DEBIASING IN THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

or

PROCEEDING WITH POLITICAL POLARIZATION

or

SURVIVING AND CREATING CHANGE IN THIS POLITICAL CLIMATE

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December 2017

DEBIASING

When social psychology and the advent of behavioral economics began casting individuals as imperfect information processors rather than perfectly rational decision makers with systematic biases and heuristics, there was a consequent -if unproportional- interest in knowing how to reduce these biases. Fischhoff (1981) for example, is one of the earliest debiasing reviews in the literature. He sought to determine how hindsight bias and overconfidence bias can be reduced and concluded that neither bias is lessened even when raising the stakes, nor when encouraging the individuals to work harder, nor was there any particular immunity for subject matter experts unless they specifically trained in judgement. He saw promise, however in certain training interventions. Two decades later, Montibeller & Winterfeldt (2015) gives a wider systematic review of the debiasing literature and show differential efficacies of interventions across the wide array of different cognitive and motivational biases. The authors also delineate between biases that are difficult to correct because they tend to be resistant to logic and the use of training and tools (ex. Overconfidence bias and anchoring) from biases that are easier to eliminate (ex. Conjunction bias). Lilienfeld & colleagues (2009) meanwhile gave a call to “give debiasing away” to the general public, explicitly noting how debiasing can be a crucial tool in tackling ideological extremism and inter- and intragroup conflict, with the notion that cognitive distortions lead to attitudinal polarization.

Thus we can define debiasing as “attempts to eliminate or reduce cognitive and/or motivational biases” (Montibeller & von Winterfeldt, 2015). Which imply two channels: (i.) a reduction of judgmental of biases and independently *or consequently* (ii.) a reduction of attitudinal polarization.

However many of these biases are ubiquitous, and in fact represent a common, consistent pattern of individuals’ mental processing. So the vital question is: if we all have these biases, then why aren’t we all polarized?

WHEN DOES POLARIZATION OCCUR?

A rational approach to looking at understanding polarization is to look at when they begin. And generally, we can tentatively categorize them into three non-exclusive categories the first being (i.) Catalyst Events. Many polarities seem to stem from having widespread intensely focused discussions about single specific events and issues. This category includes elections, which provide a fertile ground for people to invest in inevitably opposing camps. But we note that historically, political polarization does not only stem from single events, whether spontaneous or cyclical, but rather as a slow shift and amalgamation of differing factors. This represents (ii.) Gradual movements. A salient example of which would be the Illustrated led

Propaganda Movement, which caused a divisive and consequential political polarity in Spain dominated Philippines. However, we also know that political polarizations may not necessarily stem from any novel event but reflect the influence of (iii.) Pre-existing groups and social divisions. Millennial Democrats and Republicans for example, are divided along party lines which have existed long before they have been born; with many values and ideological underpinnings unchanged throughout the years.

Whether through catalyst events, gradual movements or pre-existing groups, a careful scrutiny of these three categories, and the many different polarities across different settings, cultures and history (from the Occupy Movement, to Gorbachev supporters in Russia, to Marcos loyalists) suggest strongly the common and underlying role of identity – whether this identity stems from a central figure, the larger group or the advocacy itself. Indeed, it seems that no meaningful social movement, ideological extremism or political polarization has successfully launched without a modicum of social identity (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013; Simon & Klandermans, 2004). With identity as a central concept, it allows us to apply the well-established social identity theory in analysis (Ellemers & Haslam, 2012) including ingroup-outgroup attribution and dynamics, as well as nuances self-categorization. But also importantly, (social) identity allows us to make sense of the often contended determinants of group polarization.

These determinants include (i.) Social comparison, where ingroup social referents set the new standards and norms, and individuals try to one-up /signal ‘virtuosity’ as an ingroup member and therefore adjust attitudes to be above the perceived prototypic norm; in effect making the group orientation more extreme. (ii.) Shared information bias, where arguments produced by the group tend to be in the direction of the majority orientation (for example, liberal Tumblr blogs ‘disproportionately’ discussing the merits of abortion rather than its perceived moral dubiety), and (iii.) social identity dynamics including that our attitudes, cognitions and behaviors shift/match to the perceived prototypic member, as well as the tendency to trust in the arguments of the members of our own ingroup (Gaffney, & Hogg, 2017; Forsyth, 2009 ; Isenberg, 1986)

Thus even though we all have our systematic biases, our social identity is not all equally anchored in any given issue, advocacy or movement. And identity either facilitates these said biases, as in confirmation and disconfirmation bias (Kahan, 2012) or it gives it a direction, as in heuristic processing (Chaiken & Ledgerwood, 2012) Consequently, and importantly, it can be asserted that polarizations are predicated on when identity materializes and an ingroup and an outgroup starts to be demarcated.

However, we also know that not all polarizations launch off and become entrenched. So how does polarization maintain?

WHEN DOES POLARIZATION MAINTAIN?

As a caveat, before continuing the discussion of how polarization maintenance; while political polarization, - especially with events of the previous year- can feel very intense and all encompassing, in fact political polarization isn't as common as one might perceive (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007) Along the whole corpus of issues that has the potential to be polarized or polarizing, it's only a relatively few that does. For example, while Filipinos are polarized over extra judicial killings (EJKs) and the benefit of having a Commission of Human Rights, there do not seem to be widespread polarization over corruption, agrarian reform, protection of environment, welfare of seamen, protection of children, care for the elderly and so on. (Incidentally also issues that have not been co-opted in identity-driven movements)

Figure 1: Hypothetical Network showing attitude heterogeneity despite political polarization in one issue (pre-print note: figures taken from the public presentation of this paper)

In this light, when talking about political polarization, we also need to be issue/identity specific. While one particular polarity might see clearly demarcated networks (see *Figure 1*), within this communities there can still be great heterogeneity of other related attitudes (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007) [i.e those who might oppose EJK including youth groups, church members and NGOs, might have wildly differing attitudes to another issue such as abortion]. In fact, and as seen in the local context, political polarization does not necessarily lead to offline social segregation. There are no neighborhoods demarcated for one political party. And it seems to be common for there to be a heterogeneity of political views under one household. Given this caveat, we now discuss processes that contribute to the maintenance of polarities.

ATTITUDE INOCULATION

At its essence, attitude inoculation is a process of cultivating resistance to counterattitudinal positions by first presenting weakened versions of opponent arguments. Kiesler (1971) phrases this succinctly when

he says “When you attack committed people and your attack is of inadequate strength, you drive them to even more extreme behaviors in defense of their previous commitment”. Key elements of effective inoculation include the feeling of threat (that is, the feeling that the individual’s prior belief is being threatened) and a forewarning that individuals will face counterattitudinal arguments (Pfau et al. 2004) the inoculation process of which would allow individuals to practice counterarguments and increase attitude accessibility, both of which also facilitate resistance to influence (Pfau et al. 2004). Attitude inoculation seem to be robust, seen in both laboratory and applied settings, and across different domains like politics, public relations, marketing and adolescent health campaigns (Compton & Pfau, 2005). A recent meta-analysis (Banas & Rains, 2010) additionally support this phenomenon, with the mean effect size equal to $d=.43$ (studies = 41, $N=10,660$; 95%CI = .39 to .48) against no-inoculation baseline condition. An effect size that represents a moderate effect in applied settings (Bosco, Aquinis, Singh, Field & Pierce, 2015). And what’s more, it’s found that inoculation provides resistance not only for the initial arguments presented but also to novel forms of attack, a so called ‘umbrella protection’ (Banas & Rains, 2010) which is well and good for when teaching teenagers to resist smoking but adds a layer of difficulty in penetrating political polarities.

In a well-considered laboratory experimental study for example, Redlawsk, Civettini, & Emmerson (2010) show that presenting a 10% to 20% discongruent information to an initially preferred candidate (e.g finding out that a liberal candidate supports abortion) actually *increases* candidate rating, even surpassing mean ratings for a candidate that had no discongruent information.

In the local setting we can provide a reasoned assertion that inoculation played a meaningful role in the latest election season. Looking at the timeline of the issues in the campaign trail of Rodrigo Duterte (*Figure 2*), we see how the tenor of his issues increase from more ambiguous and less consequential (ex. Pope Francis incident where supporters heatedly denied it was about the pope, but rather the then current government and the negative effect of the pope’s visit. Similarly are the disqualification petitions that include that his substitution for previous PDP-Laban candidate Martin Diño was invalid, and that had no regard for human rights and the law) to less ambiguous and more consequential issues (i.e Australian missionary rape joke incident) that by the time the most impactful issue that struck right into the heart of his campaign advocacy was presented (i.e bank controversy incident) the support was already firmly inoculated.

In fact, the election environment provides fertile ground for the many element of the inoculation process. Threat to the belief in candidates and forewarning that there will be attacks against these beliefs, already

seem to be embedded in the election process. We also see how social media plays a big role in providing counterargument scripts that spread through online social networks (as in top comments of various news media posts; as well as the dynamic direct sharing of opinions along the network itself) especially salient in various blogging personalities Mocha Uson, Sass Sasot and ‘Thinking Pinoy’. All of which feed into influence resistance and inoculation.

Campaign Timeline

Figure 2: Timeline of issues and other events faced by Rodrigo Duterte in his Campaign Trail (pre-print note: figures taken from the public presentation of this paper)

MOTIVATED REASONING

That individuals -acting in their capacity as political actors- are not perfectly rational but are biased information processors, is long established in political psychology. In a series of studies, Lodge and Taber (2006; 2007; Strickland, Taber & Lodge, 2011) characterizes individuals as motivated reasoners. With affect towards issues/figures/political events being an automatic and primary consideration, before any rationalization and argument. As motivated reasoners, individuals are also said to ubiquitously have (i.) confirmation bias, in which, if free to self-select, individuals tend to find or attend to information that confirms what they already believe in. (ii.) Disconfirmation bias, or ‘motivated skepticism’ in which individuals spend longer time attending to discrepant information, scrutinizing it and generating

arguments that refute the information presented. That is to say, individuals are critical of information it dislikes and uncritical of information that confirms their belief. Again, identity gives a foundation as to what beliefs individuals are motivated to defend.

Indeed, in a well-powered experiment, this motivated scepticism can be so portentous that individuals are likely to provide an incorrect analysis of raw data if the correct analysis leads to a solution that is against their ideological belief (Kahan, Peters, Dawson & Slovic, 2013) And that in fact, greater polarization in 'motivated numeracy' wasn't due to a overdependence of System 1/ Heuristic Processing, but that it was the more systematic thinkers that was more polarized in their interpretation of the data (Kahan et al., 2013; see also Kahan, 2012 for another well-powered experiment supporting this conclusion), giving support to a long-standing hypothesis that it is individuals who are more politically sophisticated that are more prone to attitudinal polarization, due to confirmation and disconfirmation bias (Taber & Lodge, 2006) as they have the cognitive capacity and knowledge resources to defend their existing beliefs. And that both liberals and conservatives are vulnerable to politically motivated reasoning (Ditto et al. 2017). Kahan calls this an identity-driven motivated reasoning

KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL FACTS DO NOT NECESSARILY ALTER POLITICAL AFFECT

In an intriguing but well-powered and well-considered study released this year Hill (2017), unlike the researchers discussed so far, casted political actors as 'cautious Bayesians'. (with Bayesians being a short hand term for those that follow the Baye's Rule, the only perfectly logical way to update one's belief given a current input of evidence *and* one's prior belief) This is due to the findings of his study that show that even across the partisan divide, individuals can still update their beliefs of the political facts in the accurate direction, albeit a little slower if it disagrees with their prior belief.

However, this isn't as discrepant as can initially assumed. Nyhan, Porter, Reifler & Wood (2017), in another well-powered study for example, show correcting information does work during the American Presidential Election 2016. Given the correction on the misinformation, Trump supporters were more likely to believe in the accurate state of events than what Trump originally communicated, however this correction did *not* affect their favourability for Trump. That is, they took the correction literally but not 'seriously'. Thus Hill's notion is reconcilable with our overall discussion: we may be cautious Bayesians when it comes to political facts, but we are still identity-driven motivated reasoners when it comes to political affect.

ECHO CHAMBERS

With the rise of ideological extremism and polarization across various issues (the radical alt-right, climate change deniers, flat earth society), and with the exponential popularity of social media as a source of information and as a form of social network that allows more accessible environment modification, there has been widespread concern that social media has been (or has the great potential to be) echo chambers. Dutton (2017) in citing their study (Dutton, Reisdorf, Dubois & Blank, 2017) says “... panic over fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles is exaggerated, and not supported by the evidence from users across seven countries.” Calling the study of echo chambers “underresearched and overhyped”.

Reviewing the extant literature show varied, often seemingly conflicting claims:

Quattrochi, Scala and Sunstein (2016), in a large scale observational study, looking at ‘likes’ and ‘shares’ of certain conspiracy theory vs science content in Italian and American Facebook users show that there were identifiable communities, and that members of these communities seldom pass on information to another (thus asserting evidence for echo chambers at least for the specific issue). However, Messing & Adamic (2015) find that despite a clustering of political affiliation (Republican vs Democrats) in Facebook, there were many friendships that cut across ideological affiliations. Taking into account both algorithm preference and network of acquaintances, they report that the risk ratio for an individual clicking a cross-cutting content is 17% for conservatives and 6% for liberals. And that, like discussed in the introduction of this paper, 20% of an individual’s Facebook friends report an opposing ideological affiliation. And that in fact, “individual choices more than algorithms limit exposure to attitude-challenging content in the context of Facebook”

Boutyline & Willer (2017), in analysing a 2009 Twitter dataset, by focusing the ‘likers’ of partisan Democrat – Republican figures, and those who ‘like’ the ‘likers’ in return show a distinct, with little cross ‘liking’ (thus polarized) networks/communities which they deem as support for Twitter-as-an-echo-chamber hypothesis. However Colleoni, Rozza & Arvidsson (2014) in analysing the same 2009 dataset and in answering whether twitter can be better characterized as an echo chamber or a public sphere, gives the answer, “it depends”. If the structures of the social network itself is being looked at, then there does seem to be polarized, identifiable communities. However, looking at the diffusion of news and information itself, regardless of social ties, seem to suggest a more public sphere like scenario. The authors advocate that instead of just merely focusing on the platform/website, researchers should see how the platform interacts with the culture and practices of online users.

Barbera (2014) meanwhile, in studying a 2014 Twitter dataset was the only study flagged that asserted the use of social media reduces mass political polarization; that exposure to political diversity on social media is associated with political moderation. Correspondingly, Boxell, Gentzkow, & Shapiro (2017) intriguingly show that greater polarization was seen in demographics least represented in the (US) Internet (aged 75 and up, especially compared against the 18-39 year old demographic). The authors also speculate a hypothesis by Davis & Dunaway (2016) that the “relationship between internet and polarization is mixed, possibly only impacting those with high levels of engagement with news and politics”. In a similar note, Bode (2016) assert that social media does not exacerbate the political information gap, that is despite the ability to unfriend and unfollow, political information is still likely to reach both the politically unengaged and the politically engaged.

What to make of this series of studies? For one, it may be safe to say that Facebook and Twitter, as popular social networking sites, serve as a form of ‘weak echo chambers’. This is, it is characterized by a formal network structure that connects like-minded individuals more strongly than those of the ideological opposite, *but* cross-cutting information and news still diffuse into these communities and the individuals within them. However these weak echo chambers are *not necessary for political polarization to occur* (Karlsen, Steen-Johnsen, Wollebæk, & Enjolras, 2017) which is also a prediction from Kahan as well as Lodge and Taber’s series of studies on motivated reasoning that suggest that the same information can be construed and/or affect valence differently for those who hold opposite ideological position. Subsequently, this political polarization may come from both the structural and information diffusion features of this polarized network, individuals’ own motivated reasoning and decision-choices, as well other exogenous variables not measured in these echo chamber studies.

These ‘weak echo chambers’ can be contrasted to internet spaces that truly seem to be ‘strong echo chambers’ including some ‘subreddit’ -independent online communities- of popular web aggregator site Reddit (including the infamous r/incel subreddit: a community for *involuntary celibates*, or adult virgins whose posts usually show vitriol against women who do not want to have sexual acts with them. Similarly, the subreddit r/FatPeopleHate, a community dedicated to mocking fat individuals whose pictures community users post in the virtual boards) as well as enclaves in microblogging site Tumblr, and web aggregator 4Chan. Unlike Facebook and Twitter, these sites are generally more anonymous, with user online networks not corresponding to offline social networks (i.e online ‘friends’ are often not ‘real life’ relatives and friends) For these strong echo chambers, definite structural interventions seem to work (Chandrasekharan et al., 2017); deleting r/FatPeopleHate for example, instead of diffusing the individuals

into virtual neighboring communities and thus spreading the pattern of negative attitude and online behavior, it seemed that the ban truly did work, with accounts either discontinuing using the site or drastically decreasing their hate speech usage. Thus in both weak and strong echo chambers, polarizations still occur although with different weights in different potential causal mechanisms involved (structural & information-diffusion features vs. individual motivated reasoning vs. other exogenous variables not measured)

Yet as a caveat, despite the seemingly obvious causal pathway; because of the nature of the methodologies it's still not formally clear if echo chambers create/maintain political polarizations, or political polarizations create/maintain echo chambers, or if it's truly a feedback loop. Only one research I've flagged has taken the temporal facet into consideration (Chan & Fu, 2015), here the authors show that the 'cyberbalkanization' or the number of sharing of content from strong network ties (other close like-minded individuals) was significantly associated with opinion poll ratings about the Hong Kong Occupy Movement at least 10 days later. However, a cross-lagged panel was not done (is current opinion poll rating not associated with content sharing in time 2?), and as a non-experimental design, this again only suggests but is not a definitive evidence for the true causal pathway of polarized communities on individual polarization.

THEREFORE

We see that identity both launches polarities, and plays a strong facilitative role in its maintenance. Polarities are especially difficult to resolve because individuals and collectives in these polarities are, as discussed, inoculated, motivated (with strong links to confirmation and disconfirmation bias) and are essentially identity-driven.

Kahan (2012), in talking about science communication suggested that for advocacies to be unhindered, communicators and organizers must be careful for the advocacy (i.e climate change) not to be co-opted by partisan groups and thus avoid political/social polarization and the consequent difficulties of policy change and acceptance by the population. However we see from recent events that it seems to be almost the prerogative of populist leaders (i.e Trump and Duterte, and possibly other head political figures) to co-opt issues under the identity of their ideological camp. By their words, tweets or press conferences and the subsequent group dynamics of their camp (ingroup and prototypical members affirming; iterative arguments produced for the leader's stance; community meaning-making; norm-setting) they can prompt attitudes, cognitions and behaviors to be very strongly associated with identity. And these are seen

whether the issues are about the support of EJKs, the belief that media criticism are destabilization plots, or that NFL kneeling are unpatriotic. That is, by identifying yourself as an ingroup, its almost guaranteed that you will support a majority of the positions of the imagined (constructed) prototypic group member, especially in groups whose norms punitively punish deviation from party lines. Thus, these identity associated behaviors and attitudes are not only seen as symptoms of polarization that we aim to resolve, but also as important characteristics of individuals and collectives we need to deal with.

As the mantra goes, etiology defines intervention. *Figure 3* is an image summary of the central characteristics which must be tackled in any polarization intervention, as these drive the maintenance of any polarization. And we see that the initial idea of a debiasing intervention that works strictly on cognitive biases in information processing – and not even taking into account the difficulty of executing and scaling such interventions – only tackle small parts of this multi-faceted subject.

Figure 3: central characteristics that maintain polarization (pre-print note: figures taken from the public presentation of this paper)

WHEN DOES POLARIZATION END?

We know from historical events that a number of political and social polarizations are consequential, which has been launching pads for ideology driven conflict and violence (ex. Third Reich, Rwandan inter-ethnic violence) as well as momentous social shake-ups and/or ‘transformations’ (Arab Spring, national liberation movements in colonized countries, contemporary movements against India’s caste system)

But we also know that even the most intense and politically polarizing issues do resolve: overt and oppressive racism in early 20th century America, the suffragette movement in the middle 20th century and LGBT acceptance almost globally during the recent years. All these social movements, characterized by intense resistance, occasionally violent social and political polarizations, provide examples of successful resolutions that are socially ‘transformative’. Meanwhile, Christian Nationalism in 20th century Northern

Ireland (see Dorney, 2015) Rwanda post-genocide (see Florence, 2016) and Cambodia after Pol Pot (see Power, 2013; Hume, Coren & Luu, 2015) are also examples of imperfect, but consequential resolutions of polarities that stop the proliferation of further conflict and violence.

We also note that structural reasons and the changes in a whole roster of societal variables help in the resolution of polarities and ideological extremism (change in economy, proliferation of resources for minority group including access to education and access to travel, rise of the middle class, ubiquity of information networks, gradual change in public opinion, political will, institutional reforms, progressive changes in legislature and law execution, changes in social norms and mores etc.). Thus the ‘packages’ and directions suggested below are not meant to be exhaustive societal cure-alls which tackle change in all structures, groups and individuals but rather as empirically validated and/or promising frameworks in the literature of applied social psychology that can help resolve political polarizations, and which more or less are directly applicable. Nonetheless they can also inform a number of directions indirectly, especially of those that tackle polarization along higher levels of social organization (ex. ‘debiasing through law’ Jolls, & Sunstein, 2006).

As applied psychological interventions these are also explicitly value laden. We do not believe that just because they are polarized, any two groups are morally equal in any given issue and the bias in this paper will always be for principled, progressive, liberal and egalitarian ideals and stances.

APPLYING: TIPS, TOOLS AND ARMS FOR THE POLI-CULTURAL WAR

PACKAGE 1: HUMANIZATION, CONTACT THEORY, SYSTEM 2 ‘OVERRIDE’ & BRINGING THE ‘OTHER’ TO LUNCH

This package represents the broad direction of face-to-face contact, humanization approaches and deliberate dialogue with the ‘other’ side.

Broockman and Kalla (2016), in a well-powered, well-considered field experiment calls this ‘deep canvassing’, a mixture of deliberate and effortful processing (crudely: system 2 overriding negative prior attitudes and/or heuristic judgements) and perspective-taking, or imagining another person’s point of view. Their field experiment show that this approach (which took from around 10 to 30 minutes of conversation) both practically and significantly increased positivity for transgender individuals for both Republican and Democrat that were canvased, even 3 months after the intervention. It also subsequently increased the support for a transgender protection law, even surviving opposition ads, and is similarly durable 3 months after the intervention (see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tdjtFRdbAo> for an example of the intervention.)

This ties very closely with what Bandura (2015) dubs as humanization, which he proposed as a key element against moral disengagement and its various loci (giving examples like Hugh Thompson saving dozens of villagers in the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and that led to the case against William Calley) This ‘humanization’ is also closely related to the more empirically validated Contact Theory, that show how intergroup exposure and contact do facilitate the reduction of prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; see Paluck, Green S., & Green D., 2017 for nuanced discussion)

Also in this package is the call to take the ‘other’ to lunch (Lesser, 2010), and similar calls for reaching over the ideological divide, talking to the person as a person, and not with any goal of persuasion in mind.

Referring to *Figure 3*, this package targets directly the primary characteristic of polarities: it’s identity-driven nature. This general ‘humanization’ package facilitates recategorization and/or multiple categorization of the ‘other’ which minimizes ingroup-outgroup distinctions and subsequently lower identity-driven efforts and behaviors. Of the packages, this seem to be the most immediately efficacious, although it is difficult to scale up. Nonetheless, it’s a foundational tool for any polarity resolution. And current replication work is being planned for its fit, efficacy and relevance in the local context.

PACKAGE 2: MINORITY INFLUENCE, CONSISTENCY & ORGANIZED CAMPAIGNS

Historically, groups and individuals with no authority, credibility or immense resources have still managed to affect change and convert people to their way of thinking. Christianity’s beginning and its eventual global domination is a salient example. Minority influence is a field of study that seeks to find how minority groups manages to influence majority groups (or how minority members within a group influence majority members within a group) and possibly the larger society. Butera, Falomir-Pichastor, Mugny & Quiamzade (2017) gives a review. It’s known that the majority group have several influence channels at their disposal, including the asymmetric pressure for compliance and obedience, as well as normative and informational influence. Needless to say, the minority has much less influence resources. One integrative model of minority and majority influence (Heuristic and Systematic Processing of Majority and Minority Model; De Vries, et al. 1996) asserts that a minority can elicit systematic processing in the majority (and thus influence them towards their goal) when circumstances make systematic processing hard to neglect: when the minority is consistent, when there is conflict, when there is threat to the majority or when ingroup sources within the majority themselves forward the minority cause.

Of these determinants, the consistency ‘principle’ seem to be the most feasible take-away. However Mugny (1982; in Butera et al. 2017) proposes to demarcate the majority into two distinct facets/actors

the *power* and the *population*. Power in this case refers to subgroups and individuals who have the asymmetric privilege to dictate rules and norms, whereas the population refers to the individuals submitting to this dominant ideology through various socialization and institutionalization processes. Mugny proposes that effective minority influence consists of principled consistency against this power, but maintaining a flexible negotiation style with the population. However, in non-totalitarian societies, it's not always clear who the 'power' and who the 'population' is; especially in modern 'identitarian' movements in which the population themselves can perpetuate the power structure (i.e 'normal' men perpetuating the 'patriarchy') However in thinking of recent cases of 'illiberal' feminism where both power *and* population is attacked i.e generalized "sexist pig" insults, its much easier to see alternative forms where power is attacked but the population isn't "your behavior, maybe unknowingly perpetuates a system where I am put at a disadvantage". Especially as it is the pattern of behavior not the people per se, that perpetuates certain power systems. Thus consistent resistance to the majority status quo is hypothesized to be more effective, and perceived as less rigid if it demarcates between the power and the population.

Included in this package are organized campaigns as a reminder that no successful social movement sprung up in a vacuum, and of the real effort, sweat, legwork, coordination, brainpower and all the little self-sacrifice that goes on behind mobilizing and creating change. A real-time example of a movement and organized campaign in action today would be the body positivity and diversity campaign, who has managed to advance in the past few years making companies adjust market products (i.e Dove, various fashion merchandising, make-up) and spotlight attention to the specific issue in popular consciousness and media coverage.

This package is forwarded in that it tackles two of the central characteristics in *Figure 3*. While inoculation might be effective, it is not a panacea and can weaken through multiple and sustained attacks (Ivanov, Pfau & Parker, 2009) Likewise, motivated reasoners might seemingly increase candidate preference for each negative information presented during the early phases of polarities (which in elections seem to hold for the whole campaign period) however this doesn't or cannot go ad nauseum, there is an "affective tipping point" (Redlawsk et al., 2010) afterwhich reasoning ceases to be motivated i.e affect follows the valence of the information.

These multiple sustained attack against inoculation, and the affective tipping point against motivated reasoning are the main channels through which package 2 techniques aims to affect change.

PACKAGE 3: MORAL FOUNDATION THEORY & SOCIAL DOMINANCE THEORY ¹

Haidt says political polarization are often divided along moral lines. Two men kissing on the street for example, may be seen as a non-issue by a liberal minded person (“wala naming ginagawang masama”) or as morally wrong by another (“hindi yan natural”) suggestive of harm and purity foundations respectively. And what we view as moral and immoral are asserted by Graham et al. (2012) to likely fall under 5 broad moral foundations: Care/Harm, Fairness, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority and Purity.

Knowing the foundations certain populations rely on may be half the battle. Feinberg & Willer (2015) show that liberal vs conservative political arguments that are framed to the moral values of the opposing side are typically more effective (ex. “same-sex couples are proud and patriotic Americans” as a ‘liberal issue’ wrapped in ingroup/loyalty foundation routinely promoted by conservatives). This was supported in a study from Miles (2016), who asserted that appealing to the Fairness foundation might be a way to bridge the partisan divide. In fact Clifford and colleagues (2015) assert from their large scale data:

While pro and con arguments had the expected effects among people who were high in the care foundation. No amount of pro rhetoric was able to persuade those who did not endorse it. Thus, one implication of our study is that unless rhetoric targets the particular foundations endorsed by opposing sides of an issue, it will be difficult to reach consensus among people with differing moral beliefs

From our findings in exploring charisma and morality in the Philippine presidential elections (Silan & Encarnacion, 2017) we see that Duterte’s rhetoric rates highest in care negation or “harming” especially concrete subpopulations like drug addicts, elite opposition and against the corrupt. Sio, Quinones and Ochoa (2016) meanwhile show that while purity predicts voting preference for Grace Poe and Mar Roxas, it was Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) that predicted voting preference for Rodrigo Duterte. In the reasonable assumption that SDO relates strongly to the Authority Foundation (and in fact might have gotten the proportion of variance in the regression model); then both local studies are suggestive as to what moral foundations current Duterte supporters rely on

Thus packaging issues such as EJKs in possible moral foundations that they rely on (care negating, ingroup, authority and fairness) may reasonably be effective in lowering their support. This include packaging EJK

¹ Abridged from Silan (2017, December 5). Take Home Exam: 281 Political Psychology

as against the authority foundation (in this case quoting the current pope on the grievousness of supporting killings), against the fairness foundation (article on how police politely knock in Makati villages but knock down doors in shanty houses) and against the ingroup foundation (share news story of fellow Duterte Die Hard Supporters (DDS) being killed despite ardent support; or frame Duterte as ‘selling us out to china’). Of course this needs more empirical backing in the local context, but the framework is proving promising and can be generalized into many different polarities and ideological extremism settings

Like package 2, this package aims to have multiple, sustained attacks against inoculation, as well as reaching an affective tipping point for motivated reasoning. However, this Package adds precision to the persuasive attempts, and possibly even tap into identity associated parts of the individual, if only because morality are almost always linked to identity and one’s meaning-making of the world.

PACKAGE 4: NORM PERCEPTION

As an aside, and to make sense of the package, one crucial question not explicitly discussed in polarization studies is: when do polarizations matter? It seems for some issues, like LGBT acceptance and mental health, polarities immediately and inherently matter if only because they affect how the individual is treated, what they’re allowed and not allowed to do and what immediate opportunities are available. However, for some polarities, like opposing camps in favour or against Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and Stem Cell Research, the polarity matters not because of anything inherent but because this polarity as a public opinion is instrumental to setting policy, legislature, industry standards or otherwise externally associated behaviors (‘decisions’ resulting from the polarization). Thus a proposed organization of when polarization matters is a continuum between “inherent” and “instrumental”, on which polarities can range anywhere along the line.

This continuum is distinguished, because if it is the externally associated behaviors we are interested in (see *Figure 3*), then for the purpose of our persuasive attempts, we can bypass inoculation, motivation and identity to the link towards behavior directly.

And this is what current norm perception studies seem to be giving evidence for: changing behaviors without necessarily changing attitudes, morality or identity. This is seen for example on a large scale field experiment using a mass media campaign in Uganda (Green, Wilke & Cooper, 2017), where empathy with women who experience partner violence did not increase, nor were there change in the attitudes towards domestic violence but willingness to intervene in domestic violence increased substantially and have considerably reduced domestic violence in the treatment condition. A similar framework is also done in a

large scale field experiment on Rwanda rival ethnicities (Paluck & Green, 2009), and school bullying (Paluck & Shepherd, 2012)

That is to say, we change behaviors by changing perceptions of what is normatively and politically acceptable. How this will work in the local context and across different types of polarities are still to be undertaken, however this package is added here in the hopes that it will spur ideas for future applied use.

PACKAGE 5: CHANGE TAKES TIME

From it's the time of America's independence in 1776, it was only in 1920 that American women was able to vote and It was only 2003 that a state was able to allow same-sex marriage and only 2015 a ban on same-sex marriage considered unconstitutional (BBC News, 2015) and only last week as of the time of writing, that Australia signed same-sex marriage into law (BBC News, 2017)

On one hand there is an immediate benefit of time in our model, that is inoculation decays with time (Banas & Rains, 2010) how long exactly is not yet know, but inoculation seem to endure for weeks until several months long. And so bidding time in persuasion campaigns is not without its benefits.

But more primarily, this package is a management of expectation and a reminder that no matter how choking political polarizations may feel, and how immediate one wants transformation to happen, change is very often gradual, very often drawn and painful, and very often in timeframes that one need to take a step back on to appreciate. Thus this package is reminder that while the fight is long, and there surely will be darker days ahead it's in the worthwhile hope for a better future that applied social psychology is studied and executed.

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