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Intergroup Inequality Heightens Reports of Discrimination along Alternative Identity
Dimensions

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Abstract

How do members of societally-valued (dominant) groups respond when considering inequality? Prior research suggests that salient inequality may be viewed as a threat to dominant-group members' self and collective moral character (e.g., Knowles et al., 2014). However, people possess multiple social identities and may be advantaged in one domain (e.g., White) while concurrently disadvantaged in another domain (e.g., sexual minority). The present research tests whether individuals may reduce the moral-image threat of being societally-advantaged in one domain by highlighting discrimination they face in other domains. Four experiments with individuals advantaged along different dimensions of inequality (race, social-class, sexuality) reveal that making such inequality salient evokes greater perceived discrimination faced by oneself and one's ingroups along other identity dimensions.

Keywords: inequality, perceived discrimination, intergroup relations, multiple identities

Intergroup Inequality Heightens Reports of Discrimination along Alternative Identity Dimensions

In August 2016, Colin Kaepernick started a movement within the National Football League in which (predominantly Black American) players decline to stand for the national anthem in protest of “a country that oppresses Black people and people of color” (Wyche, NFL Media interview, 2016). In response to Kaepernick highlighting racial inequality, National Women’s Soccer League player Megan Rapinoe (who is White) kneeled during the national anthem before one of her team’s games. She explained her motivation to kneel by stating that she sympathizes because she faces discrimination as a gay woman (Payne, 2016). That is, whereas Kaepernick highlighted a system of race-based oppression in which Rapinoe belongs to the advantaged racial group (White Americans), Rapinoe’s comments emphasized one of her societally-disadvantaged social identities. This prompts an essential question of how people respond to inequality, given the plethora of social groups to which we all belong. Because widespread inequities exist along multiple dimensions of identity (e.g., race, social-class, sexuality), most individuals simultaneously belong to some advantaged social groups (e.g., Whites) and some disadvantaged groups (e.g., sexual minorities). How does possessing both advantaged and disadvantaged identities influence individuals’ responses to inequality? The present research explores this dynamic and examines how and why members of groups advantaged by inequality respond to this inequity by perceiving that they face discrimination along other dimensions of social identity.

Societally-Dominant-Group Members’ Responses to Inequality

Across several domains of social identity, research has examined dominant-group members’ reactions to inequality (e.g., racial inequality: Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Lowery,

Chow, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2012; Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2007; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005; gender-based inequality: Branscombe, 1998; social-class-based inequality: Chow & Galak, 2012). This work underscores how inequality relating to one's dominant-group membership can elicit threats to self- and collective-image—particularly the threat that one's group and oneself as a member of that group are the perpetrators of unjust harm (group-esteem or moral-image threat; see Knowles, Lowery, Chow, & Unzueta, 2014; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009).

Inequality can induce threat to dominant-group members' moral-image by highlighting their position as prototypical perpetrators of immoral intergroup behavior (e.g., discrimination; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Shnabel & Nadler, 2015). These moral-image concerns are found in the interracial interaction literature as White Americans are motivated to be liked and seen as moral and unprejudiced, particularly if race is salient (e.g., Bergsieker, Shelton & Richeson, 2010). These motives can lead Whites to overestimate their understanding of a Black interaction partner's feelings on racial topics (Holoien, 2016) or to distance themselves from an interracial interaction altogether (Goff, Steele, & Davies, 2008).

The framing of inequality (as ingroup privilege or outgroup disadvantage) may shape which collective moral emotions (emotions elicited when groups violate moral standards; Iyer & Leach, 2008) are activated among dominant-group members. Evidence of ingroup privilege activates collective guilt (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2003; Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006; Powell et al., 2005) and anger directed at the ingroup (i.e., self-focused anger; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006), whereas outgroup disadvantage induces self-focused anger (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007) and moral outrage (i.e., anger at a third-party for violating moral standards; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). Depending on which emotions are activated, people can

engage in different strategies to alleviate arousal. To defuse guilt, people may justify their group's behavior (e.g., Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010) or engage in less effortful signaling (e.g., reporting support for reparations; Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2006). To diffuse anger, people engage in action-based strategies, such as collective action to rectify injustice (Leach et al., 2006; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Overall, evidence of inequality evokes moral-image threat among dominant-group members that can be measured via activated moral emotions (guilt and/or anger).

Prior work suggests that making dominant-group members' advantaged status salient can motivate efforts to reduce moral threat, but this work primarily focuses on responses relating to the morally-threatened identity (e.g., making salient men's role as perpetrators of sexism can lead men to report that men suffer more than women; Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012) or one's personal character (e.g., salient racial inequality leads Whites to report they are personally hardworking; Phillips & Lowery, 2015). The present work introduces another response to moral-image threat for dominant-group members—highlighting discrimination experiences relating to their other identities.

Multiple Social Identities and Reducing the Threat of Intergroup Inequality

People have multiple social identities that interact and intersect to shape their experiences (e.g., being White *and* a woman *and* gay). The present research focuses on how salient inequality on one dimension of identity affects self-perceptions of *other* group identities. This approach is consistent with recent calls stressing the need to consider the multidimensional nature of social identity (see Cole, 2009; Gaither, 2018; Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015; Remedios & Snyder, 2015).

Much research that has adopted an intersectional perspective has explored the experiences of individuals possessing multiple stigmatized identities (e.g., racial minority women; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008; Remedios & Snyder, 2015; Sesko & Biernat, 2010), whereas less research examines the experience of possessing multiple identities with different statuses (however, see Curtin, Kende, & Kende, 2016; Curtin, Stewart, & Cole, 2015; Roccas, 2003; Rosette & Tost, 2013). Given that people can contextually construct their identity to satisfy various motivational goals (Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Gollledge, & Scabini, 2006) and minimize threats to self- and collective-image (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 2001), different identities may become salient to aid in satisfying goals in a given context. People can downplay a low-status identity (e.g., gender) and highlight a high-status identity in another domain (e.g., race), for example, to deflect an activated threat (e.g., competence threat; Mussweiler, Gabriel, & Bodenhausen, 2000; Pittinsky, Shih, & Ambady, 1999). Relatedly, among individuals who perceive themselves as relatively professionally unsuccessful, membership in a disadvantaged group (e.g., racial minority) increases the likelihood of recognizing privilege in another identity domain (e.g., gender), potentially because the combination of having a low-status social identity and lack of professional success assuages moral-image threats, facilitating privilege acknowledgement (Rosette & Tost, 2013).

Inversely, an individual presented with evidence of inequality relating to their dominant-group membership may alleviate this moral threat by highlighting discrimination experiences in other identity domains. Because victims are viewed as more moral than perpetrators, observers view perpetrators of wrongdoing as less blameworthy if *unrelated* victimhood is highlighted (vs. if victimhood is not salient; Gray & Wegner, 2011; Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach, 2010). Thus, individuals may emphasize experiences of discrimination due to their other identities to restore

moral-image. For example, salient racial inequality may lead White women to report facing gender-based discrimination. The present research tests whether moral-image threat induced by evidence of inequality relating to one's dominant-group membership leads individuals to report greater perceptions that their other social identities face discrimination.

Overview of Studies

Across four experiments, with samples of individuals belonging to societally-dominant-groups along three dimensions of inequality (race, social-class, sexuality), we test whether the salience of this inequality leads people to report that they and their ingroups (but not outgroups) experience discrimination. Studies 1-3 also explore whether the framing of inequality (as ingroup privilege or outgroup disadvantage) affects individuals' responses. We provide support for the proposed mechanism, moral-image threat, through multiple methodological routes. Study 2 provides a traditional test of statistical mediation via moral-image-related emotions (i.e., anger and guilt). Studies 3-4 assess if salient inequality elicits greater perceived discrimination only for groups relevant to one's self-concept (ingroups). Study 4 experimentally manipulates whether salient inequality morally-implicates one's ingroup as the relative advantaged group. Overall, these studies empirically examine how and why the salience of inequality relating to dominant-group membership activates individuals' perceptions that they and their ingroups face discrimination.

Study 1

Study 1 examines how the salience of inequality in a domain of identity (e.g., race) in which one's group is societally-dominant (e.g., Whites) affects perceptions that one faces discrimination due to membership in other social groups (e.g., lower-class). Lower-class White participants first viewed information detailing class-based disadvantages to make salient this

disadvantaged identity and then either read about racial inequality or control information. They then reported the degree to which they personally-faced discrimination due to several identities (e.g., social-class, gender, sexuality).

Participants exposed to racial inequality information saw one of two framings—either the ingroup benefitted from inequality (White privilege frame) or the outgroup suffered from inequality (Black disadvantage frame). We included these different framings because prior work suggests that outgroup disadvantage framing may implicate the ingroup less than privilege framing (see Lowery et al., 2007). We predicted that White lower-class individuals exposed to racial inequality information would report experiencing greater discrimination due to their salient disadvantaged identity (social-class) and other identities, compared with participants reading control information. Based on previous work (e.g., Lowery et al., 2007), we tested if the privilege framing elicits greater reported discrimination than disadvantage framing.

Method

Participants. One hundred and forty-three White U.S. citizens (55% female, ages 18-73, $M_{\text{age}}=38.04$, $SD_{\text{age}}=11.48$) who identified as working-class ($n=122$) or poor ($n=21$) were recruited from MTurk.com in exchange for \$1. Sample size was determined by G*Power using the effect sizes from prior research utilizing inequality framing manipulations (Phillips & Lowery, 2015; $d=.49$), yielding a required sample size of 134 to achieve 80% power.

Materials and measures

Disadvantaged identity prime. To prime a disadvantaged identity (lower-social-class), all participants first viewed information about social-class inequality (adapted from Craig & Richeson, 2012; Major, Kaiser, O'Brien, & McCoy, 2007). Participants viewed an infographic titled, “New Research on Social-Class Inequality,” including information such as “78% of upper-

class individuals report some discomfort interacting with lower-class (poor and working-class) individuals.”

Race-based inequality manipulation. To manipulate exposure to a form of inequality in which participants belong to the societally-dominant-group, participants were randomly-assigned to read one of three articles. Two articles described racial inequality (adapted from Phillips & Lowery, 2015; Powell et al., 2005). One article emphasized advantages that White Americans have relative to Black Americans (White Privilege condition). The other racial inequality article detailed the same inequities but emphasized as disadvantages that Black Americans have relative to White Americans (Black Disadvantage condition; e.g., “[White Americans/Black Americans] receive [higher/lower] salaries than equally-qualified [Black Americans/White Americans]”). In the third (control) condition participants read an article of similar length that provided information unrelated to inequality (“Researchers Explore Left-Handedness”; see Study 2 of Craig & Richeson, 2012).

Perceived personally-faced discrimination. To assess perceptions that one personally-faces discrimination, participants were asked to indicate the extent (1=*not at all*, 10=*very much*) to which they personally experience discrimination due to several group memberships (e.g., social-class, gender).¹ Perceived discrimination for the primed identity (social-class) was examined separately from the perceived discrimination for other identities (gender, sexual orientation, religion, $\alpha=.58$). Larger numbers indicate greater perceptions that one personally-faces discrimination due to these group identities.

Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed an initial set of demographic questions (e.g., race, gender, social-class).² Lower-class White participants then read an infographic to prime a disadvantaged identity (social-class) and were randomly assigned

to read an article manipulating the salience of inequality relating to their dominant-group membership (White Privilege, Black Disadvantage, Control). Participants then reported their personally-faced discrimination.³ Finally, participants reported additional demographic information (e.g., age, income),⁴ were debriefed, and compensated.

Results

We did not exclude participants from the final sample (52 White Privilege condition, 50 Black Disadvantage condition, 41 Control condition). We first sought to test whether the salience of racial inequality led lower-class White participants to report experiencing more discrimination due to their primed disadvantaged identity (social-class), compared with control participants. Contrary to predictions, no significant effect of condition on perceived social-class-based discrimination emerged, $F(2, 149)=0.32$, $p=.730$, $\eta_p^2=.01$, White Privilege: $M=5.06$ [4.25, 5.87], $SD=2.91$, Black Disadvantage: $M=4.62$ [3.82, 5.42], $SD=2.81$, Control: $M=4.76$ [3.87, 5.64], $SD=2.81$. However, given that this identity was primed for *all* participants, it is possible that this prime attenuated the expected effect. Thus, we next examined whether exposure to racial inequality information influenced participants' reports of experiencing discrimination due to their other (non-primed) identities. As shown in Table 1, a significant effect of condition on perceptions of personally-faced discrimination due to these other identities (gender, sexual orientation, religion) emerged, $F(2, 140)=3.59$, $p=.030$, $\eta_p^2=.05$. Consistent with predictions, White participants exposed to racial inequality information reported that they faced more discrimination due to their other identities, compared with participants who read about handedness [White Privilege vs. Control: $t(140)=2.28$, $p=.024$, $d=.50$; Black Disadvantage vs. Control: $t(140)=2.44$, $p=.016$, $d=.53$]. Interestingly, the framing of racial inequality (as White

privilege or Black disadvantage) did not differentially influence reported discrimination experiences, $t(140)=0.19$, $p=.850$, $d=.03$.

Discussion

In Study 1, Whites responded to race-based inequality by highlighting the discrimination they faced in other identity domains, presumably to alleviate the activated moral-image threat from belonging to a societally-dominant-group in the context of inequality. Although we expected participants would report greater perceptions of discrimination due to the most accessible alternative identity (social-class), results suggest that people may focus on different identities when reporting personally-faced discrimination, depending on their own unique experiences. Aligned with Phillips and Lowery (2015), who found that racial privilege information led Whites to claim more personal hardships (e.g., divorce, emotional turmoil), Study 1 reveals that Whites also respond to racial privilege (and racial inequality generally) by emphasizing personal discrimination. Both framings of inequality similarly evoked reports of personally-faced discrimination, suggesting that privilege framing does not accentuate reports of discrimination more than disadvantage framing; we seek to replicate this pattern before discussing it further. Study 2 tests for effects in another domain of inequality (social-class) and provides an initial test of the proposed underlying mechanism (moral-image threat).

Study 2

In Study 2, upper-class racial minority participants either read about social-class inequality (with ingroup privilege and outgroup disadvantage frames) or control information and then reported personally-faced discrimination due to a primed societally-disadvantaged identity (race) and other non-primed social identities (e.g., gender, sexual orientation, religion). Consistent with Study 1, we predicted that upper-class racial minority participants would report

that they experience more discrimination due to their other identities if social-class inequality is salient, compared with control information. To test if moral-image concerns may drive effects, participants also reported feelings of moral emotions (guilt, anger) after reading the article. Given prior work suggesting that ingroup privileges can lead individuals to express guilt and anger (e.g., Leach et al., 2006), but salient outgroup disadvantages typically elicit anger alone (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007), we tested whether these emotions statistically mediate the effects of the different framings of class-based inequality on perceived discrimination stemming from other identities.

Method

Participants. One hundred and fifty racial minority undergraduates (63% female, ages: 17-24, $M_{\text{age}}=19.43$, $SD_{\text{age}}=1.33$; 102 Asian, 13 Black, 17 Latino/a, 5 Middle Eastern, 13 Multiracial/Other) who did not identify as poor or working-class were recruited in exchange for partial course credit. Participants' median household income (between \$100,000-\$250,000) was over twice as large as that of the local area (New York City: \$50,711; U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). The sample size was determined by the number of eligible students from the psychology subject-pool who participated over an academic year (Study 2 ran concurrently with Studies 1 and 3).

Materials and measures

Disadvantaged identity prime. Similar to Study 1, all participants first viewed information intended to prime participants with a disadvantaged group identity (race) adapted from prior research ("New Research on Racial Inequality"; Craig & Richeson, 2012).

Social-class inequality manipulation. As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to read one of three articles. Two conditions described social-class inequality, either

focusing on upper-class privileges or on lower-class disadvantages, and the third (control) condition described research on handedness.

Perceived personally-faced discrimination. As in Study 1, we measured perceived personally-faced discrimination. Perceptions of discrimination for the primed identity (race) were examined separately from the perceptions of discrimination for other identities (gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, physical abilities, $\alpha=.67$). Larger numbers indicate greater perceptions that one personally-faces discrimination due to these group identities.

Moral-image-based emotions. To assess moral-image-concerns, participants reported how much (1=*not at all*, 6=*extremely*) they felt *guilty* and *angry* after reading the inequality article.⁵ Based on prior work (e.g., Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006) distinguishing these emotions and given that these items were relatively-weakly correlated $r(150)=.30, p<.001$, we analyzed guilt and anger separately.

Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants completed initial demographic information (e.g., race, gender, social-class) and were presented with the infographic to prime a disadvantaged identity (race). Participants were then randomly assigned to read one of three articles to manipulate the salience of inequality relating to their dominant-group membership (Upper-class Privilege, Lower-class Disadvantage, Control). Participants then reported the extent to which they personally-faced discrimination and their emotions while reading the article. Finally, participants reported additional demographics (e.g., age, income), were debriefed, and credited.

Results

We did not exclude participants from the final sample (50 Upper-class Privilege condition, 51 Lower-class Disadvantage condition, 49 Control condition). Similar to Study 1, we

tested if the salience of inequality on a dimension of identity in which one is advantaged (upper-class) elicits reports of personally-faced discrimination due to another salient identity (race).

Contrary to the results of Study 1, but consistent with our initial predictions, results revealed a significant effect of condition on perceived racial discrimination, $F(2, 147)=3.27, p=.041, \eta_p^2=.04$. Upper-class racial minority participants exposed to lower-class disadvantages ($M=6.24$ [5.52, 6.95], $SD=2.41$) reported experiencing somewhat greater racial discrimination than did participants exposed to control information ($M=5.35$ [4.62, 6.07], $SD=2.55$), $t(147)=1.73, p=.086, d=.36$. Further, participants exposed to lower-class disadvantages reported experiencing significantly more racial discrimination than those exposed to upper-class privileges, $t(147)=2.49, p=.014, d=.49$. No reliable differences in perceived personally-faced racial discrimination emerged between participants exposed to upper-class privileges ($M=4.96$ [4.24, 5.68], $SD=2.75$) and those exposed to handedness, $t(147)=0.75, p=.455, d=.15$.

Similar to Study 1, we next tested if evidence of social-class inequality leads upper-class racial minority participants to perceive that they face discrimination due to their other (non-primed) identities. As shown in Table 1, a significant effect of condition on perceptions of personally-faced discrimination due to other identities (gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, physical abilities) emerged, $F(2, 147)=5.77, p=.004, \eta_p^2=.07$. Consistent with predictions and the results of Study 1, upper-class racial minority participants exposed to social-class inequality reported that they faced more discrimination due to these other identities, compared with participants who read about handedness [Lower-class Disadvantage vs. Control: $t(147)=3.39, p<.001, d=.70$; Upper-class Privilege vs. Control: $t(147)=1.85, p=.066, d=.39$; Lower-class Disadvantage vs. Upper-class Privilege: $t(147)=1.54, p=.126, d=.29$].

We next tested whether emotions associated with moral-image threat (guilt, anger) reliably varied by experimental condition and found significant effects for both guilt [$F(2, 147)=3.97, p=.021, \eta_p^2=.05$] and anger [$F(2, 147)=11.36, p<.001, \eta_p^2=.13$]. Upper-class racial minority participants exposed to social-class inequality (framed as lower-class disadvantage or upper-class privilege) reported feeling guiltier and angrier compared with participants who read about left-handedness (see Table 1).

We conducted parallel mediation analyses (with 10,000 bootstrap samples; Hayes, 2013) to test whether guilt and/or anger statistically mediated the effects of experimental condition on perceived discrimination. As shown in Figure 1a, although participants in the Lower-class Disadvantage condition reported feeling greater guilt and anger than those in the Control condition, only anger statistically mediated this between-condition comparison (Indirect effects: guilt: 0.04, 95%CI[-0.08, 0.26]; anger: 0.32, 95%CI[0.06, 0.67]). Consistent with prior work (Leach et al., 2006), both guilt and anger served as mediators (guilt: 0.11, 95%CI [0.02, 0.30]; anger: 0.13 95%CI [0.01, 0.31]) of the effect of upper-class privilege information (vs. control) on perceived discrimination (see Figure 1b).

Discussion

The results of Study 2 are largely consistent with Study 1, suggesting that salient inequality in which one's ingroup is advantaged evokes greater reports of personally-faced discrimination along other dimensions of identity (e.g., gender, sexual orientation, religion). Individuals also reported somewhat more discrimination due to their primed identity in response to salient lower-class disadvantage (compared to control and upper-class privilege). The change in domains (from social-class to race) or samples (from an online sample to an in-lab student sample) may account for this discrepancy between studies. For example, upper-class racial

minorities may have more conscious experiences of racial discrimination than lower-class Whites have of class-based discrimination. Or, individuals participating in the lab may have paid greater attention to the identity prime than individuals participating online. These possibilities are, of course, speculative. To allow for greater flexibility and ability to measure each participants' most personally-meaningful identity, Study 3 includes a more idiosyncratic measure of perceived personally-faced discrimination and removes the pre-manipulation identity prime.

Interestingly, compared with past work suggesting that ingroup privilege framing may threaten the ingroup more than outgroup disadvantage framing (e.g., Lowery et al., 2012), the framing of racial and class-based inequality (ingroup privilege or outgroup disadvantage) in Studies 1-2 did not differentially influence reported discrimination for other dimensions of identity. Past research on inequality framing often focuses on dominant-group members' attitudes toward the disadvantaged group (e.g., how Whites respond to privilege vs. disadvantage framing with positive attitudes towards Blacks; Powell et al., 2005, and support for redistributive policies; Lowery et al., 2012). In contrast, Studies 1-2 assessed perceptions of self-relevant discrimination among dominant-group members, finding that both privilege and disadvantage framing may activate a desire to highlight discrimination in alternative identity domains. Taken together, privilege framing may be more effective for influencing attitudes toward disadvantaged outgroups (as found in prior work), compared with disadvantage framing, but both types of framing appear to influence self-relevant perceptions of discrimination.

Importantly, Study 2 also revealed support for the proposed mechanism of moral-image threat. These results were quite consistent with past research in which ingroup privilege information activates collective guilt (Powell et al., 2005) and self-focused anger (Leach et al., 2006) whereas outgroup disadvantage activates self-focused anger (Iyer et al., 2007) and system-

directed moral outrage (Thomas et al., 2009) among dominant-group members. In our work, both guilt and anger mediated the effect for participants exposed to ingroup privilege (vs. control), whereas anger alone mediated the effect of outgroup disadvantage (vs. control). Activated anger and guilt often indicate that one's morality is under threat (Iyer & Leach, 2008), and thus Study 2 provides initial evidence that salient inequality may evoke perceptions of personally-faced discrimination due to moral-image concerns.

Study 3

While Studies 1-2 examined how lower-class White and upper-class racial minority individuals respond to salient race- and class-based inequality, respectively, in Study 3 straight participants considered either sexuality-based inequality (framed as straight privilege or gay disadvantage) or control information. Participants then reported the amount of discrimination faced by themselves personally due to different social identities as well as discrimination faced by different social groups. If the proposed mechanism (moral-image threat) accounts for the observed effects, then inequality information should lead participants to emphasize discrimination faced by personally-relevant groups (to signal positive moral-image), but not groups to which participants do not belong. Thus, consistent with and extending the results of Studies 1-2, we predicted that straight participants will report that they and their ingroups experience more discrimination if sexuality-based inequality is salient, compared with control participants. We predicted no differences for perceptions that outgroups face discrimination.

Method

Participants. Three hundred and seven U.S. citizens who identified as heterosexual/straight (51% female; ages: 18-71; $M_{\text{age}}=36.64$, $SD_{\text{age}}=11.77$; 27 Asian, 40 Black, 216 White, 15 Latino/a, 2 Native American/Pacific Islander, 7 Multiracial/Other) were recruited

from MTurk.com in exchange for \$1. We sought to collect a sample of at least 261 participants, based on a power analysis (to achieve 90% power), using the effect size of the previous online study (Study 1: $\eta_p^2=.047$). We sought to achieve 90% power because no prior research (to our knowledge) has tested framing effects for sexuality-based inequality.

Materials and measures

Sexuality-based inequality manipulation. As in Studies 1-2, participants were randomly assigned to read one of three articles. Two conditions described sexuality-based inequality, either focused on straight privilege or gay disadvantage (e.g., “[Straight people can/Gay people cannot] show affection in public, safely and comfortably, without fear of harassment or violence.”). We used the same handedness control condition as in Studies 1-2.

Perceived personally-faced discrimination. The measure of personally-faced discrimination in Study 3 differed from that utilized in Studies 1-2. One question asked participants to nominate an identity due to which they personally-faced the most discrimination. Participants then rated the extent (1=*not at all*, 10=*very much*) to which they personally-experienced discrimination due to that identity. This single item provided the participant-nominated measure of perceived personally-faced discrimination.

Participants were also provided with a list of identities (*race, gender, social-class, sexual orientation, physical disabilities, religion, age, political orientation, other*) and asked to check off the identities in which they experienced discrimination. Then participants rated how much (1=*not at all*, 10=*very much*) they personally experienced discrimination due to all of these identities. We used participants’ responses on the check-list to create a personalized perceived personally-faced discrimination index ($\alpha=.83$)⁶ that reflects the average of discrimination ratings for the identities that participants selected. For example, if participants indicated experiencing

discrimination due to their race and gender on the check-list task, then the personalized-discrimination index was their average perceived personally-faced discrimination due to race and gender.

Perceived group-based discrimination. To assess perceptions of group-based discrimination (ingroup discrimination and outgroup discrimination), participants were asked, “Please indicate how much you think different groups are *currently* the victims of discrimination...” (1=*not at all*, 10=*very much*; Norton & Sommers, 2011). Participants rated discrimination for the following groups: *White Americans, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, Christians, Jews, Muslims, lower-class Americans, and upper-class American*.^{7,8} We again used participants’ responses on the previously-described check-list task as well as participants’ demographic information to create a personalized-ingroup discrimination index ($\alpha=.67$) and a personalized-outgroup discrimination index ($\alpha=.62$). For example, if participants indicated experiencing discrimination due to their race and religion and they identified as Asian American and Jewish, the ingroup discrimination index consisted of an average of how much they reported that Asian Americans and Jews face discrimination. In turn, the outgroup discrimination index would consist of an average of how much they perceived discrimination for White Americans, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Christians, and Muslims.⁹

Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of three articles to manipulate the salience of inequality relating to their dominant-group membership (Straight Privilege, Gay Disadvantage, or Control). Participants then reported the extent to which they personally-faced discrimination and rated how much different groups

experience discrimination.¹⁰ Finally, participants reported additional demographics (e.g., age, income), were debriefed, and compensated.

Results

We did not exclude participants from the final sample (105 Straight Privilege condition, 106 Gay Disadvantage condition, 96 Control condition). See Table 3 for correlations among all dependent measures.

Perceptions of personally-faced discrimination. We first tested the possibility that evidence of sexuality-based inequality influences straight participants' perceptions that they face discrimination due to their self-nominated identity. As shown in Table 2 and Figure 2, a significant effect of condition on reported discrimination due to participants' nominated identity emerged, $F(2, 304)=6.14$, $p=.002$, $\eta_p^2=.04$. Consistent with predictions, straight participants exposed to information detailing gay disadvantages reported greater experiences of discrimination for their nominated identity than control participants, $t(304)=3.17$, $p=.002$, $d=.44$. Additionally, participants exposed to gay disadvantages reported greater discrimination for their nominated identity than those exposed to straight privileges, $t(304)=2.84$, $p=.005$, $d=.38$. However, participants exposed to straight privileges did not differ in terms of perceived discrimination for their nominated identity, compared with participants in the control condition, $t(304)=0.39$, $p=.694$, $d=.06$.

We next tested if exposure to sexuality-based inequality influences straight participants' responses on the close-ended personalized measure of perceived personally-faced discrimination. Similar to the results for the participant-nominated identity, there was a significant effect of condition on perceived personally-faced discrimination, $F(2, 292)=11.90$, $p<.001$, $\eta_p^2=.08$. Consistent with hypotheses, straight participants exposed to gay disadvantages reported that they

faced more discrimination due to their other identities, compared with participants who read about handedness, $t(292)=4.54, p<.001, d=.65$. Again, straight participants exposed to gay disadvantages reported greater personally-faced discrimination, compared to those exposed to straight privileges, $t(292)=3.77, p<.001, d=.53$, but those exposed to straight privileges did not differ from control participants, $t(292)=0.87, p=.383, d=.13$ (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics).

Perceptions of group-based discrimination. We next tested the possibility that salient sexuality-based inequality leads straight participants to perceive that their ingroups experience discrimination. As shown in Table 2, a significant effect of condition on the perceived ingroup discrimination index emerged, $F(2, 201)=3.50, p=.032, \eta_p^2=.03$. Consistent with the results of personally-faced discrimination and predictions, straight participants exposed to gay disadvantages reported that their ingroups faced more discrimination, compared with control participants, $t(201)=2.56, p=.011, d=.43$. Further, participants exposed to straight privileges reported that their ingroups faced somewhat more discrimination than control participants, $t(201)=1.80, p=.073, d=.32$. Dissimilar to the results of the personally-faced discrimination ratings (in Study 3), but consistent with results of Studies 1-2, there was no difference in ingroup discrimination ratings for those exposed to gay disadvantages and those exposed to straight privileges, $t(201)=0.69, p=.491, d=.12$. Consistent with expectations and the proposed moral-image threat mechanism, the salience of sexuality-based inequality did not reliably affect perceptions that outgroups experience discrimination (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations), $F(2, 201)=1.45, p=.237, \eta_p^2=.01$.

Discussion

The results of Study 3 suggest that sexuality-based inequality exposure (particularly if focusing on the disadvantages of being gay) elicits greater perceptions that oneself personally and one's ingroups face discrimination, compared with not making inequality salient. Notably, across conditions, participants reported personally-experiencing more discrimination than was reported in Studies 1-2 (see Figure 2). We consider this likely due to the differences in measurement across studies. Study 3 asked participants to report on their most discriminated-against identity and to indicate the specific identities due to which they faced discrimination, creating more personalized measures of perceived discrimination than Studies 1-2 (which simply aggregated across all identity options without asking whether participants viewed themselves as stigmatized in those dimensions).

In Study 3, individuals responded to inequality with greater perceptions of discrimination faced by personally-relevant ingroups (i.e., groups that if victimized could serve to alleviate moral-image threat), but not greater perceptions of discrimination faced by all groups, indiscriminately. This is consistent with the idea that moral-image threat (and not general discrimination salience) accounts for the effects of inequality salience on perceived discrimination. We directly address the possibility of general discrimination salience as an alternative interpretation of effects in Study 4.

Deviating from Studies 1-2, we did not find that ingroup privilege framing of sexuality-based inequality (vs. control) led to greater perceptions of personal discrimination, although a trend towards this pattern emerged for the perceived ingroup discrimination index. Past research on inequality framing posits that outgroup disadvantage framing may allow dominant-group members to dissociate inequity from their self-concept more than ingroup privilege framing (which directly references the legitimacy of their group's position; Lowery et al., 2007, 2009;

Phillips & Lowery, 2015). Contrary to this idea, the results of Study 3 suggest that exposure to ingroup privilege framing of sexuality-based inequality may be less personally-threatening than disadvantage framing. Considering the trend for ingroup discrimination perceptions, it's possible that straight privilege framing activates *collective-level* threats, similar to past work with race- and class-privilege (e.g., Chow & Galak, 2012; Lowery et al., 2012). We return to this point in the general discussion.

Inequality Frame Revisited: Integrative Data Analysis

Studies 1-3 revealed mixed results regarding which inequality framing (ingroup privilege or outgroup disadvantage) elicits reports of personally-faced discrimination for one's other identities, compared with control information. To assess the evidence for an overall effect of ingroup privilege framing (as well as the effect of outgroup disadvantage framing) on perceived personally-faced discrimination, adjusting for each study's population differences, we conducted an integrative data analysis (IDA; Curran & Hussong, 2009; see Supplemental Materials for methodological details). Results of the IDA revealed that, across studies, participants exposed to ingroup privilege reported greater personally-faced discrimination, compared to those who read control information (about handedness), $B=0.23$, 95%CI [0.04, 0.43], $SE=.10$, $t(595)=2.33$, $p=.020$, $\eta_p^2=.01$. Those for whom outgroup disadvantage was salient also reported greater personally-faced discrimination compared to control participants (across studies), $B=0.51$, 95%CI [0.31, 0.70], $SE=.10$, $t(595)=5.13$, $p<.001$, $\eta_p^2=.04$. Additionally, those who read about outgroup disadvantage reported greater personally-faced discrimination than those who read about ingroup privilege, $B=0.28$, 95%CI [0.09, 0.47], $SE=.10$, $t(595)=2.88$, $p=.004$. Overall, these results suggest that exposure to inequality for dominant-group members framed as *either* ingroup privilege or outgroup disadvantage evokes greater reports of perceived discrimination

for one's other identities, but that outgroup disadvantage framing may be particularly potent (Figure 2).

Study 4

Study 4 examines if one's ingroup must be implicated as the relative advantaged group for people to respond to salient inequality with perceived discrimination for other identities. Considering inequality that does not implicate one's own ingroup (e.g., an outgroup's disadvantages in another country) should not trigger moral-image threat and the resultant reports of discrimination due to other identities. Consistent with this reasoning, in Study 4 we manipulate self-relevance of discrimination directly—straight participants read about either self-relevant inequality that invoked one's ingroup as the advantaged group (the disadvantages of being gay in America) or self-irrelevant inequality (the disadvantages of non-majority language speakers in Spain) and reported perceived discrimination both personally and at the group-level. Study 4 only incorporated outgroup disadvantage framing of inequality, as the results of the IDA revealed stronger effects of outgroup disadvantage framing than of ingroup privilege framing. We predicted that straight American participants would report that they personally and their ingroups experience more discrimination if exposed to self-relevant inequality, compared with self-irrelevant inequality.

Given that Studies 1-3 reveal that exposure to inequality in which one is advantaged leads to perceptions of personal and ingroup discrimination, Study 4 tested the potential intergroup consequences of perceiving greater self-relevant discrimination. Prior research has examined how salient ingroup discrimination may lead to either competition with other stigmatized groups or a desire to work together and form coalitions with other stigmatized groups (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2012, 2014, 2016). In Study 4, participants rated their perceptions that victimhood is a

shared or distinctive state (inclusive and exclusive victim consciousness; Vollhardt, 2015; Vollhardt, Nair, & Tropp, 2016) and their perceived commonality and expressed support for working with other stigmatized groups to reduce inequality.

Method

Participants. Three hundred and eighty-three U.S. citizens (50% female; ages: 19-73; $M_{\text{age}}=36.76$, $SD_{\text{age}}=10.97$; 26 Asian, 40 Black, 278 White, 18 Latino/a, 4 Native American/Pacific Islander, 2 Middle Eastern, and 15 Multiracial) who identified as heterosexual/straight and whose first language was English were recruited from MTurk.com in exchange for \$1. We sought to collect at least 350 participants, given that this was the sample size recommended to achieve 80% power (using the effect size of the Gay Disadvantage vs. Straight Privilege comparison for ratings of personally-faced discrimination in Study 3, $d=.31$). We used the effect size between these two conditions because Study 4 incorporated a more conservative control condition that also made inequality salient.

Materials and measures

Inequality article manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two articles detailing inequality framed as outgroup disadvantage. Those in the self-relevant condition read the same information as in Study 3 regarding the disadvantages for gay Americans, while those in the self-irrelevant condition read about the disadvantages for Non-Castellano speakers in Spain (e.g., “Non-Castellano speakers cannot speak their language in public...without fear of harassment or violence.”).

Perceived personally-faced discrimination. The same items from Study 3 were used to measure perceived personally-faced discrimination: the participant-nominated item and the checklist of discriminated identities (*race, gender, social-class, sexual orientation, physical*

disabilities, religion, age, political orientation, weight, and other) used to create the personalized personally-faced discrimination index ($\alpha=.89$).

Perceived group-based discrimination. Perceived group-based discrimination was assessed using the same measures as Study 3 (ingroup discrimination: $\alpha=.74$, outgroup discrimination: $\alpha=.69$).⁸

Perceived similarly and coalition support among stigmatized groups. Participants completed the adapted Victim Consciousness Scale (Vollhardt et al., 2016; 1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*) to measure inclusive and exclusive experiences of victimhood due to the participant-nominated discriminated identity. The measure of inclusive victim consciousness ($\alpha=.80$) used four items to assess perceived similarity between the ingroup and other stigmatized groups (e.g., “Other groups have experienced similar suffering as my group has.”). The measure of exclusive victim consciousness ($\alpha=.76$) used four items describing the tendency to perceive the ingroup as unique (e.g., “The suffering of my group is unique in history.”).

Participants also completed the adapted eight-item Oppressed Minority Subscale from the Revised Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998; 1=*strongly disagree*, 7=*strongly agree*) to measure perceived similarity with other stigmatized groups and coalitional attitudes. An exploratory factor analysis yielded two factors (using principal axis factoring with Varimax rotation; see Supplementary Materials for all items and their factor loadings). Four items assessed participants’ perceived similarity with other stigmatized groups ($\alpha=.79$; e.g., “The same forces which have led to the oppression of my group have also led to the oppression of other groups”) and four items described participants’ desire to form coalitions with other stigmatized groups ($\alpha=.86$; e.g., “My group should treat other oppressed people as allies”).

Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were assigned to read one of two articles to manipulate the salience of self-relevant inequality (Self-relevant inequality condition, Self-irrelevant inequality condition). Participants then reported their perceptions of personally-faced and group-faced discrimination as well as perceived similarity of oppressions and coalition support. Finally, participants indicated demographic information (e.g., age, income), were debriefed, and compensated.

Results

After removing 13 participants who did not nominate a discriminated-against social identity, the final sample included 370 participants (196 Self-relevant inequality condition, 174 Self-irrelevant inequality condition). See Table 3 for correlations among main dependent variables and Table 4 for descriptive statistics.

Perceptions of personally-faced discrimination. We first tested the degree to which participants reported personally-facing discrimination if exposed to self-relevant inequality. Unexpectedly and contrary to the results of Study 3, participants reading about the gay disadvantages in America (self-relevant inequality) reported similar levels of personally-faced discrimination as participants reading about the Non-Castellano speaker disadvantages in Spain (self-irrelevant inequality; participant-nominated identity: $t(367)=-.05$, $p=.957$, $d=.01$; personalized personally-faced discrimination index: $t(367)=0.05$, $p=.963$, $d=.01$).

Perceptions of group-based discrimination. We next tested if exposure to self-relevant inequality elicits greater reports of discrimination for one's ingroup than does self-irrelevant inequality. Consistent with predictions and the results of Study 3, a significant effect of condition on the ingroup discrimination index emerged, $t(243)=2.84$, $p=.005$, $d=.37$, with straight participants reading about the gay disadvantages America reporting greater discrimination faced

by their ingroups than participants reading about non-Castellano speaker disadvantages. Further similar to Study 3, there was no effect of condition on the outgroup discrimination index, $t(243)=1.38, p=.168, d=.20$, suggesting that the effect of self-relevant inequality on perceived discrimination occurs for self-relevant discrimination perceptions and not perceptions of all groups' discrimination.

Perceived similarly and coalition support among stigmatized groups. We tested if the inequality manipulation affected participants' perceptions that their experiences of discrimination were similar (inclusive) or distinctive (exclusive) to those of other stigmatized groups. No effects of condition emerged on inclusive victim consciousness, $t(368)=1.53, p=.127, d=.16$, or exclusive victim consciousness, $t(368)=0.85, p=.398, d=.09$.

Next, we tested if participants reported that their experiences of discrimination were similar to those of other stigmatized groups and if they wanted to work together with other disadvantaged groups. There was no effect of condition on similarity ratings, $t(368)=0.78, p=.435, d=.08$, but a reliable effect of condition on coalitional attitudes emerged, $t(368)=2.02, p=.044, d=.21$. Participants who read about gay disadvantages supported coalitions more than those exposed to non-Castellano speaker disadvantages. This finding suggests that perceiving ingroup discrimination after exposure to self-relevant inequality may lead to a desire to work together with other disadvantaged groups.

Discussion

The results of Study 4 indicate that salient self-relevant inequality (the disadvantages gay Americans experience relative to straight Americans among a sample of straight Americans) induces greater perceptions that one's ingroups face discrimination, compared to salient self-irrelevant inequality (the disadvantages of non-majority language speakers in Spain). This is

consistent with our theorizing that exposure to inequality relevant to one's dominant-group membership activates moral-image threat and that to alleviate such threat one may highlight discrimination faced by groups associated with the self (ingroups) in other domains. This appears unique to when one's ingroup is the dominant-group in the domain of inequality. In contrast to the quite consistent results of Studies 1-3, perceptions of personal discrimination did not vary by condition in Study 4. This departure may be sampling variation, but given this inconsistency, future work should examine when people may assert personal- and/or group-level discrimination simultaneously or independently.

Study 4 also suggests that exposure to self-relevant inequality (as opposed to self-irrelevant inequality) may spur affiliative processes as individuals expressed greater support for coalitions with other stigmatized groups. Although salient inequality in which one's group is societally-dominant enhanced both support for coalitions among stigmatized groups and perceived ingroup discrimination, the extent to which people highlighted ingroup discrimination did not correlate with support for working together with other stigmatized groups (see Table 3). Consistent with prior research indicating that advantaged group members express desires to engage in helping behaviors to signal positive collective image (Hopkins et al., 2007) and restore threatened identity (van Leeuwen, 2007), this suggests that reports of desire to become allies with other stigmatized groups may be an alternative route to alleviating threatened moral-image. More research is needed to explore this intriguing possibility.

General Discussion

The present research tested whether the salience of inequality on an advantaged dimension of identity influences perceptions that oneself personally and one's ingroups face discrimination along other dimensions of identity. Exposure to self-relevant inequality led

individuals to report that they personally (Studies 1-3) and their ingroups (Studies 3-4) face discrimination in other social dimensions. Importantly, these patterns were observed among individuals who were societally-advantaged along three domains of inequality (Study 1: race; Study 2: social-class; Studies 3-4: sexuality), highlighting the robustness and generalizability of the observed effects. Further, Studies 2-4 provided support for moral-image threat as the underlying reason *why* people may emphasize discrimination for other social identities in response to inequality. In Study 2, moral emotions (anger, guilt) served as statistical mediators of effects. Studies 3-4 revealed a boundary condition of the effect as discrimination was emphasized for groups relevant to individuals' self-concept (ingroups), but not for perceptions of discrimination for outgroups. Finally, Study 4 experimentally manipulated whether one's group was implicated as benefitting from an immoral system by comparing exposure to self-relevant inequality to self-irrelevant inequality. Taken together, this work provides evidence that people may highlight their experiences of discrimination to alleviate moral-image concerns activated in response to inequalities in which they and their group are societally-dominant.

The Impact of Inequality Framing for Different Social Domains

This research contributes to the body of work examining dominant-group members' responses to different frames of inequality. The present research revealed that exposure to outgroup disadvantage framing (vs. control) consistently led to reports of discrimination with respect to one's other identities. In contrast, ingroup privilege framing (vs. control) yielded inconsistent results depending on the study. One possible reason for differences in how the ingroup privilege and outgroup disadvantage framing influenced perceptions of discrimination across studies is that different studies focused on different dimensions of social inequality. In Studies 1-2, ingroup privilege framing of *racial* and *social-class* inequality led individuals to

report that they personally-faced discrimination in other social domains (albeit marginally in Study 2). These results are aligned with work finding that privilege framing leads people to react defensively, as it directly references the illegitimacy of one's position due to dominant-group membership (Lowery et al., 2007, 2009; Phillips & Lowery, 2015). Conversely, in Study 3, the ingroup privilege framing of *sexuality-based* inequality did not affect perceptions of personally-experienced discrimination for other identities differently than control information (although a trend emerged for perceived ingroup discrimination). Consequently, different framings of inequality (ingroup privilege vs. outgroup disadvantage) may be viewed differently depending on the social domain (e.g., race, sexuality).

The privilege framing primes used in the present work included common examples of privileges taken from newspaper articles and advocacy platforms and these instances of racial, class, and sexuality privileges may be perceived differently. Racial or class privileges may be viewed as more illegitimate (activating greater personal-moral threat) than sexuality privileges. For example, whereas racial privilege may be perceived as Whites gaining undeserved resources (e.g., Whites receiving higher salaries than equally-qualified Black Americans; see Lowery et al., 2012), sexuality-based privilege may be perceived as straight people living at the equity standard—not receiving more than they deserve, but receiving what everyone deserves (e.g., the right to live without harassment). Thus, when considering how straight people can show affection in public, the focus may not be on what straight people illegitimately acquire, but on what rights should also be granted to the LGBT community. This explanation remains speculative from the current data, but these findings underscore the need for future work testing across multiple forms of inequality.

Moral-image Emotions & Action Tendencies

In the present research (Study 2), highlighting personal discrimination in response to ingroup privilege framing was statistically mediated by both moral emotions of guilt and anger, whereas highlighting discrimination in response to outgroup disadvantage framing was mediated by anger alone. This is aligned with prior work on inequality exposure and moral emotions (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006), but we did not specify the target of the emotion, leaving some ambiguity as to whether moral anger was directed towards the ingroup for being responsible for disadvantage (i.e., self-focused anger; Leach et al., 2006) and/or towards the moral injustices that the outgroup experiences (i.e., moral outrage; Thomas et al., 2009). Both self-focused anger and moral outrage has been shown to drive collective action meant to rectify injustice (Iyer et al., 2007; Thomas et al., 2009), which is consistent with the finding from Study 4 in which exposure to self-relevant outgroup disadvantage promotes support for coalitions among disadvantaged groups to address inequality. Future work is needed to disambiguate the targets of these emotions to further clarify the types of action strategies people may engage in to rectify injustice (e.g., confront the ingroup or a third-party).

Competition or Affiliation?

Research examining competitive victimhood reveals that people can emphasize that their ingroup suffers *more* than the harmed outgroup (within the same identity domain) as a method to restore moral identity (Sullivan et al., 2012). Our studies revealed a different pattern of results in which people highlighted discrimination faced in *another* identity domain but did not claim more discrimination than the harmed outgroup after exposure to inequality (see supplemental materials for these analyses). Competitive victimhood processes typically are spurred in more explicitly competitive contexts (e.g., men read about women as victims of discrimination *intentionally* perpetrated by men; Sullivan et al., 2012), potentially accounting for this discrepancy in findings.

The inequality information utilized as stimuli in the present studies included information about group disadvantages (or privileges) but did not explicitly indicate intergroup competition or an intentional perpetrating role of the societally-dominant-group. While individuals in the present studies reacted with moral-image threat, perceived intentionality may play a role in guiding whether the perceived victimhood driven by this threat yields competitive or affiliative outcomes.

Constraints on Generality

Our findings demonstrate that the salience of inequality on an advantaged dimension of identity (particularly framed by focusing on outgroup disadvantage) leads to greater reports that one and one's ingroups face discrimination in other personally-relevant identity domains. Although our studies only utilized article primes to manipulate inequality salience, we would expect studies using other materials (e.g., podcasts, videos) to produce similar effects, assuming these materials conveyed information about self-relevant inequality and effectively made inequality salient. Given that the present studies employed participants from both online convenience samples and an undergraduate sample, we would expect our results to generalize to additional U.S. populations. We consider it likely that historical context plays a role in these observed effects, as the inequalities in the domains tested (i.e., race, class, and sexuality) are current topics of national concern. If these inequalities are viewed as more legitimate or less prevalent, then one may not observe the same effects. Indeed, it's possible that the lack of strong evidence that sexuality-based privilege information elicits perceived discrimination (compared with race or class privileges) may be due to differences in perceived illegitimacy of sexuality privilege and race/class privilege. We have no reason to believe that the results depend on other characteristics of the participants, materials, or context.

Conclusion

The present research reveals that individuals advantaged along different types of inequality (race, social-class, sexuality) respond to information about that inequality with reports of facing discrimination along alternative dimensions of identity. Examining which of our many social identities we highlight and what happens after we highlight them is a vital next step in understanding intergroup dynamics in the face of multiple forms of pervasive inequality. Considering one's own experiences with discrimination may eventually lead to acts of solidarity, as in the case of Megan Rapinoe kneeling during the national anthem to combat racial injustice. However, another possible response to the salience of one's own victimization may be perceived moral entitlement and selfish behavior (e.g., Zitek et al., 2010) as one prioritizes one's own group's concerns. Thus, understanding how people respond to inequality along multiple dimensions requires consideration of people's experiences with their own multitude of social identities.

Footnotes

¹For all studies, see supplemental materials for results for perceived discrimination due to participants' societally-dominant identity referenced in the manipulation.

²Racial minority participants were filtered into a different experiment.

³Participants completed exploratory items assessing identity and policy preferences.

⁴Attention check questions were included in all studies. Findings do not meaningfully differ (in terms of statistical significance) if excluding participants who failed checks.

⁵Participants also indicated their happiness, distress, and sympathy.

⁶Cronbach's alpha calculated in R:psych-package using pairwise deletion (instead of listwise deletion) of missing data.

⁷We did not include gender in the ingroup and outgroup indices because these questions specified straight women and straight men, which complicates the interpretation given the sexuality-inequality manipulation. Findings remain consistent if the relevant gender (and sexuality) items are included in ingroup and outgroup indices.

⁸We asked for perceived discrimination faced by *gay men* and *lesbians*, and also *non-Castellano speakers* (Study 4) as manipulation checks. See supplement for analyses.

⁹If excluding societally-dominant-groups (Whites, upper-class, Christians) in the outgroup discrimination index all effects remain non-significant.

¹⁰Participants completed exploratory items including perceived personal and group-based advantages and explicit identity items.

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Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for Participants' Personally-faced Discrimination for Study 1 and 2 by Inequality Salience Condition

Study	Study 1						Study 2					
Condition	White Privilege		Black Disadvantage		Control		Upper-class Privilege		Lower-class Disadvantage		Control	
	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>
Personally-faced discrimination (other identities)	3.33 _a [2.76, 3.89]	2.03	3.40 _a [2.80, 4.00]	2.09	2.40 _b [1.88, 2.92]	1.64	3.01 [2.59, 3.44]	1.60	3.48 _a [3.06, 3.90]	1.63	2.44 _b [2.02, 2.88]	1.31
Guilt	--	--	--	--	--	--	2.28 _a [1.91, 2.65]	1.34	2.24 _a [1.87, 2.60]	1.45	1.61 _b [1.24, 1.98]	1.13
Anger	--	--	--	--	--	--	2.82 _a [2.40, 3.24]	1.56	3.08 _a [2.66, 3.50]	1.73	1.71 _b [1.29, 2.14]	1.19

Note. Means with different subscripts indicate significant differences at $p < .05$.

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics for Participants' Perceived Discrimination for Study 3 by Inequality Salience Condition

Condition	Straight Privilege		Gay Disadvantage		Control	
	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>
Participant-nominated discrimination	5.31 [4.88, 5.75]	2.23	6.21 [5.73, 6.69]	2.48	5.19 [4.76, 5.61]	2.10
Personally-faced discrimination	5.48 [5.06, 5.89]	2.12	6.61 [6.18, 7.03]	2.18	5.21 [4.77, 5.65]	2.11
Ingroup discrimination	6.23 [5.57, 6.88]	2.60	6.54 [5.89, 7.18]	2.72	5.41 [4.83, 6.00]	2.46
Outgroup discrimination	5.35 [4.72, 5.98]	2.49	5.18 [4.62, 5.74]	2.37	4.68 [4.12, 5.23]	2.32

Table 3

Correlations between measures in Study 3 and 4

Study	Study 3				Study 4				
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	5
1. Participant-nominated discrimination	--				--				
2. Personally-faced discrimination	.62***	--			.73***	--			
3. Ingroup discrimination	.25***	.45***	--		.31***	.45***	--		
4. Outgroup discrimination	.12 [†]	.20**	-.07	--	.11 [†]	.08	-.11 [†]	--	
5. Coalitional attitudes	--	--	--	--	.09 [†]	.03	.05	.11 [†]	--

Note. [†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics for Participants' Primary Outcome Measures for Study 4 by Inequality Salience Condition

Condition	Gay Disadvantage		Non-Castellano Speaker Disadvantage	
	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i> [95% <i>CI</i>]	<i>SD</i>
Participant-nominated discrimination	5.61 [5.30, 5.91]	2.15	5.59 [5.29, 5.90]	2.04
Personally-faced discrimination	5.88 [5.58, 6.18]	2.13	5.87 [5.55, 6.19]	2.15
Ingroup discrimination	6.66 [6.20, 7.11]	2.52	5.71 [5.23, 6.18]	2.73
Outgroup discrimination	4.69 [4.27, 5.11]	2.42	5.11 [4.69, 5.53]	2.32
Inclusive victim consciousness	4.87 [4.71, 5.03]	1.15	4.69 [4.51, 4.86]	1.17
Exclusive victim consciousness	3.31 [3.12, 3.51]	1.38	3.20 [3.01, 3.38]	1.23
Similarity ratings	4.98 [4.80, 5.15]	1.23	4.88 [4.70, 5.06]	1.20
Coalitional attitudes	5.14 [4.96, 5.32]	1.27	4.87 [4.68, 5.06]	1.27

Figure 1a. Process model of the indirect effect of experimental condition (outgroup disadvantage vs. control condition) on perceived discrimination for other social identities via guilt and anger (with 10,000 bootstrap samples). Significant effects are represented by solid arrows, whereas non-significant effects are represented by dashed arrows. The values in parentheses represent the total effects prior to the inclusion of the mediators. *Notes.* $^{\dagger}p < .10$, $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$, $***p < .001$.

Figure 1b. Process model of the indirect effect of experimental condition (ingroup privilege vs. control condition) on perceived discrimination for other social identities via guilt and anger (with 10,000 bootstrap samples). The values in parentheses represent the total effects prior to the inclusion of the mediators. *Notes.* [†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure 2: Perceived discrimination ratings by experimental condition (ingroup privilege frame, outgroup disadvantage frame, and control) for Studies 1-3. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.