	13.08	< .001	.68	.43***	.55***	.69***	.33***	.30***	.50***	.44***	.67***	-

Note. Pearson's correlation coefficients are reported. Correlations for women are presented above, and correlations for men below the diagonal of the correlation matrix.

$n = 1499$ ($n_{\text{women}} = 769$; $n_{\text{men}} = 730$).

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

H1-H2 Moderated Mediation: Misogyny, Revenge Planning, Collective Narcissism, Violent Extremist Attitudes and Intentions among Men

We examined if and how misogyny affects violent extremist attitudes and intentions directly and through the mediator revenge planning and more specifically, whether the indirect effects are contingent upon men's levels of collective narcissism. The path (a-path) linking misogyny to revenge planning is expected to be moderated by levels of collective narcissism. For both extremist models, misogyny ($b = .30$, 95% CI [.10, .49]) and collective narcissism ($b = .26$, 95% CI [.11, .41]) were significant predictors for revenge motivation and their interaction was also significant ($b = .05$, 95% CI [.01, .08]). Revenge motivation, in turn, showed a significant and positive effect on violent extremist attitudes ($b = .35$, 95% CI [.26, .44]) and violent extremist intentions ($b = .35$, 95% CI [.28, .43]).

Additionally, we examined the conditional indirect effects at the three levels of the moderator (i.e., at the mean as well as $M \pm 1SD$). Table 3 shows significant indices of moderated mediations for violent extremist attitudes and violent extremist intentions. The results demonstrate that, as hypothesised, the effects of misogyny on both extremism measures via revenge planning were strongest for those men who experienced higher levels of collective narcissism and thus, indicate a significant moderated mediation effect (supporting H1 and H2). Misogyny was also a significant direct predictor for violent extremist attitudes even after accounting for the moderation- mediational associations and covariates ($c' = .12$, 95% CI [.05, .17]). Yet, the direct effect of misogyny on violent extremist intentions was not significant when the mediator, interaction effects, and control variables were estimated simultaneously ($c' = .08$, 95% CI [-.02, .17]). These findings indicate that misogyny predicts violent extremist attitudes and intentions via increased revenge thoughts and the effects are particularly strong for men who hold high levels of collective narcissism.

H3-H4 Moderated Mediation: Misogyny, Revenge Planning, Collective Narcissism, Justification of and Willingness to Use Violence among Men

Similar to the findings above, across both interpersonal violence models, misogyny ($b = .30$, 95% CI [.10, .49]), collective narcissism ($b = .26$, 95% CI [.11, .41]) and their interaction ($b = .05$, 95% CI [.01, .08]) were significant predictors of revenge planning, which in turn, demonstrated a significant effect on support for ($b = .33$, 95% CI [.26, .40]) and intentions to engage in interpersonal intentions ($b = .38$, 95% CI [.32, .43]). Table 3 shows that the moderated mediation indices for both models were statistically significant. In line with the previous violent extremist models, both moderated mediation models showed that those highest in collective narcissism demonstrated the strongest link between misogyny and revenge planning. Similar to model 1 and 2, the effects of misogyny on support for and willingness to engage in violence are mediated by heightened revenge thoughts and the effects are particularly pronounced for men who experience high levels of collective narcissism (supporting H3 and H4, see Table 3) The effects of misogyny on support for violence ($c' = .28$, 95% CI [.20, .36]) and intentions to engage in violence ($c' = .21$, 95% CI [.14, .27]) were statically significant after including the moderation- and mediational associations and covariates in the model. As such, misogyny was found to be associated with interpersonal violence via revenge planning, particularly among those men who reported a strong sense of collective narcissism.

H5-H6 Moderated Mediation: Misogyny, Hypermasculinity, Group Threat, Violent Extremist Attitudes and Intentions among Men

It was further tested if and how misogyny affects violent extremist attitudes and intentions directly and through the mediator hypermasculinity and if indirect effects are contingent on levels of perceived group threat. The path (a-path) linking misogyny to hypermasculinity is hypothesised to be moderated by perceptions of group threat. Like in the

previous analyses, two separate models were estimated. For both, the extremist attitudes and the extremist intentions model, misogyny showed a significant positive association with hypermasculinity ($b = .22$, 95% CI [.10, .33]), whereas perceived group threats was non-significant ($b = .02$, 95% CI [-.07, .10]). However, the interaction term between misogyny and perceived threats on hypermasculinity was significant ($b = .04$, 95% CI [.02, .07]). Hypermasculinity, in turn, was a positive and significant predictor for violent extremist attitudes ($b = .63$, 95% CI [.52, .74]) and violent extremist intentions ($b = .53$, 95% CI [.43, .63]). The indices for both moderated mediations were statistically different from zero, indicating that the mediations for the effects of misogyny on both violent extremism measures via hypermasculinity are moderated by levels of group threats (supporting H5 and H6). The findings showed that the indirect effects were strongest for those men who reported higher levels of self-reported group threat (Table 3). Yet, the direct effects of misogyny were not statistically significant after the mediational and moderating effects as well as the covariates were taken into account ($c'_{\text{Attitudes}} = .04$, 95% CI [-.05, .12]), $c'_{\text{Intentions}} = .01$, 95% CI [-.07, .07]).

H7-H8 Moderated Mediation: Misogyny, Hypermasculinity, Group Threat, Justification of and Willingness to Use Violence among Men

To investigate whether the relationships between misogyny and support for and intentions to engage in interpersonal violence are mediated by hypermasculinity and are in addition conditional upon levels of group threats among men, another two separate moderated mediation path analyses were conducted. Replicating the findings above, misogyny was positively associated with hypermasculinity ($b = .22$, 95% CI [.10, .33]), while perceived group threats was not significant ($b = .02$, 95% CI [-.07, .10]). Yet, again, the interaction terms between misogyny and group threats for both interpersonal violence models were significant

($b = .04$, 95% CI [.02, .07]). In addition, hypermasculinity was predictive of support for interpersonal violence ($b = .80$, 95% CI [.72, .87]) and individuals with higher levels of hypermasculinity showed a greater willingness to engage in violence ($b = .71$, 95% CI [.64, .77]). In line with the violent extremist models, indices of moderated mediation were statistically significant for both models. Similar to previous findings, the effects of misogyny on justification of violence (supporting H7) and willingness to engage in violence (supporting H8) are mediated via hypermasculine attitudes and the effects are particularly pronounced for men who express strong ingroup threats (Table 3). The direct effects of misogyny ($c'_{\text{Justification}} = .17$, 95% CI [.10, .23], $c'_{\text{Williness}} = .14$, 95% CI [.09, .20]) were statistically different from zero after accounting for covariates as well as moderating and mediating effects.

Given that our data were cross-sectional, directionality was theorised based on previous research and theory. Therefore, each model was estimated with alternated path directions (i.e., reversed causality) as means to strengthen the arguments for the hypothesised relationships. We estimated whether the effects of the violent extremism and interpersonal violence measures on misogyny were mediated via revenge planning and hypermasculinity and whether they were conditional upon levels of collective narcissism and perceptions of group threat, respectively. Running several ANOVA tests, we compared the fit indices (AIC and BIC) of the original models to the alternative ones. A decrease in fit indices (i.e., alternative models showing higher values for AIC and BIC), indicated that the original models fit the data better. Additionally, original models demonstrated stronger effect sizes for indices of moderated mediations. These findings strengthen the evidence for the hypothesised directionality of the relationships between the measures.

Table 3. Misogyny predicting violent (extremist) outcome measures among men and women.

Mediator		Criterion	Index of moderated mediation	Conditional indirect effects at level of			Hypothesis Supported
				(1) collective narcissism	(2) group threats		
				Low	Moderate	High	Yes/ No
				(1)			
H1	Revenge motivation	Violent extremist attitudes	.02 [.004, .03]	.14 [.08, .20]	.16 [.10, .21]	.18 [.12, .24]	Yes
H2		Violent extremist intentions	.02 [.01, .03]	.14 [.10, .18]	.16 [.11, .21]	.18 [.14, .23]	Yes
H3		Justification of violence	.02 [.002, .03]	.13 [.08, .17]	.15 [.09, .20]	.18 [.12, .23]	Yes
H4		Willingness to use violence	.02 [.01, .03]	.15 [.09, .22]	.17 [.11, .24]	.20 [.13, .28]	Yes
				(2)			
H5	Hypermasculinity	Violent extremist attitudes	.03 [.01, .05]	.17 [.11, .23]	.21 [.13, .29]	.25 [.17, .33]	Yes
H6		Violent extremist intentions	.02 [.01, .04]	.13 [.08, .18]	.18 [.12, .26]	.23 [.15, .28]	Yes
H7		Justification of violence	.03 [.02, .05]	.22 [.15, .30]	.26 [.17, .34]	.32 [.25, .40]	Yes
H8		Willingness to use violence	.03 [.01, .05]	.18 [.12, .25]	.23 [.15, .25]	.29 [.22, .37]	Yes

Note. Misogyny predicting violent (extremist) outcome measures among men, mediated by revenge motivation and hypermasculinity, with the a-paths moderated by collective narcissism or perceived group threat. Total, direct, and indirect effects of misogyny predicting violent outcomes among women, mediated by revenge planning. 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals used, along with 5000 bootstrap samples. Controlling for age and education. Index of moderated mediation = statistical test for the moderation of the indirect effects. Levels of the moderators are M-1SD (low collective narcissism/ low group threats), M (moderate collective narcissism/ moderate group threats), and M+1SD (high collective narcissism / high group threats).

Discussion

The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between misogyny, violent extremism, and interpersonal violence. Misogyny may help to uplift men's self and their group's image and to restore (lost) self- and group worth, particularly if women are perceived to threaten traditional gender hierarchies (Golec de Zavala & Bierwiazzonek, 2020). Going beyond simply establishing misogyny as a predictor of these types of violence, we aimed to articulate the *relevance* of misogyny by examining the mediating and moderating effects linking misogyny, violent extremism, and interpersonal violence. Interestingly, the present study showed that both men and women endorse misogynistic attitudes but the consequences of holding such beliefs differ. While misogyny was significantly and positively related to violent extremist attitudes and intentions among men, this relationship was not significant within the female sample. Yet, misogyny was associated with increased support for and readiness to use violence amongst women. We further examined *how* and *when* misogyny, group threats, and frustrated narcissistic entitlement translate into revenge motivation and hypermasculinity, and thus, may increase violent extremist intentions and attitudes, as well as justification of and willingness to engage in interpersonal violence. The findings suggest that engagement in violent extremism and interpersonal violence may be partly driven by misogyny, revenge motivations, and hypermasculinity.

More specifically, the findings of the first conditional mediation analysis showed that men who hold stronger misogynistic beliefs and who demonstrate higher levels of collective narcissism, are more likely to engage in revenge planning, which in turn, is positively associated with stronger support of and willingness to engage in violent extremism and interpersonal violence. Our results further highlight that similar to individual narcissists, who have been found to engage in retaliatory interpersonal aggression to protect their inflated egos (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Chester & DeWall, 2016), men who espouse misogynistic

and collective narcissistic beliefs, hold more revenge thoughts and are more likely to engage in violence. Similarly, the results are in line with studies that have found that hostile sexism among men (Golec de Zavala & Bierwaczzonek, 2020) is related to (male) collective narcissism, while collective narcissism was further associated with retaliatory intergroup aggression (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009) and an increased desire for revenge, particularly against outgroups who were perceived to be threatening (Dyduch-Hazar & Mrozinski, 2021). This also aligns with recent studies which have found evidence that collective narcissism is positively related to support for violent extremist ideologies and groups (Jaśko et al., 2017).

The second conditional mediation analysis found that when misogynistic men feel threatened based on their ingroup, they are much more likely to exhibit hypermasculine attitudes (e.g., justifying violence and emphasising male dominance and strength), which in turn, are related to higher levels of support for and stronger intentions to engage in violent extremism as well as interpersonal violence. These findings are consistent with the idea that adopting a violent masculinity and executing violent retribution may represent means of demonstrating or restoring masculinity, particularly if men experience group or status threats (Bosson et al., 2009; Vandello et al., 2008). The link between misogyny, masculinity, and violence is further evident within extremist groups. The study findings align with previous research which argues that the patriarchal nature of jihadist and far-right ideologies is tied to a strict adherence to masculine gender/ cultural ideals (Lia, 2017). Correspondingly, engagement in violent extremist groups has been argued to depict a way of exhibiting male dominance whereby the use of violence is a means to assert a masculine status (Pearson, 2020; Kimmel, 2018).

Our findings begin to delineate through what kinds of mechanisms and for what type of people, misogyny may constitute a risk factor for violent extremism and interpersonal violence, which has important practical implications. In terms of risk assessment, whilst

existing violent extremist risk assessment tools do not explicitly consider misogyny, one implication of our findings is to provide empirical evidence to support incorporating such factors into existing structured professional judgement (SPJ) guidances. For instance, the VERA-2R (Pressman, Duits, Rinne, & Flockton, 2016) and the Extremism Risk Guidelines 22+ (Powis, Randhawa, & Bishopp, 2019) are SPJ guidances for the risk assessment of potential violent extremist offenders. The VERA-2R considers indicators across five domains including (1) beliefs, attitudes, and ideology, (2) social context and intention, (3) history, action, and capacity, (4) commitment and motivation, and (5) protective/risk mitigating indicators. The VAF comprises 22 indicators across three broad domains including (1) engagement with a group, cause, or ideology, (2) intent to cause harm, and (3) capability to cause harm. Both require professionals to formulate judgements about how attitudes and beliefs, grievances and/or perceived injustices, perceived threats to the ingroup, and motivation, amongst other indicators, may relate to the risk of an individual engaging in violent extremism. Given our findings, practitioners may wish to consider misogyny relevant to the risk assessment of potential violent extremist offenders, particularly when expressed alongside hypermasculinity and revenge motivation and amongst those who express frustrated (collective) entitlement and perceived threats.

The present results could also inform SPJ guidances developed to assess and manage the risk of domestic and interpersonal violence. For example, it broadens the types of (distorted/negative/violent) attitudes requiring attention for the Short-Term Assessment of Risk and Treatability (Viljoen et al., 2012), SAVRY (Borum, Lodewijks, Bartel, & Forth, 2020), SARA-v3 (Kropp & Gibas, 2020), HCR-20v3 (Douglas, Hart, Webster, & Belfrage, 2013) guidances. The results also provide direct empirical support and added nuance for several risk factors contained in the Stalking Risk Profile (MacKenzie et al., 2009).

In terms of prevention, combatting violence continues to evolve towards a public health approach, aiming to mitigate vulnerability before behaviour escalates. For instance, the PREVENT arm of the UK's CONTEST strategy (Home Office, 2018), as well as the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) recently announced Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3; Department of Homeland Security, 2021), employ a public health approach to combatting grievance-fuelled violence. Given the relationship between misogyny and violent extremism, as well as interpersonal violence more generally, preventative programming aimed at challenging misogynistic attitudes may be of substantial benefit in terms of violence and crime prevention. The implications are likely to be far wider-reaching than grievance-fuelled violence only, given the gendered nature of crime and violence in general, including sexual assault, intimate partner violence, and stalking. Again, our findings provide evidence to support the design of preventative programming by detailing the mechanisms via which such attitudes may increase the risk of violent behaviour, in doing so providing program designers with clear guidance on who and how to target with such programming.

Nevertheless, the current study contains several limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, the study is solely based on data from the UK. As such, the findings may not easily generalise to other contexts. Therefore, we strongly encourage future studies to examine the associations among misogyny and (extremist) violence in other contexts. Second, we need to consider the representativeness of the sample. The present sample is only approximatively representative based on the following variables: age, gender, and ethnicity. Further, Prolific is an online platform and the subject pool is limited to those who have internet access. As such, the sample is limited in the extent to which it is truly representative of the general population. We must take this into account when interpreting the findings. Yet, studies highlight how Prolific affords researchers access to more novel populations than more

traditional subject pools, e.g., student samples (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). Another limitation is the cross-sectional nature of our data. Despite examining multiple theoretically informed moderated mediation models with several violence related outcome measures as well as testing for reversed directionality of relationships (i.e., reversed causality), such data does not allow us to establish firm inferences regarding directionality and causality of the tested direct, indirect, and conditional relationships. Further studies operationalising longitudinal and experimental research designs are required.

Additional shortcomings are related to the operationalised measures. For instance, the samples do not consist of people who have actually engaged, to the best of our knowledge, in any violent extremist behaviours or interpersonal violence. Instead, we applied proxy measures to assess individuals' attitudes towards and their willingness to engage in violent (extremist) behaviour. Due to ethics approvals and misreporting of survey answers, assessing actual violent (extremist) behaviour is a very challenging task to undertake in general population samples. To overcome these issues, violent (extremist) attitudes and behavioural intentions (i.e., violent extremist intentions and willingness to engage in interpersonal violence) rather than individuals' actual behaviours were measured. Ajzen's theory of planned behaviour (1985) posits that intentions constitute the immediate antecedents of behaviour and therefore, reveal people's readiness to perform a behaviour. Additionally, we acknowledge that future studies would benefit from including a collective narcissism scale and a perceived threat measure which specifically refer to male gender identity.

Conclusion

Combinations of misogyny, perceived victimhood and frustrated entitlement, revenge motivations as well as status threats have to a varying extent shown to motivate explicit misogynistic attacks but are also common motives among far-right terrorists (DiBranco, 2020;

Hoffman et al., 2020; Jasser, Kelly, & Rothermel, 2020) and represent drivers for joining extremist groups (Kimmel, 2018). Importantly, rather than being the sole motive, misogyny seems to be interrelated with various other grievances and adverse experiences, which together appear to have formed an extremely hostile worldview, where anger, perceived victimhood and frustrated entitlement are played out through retributive and hypermasculine violent acts (e.g., Wilson, 2020). As such, more research into these concepts is necessitated to understand the impacts such beliefs and resulting worldviews can exert upon violent extremism and interpersonal violence. We argue that rather than assessing those grievances and strains in isolation, it is imperative to analyse the interplay of factors that provide men a sense of being unfairly deprived of their deserved place in society, which may lead to support of and engagement in (extremist) violence and which ultimately intends to provide them a sense of empowerment and male superiority. Research on these concepts may offer promising avenues for examining the mechanisms underlying misogynistic violence and attraction to extremist groups more broadly.

Importantly, we further argue that it is fundamental to apply a gendered framework to better understand mass violence and violent extremism. Acknowledging gendered socialisation processes in relation to violence perpetration as well as gendered radicalisation processes will be an important step forward. Continuing to downplay the relationship between gender, sex, masculinity, and mass violence and failing to acknowledge the fact that perpetrators of these crimes are predominantly men and thus, treat it as gender-based violence, will contribute and further sustain a culture of male dominance and aggression. As such, we encourage further research into the gender-based mechanisms underlying acts of mass and extremist violence.

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