**Faustian bargain: Exploring the role of monetary value amount in moral judgment and decision difficulty
using taboo trade-off narratives**

Yalda Daryani (corresponding author, email: yaladaryani@gmail.com)

University of Tehran, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Tehran, Iran

ORCID: 0000-0002-6463-9845

Yaser Tedadi (y.tedadi@ut.ac.ir/mahvid.bb@gmail.com)

University of Tehran, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Tehran, Iran

ORCID: 0000-0002-6565-3163

Javad Hatami (hatamijm@ut.ac.ir/hatamijm@gmail.com)

University of Tehran, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Tehran, Iran

ORCID: 0000-0002-6036-1487

Abstract

Sacred values play a significant role in moral judgment and perceived decision difficulty. This study aimed to examine whether the worth of the monetary value in taboo trade-off situations (i.e., trading a sacred value with a secular value) can have an impact on moral cleansing, perceived decision difficulty, moral outrage and punitive-interpersonal stance. We recruited a total of 312 undergraduate students and randomly assigned them into three groups: "trade-off with high monetary value," "trade-off with low monetary value," and the "control group." In the two experimental groups, participants read scenarios in which the protagonists engaged in taboo trade-offs. While in the control group, we presented routine trade-off scenarios (i.e., secular value vs. secular value). Next, moral outrage and punitive-interpersonal stance index, moral cleansing measure, and decision difficulty measure were presented. Current findings indicated that participants in trade-offs with high monetary value expressed less moral outrage, were less likely to engage in moral cleansing acts, and perceived the decision more difficult. The results suggest that taboo trade-off is more morally acceptable and less outrageous when the obtained secular value is considerable. Also, the decision is perceived as more difficult in this situation.

Keywords: Sacred values, taboo trade-off, moral judgment, moral cleansing, decision difficulty

Sacred values are defined as values that are non-negotiable and go beyond the cost-benefit logic of rational choice models (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, 2003; Atran & Ginges, 2012). These values are believed to be closely tied to national and cultural identities, justice, and honor and are considered absolute and inviolable (Tetlock et al., 2000, Tanner & Medin, 2004). However, further studies have shown how scarcity of resources leads to trading sacred values (Tetlock, 2003). Although people exhibit moral outrage to sacred value trade-offs, they constantly find themselves in real-life situations that make these trade-offs inevitable. Tetlock (2003) has introduced two types of trade-offs. The taboo trade-off is a situation in which the person has to choose between a sacred value and a secular value (e.g., saving a patient's life vs. spending money on better equipment). Conversely, the tragic trade-off is a situation in which the person has to choose one of the two sacred values (saving person's A life vs. saving person's B life). It has also been revealed that when people find themselves in a situation of tragic trade-off, they perceive the decision-making task as more stressful and more difficult. On the contrary, when the situation only involves one sacred value (taboo trade-off), people perceive the task of decision-making to be easier (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008).

Sacred values have been the subject of various domains of psychological research. Studies in social cognition suggest that sacred values play a crucial role in decision-making on a social level. Studies have shown that sacred values are responsible for enduring complex conflicts such as sovereignty over Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank (Ginges, 2007; Rozin & Wolf, 2008). Insensitivity to quantity and calculation of cost and benefit (Baron & Spranca, 1997; Ritov & Baron, 1999; Tanner and Medin, 2004), resistance to taboo trade-off (Tetlock, 2003; Atran, Axelrod & Davis, 2007; Ginges & Atran, 2009; Sachdeva & Medin, 2009), and non-instrumental decision making (Ginges, Atran, Medin & Shikaki, 2007) are concepts to which sacred values are intimately tied.

Despite the critical role of sacred values in multiple levels of decision making, human emotions, and the unavoidable nature of taboo trade-offs in daily life, there are still significant gaps in the research in this area. Namely, no research has investigated whether the monetary worth would affect moral judgment, decision difficulty, and moral cleansing in the setting of taboo trade-offs. Focusing on taboo trade-offs, the present research aims to answer the previous question. We hypothesized that in taboo trade-offs when the sacred value is traded with a high monetary value, 1) people express less moral outrage 2) people perceive the decision to be more difficult 3) people engage less in the act of moral cleansing.

We based our work on three research frameworks. Mainly our hypotheses were based on rational choice theory. This theory has achieved a prominent place among the current psychological theories, as evident by the number of articles

dedicated to examining its hypotheses and applications. Rational choice theory illustrates a rational individual as someone who sets a goal and some options to achieve the goal. This person is guided by the maximum personal utility and the simple principle of cost-benefit (Radovanović, 2019). In this framework, it can be assumed that when people gain more benefits (such as money) in sacrificing a taboo trade-off, they find this trade-off more acceptable and thus express less moral outrage. To assess moral judgment and moral cleansing, we base our work on the sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000). The general assertion of the sacred value protection model (SVPM) is that when people feel their sacred values are being morally contaminated by secular assault, they use impure thoughts and deeds as shelters to protect their private selves and social identity and express moral outrage. Moral cleansing, one of the propositions of the SVPM, predicts that merely contemplating scenarios that violate the psychological border between secular and sacred can lead the decision-maker to symbolic acts of moral cleansing (e.g., donating to a charity) that reaffirms their unity with the moral community. Finally, we relied on the thick body of literature on decision difficulty. According to normative theories of decision making, decision making is a process that involves trade-offs between the values and all types of values can be negotiated to reach a selection that maximizes subjective utility (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). However, further studies have shown that some decision-making tasks are viewed as negatively emotion-laden and difficult; therefore, individuals tend to avoid them (Anderson, 2003). Specifically, Hanselmann & Tanner (2008) illustrated that people perceive the decision task as easier when one option has moral aspects. They revealed that when the decision situations involve two sacred values (i.e., tragic trade-off), people perceive the decision task as more difficult than the situation involving only one sacred value (i.e., taboo trade-off). We believe that the monetary worth of the value being traded with a sacred value can affect the perceived decision difficulty. People are expected to judge decisions of taboo trade-offs involving high monetary value as more difficult since the conflict between the personal gain and sacred value is more salient in this condition. On the other hand, when the sacred value is being attacked by the low amount of money, the decision should be perceived as easier considering that the personal profit is modest in this situation and the conflict is less salient for the decision-maker.

In the present research, we defined two experimental conditions. Participants were given scenarios in which the protagonists engaged in a taboo trade-off situation. In the first experimental condition, the protagonists trade the sacred values with a high amount of money. In contrast, they trade the sacred value with a low amount of secular values in the second condition. We predicted that in the high monetary value situations, the participants would express less moral outrage, engage less in the act of moral cleansing, and perceive the decision as more difficult.

Method

Participants and design

A sample of 312 undergraduates was recruited from the University of Tehran community. The sample consisted of 137 male participants ($M = 22.52$, $SD = 4.43$) and 175 female participants ($M = 22.93$, $SD = 5.64$). Subjects gave informed consent prior to entering the experiment and received a discount book coupon for their participation.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three groups. In the first experimental group, subjects were provided with three scenarios in which the protagonist traded a sacred value with a high monetary value. While in the second group, the protagonist traded the sacred value in return for a low monetary value. In the control group, the protagonist had to decide between two secular values (routine trade-off). To study the dependent variables, participants were given some questions regarding moral outrage, punitive-interpersonal stance, moral cleansing, and decision difficulty after reading each scenario. We used the scenarios of the research conducted by Tetlock (2000) in our study. For instance, the first scenario in the first experimental group was as follows:

"Moein is the financial manager of a big company. He is in charge of organizing the financial and human resources and has to make important decisions regarding the patients and the financial status of the hospital. One of the situations in which Moein had to make a decision is as follows:

Moein can save the life of Arian, a five-year-old boy who needs a liver transplant. However, the transplant procedure costs the hospital One billion Tomans. This money can be spent on new facilities of the hospital or hiring more professional doctors. Moein can decide to spend the money on Arian's transplant or on improving the hospital. Finally, he decides to dedicate the money to the hospital."

The mere difference that was made in the second experimental group was to lower the monetary value from One billion to 100 million Tomans. Finally, in the first scenario of the control group, the protagonist had to decide between spending the money on improving the hospital's cafe or the hospital's guestroom.

Measures and Materials

In each group, three sets of scenarios were presented to the participants. All the scenarios in the experimental groups revolved around taboo trade-offs. Meanwhile, the scenarios in the control group illustrated routine trade-off situations. In the first group, the trade-offs were made in exchange for a high amount of money, whereas the monetary values in the scenarios of the second group were low. Other parts of the scenarios were kept constant between the groups. Scenarios were taken from Tetlock's (2000) study.

All participants completed the following self-report measures after reading each scenario.

Moral outrage and punitive-interpersonal stance index. Constructed by Tetlock (2000), the index consists of two factors: an Outrage factor (rating the protagonist's decision using 7-point scales on good-bad, wise-foolish, positive-negative, and moral-immoral) and a Punitive Stance factor (to what extent on a 7-point scale do the participants believe the protagonist should be dismissed from job, be punished, and unfriended). Both the Moral-Outrage and the Interpersonal-Punitiveness Scales showed good reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha = .96$ and $.73$ respectively) and were positively correlated ($r = .63$) (Tetlock, 2000).

Moral cleansing measure. According to Tetlock (2000), we asked participants (using a 7-point scale) whether they were willing to donate to a charity after reading each scenario. The purposes of the charities were related to the subjects of the scenarios. Previous studies (Tetlock, 2000) have shown that responses to moral cleansing questions have a positive correlation with moral outrage ($r(228) = .21, p < .01$).

Decision difficulty measure. We used the decision difficulty question designed by Hanselmann & Tanner (2008) to assess the perceived decision difficulty on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very easy) to 7 (very difficult).

Procedure

The experiment took place at the cognitive laboratory of the University of Tehran. Each participant completed a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that contained three scenarios. Materials were written in Persian. All items of Moral outrage and punitive-interpersonal stance index were translated into Persian using the standard back-translation technique (Brislin, 1970). In the two experimental groups, subjects were provided with taboo trade-off scenarios, while in the control group, routine trade-off scenarios were used. Participants were debriefed upon completion of the task.

Result

One-way MANOVA was conducted to analyze the data. We found a statistically significant difference in moral judgment based on the amount of money in the trade-off between the three group in all dependent variables, $F(8, 612) = 172.97, p < .0001$, partial $\eta^2 = .71$. Tests of between subject effects showed that the amount of the monetary value in taboo trade-off has a statistically significant effect on moral cleansing, $F(2, 309) = 118.60, p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .434$, decision difficulty, $F(2, 309) = 215.70, p < .001$; partial $\eta^2 = .51$, moral outrage, $F(2, 309) = 266.87, p < .001$; partial $\eta^2 = .78$, and punitive-interpersonal stance, $F(2, 309) = 222.14, p < .001$; partial $\eta^2 = .693$ (see table 2).

Next, we used Tukey's HSD post-hoc test for multiple comparisons (see table 3). Mean scores of moral cleansing were significantly higher in the high and the control group than in the low group, $p < .001$) and lower in the low group than in the control group, $p < .001$. However, no significant difference was shown between high and control group, $p = .130$. High group had significantly higher mean scores in decision difficulty compared to low and control group, $p < .001$. There was no significant difference between the low and the control group in the perceived decision difficulty, $p = .131$. We found a significant difference between all three groups in the moral outrage variable. Mean scores of the high group are significantly lower than the low group and higher than the control group, $p < .001$. The high and the low group have obtained significantly higher means in this variable than the control group. Finally, participants in the high group had significantly higher means scores than the low group, $p < .001$ in the punitive-interpersonal stance.

Also, we considered investigating the correlations between the dependent variables. The correlations between moral cleansing and decision difficulty, moral outrage, and punitive-interpersonal stance are $-.003$, $-.767$, and $.779$, respectively. The correlation between decision difficulty and moral outrage was $-.177$, and the correlation between decision difficulty and punitive-interpersonal stance was $.250$. Also, the correlation between moral outrage and punitive-interpersonal stance is equal to $-.919$. Except for the relationship between moral cleansing and decision difficulty, all other relationships were significant (see table 4).

Table 1: Means and standard deviations of DVs based on levels of the IV

Variables	Low (n = 105)		High (n = 102)		Control (n = 105)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Moral Cleansing	2.21	.699	4.51	1.45	4.88	1.71
Decision Difficulty	3.05	1.31	5.39	.764	2.74	1.28
Moral Outrage	5.31	.577	2.98	.920	2.25	.487
Punitive-Interpersonal Stance	2.82	.845	5.10	.879	5.53	.654

Fig. 1 Scaled means for DVs based on IV categories ($n = 312$)

Table 2: Between subject effects for DVs ($df = 2$)

Variables	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Moral Cleansing	219.33	118.60	.001	.434
Decision Difficulty	215.70	161.86	.001	.512
Moral Outrage	266.87	569.29	.001	.787
Punitive-Interpersonal Stance	222.14	348.45	.001	.693

Table 3: Tukey's HSD post-hoc test results

Variables	(I) group	(J) group	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
	high	low	2.30	.189	.001

Moral Cleansing		control	-.366	.189	.130
	low	control	-2.66	.187	.001
Decision Difficulty	high	low	2.33	.160	.001
		control	2.64	.160	.001
	low	control	.307	.159	.131
Moral Outrage	high	low	-2.32	.095	.001
		control	.733	.095	.001
	low	control	3.05	.094	.001
Punitive- Interpersonal Stance	high	low	2.28	.111	.001
		control	-.424	.111	.001
	low	control	-2.70	.110	.001

Table 4: Matrix of correlations between dependent variables

	Moral Cleansing	Decision Difficulty	Moral Outrage	Punitive- Interpersonal Stance
Moral Cleansing	1			
Decision Difficulty	-.003	1		
Moral Outrage	-.767**	-.177**	1	
Punitive Instance	.779**	.250**	-.919**	1

** p < .01

Discussion

The present research helps to clarify how the monetary value amount in taboo trade-off can affect moral judgment and perceived decision difficulty. We found that people express more moral outrage when the sacred value is traded with a low amount of money and are more willing to agree that the protagonist should be punished. On the other hand, trading sacred values with a high amount of money triggers less moral outrage. Second, we observed that participants are more willing to engage in moral cleansing when reading scenarios containing trading a sacred value with a low amount of money compared to the situation in which the sacred value is traded with high monetary worth. Third, the perceived decision difficulty varies in response to the amount of the monetary value in the trade-off. Compared to the situation in which the sacred value is traded with a high amount of money, decisions were perceived as easier when

the trade-off involved a low amount of money. Conversely, these decisions were perceived as more difficult when they involved a high amount of money.

The main findings of our study could be explained in the framework of rational choice theory and the Sacred Value Protection Model (SVP). SVP asserts that observing other individuals trading sacred values triggers an aversive arousal stage called moral outrage. Based on this model, people find trade-offs between secular values such as money and sacred values such as love, justice, honesty, and human lives cognitively confusing and morally disturbing (Tetlock, 2003). However, these trade-offs are inevitable in the real world. For example, many hospitals experience a lack of facilities in times of a pandemic and the staff should decide which patient should get the last ventilator. We discovered that trading sacred value with a high monetary worth triggers less moral outrage than trading it with a low amount of money. This can be explained by the principles of rational choice theory (Scott, 2000). In the situation of trading a sacred value with a considerable amount of money, individuals do a simple calculation of how much they gain a personal benefit. As in this condition, when they achieve more personal gain, they tend to express less moral outrage and show more disagreement with the punishment of the protagonist. Conversely, trading sacred values with a low amount of money causes more cognitive and moral disturbance. Therefore, they exhibit more moral outrage. The finding that the inclination to take part in a moral cleansing act is less in the high monetary value condition indicates that taboo trade-off is more morally acceptable and less outrageous when the obtained secular value is with a considerable amount. This notion was supported by our findings that the acts of the protagonists were rated as less morally outrageous in high monetary value conditions and the participants were less likely to consider them for punishment. Based on Tetlock's (2003) *mere contemplation* assumption, feelings of distress and disturbance that are elicited when the sacred value is traded-off lead the individuals towards the act of moral cleansing. Given this statement, we can deduce that when the taboo trade-off involves a high amount of money, less negative emotions are experienced. This is in line with research suggesting an informational role for emotions in decision making (Finucane et al., 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 2008).

In literature, values are defined as types of beliefs that lead us to behavior consistent with them (Bradi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2005). For instance, if the value of justice matters to us, we tend to perform fairly when the opportunity arises and acting unfairly would be more difficult. In other words, values affect our decision-making in trade-offs (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005). In the context of value conflict, values influence the process of decision-making and can increase decision difficulty. Previous research has shown that the only factor influencing decision difficulty in the context of value conflict is the number of the sacred values involved in the options. Hanselmann & Tanner (2008) showed that decision making is perceived as more difficult in tragic trade-offs than in taboo trade-offs. However, we discovered that the monetary worth of the value with which the sacred value is traded could determine the decision difficulty. Our findings on how perceived decision difficulty varies between the high and low monetary value conditions suggest that taboo trade-offs involving a low amount of money trigger more non-compensatory decisions strategies and sacred values are considered sufficient reasons for preferring one choice over another. Studies in the field of decision-making propose that taboo scenarios trigger affective responses and intuitive rather than deliberative processes are responsible for moral judgment (Haidt, 2001; Sunstein, 2005; Lichtenstein, 2007). It is possible that a trade-off with a low amount of money is intuitive, effortless, and involves emotional processes, whereas a trade-off with a high amount of money engages deliberative, effortful, and logical processes. Further, findings from cognitive neuroscience support the existence of simultaneous affective and reasoning processes in moral judgment (Greene & Haidt, 2002).

Future research is needed to unravel the underlying processes in moral judgment and decision making in taboo trade-offs. Recent studies in the field of neuroscience have investigated the neural representations of sacred values (Berns et al., 2012), neural correlates underlying the response to sacred values in narratives (Kaplan et al., 2017), and brain activities when the individuals are willing to fight and die for sacred values (Hamid et al., 2019). Similar research can uncover the brain activities in taboo trade-offs when a high amount and low amount of money is involved. This can lead to a more profound understanding of deliberate and intuitive processes of judgment and decision making. Another

line of research will be assessing the role of emotions in moral judgment and perceived decision difficulty of taboo trade-off scenarios. Research has shown taboo trade-offs elicit strong emotions (Ginges et al., 2007; Lichtenstein et al., 2007; Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). Further research can clarify whether there is a difference in the intensity rate of experienced negative emotions when the trade-off includes a high amount of money rather than a low amount of money. Finally, replicating this study with bigger sample sizes would help bolster the results we found in this research.

Conclusion

Previous work has found that compromising sacred values causes moral outrage, more agreement to punishment, engagement in moral cleansing, and decision difficulty. However, studying the variation of these factors based on situation and personal gain had been neglected. We observed that trading sacred values with a high amount of money elicits less moral outrage and agreement to punishment, yet the decision is perceived as more difficult. Also, when participants witness the mentioned condition, they are less likely to engage in moral cleansing. These findings offer crucial implications for the critical role of values and value systems in both theoretical and applied realms of decision making. For instance, research has shown that sacred values play a major role in long-lasting political conflicts (Atran et al., 2007; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Understanding the mechanisms and details of this influence would result in more efficient applied interventions. By introducing the role of the monetary value amount in the taboo trade-off, we believe that our work contributes significantly to the growing body of research on sacred values, moral judgment, and decision-making. It is imperative that future research investigates factors that influence judgment and decision-making when individuals encounter decisions that involve one sacred value and decisions that involve two or more sacred values.

References

- Anderson, C. J. (2003). The psychology of doing nothing: forms of decision avoidance result from reason and emotion. *Psychological bulletin*, 129(1), 139. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.139>
- Atran, S., & Ginges, J. (2012). Religious and sacred imperatives in human conflict. *Science*, 336(6083), 855-857. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1216902>
- Atran, Scott, Robert Axelrod, and Richard Davis. "Sacred barriers to conflict resolution." *Science* 317 (2007): 1039-1040. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1144241>
- Bardi, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Values and behavior: Strength and structure of relations. *Personality and social psychology bulletin*, 29(10), 1207-1220. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167203254602>
- Baron, J., & Spranca, M. (1997). Protected values. *Organizational behavior and human decision processes*, 70(1), 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1997.2690>
- Berns, G. S., Bell, E., Capra, C. M., Prietula, M. J., Moore, S., Anderson, B., ... & Atran, S. (2012). The price of your soul: neural evidence for the non-utilitarian representation of sacred values. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 367(1589), 754-762. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2011.0262>
- Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., & Johnson, S. M. (2000). The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits. *Journal of behavioral decision making*, 13(1), 1-17. [https://doi.org/10.1002/\(sici\)1099-0771\(200001/03\)13:1<1::aid-bdm333>3.0.co;2-s](https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::aid-bdm333>3.0.co;2-s)
- Ginges, J., & Atran, S. (2009). What motivates participation in violent political action. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1167(1), 115-123. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04543.x>

- Ginges, J., Atran, S., Medin, D., & Shikaki, K. (2007). Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conflict. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 104(18), 7357-7360. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701768104>
- Gómez, Á., López-Rodríguez, L., Sheikh, H., Ginges, J., Wilson, L., Waziri, H., ... & Atran, S. (2017). The devoted actor's will to fight and the spiritual dimension of human conflict. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 1(9), 673. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0193-3>
- Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002). How (and where) does moral judgment work?. *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 6(12), 517-523. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613\(02\)02011-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(02)02011-9)
- Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. *Psychological review*, 108(4), 814. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814>
- Hamid, N., Pretus, C., Atran, S., Crockett, M. J., Ginges, J., Sheikh, H., ... & Vilarroya, O. (2019). Neuroimaging 'will to fight' for sacred values: an empirical case study with supporters of an Al Qaeda associate. *Royal Society open science*, 6(6), 181585. <https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.181585>
- Hanselmann, M., & Tanner, C. (2008). Taboos and conflicts in decision making: Sacred values, decision difficulty, and emotions. *Judgment and Decision making*, 3(1), 51-63. <https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-5948>
- Kaplan, J. T., Gimbel, S. I., Dehghani, M., Immordino-Yang, M. H., Sagae, K., Wong, J. D., ... & Damasio, A. (2016). Processing narratives concerning protected values: A cross-cultural investigation of neural correlates. *Cerebral Cortex*, 27(2), 1428-1438. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhv325>
- Keeney, R. L., & Raiffa, H. (1976). *Decisions with multiple objectives: Preferences and value tradeoffs* John Wiley & Sons New York. <https://doi.org/10.1109/tsmc.1979.4310245>
- Kruglanski, A. W., & Stroebe, W. (2005). The influence of beliefs and goals on attitudes .In D. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson, & M. T. Zanna (Eds.), *Handbook of attitudes*(pp. 323–368). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edh109>
- Lichtenstein, S., Gregory, R., & Irwin, J. (2007). What's bad is easy: Taboo values, affect, and cognition. <http://hdl.handle.net/1794/22040>
- Radovanović, B. (2019). Rational choice theory and charitable giving. *Социолошки преглед*, 53(2), 445-466. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5937%2Fsocpreg53-19679>
- Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1999). Protected values and omission bias. *Organizational behavior and human decision processes*, 79(2), 79-94. <https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1999.2839>
- Rozin, P., & Wolf, S. (2008). Attachment to land: The case of the land of Israel for American and Israeli Jews and the role of contagion. *Judgment and Decision Making*, 3(4), 325.
- Sachdeva, S., & Medin, D. (2009). Group identity salience in sacred value based cultural conflict: An examination of the Hindu-Muslim identities in the Kashmir and Babri Mosque issues. In *the Proceedings of the 31th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci)*.
- Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). Sinning saints and saintly sinners: The paradox of moral self-regulation. *Psychological science*, 20(4), 523-528. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02326.x>
- Schwartz, S. H. (2005). Robustness and fruitfulness of a theory of universals in individual values. *Valores e trabalho*, 56-85.

- Scott, J. (2000). Rational choice theory. *Understanding contemporary society: Theories of the present*, 129, 671-85. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446218310.n9>
- Sunstein, C. R. (2005). Moral heuristics. *Behavioral and brain sciences*, 28(4), 531-541. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X0534009X>
- Tanner, C., & Medin, D. L. (2004). Protected values: No omission bias and no framing effects. *Psychonomic bulletin & review*, 11(1), 185-191. <https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03206481>
- Tetlock, P. E. (2003). Thinking the unthinkable: Sacred values and taboo cognitions. *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 7(7), 320-324. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613\(03\)00135-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00135-9)
- Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Green, M. C., & Lerner, J. S. (2000). The psychology of the unthinkable: taboo trade-offs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 78(5), 853. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.853>
- Zeelenberg, M., Nelissen, R. M., Breugelmans, S. M., & Pieters, R. (2008). On emotion specificity in decision making: Why feeling is for doing. *Judgment and Decision making*, 3(1), 18.